


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Navya Nyāya System of Logic

NAVYA NYĀYA SYSTEM OF LOGIC

(*Basic Theories & Techniques*)

DINESH CHANDRA GUHA

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi :: Varanasi :: Patna

FOREWORD

Dr. Dinesha Chandra Guha has spent years in intensive study of the *Navya Nyāya* classics. He has written this book to make the subtleties of this discipline intelligible to modern students. It is the considered opinion of veteran professors and students of *Navya Nyāya* that the terminological devices cannot be translated into another idiom.

But Dr. Ingalls' pioneer work has gone a long way in proving that this idea is not infallible. Dr. Guha has got down to brass tacks and has explained the terminologies in a lucid language. Such a work has been a long-felt desideratum.

The works of *Navya Nyāya* produced by scholars of Mithilā and Bengal have special importance for students of Indian logic. But the precise modes of expression and subtle analysis of the meanings of words have been exploited by writers of serious works in Sanskrit on every subject during the 18th and 19th centuries. So an advanced student of Sanskrit Grammar, Politics and other Schools of Philosophy is confronted with the formidable array of *Navya Nyāya* terminology. He can do justice to these authors only by understanding the new style of thought and expression forged by the neo-logicians. A knowledge of the techniques has become an imperative equipment.

Dr. Guha's work will go a long way in eliminating this hurdle in the way of students of Sanskrit in modern Universities. I unhesitatingly recommend this book to students of Philosophy and Indian Philosophy in particular. By mastering the technological devices and *cliches* they will not be scared away by the bugbear of the barrage of words used by professional Pandits to sneak out of a difficult situation. The author should be encouraged by the different Universities and Libraries by the acquisition of this book.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

A Western philosopher with whom I used to argue once expressed a prejudice in somewhat the following terms: "The Indians", he said, "were never really interested in philosophy. They were interested in religion. Their philosophy always leads to a religious or mystical goal, which is all very fine, I dare say, but it is not what I call philosophy; it is not at all the sort of things that I am interested in." He admitted that his knowledge of the subject was limited to translations of religious texts and to selections from Buddhist and Vedānta idealism, and he agreed to read any two books I should give him before reasserting his judgment. I gave him two translations of Navya-nyāya texts. Actually, they were the only translations of Navya-nyāya available at that time. My philosopher had hard work of it but persevered, until one day he said, "I admit I was hasty. Your Navya-nyāya is talking about problems of philosophy all right, problems that interest me greatly. My only trouble now is that I find their talk so difficult to understand."

The anecdote points to a common misconception. Even Indians nowadays for the most part are unaware of the extent of their rationalist literature, a literature which deals with mathematics, astronomy, grammar, semantics and logic. Even the many-faceted Vedānta has a strong complement of non-theological rationalists. Of special importance in this respect, however, is the literature of the Navya-nyāya, for that school specialized in epistemology, logic and semantics. Some would have the Navya-nyāya begin with Udayanācārya (1000 A. D.), some with Gaṅgeśa (1400 A. D.), some only with Raghunātha (1475-1550 A. D.). But even by the most restricted view the school can claim hundreds of texts. From the published texts of Navya-nyāya, which form less than a tenth of what lies buried in manuscripts, one may see that the Indian genius erected noble edifices of rationalism as well as the edifices of theology and mysticism that are better known to the cultural 'tourist trade'.

The anecdote points also to a failure in communications between parallel traditions in the East and in the West. There

are striking similarities between Western symbolic logic and Navya Nyāya. They deal with similar problems and are often guided by a similar spirit of inquiry. Why then have they remained such strangers ? One reason is that the palaces of logic are built by a very complicated system of architecture, designed to defend the buildings against the storms of contradiction and argument which assail them. It is well-known that Navya-nyāya is written in the most formidable style of Sanskrit, a style which seems to delight in technical terms and breath-taking compounds. What holds for India holds also for the West. The average Englishman cannot pronounce, let alone understand, a page of the *Principia Mathematica*. Furthermore, the complexities of the one tradition are not readily translatable into the other. For all the similarities of subject matter and spirit, the structures of symbolic logic and Navya-nyāya are radically different. They differ not only as wholes; the difference permeates each detail of the architecture. And so it comes about that whereas those who are religiously or mystically inclined in India and Europe have been able to communicate with a fair degree of success, the traditions of logic have long failed to communicate because of ignorance and lack of understanding.

What then is to be done ? A great deal must be done, it seems to me. There is the task of making the Navya-nyāya texts available. There is the task of translating at least the more important texts into terms intelligible to members of the Western tradition. It would be well also, although the event is unlikely, to produce translations in the opposite direction. Then one must explain what one has translated. Finally, after all these preparations may come the feast of the philosophers, where the two rationalist traditions can trade theories, techniques and judgments, and so enrich one another.

Dr. Dinesh Guha in his *Navya-nyāya System of Logic* addresses himself to several of the tasks which I have mentioned. What he has done is to elicit a number of fundamental definitions and judgments from the great mass of Navya-nyāya literature. By translation and explanation Dr. Guha tries to render these definitions and judgments intelligible to the English speaking public. *Navya-Nyāya System of Logic* does not make easy reading, but one may defy any author to write easily on this

subject. Despite the difficulties, Dr. Guha has explained a number of Navya-nyāya theories which can be understood from no other English-language book.

Of the individual chapters of the book the one which has most interested me and from which I have learned the most is Chapter VII on the techniques of the insertion of *paryāpti*. Dr. Guha there gives the first Western-language explanation of the method by which Jagadīśa and Gadādhara guarded against insufficient (*nyūnavāraka*) and irrelevant (*itaravāraka*) terms in their logical formulas. The concept of the relation *paryāpti* itself is also elucidated by Dr. Guha. For example, I see from his remarks on the distinction between *dvitva* in one context and *dvitva* in another that an analogy which I made some years ago in print between *paryāpti* and Frege's theory of number should now be amended.

But each of the chapters of the book contains several points which have furthered my understanding of Navya-nyāya problems and texts. I would point out as especially useful the explanation of the various theories of the ontological nature of *viśayatā*. Dr. Guha goes on to expound the theory that the object of an invalid knowledge has no *viśayatā*¹, an interesting symptom of Nyāya realism. He then gives the first explanation to be given in English (although the fainthearted may feel that even the explanation needs explaining) of the argument between Jagadīśa and Gadādhara on whether the *viśayatā* and the *prakāratā* in a single object of a complex knowledge are or are not identical.

Chapter X gives numerous examples of the peculiarities of grammar and style among the Naiyāyikas. Finally, of great interest to me throughout the book are the references to the works of late and even modern Naiyāyikas such as Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya, Harihara Śāstrī, Śivadatta Miśra, etc., whose *kroḍa-patras*, even when published, are quite unknown to the West.

I refrain from itemizing all the points of interest in Dr. Guha's book lest I waste the time of the reader. He will need both time and attention to understand the pages which follow. If

1. The absence of *viśayatā* in the object of an invalid knowledge means the absence of a qualified *viśayatā* (विशिष्टविषयता).

are striking similarities between Western symbolic logic and Navya Nyāya. They deal with similar problems and are often guided by a similar spirit of inquiry. Why then have they remained such strangers ? One reason is that the palaces of logic are built by a very complicated system of architecture, designed to defend the buildings against the storms of contradiction and argument which assail them. It is well-known that Navya-nyāya is written in the most formidable style of Sanskrit, a style which seems to delight in technical terms and breath-taking compounds. What holds for India holds also for the West. The average Englishman cannot pronounce, let alone understand, a page of the *Principia Mathematica*. Furthermore, the complexities of the one tradition are not readily translatable into the other. For all the similarities of subject matter and spirit, the structures of symbolic logic and Navya-nyāya are radically different. They differ not only as wholes; the difference permeates each detail of the architecture. And so it comes about that whereas those who are religiously or mystically inclined in India and Europe have been able to communicate with a fair degree of success, the traditions of logic have long failed to communicate because of ignorance and lack of understanding.

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1. The absence of *viśayatā* in the object of an invalid knowledge means the absence of a qualified *viśayatā* (विशिष्टविषयता).

he applies both, however, he will receive much new light on the Navya-nyāya, light which may serve some day to illumine that feast of the philosophers of which I have spoken.

Harvard University,
U. S. A., 1966

DANIEL H. H. INGALLS

PREFACE

The first edition of the *Navya Nyāya System of Logic* having been exhausted some time back, I have been receiving persistent demand for the book from scholars in India and abroad.

Considering the keen interest evinced by the scholars I have been encouraged to present the revised edition of the work accompanied by fresh points and new expositions. To bring the book up-to-date I have added an altogether new section entitled *The technique of clarification (pariṣkāra) of definitions by Anugama through relations*. This revised and enlarged edition, I hope, will better help the inquisitive scholars to understand and appreciate the subtle problems of Navya Nyāya logic.

Varanasi, India
1979

D. C. Guha

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

In 1963, I was awarded the degree of Doctor of Literature by the University of Calcutta on my thesis *Some Basic Theories and Techniques of the Navya Nyāya System of Logic*. The present book is essentially the same with minor changes in language here and there.

The publication of this edition had been overdue for a long time, yet due to some exigencies of circumstances, it could not have been done earlier, for this I offer my sincerest apology to the readers in general and to the scholarly world in particular. In this book I have tried to interpret one of the most abstruse branches of Sanskrit study. As it is a pioneer work in this special field, I am conscious that there must be short-comings in it. I invite suggestions of the reader and assure him that they will receive my proper attention in the next edition of this work.

It is my pleasant duty to place on record the help I received from the book *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic* of Prof. Ingalls of the Harvard University. Without this help my task of interpreting the theories and techniques of Navya Nyāya would have been much more difficult. For the names of other scholars and their works in the field without which my work would have been incomplete and defective, I should like to refer the reader to the Bibliography and the foot-notes of this book.

I am specially grateful to Professor Daniel Henry Holmes Ingalls of the Harvard University for writing preface and to Professor Satakari Mukerjee of the University of Calcutta for writing the foreword.

Varanasi, India
1968

D. C. GUHA

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ERRATA

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| p. 23, 17th line | For pervadedness read pervaderness. |
| p. 97, footnote 1. | For स्वस्थतद्भाव etc. read स्वस्यतद्भाव etc. |
| p. 127, footnote 2. | For प्रतियोगित्वादावन्यूनतातिप्रसक्त etc.
read प्रतियोगित्वादावन्यूनानतिप्रसक्त etc. |
| p. 159, footnote 2. | For साक्षात्करोमीतिप्रतीतिविषयताविशेषो etc.
read साक्षात्करोमीतिप्रतीतिविषयताविशेषो etc |

INTRODUCTION

The science of Logic was rightly acclaimed by the scholars of ancient India as the light of all the branches of learning—*Pradīpaḥ sarvaśāstrāṇām*. This perhaps can more appropriately be said in regard to the Navya Nyāya system of Logic which gradually flourished in India after Udayanācārya (1000 A.D.) and particularly at the time of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the illustrious author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Later on, a galaxy of astute logicians headed by Jayadeva Miśra (Pakṣadhara), Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, etc., only to mention a few, made this branch of learning so perfect and useful for unambiguous expression of subtle ideas that books and dissertations on any branch of Sanskrit study which happened to be written after the development of Navya Nyāya were invariably couched in the language of that system.

This technique of Navya Nyāya is so thorough and subtle that it is almost impossible to conceive a more perfect and unambiguous method of expression in Sanskrit, if not in any other language. The super-excellence of the technique of Navya Nyāya is clearly borne out by the fact that the whole of India spontaneously accepted this technique as the instrument par excellence to give expression to any subtle idea that might have occurred in the minds of the scholars of any branch of Sanskrit study. One has only to look into any modern school of grammar—Pāṇinian or other, the modern Vedānta, the modern system of law and theology (*Smṛti*) of Bengal, the modern criticism and dissertations on literature and rhetoric, the modern Mīmāṃsā and the like, to be convinced of the extent of influence of the Navya Nyāya technique on those branches of Sanskrit study.

It is only to express God's truth that without a thorough grounding in the Navya Nyāya dialectics and technique, no scholar however intelligent, will ever be able to understand properly the inner significance of any one of the modern branches of Sanskrit study. Though the scholars before the development of Navya Nyāya had their own way of understanding and inter-

preting the scriptures, yet those old books written in the then prevailing style can surely be better understood and interpreted in the light of the technique of Navya Nyāya, which certainly has got its advantage from the standpoint of subtle and unambiguous expression of facts and ideas over the old method of expression.

It is indeed a matter of great satisfaction that the utmost necessity of the study of Navya Nyāya is being gradually appreciated by scholars all the world over. Prof. Ingalls of the Harvard University in his *Introduction to the Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic* quite justifiably says that a great part of Indian philosophy since the thirteenth century is unintelligible without Navya Nyāya.¹ I should like to go a bit further and say, as I have stated earlier, that not only philosophy, but the other modern branches of Sanskrit study also can never be properly understood without a sure grounding in the technique of Navya Nyāya.

The Navya Nyāya is a comprehensive system of philosophy having for its subject-matter not only logic, but epistemology, physics, grammar and many other incidental topics of interest. Again, to quote Prof. Ingalls: "These philosophers (Navya Naiyāyikas) have written on logic, epistemology, physics and grammar, but logic has been the most distinctive of their disciplines."²

The Navya Nyāya system of philosophy is a vast mass of literature on which almost nothing has been done up till now by way of interpretation according to the modern method of research. It is an arduous task and it seems to me that it is well nigh impossible for any single scholar, however intelligent and talented he may be, to do full justice to the subject in trying to interpret it in a modern way. Team-work is urgently necessary in this respect and I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that a thorough and systematic study of the subject by a team of modern scholars thoroughly trained in the traditional method of studying the scriptures in the way it is done in the *Ṭols* and *Pāṭhaśālās* of our country will be amply rewarding in every respect.

1. & 2. *Introduction to the Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, p. 1.

The study of Navya Nyāya goes a long way in sharpening one's faculty of understanding and making it thorough and incisive. The method and technique of Navya Nyāya are so perfect that they can only be compared with highly advanced Mathematics. The highest possible perfection and extreme thoroughness of analysis are the outstanding features of Navya Nyāya, which would naturally fill the mind of even a casual but sympathetic reader with a sense of awe and wonder.

It is but natural that Navya Nyāya has developed its own way of interpretation with the help of numerous abstracts, *cliches* and technicalities, but even in this respect the Navya Nyāya has been thoroughly systematic and perfect. Nowhere in the vast Navya Nyāya literature will be found a single technical term or even a single syllable which is not extremely significant. The subtle analysis of objects as also of ideas necessitated the forming of a very difficult and complex system of terminology. Hence the Sanskrit language of Navya Nyāya appears to be an altogether different language compared to that of the popularly known Sanskrit literature.

Yet the study of Navya Nyāya is certainly very much interesting from the standpoint of the extremely thorough method of interpretation of any fact or idea which may be humanly conceived. Those, who generally do not appreciate this perfect technique of Navya Nyāya, are men who, I fear, have not possibly got themselves thoroughly trained at the feet of the traditional teachers of this branch of study, without which nobody, however intelligent, will ever be able to properly evaluate and grasp the beauty of the subject.

Incidentally, I may point out here that India is still fortunate in having a few thoroughly trained traditional teachers of Navya Nyāya who have studied the subject very systematically and it is the duty of our countrymen as also of our Government to maintain this traditional method of teaching without disturbing it in the least out of our zeal of incorporating some sort of modernity in it with a view to making it unwarrantedly cheap and easy-going.

The language of Navya Nyāya is certainly difficult to a degree, particularly to the uninitiated, but at the same time it is equally precise and interesting to the trained mind. In fact the language of Navya Nyāya as such is not actually so difficult as it may

appear to be, but the very subtle and hair-splitting analysis of facts and ideas gives a look of difficulty to it. Once the method of analysis is known, the apparent difficulty of the language vanishes altogether.

The language of Navya Nyāya has got a peculiar ring of music of its own for the appreciation of which the mind and the ear have got to be systematically trained, as stated earlier, and I think it should be repeated a thousand and one times, in the traditional method of study as is still in vogue in our country in the Sanskrit *Ṭols* and *Pāṭhaśālās*.

It is, of course, very difficult to say, precisely, when the logical treatises came to be known by the name of Navya Nyāya. The commonly accepted theory is that Gaṅgeśopādhyāya who flourished in Mithilā in Behar in 1200 A.D. started this new school of logic.¹ But it is not possible for any scholar, however intelligent and talented he may be, to introduce an altogether new and finished method of interpretation unless the grounds are slowly prepared by other scholars before him. Actually, before the advent of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas had paved the way of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in this new method of approach which is commonly known as the technique of Navya Nyāya.² It is not quite correct to hold, that the treatises whose language is marked with the expressions like *Avaccheda-kāvachhinna* should be taken as Navya Nyāya, because, that is not a distinctive feature of this particular branch of Sanskrit study, though upto a certain extent it does characterise the Navya Nyāya literature.

The system of Navya Nyāya originally flourished in Mithilā, but, later on, Bengal became the choice place of this branch of Sanskrit study with Navadvīpa or Nadiyā as the main centre. In Bengal the Navya Nyāya became so popular and occupied such an exalted position that popular Bengali poems were sometimes

1. Dr. Umeśa Miśra, *Bhāratīya Darśana*, p. 182.

Chatterjee and Dutta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (Fifth edition, pp. 6-7).

Paṇḍita Dhunḍhirāja Śāstri, *Introduction to Anumānakhaṇḍa Gādādhari*, p. 4.

2. Paṇḍita Vāmācarāṇa Nyāyācārya, Introduction of Mahāmahopādhyāya Pañcānana Tarkaratna to *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 3.

composed to enunciate important theories and techniques of this system of logic.¹ Even today, no one in Bengal is accepted as a sound scholar in any branch of Sanskrit study unless he has got a sure grounding in the Navya Nyāya dialectics.

There is no doubt Navya Nyāya exerted great influence over various modern branches of Sanskrit study.

Under the circumstances, it is extremely painful to hear responsible men offering adverse criticism to the study of Navya Nyāya as the misuse of one's brain². Much importance need not be attached to the unfounded criticism against Navya Nyāya as a "large mass of rubbish"³, because, if an intelligent and truth-seeking scholar ever cares to study any treatise of Navya Nyāya in the proper way, then he himself will be convinced of the shallowness of the criticism. I have not the least doubt in my mind that truth, which is Navya Nyāya, will ever shine in its pristine glory in the hearts of its votaries for all times to come.

The Navya Nyāya or the modern school of Indian logic, as has been rightly stressed by Professors Chatterjee and Datta, lays almost exclusive emphasis on the logical aspects of the Nyāya and develops its theory of knowledge into a formal logic of relations between concepts, terms and propositions.⁴

From the standpoint of metaphysics the Navya Nyāya is thoroughly realistic in its outlook. The world of the Navya Naiyāyika's conception is not at all illusory. The Navya Naiyāyika seeks to analyse the world phenomenon on the strength of his own valid knowledge. Though the Navya Nyāya is primarily based upon one rule of the Nyāya Darśana *Pratyak-ṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni*,⁵ yet it does not very much count upon any authority to come to its help for the establishment of its theories except the unfailing judgment and experience of its own. The Vedic statements, of course, are sometimes quoted in

1. *Mān vān varjyā sādhyā ān garjyā,
Yadi nā thāke mān vān,
Tva caḍāiā sādhyā ān.* (Leaving aside the suffix like *Mān* or *Vān* take the *Sādhyā* with emphasis. If there be no *Mān* or *Vān* then take the *Sādhyā* by adding the suffix *Tva*).
2. P. C. Ray, *Bāṅgālira Mastiṣkera Apavyavahāra*.
3. Mahadev Rajaram Bodas, *Introduction to Tarkasaṃgraha*.
4. Chatterjee and Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (Fifth edition), p. 166.
5. *Nyāyadarśana*, 1. 1.3.

support of its standpoint, but that is done only after establishing its theories by subtle and strictly logical arguments.

The Navya Naiyāyika is very much theistic in his outlook. The entire machinery of the Navya Nyāya dialectics is directed towards the establishment of God as the Supreme Reality. That is why the dissertation called *Īśvarānumāna-cintāmaṇi* or *Īśvaravāda*, the part of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, which deals with the proof of God, is appended almost to the last part of the book. The popular accusation against the Naiyāyikas in general and the Navya Naiyāyikas in particular, that they are atheistic philosophers, is therefore totally unfounded in every sense of the term.

The subject matter of Navya Nyāya, as has been pointed out earlier, covers various objects in the field of human enquiry. Unlike Prācīna Nyāya, which mainly deals with the philosophical aspects of the world phenomenon and its diverse objects, the Navya Nyāya mainly deals with the logical relations of facts and ideals as they stand to one another. Yet it will not be quite justifiable to call Navya Nyāya a system of Relational Logic or Symbolic Logic or Mathematical Logic as has developed in the Western countries, though some affinity-between the two systems of logic may be found out here and there, yet there is a gulf of difference between the subject matter of the two.

Of late, some very eminent scholars in the field of logical study have tried to convert Navya Nyāya into a system of Symbolic Logic by introducing some symbols of that system into Navya Nyāya.¹ Laudable as their enterprise is from its own standpoint, I am yet to be convinced of the improvement achieved by it in the field of the logical study of Navya Nyāya.

An effort has been made here to present Navya Nyāya in its original form, though in a different language, to the scholars of the field of logical study.

The entire edifice of Navya Nyāya is founded on certain theo-

1. Prof. I. M. Bochenski, *Formal Logic*, Freiburg Munchen, 1956.

Prof. S. Sen, *A Study on Mathurānātha's Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Prof. Daniel Henry Holmes Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*. Harvard Oriental Series.

Prof. J. F. Staal, *Means of Formalisation in Indian and Western Logic*, Reynier Vinkeleskade 74, Amsterdam (The Netherlands).

ries, which I have chosen to call basic theories. They are quite of a good number and are frequently used, more or less, in all the discussions regarding any problem of the Navya Nyāya logic. They have been dealt with from the metaphysical or epistemological standpoint as the case may be.

The language of Navya Nyāya, as has been pointed out earlier, is altogether different from the commonly known Sanskrit language. Even the language of Prācīna Nyāya has got no similarity with that of Navya Nyāya. In his commentary on the rule of the Nyāya Darśana *Tatsambandhāt phalanīṣpattesteṣu phalavadupacāraḥ*¹, the commentator Vātsyāyana says *Putrādīśambandhāt phalaṃ prītilakṣaṇamutpadyata iti putrādiṣu phalavadupacāraḥ. Yathā'nne prāṇaśabdo'nnaṃ vai prāṇā iti*. This language is not an analytical one. The meaning becomes quite clear on the mere reading of the sentence as follows : Owing to the relation of the son etc., the effect in the form of pleasure is produced. Therefore, the son etc., are secondarily used as the effect. As for example, the word, *Prāṇa* (life) is used to mean food, as *Annaṃ vai prāṇiṇaḥ prāṇāḥ*.

Compared to it the following lines of the Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri *Hetutāvacchedakāvacchinnahetvadhikaraṇatānirūpitahetutāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinnādheyatāpratiyogikaviśeṣaṇatāviśeṣasambandhena niruktasādhyaābhāvatvaviśiṣṭānirūpitaniruktasambandhasaṃsargakaniravacchinnādhikaraṇatāśrayavṛttitvasāmānyābhāvasya vivakṣitatvāt*, meaning: The above objections should not be made because what is meant is : a generic absence of occurrentness to a substratum of that unlimited locusness the (limiting) relation of which is the aforementioned one and which is described by (an entity) qualified by absenceness of *sādhya*, absence of *sādhya* being as before mentioned; (to this absence of occurrentness the counterpositiveness) being limited by a particular qualification relation where the adjunct is a superstratumness limited by the limiting relation of *hetutā* and described by locusness to *hetu*, which locusness is limited by the limiting properties of *hetutā*"², would appear to be an altogether different language.

1. *Nyāya-Darśana*, 4.1.53.

2. Prof. Ingalls's translation, *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, p. 117.

Even then there is no fundamental difficulty in the language of Navya Nyāya, only certain technical terms have been frequently used which have got to be mastered beforehand for the proper understanding of the statement. If one goes on searching the vast Navya Nyāya literature, then he will come across only with a very limited number of simple and familiar verbs like *Bhavati*, *Pratibadhnāti*, *Siddhyati*, *Vadanti*, *Āhuh*, *Ārabhate*, *Ucyate* etc., whereas, in the writings of Bāṇabhaṭṭa in the Kādambarī, innumerable obscure verbs and other words are met with almost at every step. Sometimes big compound words are, of course, found in the Navya Nyāya treatises, but even then the instances of *Tatpuruṣa* and *Bahuvrīhi* compounds are rather frequently met with. The implication of case endings also is very easily understandable in the Navya Nyāya treatises. Obscure expressions are never used unless they become extremely necessary for logical discussion. Very familiar words signifying commonly known objects like *Ghaṭa*, *Vahni*, *Parvata*, *Gau*, *Bhūtala* etc., are frequently used by way of giving illustrations to clarify certain standpoints. Indeed the common words *Ghaṭa*, *Vahni*, *Dhūma* etc., are so frequently used that sometimes it becomes monotonous to read them. But the Navya Naiyāyika does not bother about it, his only anxiety being to clearly impress the idea on his readers. The Navya Naiyāyika's first and foremost concern is to analyse the real objects which happen to be the content of valid knowledge and find out the logical relations underlying them. That is why sometimes a very interesting joke is popularly enjoyed by many at the cost of the Navya Naiyāyika who is supposed to say *Asmākināṃ naiyāyikeṣāṃ arthanī tātparyaṃ śabdāni kaścintā ?* (We the Navya Naiyāyikas have only concern for the real object, what do we bother about the word ?) It will be readily noticed that most of the words of the sentence are grammatically incorrect.

A little acquaintance with the analytical method and technique of the Navya Nyāya system of logic of a very simple type may be of some practical interest here. In this connection I would like to point out that just as the Sanskrit language of Navya Nyāya had naturally become a different language owing to the introduction of various technicalities, similarly the English language or for the matter of that any other language dealing with Navya Nyāya also would unavoidably assume a different shape altogether. An idea of this changed form of English language

can be had from the *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, by Prof. Ingalls.

The knowledge of an object associated with some other object is contradicted by the definite knowledge of the constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*) of that object associated with the very same other object. To be particular, we may say that the knowledge of a jar (*Ghaṭa*) associated with the ground (*Bhūtala*) is contradicted by the definite knowledge of the constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*) of the jar associated with the same ground. Here the knowledge of the jar associated with the ground is the knowledge contradicted (*Pratibadhyā*), whereas the definite knowledge of the constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*) of the jar associated with the same ground is the contradictory (*Pratibandhaka*) knowledge.

The contradictedness (*Pratibadhyatā*) of the first mentioned knowledge is limited (*Avacchinna*) by a limiter (*Avacchedaka*). Similarly, the contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatā*) of the subsequently mentioned knowledge also is limited by another limiter. The limiter of the contradictedness resident in the contradicted knowledge here is that knowledgeness (*Jñānatva*), the knowledge as the substratum (*Āśrayajñāna*) of which possesses the qualificandness limited by groundness and described by the qualificierness (*Prakāratā*) limited by jariness as also by the relation of contact (*Samyoga*) if the jar here is known to be existing on the ground through that relation. In the like manner, the limiter of the contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatā*) of the contradictory definite knowledge (*Niścaya*) is that definite knowledgeness (*Niścayatva*), the knowledge as the substratum (*Āśrayajñāna*) of which possesses the qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatā*) limited by groundness and described by the qualificierness (*Prakāratā*) limited by the property of absolute absenceness and by the relation of absential particular qualification (*Abhāviya-viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa*), the substratum of which happens to be the absence of the jar, the counterpositiveness to which again is limited by jariness and the relation of contact (*Samyoga*).

Now in the above-mentioned forms of knowledge, both contradicted and contradictory, each and every qualification is extremely necessary without which ambiguity cannot be avoided

The contradictedness (*Pratibadhyatā*) of the contradicted knowledge has been described as limited by knowledgeness

(*Buddhitva*) and not by definite knowledgeness (*Niścayatva*), because otherwise the two kinds of knowledge, doubt (*Samśaya*) and definite knowledge (*Niścaya*) cannot be taken together. As both kinds of knowledge, doubt as also definite knowledge, can be contradicted, it is necessary to include both types of knowledge in a single statement. Otherwise the general principle cannot be adequately enumerated.

The contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatā*) of the contradictory knowledge has been described as limited by definite knowledgeness (*Niścayatva*), because only the definite knowledge, and not knowledge of any other kind, can contradict another knowledge.

The qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatā*) in both the contradictory and contradicted forms of knowledge has been described as limited by the same groundness (*Bhūtalatva*), because if there is the slightest difference of the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the qualificandness in either of the aforesaid forms of knowledge, then neither of the two will ever be contradicted or become contradictory as the case may be. The knowledge having the form *Ghaṭavad bhūtaḥ* or the ground possessing the jar can be contradicted by the definite knowledge having the form *Ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtaḥ* or the ground possessing the constant absence of the jar.

But if there is the slightest difference in any one of the limitors (*Avacchedaka*) in either side of the knowledge, then the relation of the contradicted-contradictoriness (*Pratibadhyā-pratibandhakabhāva*) will forthwith cease to exist. The *Ghaṭa* (Jar) may sometimes be known as a *Dravya* or a substance. In that case *Dravyatva* (Substanceness) and not *Ghaṭatva* (Jarness) would be the limiter of the qualificandness. Similarly, the ground (*Bhūtaḥ*) also may sometimes be known as *Dravya* in which case *Dravyatva* (Substanceness) and not *Bhūtalatva* (Groundness) would be the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatā*). Surely, the knowledge having the form *Dravyavad bhūtaḥ* cannot be contradicted by the definite knowledge having the form *Ghaṭābhāvavad dravyam*.

Hence, the contradicted-contradictoriness (*Pratibadhyā-pratibandhakabhāva*) of the two aforesaid forms of knowledge may be expressed through the technique of Navya Nyāya as follows:

Ghaṭatvāvacchinna-prakāratānirūpita-bhūtalatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatāka-buddhitvāvacchinnaṃ prati ghaṭatvāvacchinnaśaṃyoga-

sambandhāvacchinna - pratiyogitākābhāvatvāvacchinna-svarūpa-sambandhāvacchinna-prakāratānirūpita-bhūtalatvāvacchinnaviśeṣ-yatākaniścayatvena pratibandhakatvam. That is, in regard to the knowledge having its qualificandness limited by groundness and described by the qualificierness limited by jarness and the relation of contact (*Samyoga*), the knowledge having its qualificandness limited by groundness and described by the qualificierness limited by constant absenceness and the relation *Svarūpa* (Absential peculiar relation), the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) of which absence (*Abhāva*) is limited by jarness and the relation of contact (*Samyoga*) is the contradictory definite knowledge, contradictoriness resident in it being limited by the property called definite knowledgeness (*Niścayatva*).

In the similar way if we go on examining any treatise of the Navya Nyāya, we would readily find that everywhere each and every word has been very carefully used, each and every qualification has got a precise significance of its own and nothing has been said in a particular context which does not logically follow from the previous statement.

In many places we would find that certain steps have not been mentioned, though they would, of course, logically follow from what has been said before. Hence, the style of the Navya Nyāya is very often elliptical, many things being not mentioned explicitly in so many words, though all the objects not mentioned clearly would certainly be understood by an intelligent man who may care to think in a strictly logical way.

The sample of the language of Navya Nyāya which has been illustrated earlier, is, of course, a natural development and by no means an artificial one. Prof. Taraporewala, an eminent linguist, also rightly stressed that the very abstruse language of Navya Nyāya was the natural outcome of an effort to obtain an accurate idea of the capabilities of language for the sake of drawing inferences in a proper way.¹

The basic theories of Navya Nyāya have been compared with the twentytwo *Śrutis*² of music by some scholars³. Fifteen among

1. Irach Jehangir Sorabje Taraporewala, *Elements of the Science of Language* p. 271, Calcutta University publication.

2. A particular division of the octave, a quarter tone or interval (twentytwo of these are enumerated, four constituting a major tone, three a minor, and two a semitone; they are said to be personified as nymphs).

3. M. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit English Dictionary*, p. 1101.

them like *Pratīyogitā*, *Anuyogitā*, *Avacchedakatā* etc., are particularly used in all the dissertations, as they form, as it were, the very foundation of this special branch of logic. Though the seven categories like *Dravya* (Substance), *Guṇa* (Quality), *Karma* (Action), etc., also are taken into account, every now and then, for the discussion of any subject matter in Navya Nyāya, yet their use is not so much confined to the Navya Nyāya system of logic alone. Though the classification of the categories under seven heads as opposed to the sixteen like *Pramāṇa*, *Prameya* etc., of the Prācīna Nyāya is, of course, a comparatively later development,¹ yet they do not occupy such an important position in the Navya Nyāya dialectics as the relational abstract properties like *Pratīyogitā*, *Avacchedakatā* etc., in the task of making clarification (*Parīṣkāra*) of any subject matter.

Of the seven categories referred to earlier, *Abhāva* or absence, of course, holds an equally high position with the relational abstract properties like *Pratīyogitā* etc., in making clarification of any object according to the Navya Nyāya style. The conception of *Abhāva* is very important from the standpoint of making subtle analysis of facts and ideas with the help of the relational abstract properties, so much so, that the technique of the application of double negation has been frequently applied in the Navya Nyāya dialectics with a view to avoiding any ambiguity.

The Navya Naiyāyikas have got their own theories in almost all the subjects which they have treated in their own way for the sake of establishing their standpoints. The entire edifice of Navya Nyāya, of course, is based upon the speculation of the

“सङ्गीतशास्त्रे सप्तस्वरात्मकस्य नाद ब्रह्मणो द्वाविंशतिश्रुतिरूपेण प्रविभज्यमानस्य समस्तगानमण्डलव्याप्तत्वं यथा विदग्धव्यवहारसिद्धमवलोक्यते तथैव तार्किकजगत्यपि, द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवायाभावाः सप्त, प्रतियोगिता अनुयोगिता अवच्छेदकता अवच्छेद्यता निरूपकता निरूप्यता आधारता आधेयता संसर्गता विषयता विषयिता प्रयोजकता प्रयोज्यता कारणता कार्यता—इत्येते पञ्चदश चेति मिलित्वा द्वाविंशतिपदार्थैरेव समस्तं विज्ञानमयं जगद् व्याप्तमवलोक्यते” —

Paṇḍita Rājesvara Śāstrī, *Avacchedakatādivimarsaḥ* p. 1, Vallabharāma Śāligrāma Sāṅgaveda Vidyālayaḥ, Varanasi.

1. नन्वन्ये पदार्थाः कथं न सन्ति न्यायसूत्रे षोडशपदार्थनिरूपणादित्याशङ्क्य नैयायिकानामपि मते सप्त पदार्था इत्यविरुद्धं षोडशपदार्थानां सप्तपदार्थेष्वन्तर्भूतत्वात्—

Dinakari on Siddhāntamuktāvali, p. 42, N. S. Press edition.

four sources of valid knowledge called *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna* and *Śabda*, the detailed discussion of which is not the aim of this treatise. Nor the historical or biographical treatment of the theories as also of the authors of various works on Navya Nyāya is aimed at here, because that has been dealt with elsewhere by eminent scholars in this field.¹

The technique of Navya Nyāya also is a separate study by itself and at the same time it is a very interesting and absorbing theme which deserves absolute attention for the proper understanding and evaluation of the vast Navya Nyāya literature. On the strength of my experience stretching over more than a quarter of a century I am inclined to think that the proper appreciation of the grandeur of Navya Nyāya and the trend of argument it follows can never be made unless the technique is thoroughly mastered beforehand with all its detail and abstruseness.

Some selected techniques have, of course, been dealt with here with a view to giving an idea about the matter and it is hoped that this treatment, however inadequate, will be able to rouse some amount of curiosity in the minds of the scholars in general and particularly in the minds of those who are interested in the analysis of language as also of facts and ideas in a spirit of logical enquiry.

Of all the techniques of Navya Nyāya, that of the insertion of *Paryāpti* (*Paryāptiniveśa*) is by far the most important on account of its being frequently used for the sake of making clarification (*Parīṣkāra*) of any subject matter. Next to it comes the technique of *Anugama*, both *Samśargamudrayā anumamaḥ* and *Prakāramudrayā anumamaḥ*, which also is almost equally important from the standpoint of making clarification. As regards the mutual relation between the two, it can be said that the *Samśargamudrayā anumamaḥ* is sometimes dependent upon the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* upto a certain extent inasmuch as the *Anugamaḥ* of this type is often-times made thorough and comprehensive with the help of this technique.

In respect of other minor techniques which are quite of a good

1. Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan, *History of Indian Logic*, Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, *Bāṅgālīra Sārasvata Avadāna* (*Baṅge Navya Nyāyacarcā*) Bangiya Sahitya Parishat publication.
Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, *History of Navya Nyāya in Mithilā*, Mithila Research Institute publication.

number, it can be readily noticed from their application that they are more or less independent of one another, though they are generally used together in a particular context to make some clarification or to convey precisely the idea regarding a particular standpoint.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the science and art of logic is an all-comprehensive branch of human enquiry and the particular branch of this science which has been called by the term of Navya Nyāya in India is no exception to it. We can offer new interpretations and even throw some light here and there, but it is extremely difficult to say something absolutely new in it, regard being had to the very hard and sustained labour and painstaking research of generations of astute logicians all over India stretching over several centuries. It can never, of course, be claimed nor should it ever be claimed, that the Navya Nyāya system of logic has uttered the final word on matters relating to logical enquiry.

Nevertheless, one is constantly reminded of the statement of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated author of the logical treatise *Nyāyamañjarī* that he has no capacity to say something new in the field of logical study, only the mode of expression is to be noticed there¹.

¹. कुतो वा नूतनं वस्तु वयमुत्प्रेक्षितुं क्षमाः ।

वचोविन्यासवैचित्र्यमात्रमत्र विचार्यताम् ॥

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Introductory verse of *Nyāyamañjarī*.

PART I

CHAPTER I

AVACCHEDAKA AND AVACCHEDAKATVA

The conception of *Avacchedaka* in Navya Nyāya is of utmost importance from the point of view of subtle analysis of ideas and their accurate expression. Though this *Avacchedaka* was not altogether unknown to the earlier philosophers of other schools of thought,¹ yet the Neo-Logicians (Navya Naiyāyikas) had attained highest perfection in the use of this particular term. Though the term *Avacchedaka* in Navya Nyāya is generally used in a highly technical sense, yet instances are not rare in which the term has been used only in the sense of an adjective. Thus, if we want to make someone understand each and every case of fire or all the cases of fire as distinguished from the pot or for the matter of that any other object, then according to the Navya Nyāya technique we would say *Vahnitvāvacchinna*,² in which expression *Vahnitva* or fireness is understood to be the *Avacchedaka* (limitor) of *Vahni* or fire. Here *Vahnitva* is an adjective of *Vahni* inasmuch as it differentiates *Vahni* from other objects. In this general sense *Avacchedaka* may be defined as that property which itself being one of the primary meanings of a term, differentiates the primary meanings of that term from other objects.³

The primary meanings of a term, according to the Naiyāyikas, are of three kinds, the generic character (*Jāti*), the form or shape of the object concerned (*Ākṛti*) and the individual object (*Vyakti*).⁴

1. जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौमा महाव्रतम् ।
Yogasūtra, Sāadhanapāda, 31 Sūtra.
पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ।
Yogasūtra Samādhīpāda, 26 Sūtra.
2. वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नस्य सर्वस्यैव धूमादिमन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकी-
भूततत्तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वाद् ।
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadīśi, p. 209, Chowkhamba edition.
3. शक्यत्वे सति शक्यव्यावर्तकत्वम् अवच्छेदकत्वम् ।
Pariṣkāradarpaṇa, p. 13.
4. व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थाः ।
Nyāya Darśana, 2-2-63

As for example, the term *Ghaṭa* (Jar) primarily signifies the generic character *Ghaṭatva* or jariness, the particular shape or form of the *Ghaṭa* (Jar) and the individual object itself, the *Ghaṭa*. Now, this particular generic character *Ghaṭatva*, which itself is one of the primary meanings of the term *Ghaṭa*, differentiates a *Ghaṭa* which also is a primary meaning of the same term from other objects like a piece of cloth etc. This kind of *Avacchedaka* is more precisely called *Śakyatāvacchedaka* or the limiter of *Śakyatā* or *Śakti* (import) of a term and has been defined by the Navya Naiyāyikas as that object which itself being a primary meaning of a term exists in another primary meaning of the same term and flashes as an adjective in the recollection of the primary meaning of the term.¹

Now, let us discuss the technical sense of the term *Avacchedaka*. *Avacchedaka* is that property which happens to possess a particular characteristic feature called *Avacchedakatva* or *Avacchedakatā*. Just as a *Ghaṭa* (Jar) is called a *Ghaṭa* by virtue of its possessing a special characteristic feature called *Ghaṭatva* or jariness, similarly an *Avacchedaka* is called an *Avacchedaka* by virtue of its possessing a special attribute called *Avacchedakatā*.

This *Avacchedakatva* or *Avacchedakatā* in the primary sense of the term means *Svarūpa-sambandha* or the relation which is essentially identical with some object. *Svarūpasambandha* has been defined as that relation which is essentially an accepted object or rather identical with some accepted objects on the one hand and at the same time which possesses the characteristic feature of a relation having been qualified by a particular attribute on the other.² As for example, the *Pratīyogitā* in the case of a negation is identical with the *Pratīyogī* or the counterpositive and as such it may be considered as an accepted object³ (*klpta-padārtha*) like a *Ghaṭa* which belongs to the category of *Dravya* or Substance. At the same time this *Pratīyogitā* may also be considered as a relation from the standpoint of its being qualified by the special attribute called *Pratīyogitātva*.⁴

1. वाच्यत्वे सति वाच्यवृत्तित्वे सति वाच्योपस्थितिप्रकारत्वम्
Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, *Śaktivāda* p. 41.

2. क्लृप्तः पदार्थः सन् किञ्चिद्धर्मोपरागेण संसर्गतावत्त्वम्
Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Avacchedakatvanirukti*

3-4. यथा प्रतियोगित्वादौ प्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रतियोगिस्वरूपतया क्लृप्त-
पदार्थत्वात् प्रतियोगितात्वेन संसर्गतावत्त्वाच्च

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Avacchedakatvanirukti*.

The idea underlying the fact is that the *Pratiyogitā* in the case of a negation is a relation between the negation and its counterpositive. The nature of its being a relation is governed by the attribute called *Pratiyogitātva*, an indivisible property (*Akhaṇḍopādhi*) resident in all the *Pratiyogitās*.

That the *Pratiyogitā* or for the matter of that the *Avacchedakatva* or *Avacchedakatā* may be considered as a relation is clearly understood from the fact that the knowledge of the absence or negation of an entity always has for its content an object which is qualified by some other object which again is a qualified object.¹ As for example, the negation in the form of *Ghaṭo nāsti*, if analysed in the Naiyāyika way, would be called *Ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭābhāvah Ghaṭābhāvah Vaiśiṣṭyaṃ ca Svāvacchinne pratiyogitākatvasambandhena*. In other words, this can be further analysed in the Naiyāyika way as *Ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭābhāvah Ghaṭābhāvah Vaiśiṣṭyaṃ ca Svanīṣṭhāvacchedakatānirūpitapratiyogitānirūpakatvasambandhena*. The underlying idea of the above analysis is this. The absence or negation of a *Ghaṭa* is that negation whose counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) is limited by *Ghaṭatva* (Jarness) through the relation as mentioned above (*Svanīṣṭhāvacchedakatānirūpita*, etc.), or, the negation *Ghaṭo nāsti* may briefly be described as *Ghaṭaviśiṣṭābhāvah Ghaṭābhāvah Vaiśiṣṭyaṃ ca Svanīṣṭhapratiyogitākatvasambandhena*. That is, the negation *Ghaṭo nāsti* is that absence which is qualified by a *Ghaṭa* through the relation called *Svanīṣṭhapratiyogitākatva*.¹

This *Svanīṣṭhapratiyogitākatva* relation is sometimes briefly called *Pratiyogitā*. Thus, the *Pratiyogitā* as qualified by *Pratiyogitātva* is a relation between the *Ghaṭa* and its absence.

Similarly, *Avacchedakatā* or *Avacchedakatva* also can be called a relation between *Ghaṭatva* and the negation of the *Ghaṭa*. In that case *Avacchedakatātva*, like *Pratiyogitātva* in the case of a *Pratiyogitā*, is the limitor of the relationship existing in the *Avacchedakatva* or *Avacchedakatā*.

That the abstracts like *Avacchedakatā*, *Pratiyogitā* etc., may be considered as so many relations has been clearly mentioned by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra in his commentary on the *Vyāptipañ-*

1. प्रतियोगिविशेषिताभावज्ञानं च विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबोधमर्यादां नातिशेते

Vyutpattivāda, p. 63. Chowkhamba edition.

*caka*¹. Raghunātha Śīromaṇi also is of the same opinion².

In the secondary sense, the term *Avacchedakatva* has got different shades of meaning. Sometimes it is called *Anyūnavṛt-titva*.³ The generally known secondary meaning is *Anatiriktavṛt-titva*⁴ which is sometimes clarified as *Anyūnānatiriktavṛttitva*.⁵ Sometimes again *Anatiriktavṛttitva* is further clarified as *Svavyāpakatatkatva*⁶. In other places *Anatiriktavṛttitva* has been clarified as *Avacchedakatvaparyāptyadhikaraṇatvam*⁷.

Now, before entering into a discussion on the *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Anatiriktavṛttitva*, I would like to discuss the *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Svarūpasambandha* in some detail.

It is also necessary to note in this connection that there is no such common attribute like *Avacchedakatā* existing in the two kinds of *Avacchedakatā* in the form of *Svarūpasambandha* and *Anatiriktavṛttitva*⁸.

1. पट्टवावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वन्तु पटत्वमवच्छिन्नत्वम् प्रतियोगित्वञ्चेति त्रितयमेव विशेष्यविशेषणभावापन्नं संसर्गः

Vyāptipañcaka, Jāgadiśi, p. 48, Chowkhamba.

2. अतएव केवलान्वयिग्रन्थे बह्विनास्तीत्यत्र बह्वित्वं तदवच्छिन्नत्वं प्रति-योगित्वं च संसर्गममुद्रया भासत इति स्वयमप्युक्तम्

Vyāptipañcaka Jāgadiśi, p. 84, Chowkhamba.

3. अवच्छेदकत्वञ्च अन्यूनवृत्तित्वमेव

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 101, Vāmācaraṇa's edition.

4. न हि अतिप्रसक्तमवच्छेदकम्

Tattvacintāmaṇi Viśeṣavyāpti, p. 331, Chowkhamba.

अवच्छेदकत्वञ्चेह अनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वम्

Sāmānyanirukti-Dīdhiti, p. 1550, Chowkhamba.

प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकानतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्

Avacchedakatvanirukti-Dīdhiti, p. 74, Śivadatta's edition.

5. अन्यूनानतिप्रसक्तत्वमवच्छेदकत्वं वा

Parīṣkāra darpaṇa, p. 13.

6. अनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वं च स्वव्यापकतत्कत्वम्

Gādādhari, Sāmānyanirukti, p. 1992, Chowkhamba.

7. अवच्छेदकत्वं च तत्पर्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वम्

Vyadhikaraṇa-Dīdhiti, p. 137, Śivadatta's edition.

8. द्विविधावच्छेदकत्वानुगतावच्छेदकतात्वस्याभावेन

Paṇḍita Somanātha Śarma, Note on *Avacchedakatvanirukti, Jāgadiśi, p. 257, Chowkhamba.*

स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपानतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपावच्छेदकतासाधारणावच्छेदकता-
त्वस्यैकस्याभावेन

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Avacchedakatvanirukti, Jāgadiśi p. 1.*

Though neither Paṇḍita Somanāth Śarmā nor Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra has given any explanation as to why there is no common attribute between the two kinds of *Avacchedakatva* (i.e. *Svarūpasambandha* and *Anatiriktavṛttitva*), yet the argument is not far to seek. *Svarūpasambandha* being identical with innumerable accepted objects (*Klptapadārtha*) on earth, it can never have a differentiating common attribute with *Anatiriktavṛttitva* which can serve as a definition of the two kinds of *Avacchedakatva*. Common attributes like *Abhidheyatva*, *Prameyatva* etc., are not differentiating attributes and hence, they would not serve any useful purpose here.

The *Avacchedakatva* in the form of a particular nature relation (*Svarūpasambandha-viśeṣa*), as for example, in the case of a negative judgement like *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar), has been defined as that property which resides in the chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) of the counterpositive.¹ In the negative judgement *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar), the generic character *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) is the *Avacchedaka* of the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) resident in the jar inasmuch as it happens to be the chief qualifier of the counterpositive *Ghaṭa*. Here the *Avacchedakatva* (limitoriness) resident in the generic character *Ghaṭatva* may be called identical with *Ghaṭatva* which is an accepted entity (*Klptapadārtha*) and at the same time it may be called a relation between the negation and its counterpositive.

In the case of this sort of *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Svarūpa sambandha*, if possible, the light property (*Laghudharma*)² as opposed to the heavy property (*Gurudharma*) should be taken as the substratum of the *Avacchedakatva*. In other words, the light property is the *Avacchedaka* and not the heavy one. In accordance with this law of parsimony, the *Avacchedakatva* in

1. तत्ताद्यं क्वचित् प्रतियोग्यं प्रकारीभूतधर्मम्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Preface of the *Avacchedakatvanirukti*, Jāgadiśi p. 1.

स च क्वचित्प्रतियोग्यं प्रकारीभूतधर्मत्वम्—

Nyāyakośa, p. 72. Also *Pariṣkāradarpaṇa*, p. 13.

2. सम्भवति लघौ धर्मो गुरौ तदभावात्—

Avacchedakatvanirukti, p. 1, Śivadatta's edition.

लघुधर्मो अवच्छेदकत्वे सम्भवति गुरुधर्मो स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपमवच्छेदकत्वं न स्वीक्रियते—

Dinakarī, p. 33, N. S. Press edition.

the form of *Svarūpasambandha* is sometimes accepted even in a property which is not the chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) of the *Pratīyogī*.¹ As for example, in the negative judgement *Kambuḡrīvādimān nāsti* (There is no object qualified by the contact etc., between the two parts of a jar), the limiter of the counterpositive is *Ghaṭatva* (jariness) and not *Kambuḡrīvādimattva*, because *Kambuḡrīvādimattva* means *Kambuḡrīva* etc., and *Kambuḡrīvā* means the contact² between the two final parts of a jar. This contact is a heavy property compared to the generic character *Ghaṭatva* (jariness).

According to the theory of *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Svarūpasambandha*, even a component part of the *Avacchedaka* is supposed to possess this *Avacchedakatva*. In other words, the component parts of an *Avacchedaka* which is the substratum of the *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Svarūpasambandha* are also considered in this case as so many *Avacchedakas*. According to this theory, the contentness (*viśayatā*) differs in different forms of knowledge and hence there will be no inconsistency from the standpoint of contradicted-contradictoriness (*Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva*) and the like.³

This *Avacchedakatva* either in the form of *Svarūpasambandha* or in the form of *Anatiriktavṛttitva* has got various ways of application of which the important ones may be enumerated here. It is not quite correct to say, as some scholars hold, that the term *Avacchedaka* has at least three meanings, as distinguishing, particularising and determining⁴, although those are, no doubt, some of the commonly used meanings.

1. क्वचिच्चाप्रकारीभूतधर्मेऽपि यथा कम्बुग्रीवादिमान् नास्तीत्यभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकता घटत्वे—

Preface to the *Avacchedakatvanirukti*—Śivadatta's edition, p. 1.

2. कम्बुग्रीवा च कपालसंयोगो बोध्यः—

Śivadatta Miśra, The commentary of *Avacchedakatvanirukti* p. 23.

3. स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपावच्छेदकत्वस्वीकर्तृभिः ज्ञानभेदेन विषयताभेदमवलम्ब्य 'वह्नयभाववान् ह्रदः' इति निश्चयीयप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकता वह्नयभावाद्येकदेशविषयतायामपि स्वीक्रियते । 'वह्नयभाववान् ह्रदः' इति ज्ञानीयवह्नयभावविषयताया निरूपकतासम्बन्धेन ज्ञानान्तरेऽसत्त्वेन वह्नयभाव इत्यादिनिश्चयस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वापत्तिविरहात्—इति बोध्यम्—

Preface to the *Avacchedakatvanirukti*—Śivadatta's edition.

4. Cowell : *Kusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya, p. 26.

Sometimes the substratum of an object is considered as an *Avacchedaka* of the property residing in that object. As for example, in the statement: *Iha parvate nitambe hutāśano na śikhare*¹ (Here in this mountain the fire is on the middle portion and not on the top), the middle portion of the mountain, which constitutes the substratum of the same mountain, is the *Avacchedaka* of the fire. Here, of course, the *Avacchedaka* particularises the location of fire. In the statement *Idānīm catvare gaur nāsti* (Now there is no cow in the field) the particular point of time during which there is the absence of a cow in the field, is the *Avacchedaka*² of the absence of a cow.

In some cases the adjective of the substratum of a particular property is called the *Avacchedaka*³ of that property. As for example, in the case of the statement like *Samyogāvacchinnavyāpārah*, the property called *Dhātvarthatā* resides in the *Vyāpāra* (activity) which is the meaning of the root *Gam* and to which *Samyoga* is an adjective.

Pervadedness (*Vyāpakatva*)⁴ is sometimes called *Avacchedakatva*. In other words, the pervader is the *Avacchedaka* as in the case of the inference of fire in all the mountains, the relation of contact (*Samyoga*) is the *Avacchedaka* of the *Vidheyatā* of the fire from the standpoint of relation. This *Vyāpakatva* is *Anyūnatva*, i.e. the state of its being existent in all the loci of the property of which it is an *Avacchedaka* or limitor.

In some cases pervadedness (*Vyāpyatva*)⁵ is considered as the *Avacchedakatva*. This pervadedness (*Vyāpyatva*) is nothing other than *Anatiriktavṛttitva*. *Anatiriktavṛttitva* here means the state or condition of its being non-existent in the locus of the absence of the property of which it is considered an *Avacchedaka*.

This *Anatiriktavṛttitva* has sometimes been clarified, as already stated earlier, as *Svavyāpakatatkatva*⁶ which signifies that the

1. *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti*, p. 219, Chowkhamba.

2. देशे कालस्यैव कालेऽपि देशस्यावच्छेदकत्वात्—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti, p. 227, Chowkhamba.

3. *Nyāyakośa*—p. 73.
Also *Parīṣkāradarpaṇa*—p. 32.

4. *Nyāyakośa*—p. 73.
Also *Parīṣkāradarpaṇa*—p. 32.

5. *Nyāyakośa*—p. 74. Also *Parīṣkāradarpaṇa*, p. 33.
See also *Sāmānyanirukti Dīdhiti*, p. 1550, Chowkhamba.

6. *Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari*, p. 1592, Chowkhamba.

property which is to be limited by the *Avacchedaka* should always be the pervader (*Vyāpaka*) of the *Avacchedaka* itself.

Avacchedakatva in the form of *Anatiriktavṛttitva* is mainly of two kinds.¹ One is the absence of the counterpositiveness determined by the absence existing in the locus of a particular object having been at the same time the absence of the occurrentness existing in the locus of the absence of the same object.² As for example, the *Avacchedakatva* determined by the counterpositiveness of the absence of a jar (*Ghaṭa*) is in the jariness (*Ghaṭatva*). In other words, *Ghaṭatva* is the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the counterpositiveness of the absence of a *Ghaṭa* (jar). This kind of *Avacchedakatva* is nothing other than *Anyūnānatiriktavṛttitva* or *Samānīyatātvā* (co-extensiveness).

The most significant point in regard to the *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Anatiriktavṛttitva* is that the *Avacchedaka* should on no account be existing in more loci than those of the property limited by it.³

The second type of *Anatiriktavṛttitva* has been defined as that object which is qualified by any property through the three relations, namely, *Vyāvartakatva* or differentiatoriness, *Sāmānādhikarāṇya* or co-existence and *Svaṇiṣṭhāvaccchedyatākatva* or the describerness of the limitedness resident in the same property.⁴ As for example, the limiter of the causeness of the jar existing in a stick is *Daṇḍatva* or stickness. Because in *Daṇḍatva* there is *Vyāvartakatva* or differentiatoriness of the causeness resident in a stick described by a *Ghaṭa* or a jar, co-existence (*Sāmānādhikarāṇya*) with the aforesaid causeness and the describerness of the limitedness resident in the aforesaid causeness (*Svaṇiṣṭhāvaccchedyatākatva*).

Of whatever form an *Avacchedakatva* or for the matter of that an *Avacchedaka* may be, the most important and common

1. तच्च द्विविधम्—

Nyāyakośa, p. 72.

2. तच्छून्यावृत्तित्वे सति तदधिकरणवृत्त्यभावाप्रतियोगित्वम्—

Nyāyakośa, p. 72.

3. न हि अतिप्रसक्तमवच्छेदकं संयोगादौ तथात्वाददर्शनात्—

Tattvacintāmaṇi Viśeṣavyāpti, p. 331, Chowkhamba.

4. व्यावर्तकत्व-सामानाधिकरण्य-स्वनिष्ठावच्छेद्यताकत्व-एतत्त्रितयसम्बन्धेन यत्किञ्चिद्धर्मविशिष्टत्वम्

Nyāyakośa, p. 73.

Naiyāyika use of the term *Avacchedaka*, as has justly been pointed out by Prof. Cowell,¹ is as a determining factor of the object limited by it.

Now a very pertinent question arises in our mind—"Why should we after all accept this *Avacchedakatva* or why should we consider something as an *Avacchedaka* of some other object?" Why instead of saying that the *Daṇḍa* or the stick is the cause of the *Ghaṭa* we should say according to the Naiyāyika that *Daṇḍatvāvacchinnaṃ Ghaṭatvāvacchinnaśya Kāraṇam*?

The answer to this question is not far to seek. If the *Avacchedaka* be not accepted, not a single relation like *Kāryatā* (effectness), *Kāraṇatā* (causeness, causality), *Śakyatā* (import), *Pratīyogitā* (counterpositiveness) etc., which are known to be existing between two terms and for the matter of that between two objects can never be explained satisfactorily.² Neither the special qualified knowledge like *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar), *Nilaghaṭo nāsti* (There is no blue jar) etc., nor the contradicted-contradictoriness (*Pratibadhya-pratibandhakabhāva*) etc., which is sometimes known to exist between two forms of knowledge and the like can ever be made clear.³

In the judgement *Daṇḍo Ghaṭasya Kāraṇam* (The stick is the cause of the jar), we understand, according to the Naiyāyikas, that there is causeness (*Kāraṇatā*) in the stick determined by the effectness (*Kāryatā*) residing in the jar. Now this stick, as any other object, has got a number of properties like *Prameyatva* (The contentness of valid knowledge), *Dravyatva* or substantiveness, *Daṇḍatva* or stickness, the generic character of all sticks, and so on. Similarly, the *Ghaṭa* (jar) also has got the like properties. Now, if it is not said specifically that the stick as qualified by the generic character called stickness (*Daṇḍatva*) is the cause of the jar (*Daṇḍaḥ Daṇḍatvena Ghaṭakāraṇam*), one, while considering the stick as a *Dravya* or substance, may take it as the cause of the jar. In that case it comes to the fact that a *Dravya* is considered to be the cause of a jar. This consideration would lead to very

1-2. Udayanācārya, *Kusumāñjali*, Cowell, p. 26.

3. यद्यवच्छेदकत्वं न स्वीक्रियते, तर्ह्यभावविशिष्टबुद्धिप्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धक-
भावादीनां केषामपि व्यवस्था न स्यात्—

Pariṣkāradarpaṇa, p. 15.

much ambiguity inasmuch as any *Dravya* (substance), even other than a stick, may sometimes be understood to be the cause of the jar. Similar arguments may be advanced in favour of the *Ghaṭa* (jar) which is known in this connection as a *Ghaṭa*, qualified, as it is, by *Ghaṭatva* (jarness, the generic character of all the jars).

Similarly, in the case of the knowledge of an absence like *Ghaṭo nāsti* (there is no jar) or *Nilo Ghaṭo nāsti* (there is no blue jar), there cannot be any precision unless the *Ghaṭa* is definitely known as a *Ghaṭa* qualified by *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) and the blue jar (*Nilo Ghaṭaḥ*) in its turn also is definitely known as a jar qualified by both *Nilatva* (blue colour) and *Ghaṭatva* (jarness). The knowledge of the generic absence of a jar (*Ghaṭo nāsti*) has for its content that absence (*Abhāva*) which is qualified by a *Ghaṭa* (jar) as such, whereas the knowledge of the specific or particular absence of the jar (*Nilo Ghaṭo nāsti*) has for its content that absence which is qualified by a blue jar, i.e. a jar qualified by both blueness or blue colour and jarness.

This difference of *Avacchedakatā* or for the matter of that of *Avacchedaka* is responsible for the difference of knowledge¹ in the aforesaid cases. The absence in the form of *Ghaṭo nāsti* is qualified by the *Ghaṭa* (jar) through the relation called *Pratīyogitā* which in its turn is determined by the *Avacchedakatā* residing in *Ghaṭatva* alone. Whereas the absence in the form of *Nilo Ghaṭo nāsti* is qualified by the blue jar (*Nilaghaṭa*) by the same *Pratīyogitā* relation which again is determined here by two *Avacchedakatās* residing in *Nilatva* (blue colour) and *Ghaṭatva* (jarness). Though the objects *Ghaṭa* and *Nilaghaṭa* are one and the same thing² and hence there can be no difference of the two aforesaid negations on that account, yet the difference of the *Avacchedakatās* here has caused the difference between the two kinds of negation.

Similarly, unless *Avacchedakatvas* are accepted or for the matter of that some properties are called *Avacchedakas*, the contradicted-contradictoriness of knowledges cannot be estab-

1. अवच्छेदकतावैलक्षण्यमेव तद्वैलक्षण्यं साधयेत्—

Pariṣkāradarpaṇa, p. 15.

2. न हि भवति नीलो घटो घटान्यः—

Vyāptipañcaka Dīdhiti, p. 82, Chowkhamba.

lished. The definite knowledge (*Niścaya*)¹ of the absence of a jar as a jar would contradict the knowledge of the jar. Now, if the jar is known as a substance (*Dravya*), then the definite knowledge of the absence of the jar as a *Dravya* would not be able to contradict the knowledge of the jar (*Ghaṭa*) as a jar. In other words, the qualifying property of the jar (*Ghaṭa*) should also be taken into account if we are to explain satisfactorily the fact that under certain circumstances one knowledge contradicts the other.

It has been pointed out earlier that *Avacchedakatva* is not considered to be existing in a heavy property (*Gurudharma*). This, in the commonly accepted theory, is in connection with the *Avacchedakatā* in the form of *Svarūpasambandha*.² But *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Anatiriktavṛttitva* is known to exist even in a heavy property.³

It is to be noted in this connection that in later days the philosophers of the Navya Nyāya school held that on the strength of our knowledge in the form of *Kambugrīvādīmān nāsti* (There is the absence of that object which is qualified by the contact etc., between the two final parts of a jar), it can be admitted that the *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Svarūpasambandha* may exist even in a heavy property. In other words, a heavy property also may be an *Avacchedaka* from the standpoint of *Svarūpasambandha*.⁴

The idea underlying this theory is that the knowledge in the form of *Kambugrīvādīmān nāsti* has for its content the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) of all the jars which may be known as qualified by the contact etc., between the two final parts of the jar. This knowledge cannot have for its content the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) of an individual jar, because, in the event

1. तद्वत्ताबुद्धिं प्रति तदभाववृत्तानिश्चयत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वम्
2. लघुधर्मोऽवच्छेदकत्वे सम्भवति गुरुधर्मो स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपमवच्छेदकत्वं न स्वीक्रियते—

Dinakarī, p. 33, N. S. Press edition.

3. अनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपावच्छेदकत्वं गुरावपीति ध्येयम्—

Preface to the commentary on *Avacchedakatvanirukti*—Śivādatta's edition.

4. गौरवप्रतिसन्धानदशायामपि कम्बुग्रीवादित्मान् नास्तीतिप्रतीतिबलाद् गुरुरपि धर्मोऽवच्छेदकः प्रतियोगितायाः

Didhiti, p. 146.

Vāmācāraṇa's edition.

of an individual jar having been known to be existing there as qualified by the contact between the two final parts of the jar, the aforesaid knowledge will never come into being.¹

Owing to the fact that the *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Svarūpasambandha* is accepted even in a heavy property, the statement of the generic absence in the form of *Kambugrīvādimān nāsti* would not be a valid one in regard to the place where even a single jar (*Ghaṭa*) may be existing. On the contrary, it would be valid only in regard to that place where even a single jar may not be existing.²

From the above facts which have just now been mentioned, it can be established that *Kambugrīvādimattva*, though a heavy property (*Gurudharma*) compared to *Ghaṭatva*, must be accepted as the *Avacchedaka* of the *Pratiyogitā* (counterpositiveness) determined by the negation *Kambugrīvādimān nāsti*. Because, the definite knowledge of a jar in a particular place would contradict the knowledge in the form of *Kambugrīvādimān nāsti* only when by that statement the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) of all the jars known as qualified by the contact between the two parts (*Kambugrīva*) of the jar is meant. Here in regard to the knowledge in the form of *Kambugrīvādimān nāsti*, *Kambugrīvā* (the contact between the two final parts of the jar) flashes as an adjective of the counterpositive *Kambugrīvādimān* and therefore on the strength of the knowledge *Kambugrīvādimān nāsti*, the limitorness (*Avacchedakatva*) of the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) should be accepted in *Kambugrīvādimattva* which is a heavy property compared to *Ghaṭatva* (jariness).

As regards *Avacchedakatva* in the form of *Anatiriktavṛttitva*, the commonly accepted Naiyāyika theory is that this form of *Avacchedakatva* may exist even in a heavy property.³

1. न चास्यास्तत्प्रतियोगिकाभावमात्रमवलम्बनम्, तथाविधयत्किञ्चिद्वच्यक्तिसत्त्वे एव तादृशप्रतीतेरनुदयात्—

Avacchedakatvanirukti Dīdhiti, p. 152.

Vāmācarāṇa's edition.

2. अत एवैकघटवति भूतले कम्बुग्रीवादिमान् नास्तीति शब्दो न प्रमाणम्, प्रमाणञ्च घटसामान्यशून्ये—

3. अनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपावच्छेदकत्वं गुरावपीति ध्येयम्—

Śivadatta Mīśra, p. 2.

It has already been mentioned earlier that in the case of the *Avacchedakatva* of the type of *Svarūpasambandha*, all the component parts of the *Avacchedaka* are also considered as so many *Avacchedakas*¹. But this cannot be said in regard to the *Avacchedakatva* of the variety of *Anatiriktavṛttitva* or *Anyūnānatiriktavṛttitva*.

Different kinds of *Avacchedakatvas* having been discussed, the question now arises as to which kind of *Avacchedakatva* should be taken into consideration in a particular context. Generally speaking, the *Avacchedakatva* of the kind of *Svarūpasambandha* is the commonly used type of *Avacchedakatva*. But sometimes *Anatiriktavṛttitva*, *Anyūnānatiriktavṛttitva*, *Svavyāpakatatkatva* are the types of *Avacchedakatvas* which are used in the technical and secondary sense of the term. The principle underlying the use of the different kinds of *Avacchedakas* is the consideration of the absence of objection (*Āpatti*) and inconsistency (*Anupapatti*). If in a particular context the acceptance of a special type of *Avacchedakatva* can satisfactorily explain the situation without in any way giving rise to any objection or inconsistency, then that form of *Avacchedakatva* should certainly be taken into account in that case.

This *Avacchedakatva* is not limited only to some property (*Dharma*) like *Vahnitva* (fireness), etc., but it is equally applicable to the various kinds of relations (*Sambandha*) also. In other words, both the property (*Dharma*) and the relation (*Sambandha*) may be the *Avacchedaka* of a particular object.² The former type of *Avacchedaka* is known as *Avacchedaka* as a property (*Dharmavidhayā Avacchedakāḥ*), whereas the latter variety is called *Avacchedaka* as a relation (*Sambandhavidhayā Avacchedakāḥ*).

1. ननु विशिष्टदोषघटकीभूततदेकदेशविषयतायां स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपावच्छेदकत्वसत्त्वेऽपि—

Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari, p. 1504, Chowkhamba.

“अवच्छेदकत्वम् अवच्छेदकत्वाश्रयत्वम् . . . अवच्छेदकत्वाश्रयश्च तादृश-विशिष्टशरीरघटकपदार्थस्तोम एव”—

Anumiti Dīdhiti Prakāśa, p. 81, Asiatic Society.

2. साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नसाध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताको बोध्यः—

Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri, p. 14, Vāmācaraṇa's edition.

The content (*Viṣaya*) of knowledge, desire etc., which are entities endowed always with a content (*Saviṣayaka padārtha*), is also considered as an *Avacchedaka* by virtue of its being a content¹ of the knowledge etc. Sometimes the terms *Viṣayavidhayā Avacchedaka* are mentioned as *Viṣayatayā*² *Avacchedaka*.

The *Avacchedakatva* or for the matter of that the *Avacchedaka* having been discussed in some detail, it now remains to be stated what precisely is the field of application of the *Avacchedaka*. It has already been mentioned earlier that the relations like *Kāryatā*, *Kāraṇatā* etc., cannot be satisfactorily explained without the acceptance of an *Avacchedaka*. This can be said about all the conceivable properties which may be interrelated with some other property. Hence, there are almost unlimited cases where an *Avacchedaka* may be used for the sake of avoiding ambiguity. We may, therefore, speak of *Pratīyogitāvacchedaka* (for an absence) *Viṣayatāvacchedaka* *Viṣayitāvacchedaka*, *Prakāratāvacchedaka*, *Prakāritāvacchedaka*, *Viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka*, *Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka*, *Viśeṣyitāvacchedaka*, *Kāryatāvacchedaka*, *Kāraṇatāvacchedaka*, *Janyatāvacchedaka*, *Saṁsargatāvacchedaka*, *Saṁsargitāvacchedaka*, *Sambandhatāvacchedaka*, *Sambandhitāvacchedaka*, *Pratīyogitāvacchedaka*, *Anuyogitāvacchedaka*, *Adhikaraṇatāvacchedaka*, *Ādhāratāvacchedaka*, *Ādheyatāvacchedaka*, *Vṛttitāvacchedaka*, *Nirūpakatāvacchedaka*, *Nirūpyatāvacchedaka*, *Nirūpitatāvacchedaka*, *Dharmitāvacchedaka*, *Koṭitāvacchedaka*, *Dhātvarthatāvacchedaka* *Vācyatāvacchedaka*, *Vācakatāvacchedaka*, *Śaktatāvacchedaka*, *Śakyatāvacchedaka*, *Lakṣyatāvacchedaka*, *Sādhyatāvacchedaka*, *Vidheyatāvacchedaka*, *Uddeśyatāvacchedaka*, *Pakṣatāvacchedaka*, *Phalatāvacchedaka*, *Avacchedakatāvacchedaka*, *Avacchedakatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka*, *Hetutāvacchedaka*, *Paryāptyavacchedaka*, *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*, *Vyāpāratāvacchedaka*, *Vyāpyatāvacchedaka*, *Vyāpakatāvacchedaka*, *Janakatāvacchedaka*, *Pratibadhyatāvacchedaka*, *Pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*, *Virodhitāvacchedaka* *Ghaṭakatāvacche-*

1. अनुमितेविषयविश्रया जनकतावच्छेदकात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadīśi, p. 215, Chowkhamba.

2. अनुमितिनिरूपितव्याप्तिज्ञाननिष्ठकारणताया विषयतया अवच्छेदकीभूतायां व्याप्तौ—

Paṇḍita Vāmācarāṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, The Commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 23.

daka, *Prayojakatāvacchedaka*, *Prayojyatāvacchedaka* and so on. These are some of the commonly used *Avacchedakas* which are generally found in the Navya Nyāya treatises. Innumerable objects, as has already been indicated earlier, may be used as *Avacchedakas* and hence it will be a difficult task to enumerate them in detail. Therefore, the principle underlying the use of the *Avacchedaka* should always be taken into consideration. The essence of the principle is the avoidance of ambiguity.

To give example of these above-mentioned *Avacchedakas* in detail would necessarily add a long chapter to the present essay and hence it would be convenient to give example in as brief a manner as possible.

Pratiyogitāvacchedaka (for an absence)—

In the case of the absence of the form of *Ghaṭa nāsti* (there is no jar), *Ghaṭa* is the *Pratiyogī* (counterpositive) of the absence and *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) is the *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka* (limitor of the counterpositiveness).

Viśayatāvacchedaka—

If the *Ghaṭa* (jar) becomes the content (*Viśaya*) of knowledge etc., then the same *Ghaṭatva* would be the *Viśayatāvacchedaka* (limitor of contentness).

Viśayitāvacchedaka—

The corresponding knowledge which is the container (*Viśayi*) of the content (*Viśaya*) has got the generic character *Jñānatva* (knowledgeness). This *Jñānatva* is the *Viśayitāvacchedaka* in this case.

Prakāratāvacchedaka—

In the case of the knowledge of the form of *Ghaṭavad Bhūtaḥ* (the ground is qualified by a jar; literally, the ground is jar-possessing), the *Ghaṭa* (jar) is the *Prakāra* or qualifier of the *Bhūtaḥ* (ground) and *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) is the *Prakāratāvacchedaka* (limitor of the qualificerness).

Prakāritāvacchedaka—

The knowledge in the above-mentioned case is called the *Prakāri* container of the *Prakāra* (qualifier) and the generic character of the knowledge, i.e., knowledgeness *jñānatva* is the *Prakāritāvacchedaka* (limitor of the containerness of the qualifier).

Viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka—

This is almost the same as the *Prakāratāvacchedaka*, the

scope of its application being wider than that of the *Prakāratāvacchedaka*.

Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka—

In the case of the previously-mentioned knowledge *Ghaṭavād Bhūtaḥ*, the *Bhūtaḥ* (ground) is the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) and *Bhūtalatva* (groundness) is the limiter of the qualificandness *Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka*.

Viśeṣyitāvacchedaka—

The generic character of the above-mentioned knowledge, i.e. *jñānatva* is the *Viśeṣyitāvacchedaka* (limitor of the container-ness of the qualificand).

Kāryatāvacchedaka and *Kāraṇatāvacchedaka*—

In the case of *Ghaṭa* (jar) being the effect of a stick etc., (*Daṇḍa*), *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) is the limiter of the effectness *Kāryatāvacchedaka* and *Daṇḍatva* (stickness) is the *Kāraṇatāvacchedaka*, the limiter of the causeness.

Janyatāvacchedaka—

The same as the *Kāryatāvacchedaka*.

Saṃsargatāvacchedaka and *Saṃsargitāvacchedaka*—

When the ground (*Bhūtaḥ*) for example, is known to be qualified by a jar (*Ghaṭa*), the relation of contact between them also is known by the association of the *Ghaṭa* with the *Bhūtaḥ*. Here the relation of contact between the jar and the ground is a special relation called *Samyoga* (contact). The term *Sambandha* is synonymous with the term *Saṃsarga* which also means relation. Hence *Samyogatva* (contactness) here is the limiter of the relationness. *Saṃsargatāvacchedaka* and the corresponding *jñānatva* (knowledge) is the *Saṃsargitāvacchedaka*.

Sambandhatāvacchedaka and *Sambandhitāvacchedaka*—

Same as *Saṃsargatāvacchedaka* and *Saṃsargitāvacchedaka*.

Pratīyogitāvacchedaka and *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* (for a relation)—

In the case of a relation, there are always two objects which may be mutually connected through that relation. The object which may exist on some other object through a relation is called the *Pratīyogī* (adjunct) of that relation and the substratum on which the object exists is called the *Anuyogī* (subjunct). The limiter of the *Pratīyogitā* (adjunctness) here is called *Pratīyogitāvacchedaka*, whereas the limiter of the *Anuyogitā* (subjunctness)

is called the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka*. In the case of a jar (*Ghaṭa*) existing on the ground (*Bhūtala*) *Ghaṭatva* (Jariness) is the *Pratīyogitāvacchedaka* (Limiter of the adjunctness) and *Bhūtalatva* (Groundness) is the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* (Limiter of the sub-junctness) of the relation.

Adhikaraṇatāvacchedaka *Ādhāratāvacchedaka* and
Ādheyatāvacchedaka or *Vṛttitāvacchedaka*—

The locus of an object is called *Adhikaraṇa* or *Ādhāra* (Substratum) and the object which exists on the *Adhikaraṇa* is called *Ādheya* (Superstratum) or *Vṛtti*. The limiter of the *Adhikaraṇatā* or *Ādhāratā* is called *Adhikaraṇatāvacchedaka* or *Ādhāratāvacchedaka* and the limiter of the *Ādheyatā* or *Vṛttitā* is called *Ādheyatāvacchedaka* or *Vṛttitāvacchedaka*. If a jar (*Ghaṭa*) exists on the ground (*Bhūtala*) then *Ghaṭatva* (jariness) is the *Ādheyatāvacchedaka* or *Vṛttitāvacchedaka* and *Bhūtalatva* is the *Adhikaraṇatāvacchedaka* or *Ādhāratāvacchedaka*.

Nirūpakatāvacchedaka and *Nirūpyatāvacchedaka*—

In the Navya Nyāya terminology mutually interrelated objects are called either *Nirūpita* (Determined, Described) or *Nirūpaka* (Determiner, Describer) as the case may be. As for example, in the case of a negative judgment like *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar), the *Pratīyogitā* (Counterpositiveness) residing in the *Ghaṭa* is determined (*Nirūpita*) by the absence (*Abhāva*) of the *Ghaṭa*, and conversely, the *Abhāva* is the *Nirūpaka* (Determiner) of the *Pratīyogitā*. Now, the absenceness (*Abhāvatva*) is the limiter of the *Nirūpakatā* (*Nirūpakatāvacchedaka*) existing in the *Abhāva*, whereas the *Pratīyogitā* (The special feature of the *Pratīyogitā*, counterpositiveness) is the limiter of the *Nirūpyatā* (*Nirūpyatāvacchedaka*) existing in the *Pratīyogitā*.

Nirūpitatvāvacchedaka—

This is the same as *Nirūpyatāvacchedaka* which has just now been described.

Dharmitāvacchedaka—

The *Viśeṣya* or the qualificand is sometimes called by the term *Dharmin* (The substratum of a *Dharma*, property). Hence *Dharmitāvacchedaka* is the same as *Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka* which has already been described.

Koṭitāvacchedaka—

In the case of a doubt (*Samśaya*), the two opposite sides of the doubt are called by the term *Koṭi*. As for example, in the

knowledge having the form "The mountain may or may not be fire-possessing" (*Parvato vahnīmān na vā*), the two contradictory sides are fire (*Vahni*) and the absence of fire (*Vahnyabhāva*). Hence, *Koṭitā* (sideness) in connection with the above-mentioned doubt resides in both *Vahni* (Fire) and *Vahnyabhāva* (Absence of fire). Therefore, the limiter of the *Koṭitā* (*Koṭitāvacchedaka*) is both *Vahnitva* (Fireness) and *Vahnyabhāvatva* (The absence-ness of the fire).

Dhātvarthatāvacchedaka—

Dhātvartha means the meaning of a root. As for example, the meaning of the root *Gam* is that operation by which one is connected with the subsequent place (*Uttaradeśasaṃyogānukūlayāpāra*). Here the limiter of the *Dhātvarthatā* existing in the meaning of the root *Gam* is *Uttaradeśasaṃyoga* or the contact with the subsequent place.

Vācyatāvacchedaka and Vācakatāvacchedaka—

The primary meaning of a term is called the *Vācyārtha* or simply *Vācyā*. The limiter of the *Vācyatā* (Primary import) existing in the meaning is called *Vācyatāvacchedaka*. As for example, *Gotva* or the generic character of all the cows is the *Vācyatāvacchedaka* (Limiter of the *Vācyatā*), whereas the generic character of the term *Go* which may be called *Go-śabdatva* for the sake of unambiguity, although it may be called *Gotva* also, as distinct from the generic character called *Gotva* existing in all the cows, is the limiter of the *Vācakatā* (the capacity of a word to express its primary meaning).

Śaktatāvacchedaka and Sakyatāvacchedaka—

The same as *Vācyatāvacchedaka* and *Vācakatāvacchedaka*.

Lakṣyatāvacchedaka—

The secondary meaning of a term is called the *Lakṣyārtha* and the special characteristic feature of the secondary meaning of the term is the *Lakṣyatāvacchedaka*. As for example, the secondary meaning of the term *Gaṅgā* is the bank of the river, whereas, the special characteristic feature of the bank of the river (*Tīratva*) is the *Lakṣyatāvacchedaka*.

Sādhyatāvacchedaka—

The object of an inference is called the *Sādhyā* and the special characteristic feature of the *Sādhyā* is the *Sādhyatāvacchedaka*. If *Vahni* or fire happens to be the object of inference (*Sādhyā*),

in a particular case, then *Vahnitva* or fireness would be the *Sādhyatāvacchedaka*.

Uddeśyatāvacchedaka and *Vidheyatāvacchedaka*—

In the case of an inference, *Uddeśyatāvacchedaka* is the same as the *Pakṣatāvacchedaka* and *Vidheyatāvacchedaka* is the same as the *Sādhyatāvacchedaka*. As for example, when fire (*Vahni*) is inferred on a mountain (*Parvata*), *Vahnitva* (Fireness) becomes the *Vidheyatāvacchedaka* and *Parvatatva* (Mountainness) the *Uddeśyatāvacchedaka*.

In other cases also where fire is predicated of a mountain, the same *Vahnitva* becomes the *Vidheyatāvacchedaka* and *Parvatatva* the *Uddeśyatāvacchedaka*, only the meaning becomes changed in different contexts.

Pakṣatāvacchedaka—

The same as the *Uddeśyatāvacchedaka* while mentioned in the context of an inference.

Phalatāvacchedaka—

The effect of something is called a *Phala*. But sometimes the word *Phala* is used in connection with the effect of an action which may be the meaning of a root verb (*Dhātvartha*). As for example, the contact (*Samyoga*) between the foot of a man who may be going to a village and the village concerned is the effect of the movement of the foot. Here *Samyoga* is the *Phala* (Effect) of the movement of the foot and *Samyogatva* is the *Phalatāvacchedaka*, the limiter of the effectness.

Avacchedakatāvacchedaka and *Avacchedakatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka*—

These terms may be used in connection with any property like *Sādhyatā*, *Pratīyogitā* etc. As for example, in the case of an inferential argument like *Daṇḍimān Daṇḍisaṃyogāt*, the *Sādhyā* of the inference is the *Daṇḍin* and the *Sādhyatāvacchedaka* is the *Daṇḍa* (Stick), whereas the *Sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* is *Daṇḍatva* (Stickness).

Other similar terms like *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* etc., should also be understood in the same manner.

Hetutāvacchedaka—

In the general sense, the term *Hetu* means a cause. In that case *Hetutāvacchedaka* means the limiter of the causeness. In this sense it is identical with *Kāraṇatāvacchedaka*. As for example,

when a stick (*Daṇḍa*) is considered to be the cause of a jar, stickness (*Daṇḍatva*) will then be the limiter of causeness (*Hetutāvacchedaka* or *Kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) existing in the stick.

But in the context of a syllogism of an inference, *Hetutāvacchedaka* would mean the limiter of the argumentness (*Hetutā*) existing in the argument or cause (*Hetu*) of the inference. In the familiar example of the smoke *Dhūma* being the argument or cause (*Hetu*) of the inference of fire (*Vahni*) on a mountain (*Parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*), smokeness (*Dhūmatva*) would be the limiter of argumentness or causeness (*Hetutāvacchedaka*) existing in the argument or cause (*Hetu*) which is smoke (*Dhūma*) in this case.

Paryāptyavacchedaka or *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*—

The subjunct (*Anuyogī*) of an entity through a particular kind of relation which is called *Paryāpti* is called *Paryāptyanuyogī*. According to the generally accepted theory, an entity exists simultaneously in a group of objects through the *Paryāpti* relation and not in the different component parts of the group.¹ The number of the subjunct is the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka* or briefly *Paryāptyavacchedaka*. Other properties existing in the subjunct (*Anuyogī*) cannot be considered as the *Avacchedaka* of the subjunctness of the *Paryāpti* because they are either too wide or too narrow.

Thus in the case of the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* of the negation or absence in the form of *Nilaghaṭo nāsti* (There is no blue jar), the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā*, according to the general theory, exists on both *Nilatva* (Blueness) and *Ghaṭatva* (Jarness) through the *Paryāpti* relation. Here the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* is the *Dvītva Saṃkhyā* or the twoness existing in the two properties *Nilatva* (Blueness) and the *Ghaṭatva* (Jarness) as a whole. The twoness is the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*, because any other property would either be too narrow or too wide.

Vyāpāratāvacchedaka—

Vyāpāra means activity. As for example, the root *Gam* (to go) exactly means the activity as a result of which one may be connected with a subsequent place *Uttaradeśasaṃyogānukūla*

1. उभयत्वमुभयत्रैव पर्याप्तम्, न तु एकत्र इति सिद्धान्तादरे—

Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri.

Vyāpāraḥ). Here the *vyāpāra* or activity is in fact the movement of the feet, if of course, the man goes on foot. Now, the limiter of the *Vyāpāra* here would be *Vyāpāratva* or actionness, that is to say, the special attribute of the action by virtue of which it is called as such.

Vyāpyatāvacchedaka—

Vyāpya means pervaded. That is the object which is the abode (*Āśraya*) of *Vyāpti* (Pervasion or invariable concomitance).¹ Hence *Vyāpyatāvacchedaka* is the limiter of *Vyāpyatā* existing in the *Vyāpya*. As for example, smoke is pervaded by fire. It is the *Vyāpya* of fire. Therefore, smokeness (*Dhūmatva*) is the *Vyāpyatāvacchedaka* or limiter of *Vyāpyatā* here.

Vyāpakatāvacchedaka—

This is just the counterpart of the *Vyāpyatāvacchedaka*. *Vyāpaka* means the pervader. Hence *Vyāpakatāvacchedaka* means the limiter of the pervaderness. As for example, *Vahni* or fire is the pervader of smoke *Dhūma*. The fireness (*Vahnitva*) is the limiter of *Vyāpakatā* or pervaderness.

Janakatāvacchedaka—

This is the same as the *Kāraṇatāvacchedaka*. When a jar (*Ghaṭa*) is produced by a stick (*Danḍa*) along with other cause, stickness or *Danḍatva* would be the limiter of *Janakatva* existing in the stick.

Pratibadhyatāvacchedaka—

This *Avacchedaka* (Limiter) is used in the connection of a knowledge, etc., which may be contradicted by some other knowledge, etc. As for example, the knowledge of a jar is contradicted by the definite knowledge of the absence of a jar. In that case, the knowledge of the jar is the *Pratibadhya* or contradicted and the knowledgedness (*Jñānatva*) is the limiter of the contradictedness (*Pratibadhyatāvacchedaka*).

Virodhyatāvacchedaka—

This is the same as *Pratibadhyatāvacchedaka*.

Pratibandhakatāvacchedaka—

This kind of *Avacchedaka* is used in the case of a knowledge, etc., which happens to be contradictory to another knowledge,

1. व्याप्यो नाम व्याप्त्याश्रयः—

Siddhānta-muktāvalī, Anumāna Khaṇḍa.

etc. As for example, the definite knowledge (*Niścaya*) of the absence of a jar (*Ghaṭa*) contradicts the knowledge of a jar. Here definite knowledgeness (*Niścayatva*) is the *Pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* (Limiter of the contradictoriness).

Virodhitāvacchedaka—

This is the same as *Pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*.

Ghaṭakatāvacchedaka—

Something which is the component part of some other object is called the *Ghaṭaka* of that subject. As for example, *Ghaṭa* (Jar) in *Nilaghaṭa* is the component part of *Nālaghaṭa*. Here *Nilatva* (Blueness) or *Ghaṭatva* (Jarness) is the *Ghaṭakatāvacchedaka* or the limiter of the componentness.

Prayojyatāvacchedaka and *Prayojakatāvacchedaka*—

An object which is caused by a remote cause or rather which comes into being on account of the influence of a remote object is called the *Prayojya* of that object and the object which exercises influence on some other object from a remote place is called *Prayojaka*. Sometimes the cause of an effect is also called *Prayojaka* in the logical terminology. Hence *Prayojakatva* is that attribute which is to be found commonly in a cause and in an object which exerts influence from a remote place. Therefore, *Prayojyatāvacchedaka* or *Prayojakatāvacchedaka* is the limiter of that attribute which is to be found in the remote effect as also in the cause or the remote object exercising influence on an effect as the case may be. As for example, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (*Vyāpti*) is the cause of Inference whereas the *Vyāpti* being an object of the knowledge which is the cause of Inference is the remote object exercising influence on the Inference. Hence the special feature of the *Vyāpti jñāna* (Knowledge of *Vyāpti*) which may be called *Vyāptijñānatva* (Knowledgeness existing in the knowledge of *Vyāpti*) is the limiter of the *Prayojakatā* existing in the cause and the *Vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) which happens to be the object of the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is also called the *Prayojaka* by virtue of its being the object of the above-mentioned knowledge *Viśayavidhayā Avacchedaka*.

Kevalānvayitāvacchedaka—

Some properties like *Abhidheyatva*, *Prameyatva*, etc., are called *Kevalānvayi*, i.e. existing everywhere which cannot be negated

at all. Here the objects like *Abhidheyatva*, etc., or limiter of the condition or state of being the meaning of a word etc., are called the *Kevalānvayitāvacchedaka* or the limiter of *Kevalānvayitā*.

These are the *Avacchedakas* in general which the Neo-logicians (Navya Naiyāyikas) have used in their treatises to analyse the objects according to their own points of view. Of course, I do not want to say that these are the only *Avacchedakas* used in the Navya Nyāya treatises, because, there may yet be innumerable instances where different types of *Avacchedakas* may be taken into consideration. But if these cases of *Avacchedakas* are properly understood, other possible instances of *Avacchedakas* will not be difficult to grasp.

From another standpoint this *Avacchedakatva* is yet broadly divided into two kinds. One is called *Dharmavidhayā Avacchedaka* or *Avacchedaka* by virtue of a property. And the other is called *Sambandhavidhayā Avacchedaka* or *Avacchedaka* by virtue of being a relation. As for example, in the case of a fire (*Vahni*) being an object of Inference by the relation of contact (*Samyoga*), the objectness (*Sādhyatā*) of Inference existing in the fire (*Vahni*) is limited both by *Vahnitva* (fireness) and the relation of *Samyoga* (Contact). The former is a limiter (*Avacchedaka*) by virtue of being a property, whereas the latter is so by virtue of being a relation.

This *Avacchedaka* may be determined either directly or indirectly by any property. According to this theory *Avacchedakatva*, *Avacchedakatāvacchedakatva* etc., are but the various forms of the same *Avacchedakatva*. They are differentiated only on account of the different determinants (*Nirūpaka*) like *Sādhyatā*, *Sādhyatāvacchedakatā*, etc.

But this theory is not universally accepted. Just as the state or condition of being a father or a grandfather and so on is pervaded by the state of being a father, or in other words, the state of being a father is common to all who may have produced a son, yet the father is exclusively called father and not the grandfather, etc., although the grandfather, etc., may certainly be called father with reference to somebody. Similarly, *Avacchedaka* *Avacchedakatāvacchedaka* etc., have a feature of *Avacchedakatva* in them, but only an *Avacchedaka* is called as such and not an *Avacchedakatāvacchedaka* or the like.

In this connection, it may be useful to note that the adjectives of an *Avacchedaka* or the component parts thereof are sometimes called *Avacchedakas*.¹ But this is not the universally accepted theory as is clearly indicated by the word *Pakṣe* in the *Subodhinī*, a gloss on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī*.

This *Avacchedakatva* when limited either by a property or by a relation, becomes different according to the difference of the limiting property or the relation.² In this case the *Avacchedakatva* resides in different objects and hence individually it is many in number. But even then, this *Avacchedakatva* may exist simultaneously in more than one object from the standpoint of being limited by *Avacchedakatātva*.³

One more point is to be mentioned in this connection. If there is a possibility of a pure and unqualified object becoming an *Avacchedaka*, then the qualified object is not considered as such.⁴

1. अवच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टानामपि अवच्छेदकत्वपक्षे—

Subodhinī, p. 26.

2. कारणतावच्छेदकता विभिन्नधर्मावच्छिन्ना नाना—

Subodhinī, p. 27.

गोत्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकतातोऽवयवसंयोगनिष्ठावच्छेदकताया भिन्नत्वात्
तदवच्छेदकसंसर्गादीनां भिन्नत्वात्—

Nāmaprakaraṇa, p. 143, *Kṛṣṇakānta*, Commentary on *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*.

3. “अवच्छेदकत्वस्य वह्नित्वमहानसीयत्वादिनिष्ठस्य भिन्नत्वेऽपि अनुगतेन
तत्तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतात्वेन रूपेण व्यासज्यवृत्तिताया . . . दीधितिकारस्या-
नुमतत्वात्”—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 614,

Asiatic Society.

4. केवलस्यावच्छेदकत्वासम्भवे एव विशिष्टस्य तथात्वस्वीकारात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadīśī, p. 211, Chowkhamba edition.

CHAPTER II

SAMBANDHA (RELATION)

The edifice of Navya Nyāya rests to a great extent on the conception of *Sambandha* or relation. Indeed the conception of relation is so interesting and all-pervasive that on account of its intensive application Navya Nyāya can be called Relational Logic viewed from this angle of vision. Anything which has most precisely been enunciated in the Navya Nyāya has been done so with the help of relations. Hence, the Navya Naiyāyikas were humorously called *Sambandhī*, a term which in Bengali and in some other allied languages refers to the brother of one's wife, with whom cutting of jokes is permissible according to social convention.¹ But humour apart, the application of relation in the Navya Nyāya indeed has a very important place. All the later clarifications (*Parīṣkāra*) of objects have been made with the help of relations.

According to some Navya Naiyāyikas, a special determinant of a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭadhī*), that is, knowledge having for its content a qualified object, is called a relation.²

But another scholar thinks that this definition of a relation is rather a round about one, inasmuch as it has got *Niyama* or *Vyāpti* or invariable concomitance included in it. Hence, in the case of the definition of *Vyāpti*, the definition would become unknowable because of its being comprised of the same *Vyāpti* and hence the technical defect called *Ātmāśraya*³ would crop up.

1. “भावादभावाद्यदि नातिरिक्तः सम्बन्धिभिः स्वीक्रियते पदार्थः ।
जन्याविनाशि प्रतियोगिशून्यं श्रीलक्ष्मणक्षौणिपतेर्यशः किम् ॥”
Phañibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgiśa, Introduction to *Nyāyaparicaya*, p. 5.
2. विशिष्टप्रतीतिनियामकविशेषस्यैव सम्बन्धत्वात्—
Vyadhikaraṇa Dīdhiti prakāśa, p. 135, Asiatic Society.
विशिष्टधीनियामकस्यैव तथात्वात्
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 252, Chowkhamba edition.
3. ननु स्वरूपसम्बन्धात्मकप्रतियोगित्वस्य विशिष्टधीजनकत्वरूपनियम-
घटितत्वादात्माश्रयत्वम्—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 255, Chowkhamba edition.

Therefore, relation has been defined otherwise by Jagadīśa as the contentness (*Viśayatā*) other than the qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatva*) and the qualifierness (*Viśeṣaṇatva*) of a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭadhī*).¹

The idea underlying the above definition is this : In a qualified knowledge, three things become primarily the object or content of knowledge, namely, the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*), the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the relation (*Sambandha*) between the two. Hence, the relation is that content of the qualified knowledge which is other than the qualificand and the qualifier. As for example, in the knowledge *Daṇḍi puruṣa*—A man with a stick or A man qualified by a stick—three things are primarily considered as the content, the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*), man (*Puruṣa*), the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) stick (*Daṇḍa*) and the relation between the two, which in this particular case is the contact (*Samyoga*) between both of them. Hence by eliminating the qualificand and the qualifier we can get the relation as the remaining content of the qualified knowledge.

Relation has been defined by many other scholars like Gadādhara, etc., in different ways, but it is not necessary to discuss all of them here, those mentioned earlier being quite sufficient for our purpose.

Relations have broadly been divided into two categories, one type is called *Vṛttiniyāmaka* or occurrence-exacting and the other is known as *Vṛtṭyaniyāmaka* or non-occurrence-exacting. In the first category three kinds of relations are included, namely, *Viśeṣaṇatā* or the qualification relation, *Samyoga* or contact and *Samavāya* or inherence. These along with *Tādātmya* or identity are called relations in the primary sense of the term.² *Viśeṣaṇtā* may be either *Abhāviya-viśeṣaṇatā*—absential qualification relation, or *Kālika-viśeṣaṇatā*—temporal qualification.

In the secondary sense relations are many, as has rightly been noted by Prof. Ingalls.³ Each and every object may be consi-

1. विशेष्यविशेषणत्वान्यविशिष्टधीविषयत्वम् एव सम्बन्धत्वमिति भावः—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadīśī, p. 256, Chowkhamba edition.

2. तच्च तादात्म्य-विशेषणता-संयोग-समवायेष्वेव मुख्यम्—
Commentary of Paṇḍita Ananta Kumāra Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha on
Jñānalakṣaṇāvicāra-rahasya, page 3.

3. *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*—Article 47, p. 74.

dered a relation or at least a component part of the same. Hence, as the objects are many the relations in the secondary sense also are countless in number.

Whether occurrence-exacting (*Vṛttiniyāmaka*) or non-occurrence-exacting (*Vṛtṭyanīyāmaka*), a relation is always conceived between two terms, or to be more precise, between two entities. Of course, in the case of the relation of identity (*Abheda sambandha* or *tādātmya sambandha*), the relation subsists in one and the same entity. In that case also the same entity may be imaginatively considered to a certain extent different by virtue of its being the adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) and the subjunct (*Anuyogī*) of the relation. Nevertheless, from the practical standpoint, the relation of identity is considered to be existing in one and the same entity.

The occurrence-exacting (*Vṛttiniyāmaka*) relations, as already stated, are primarily of three kinds.

Now let us discuss some of the relations separately.

Occurrent-exacting relations

(Vṛttiniyāmaka sambandha) : Saṁyoga

Saṁyoga or contact is an occurrence-exacting relation. It is a quality (*Guṇa*) and is supposed to exist in more than one substance (*Dravya*) through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). *Saṁyoga* has been defined as the uncommon (*Asādhāraṇa*) cause of the dealing (*Vyavahāra*) as "These two are connected."¹

This relation is generally known as a relation of incomplete occurrence² (*Avyāpyavṛtti*), because when a contact takes place between two substances (*Dravyas*), it occurs only in a part of them, if of course, the two substances have got parts. But there may be instances in which a contact may be of complete occurrence³ (*Vyāpyavṛtti*) also. As for example, in the case of a contact between two atoms (*Paramāṇu*) or between the mind and the

1. "इमौ संयुक्तौ" इति व्यवहारहेतुरित्यर्थः—

Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpikā, p. 32,

Vemkateswar Press edition, Bombay.

2. "अव्याप्यवृत्तिः संयोगः"—

Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpikā, p. 32,

Vemkateswar Press edition, Bombay.

3. Mahāmāhopadhyāya Phanibhusaṇa Tarkavagish, *Nyāya Paricaya*. p. 96.

soul or in similar other cases, the contact cannot be of incomplete occurrence, because, the atoms have got no parts or the soul also is considered partless. So also the mind in the Nyāya system is considered as having no part. In the case of the contact between the mind and the soul, there is, of course, some difference inasmuch as the contact subsisting in the mind is of complete occurrence, whereas the contact subsisting in the soul is of incomplete occurrence, because the soul being all-pervasive the contact of the mind with the soul must necessarily be confined to a particular place of the soul limited by some space or time, and hence it must be of incomplete occurrence while subsisting in the soul.

There are some subdivisions of this contact. According to some scholars it is of two kinds, one caused by action and the other by contact.¹

Some scholars again divide this contact into three sub-classes² and multiply some instances which may be dissolved into the previously stated theory of the contact having two classes.

Relations according to Mathematical Logic may be dyadic, triadic etc., in accordance with the number of terms they contain.³ From that standpoint also contact is evidently dyadic inasmuch as it subsists between two substances. But it may be called triadic, etc., from different angles of vision. In a case where two or more substances simultaneously come in contact with some other substance or conversely, where one substance simultaneously comes in contact with two or more substances, the contact there may be called triadic, etc., from the standpoint of Mathematical Logic, though slightly from a different angle of vision. Mathematical logic conceives relations as triadic, etc., when A comes in contact with C through B. But in the above stated cases A and B simultaneously come in contact with C or A simultaneously comes in contact with B and C. To use the terminology of Navya Nyāya, we may say that in the former case, A and B are the two adjuncts of the relation (*Samsarga-*

1. संयोगो द्विविधः—कर्मजः संयोगश्च—

Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā, p. 32.

2. “कीर्तितस्त्रिविधस्त्वेष”—

etc.—*Bhāṣā-Pariccheda*, Verses 116-119.

3. *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*—p. 72.

Pratīyogī) and C the subjunct (*Anuyogī*), whereas in the latter, A alone is the adjunct and B and C together are the subjuncts of the contact.

Contact is a direct relation (*Sākṣāt sambandha*), because it directly connects two or more substances, but it can be the component part of an indirect relation (*Paramparā sambandha*) also. As for example, when we perceive the colour of a jar the relation there would be *Samīyukta-samavāya*¹ or inherence in the substance contacted, because colour is inhered in the jar which is connected through the relation of contact with the eye.² There are other indirect relations also in which the relation of contact forms a component part.

Samavāya :

Samavāya or inherence

Samavāya or inherence also is an occurrence-exacting relation. It is supposed to exist between the part and the whole, the generic character (*Jāti*) and the individual manifestation (*Vyakti*), the quality and the substance qualified, the action and the substance, the substratum of action, the eternal substance and the ultimate difference (*Viśeṣa*). Generic character, as already stated, exists in the individual manifestations (*Vyakti*) through this relation of inherence. The individual manifestations may be either substance (*Dravya*) or quality (*Guṇa*) or action (*Karma* or *Kriyā*). Those substances which have their parts, inhere in their parts alone. Hence eternal substances like the soul, ether, etc., cannot inhere in anything for the simple reason of their being partless.

Though *Samavāya*, according to the Naiyāyikas, can be known by the sense organs³, yet there are philosophers of other school who do not accept the theory. The Vaiśeṣikas, particularly, hold that *Samavāya* cannot be known by perception.⁴ They, of course, have got their own argument.

1. घटरूपप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवायसन्निकर्षः—
Tarkasamgraha, p. 42, Veṅkaṭeswar Press edition.
2. “चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायात्”—
Ibid.
3. “क्रियां जातिं योग्यवृत्तिं समवायं च तादृशम् ।
गृह्णाति चक्षुः सम्बन्धादालोकोद्भूतरूपयोः ॥”
Bhāṣāpariccheda, Verse 55.
4. “वैशेषिकमते तु समवायो न प्रत्यक्षः ।”
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verse 61.

The Naiyāyikas who hold that *Samavāya* can be known by the sense organs, are of the opinion that there is regular contact of the sense organ with the *Samavāya* and hence it can be known by perception. We can have perceptual knowledge of *Samavāya* in the form of *Rūpasamavāyavān ghaṭaḥ* or the “Jar is qualified by the *Samavāya* of colour.” In this knowledge the *Samavāya* also has become the content of the perceptual knowledge along with some other objects. The *Samavāya* in this case exists in the jar through the *Svarūpasambandha* or the nature relation. The *Samavāya* is the qualifier of the jar which has got its contact with the eye. The contentness (*Viśayatā*) in the form of qualificerness (*Viśeṣaṇatā*) is in the *Samavāya*. Hence in the perception of *Samavāya* the relation called *Indriyasambaddha-viśeṣaṇatā* or the qualificerness determined by the object having its contact with the sense-organ is the cause.¹

Inherence as a relation can be established by inference in the case of any dispute. The knowledge in the form of A jar qualified by a quality (*Guṇavān Ghaṭaḥ*) or A jar qualified by an action (*Kriyāvān Ghaṭaḥ*) has got three objects as its content—the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*), the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) and the relation (*Sambandha*) of the two.² Now, the qualifier and the qualificand here are either the quality and the jar—a substance, or the action and the jar. Hence, the remaining content of the afore-said knowledge is the relation. The relation in this particular case cannot be the contact (*Samyoga*), because contact exists only between two substances.³ Other relations like absential qualification relation (*Abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā sambandha*) or the temporal qualification relation (*Kālika-viśeṣaṇatā-sambandha*) etc., cannot be conceived here as the relation on account of the non-applica-

1. एवं ‘रूपसमवायवान् घटः’ इत्यत्र समवायप्रत्यक्षस्थले चक्षुःसम्बद्धघटे विशेषणं समवायः स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन वर्तते—विशेषणतारूपा विषयता समवायनिष्ठा । अतःसमवायप्रत्यक्षे इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणतासन्निकर्षः कारणम्
Kṛṣṇaballabhācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, p. 204, Chowkhamba edition.
2. गुणक्रियादिविशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात् दण्डी पुरुषः इति विशिष्टबुद्धिबत् इत्यनुमानम्—
Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 87, N. S. Press edition.
3. द्रव्ययोरेव संयोग इति नियमादिति भावः—
Dinakarī, p. 87, N. S. Press edition.

bility¹ of those relations in this particular case owing to the different nature of the qualifier and the qualificand.

This inherence is one² in number and it is conceived as eternal³. A very interesting point is raised in this connection. If the relation of inherence is one and the same, then the inherence of touch and the inherence of colour being identical, an objection may be raised that the air (*Vāyu*) also should be endowed with colour, because the inherence of colour also is there.⁴ The existence of a relation establishes the existence of the related through that relation.

To give answer to this objection it has been said finally that the relation of colour is not inherence (*Samavāya*) but the locusness described by inherence qualified by the association of colour by virtue of its being the describer of inherence.⁵

The more modern Navya Naiyāyikas headed by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, of course, have given altogether a different solution. They say that the cognition in the form of "The inherence of smell is in the earth and not in the water" clearly proves that inherence is not one, but many in number.⁶ Hence,

1. "एतेन संयोगादिबाधात् समवायसिद्धिः"—
Siddhāntamuktāvalī p. 87, N. S. Press edition
2. "लाघवादेकसमवायसिद्धिः"—
Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 88.
3. "समवायत्वं नित्यसम्बन्धत्वम्"—
Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 86.
4. न च समवायैकत्वे वायौ रूपवत्ताबुद्धिप्रसंगः—
Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 88.
5. "रूपनिरूपितत्वविशिष्टसमवायनिरूपिताधिकरणताया एव रूपसम्बन्धत्वात् ।"
Dinakarī, p. 89.
6. 'पृथिव्यां रूपस्य समवायो न जले' इत्यादि प्रतीतेः समवायस्य नानात्वमिति तु नव्याः—
Dinakarī, p. 89
समवायोऽपि नैको जलादेर्गन्धादिमत्त्वप्रसंगात्—
Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa, p. 76.
'जले स्नेहस्य समवायो न गन्धस्य' इत्यादिप्रतीतेरेव समवायस्य नानात्वम्—
Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, Commentary on *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*
p. 126.
तथाविधविशिष्टनिरूपिताधिकरणताया अतिरिक्तत्वे किमपराद्धं विभिन्न-
समवायैरिति—
Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra, Commentary on *Padārtha-tattvanirūpaṇa*,
p. 76.

the inherence of colour not being admitted in the air, the afore-said objection does not arise at all.¹

Viśeṣaṇatā-sambandha

Viśeṣaṇatā-sambandha or qualification relation is of two kinds. One is called *Abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣasambandha* or absential particular qualification relation and the other is called *Kālika-viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣasambandha* or temporal particular qualification relation. The former category is used in the case of the occurrence of an absence (*Abhāva*) in its locus, whereas the second type is used in the case of the occurrence of objects in a portion of time (*Khaṇḍa-kāla*) or universal time (*Mahākāla*). By *Khaṇḍakāla* or 'portion of time' is meant any entity that may be caused by anything (*Janyamātram Kālopādhiḥ*). Time, of course, is one and eternal. It has got no part whatsoever in the proper sense of the term. Only the imposed properties (*Upādhi*) help us to consider time in a piecemeal way.²

Now let us come to the *Abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa* relation. This relation is called *Viśeṣaṇatā* (qualification) because it is considered identical with the absence³ (*Abhāva*) which generally is cognized as a qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) as in the cognition *Bhūtalaṃ Ghaṭābhāvavati*⁴ or the earth is absence-of-the-jar-possessing. In other words, the absence of the jar is the qualifier of the ground. The abstract *Viśeṣaṇatā* or qualifierness is here considered identical with the *Viśeṣaṇa* or qualifier. In some cases the absence is cognized as the qualificand⁵ (*Viśeṣya*) as in the judgement: "The absence of the jar is on the ground" (*Bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*). Hence, sometimes this *Viśeṣaṇatā* is called *Viśeṣaṇa*-

1. "तथा च तन्मते समवायस्य रूपसम्बन्धत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः वायौ रूपसमवायानङ्गीकारादिति भावः—
Rāmarudrī, p. 89.
2. क्षणादिः स्यादुपाधितः—
Bhāṣā-pariccheda, verse 46.
3. विशेषणविशेष्यभावी विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपमेव, नातिरिक्तसम्बन्धः—
Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā, p. 44,
Venkateswar Press edition.
4. "घटाभाववदिति, भूतलं विशेष्यम्, घटाभावो विशेषणम् । 'भूतले घटो नास्ति' इत्यत्र अभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् ।
Tarkasaṃgraha Dīpikā, p. 43.
5. अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषण-विशेष्यभावः सन्निकर्षः—
Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 53. Venkateswar Press edition.

viśeṣya-bhāvaḥ, i.e., the state or condition of being a qualifier or a qualificand.

This relation is called *Abhāvīya-viśeṣaṇatā sannikarṣa* or absential qualification relation, because the *Viśeṣaṇatā* is determined or described (*Nirūpita*) by the absence (*Abhāva*). It is called *Viśeṣa* or particular because it has got some distinctive feature from other types of relation even of the same nature.

Kālika-sambandha

The conception of *Kālika-sambandha* or temporal relation is also very important in the Navya Nyāya, because, the use of this relation has been made in the Navya Nyāya treatises in innumerable instances.

This temporal relation may be either direct (*Sākṣāt*) or indirect (*Paramparā*) in nature. When all the entities, eternal and non-eternal, are supposed to exist directly in the universal time (*Mahākāla*), the universal time itself is considered as the relation without any other medium whatsoever. Though eternal and all-pervading entities like the ether (*Ākāśa*) etc., are not universally accepted as residing in time, yet according to certain schools of Navya Nyāya, the all-pervading and eternal entities like the ether (*Ākāśa*) etc., also are supposed to exist in time through the *Kālika-viśeṣaṇatā-sambandha* or temporal qualification relation.¹

This direct temporal relation in the form of universal time may be viewed from a different angle of vision. When some entities are supposed to exist directly in a portion of time (*Khaṇḍa-kāla*) which is nothing other than the imposed properties (*Upādhi*) on universal time, the particular imaginary portion of time also is conceived as the direct temporal relation (*Sākṣāt-kālika-sambandha*).

Through indirect temporal relation (*Kālika paramparā-sambandha*) one entity is qualified by another entity when those two entities reside in the same time. This relation is usually called *Kālika sāmānādhikaraṇya* or co-existence in time. Generally, non-eternal entities are said to be mutually related through this

1. स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन गगनादेवृत्तिमत्त्वे तु—

Siddhānta lakṣaṇa-Dīdhiti, p. 220, Vāmācarāṇa's edition.

कालस्य जगदाधारत्वप्रवादमनुसृत्याह—स्वरूपसम्बन्धेनेति कालिकविशेषणतयेत्यर्थः Ibid.

relation. But, if eternal entities like the ether (*Ākāśa*) etc., are admitted to be existing in time, then those eternal entities also may mutually be related through this indirect temporal relation.

Strictly speaking, the *Kālika-sambandha* or temporal relation has got only one variety. When the time itself is conceived as the component part of a relation, in that case alone the time is used as a relation by being the part of a relation, since the conception of time also is based mainly on its being the component part of a relation.¹

Hence, all the other previously stated divisions of the temporal relation as direct or indirect are merely imaginary and have not been conceived in any authoritative treatise of Navya Nyāya.

It is interesting to note in this connection that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the most astute of all the modern logicians, has not accepted *Kāla* or time as a separate entity. In his opinion time is nothing other than God.² Hence, it appears to us that in the opinion of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi there cannot be any relation called *Kālika-sambandha* or temporal relation in the commonly accepted sense of the term because of the want of a separate entity called time, though he has not expressly denied the existence of the *Kālika-sambandha* as such.³

Paryāpti Sambandha : Relation of completion.

In connection with the *Vṛttiniyāmaka sambandha* or occurrence-exacting relation, some discussion on the *Paryāpti* relation or the relation of completion (though this relation is not traditionally mentioned in the group of primary relations) seems to be of much importance from the standpoint of clearly understanding some later developments of Navya Nyāya methodology.

The origin of the conception of this *Paryāpti* relation is to be traced, as has been pointed out by Prof. Ingalls⁴, in the

1. काल एव सम्बन्धघटकः कल्प्यते—

Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 197.

2. See also Part II, Chapter I : *The technique of the insertion of Paryāpti* (*Paryāptiniveśa*).

3. दिक्कालौ नेश्वरादतिरिच्येते—

Padārtha-nirūpaṇa, p. 2,

Benaras Mahāmaṇḍala Press edition.

4. *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic*.

Foot Note 171, p. 77.

writings of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. In the *Avacchedakatvanirukti* Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has supplied the reason for accepting *Paryāpti* as a separate relation.

Some scholars of the Navya Nyāya school thought that the relation of *Paryāpti* is nothing other than the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*).¹ Some even went on to say that there was no such relation called *Paryāpti* as it could not be established by any source of valid knowledge². But this theory was later on discarded as the concepts 'This is one pot.' "These are two pots"³ clearly establish that there is a separate relation called *Paryāpti*. Otherwise, the concepts Two (*Dvau*) and Two-ness-possessing (*Dvitvavān*) would become identical⁴. Now it is to be considered how the concepts 'This is one pot', 'These are two pots' establish the existence of a particular relation called *Paryāpti*.

In the expression *Ayam eko ghaṭaḥ* the word *Ekaḥ* has got two parts, *Ekaḥ* the *Prakṛti* or the stem word and the suffix *Su* (singular number of first case ending or Prathamā vibhakti). The stem word *Eka* means qualified by the *Ekatva saṁkhyā* or singular number or 'one-ness'. The suffix *Su* being the sign of the singular number also means *ekatva saṁkhyā* or the singular number. Here the *Ekatva saṁkhyā* or the singular number signified by the stem word *Eka* exists in the substance called *Ghaṭa* or the jar through the relation called, *Samavāya*, whereas the singular or *Ekatva saṁkhyā* signified by the suffix *Su* becomes associated with the same *Ghaṭa* (Jar) through the relation called *Paryāpti*.

1. ननु पर्याप्तिः समवायः—

Jāgadiśi, p. 262. Chowkhamba edition.

ननु पर्याप्तिः समवाय एव—

Avacchedakatvanirukti-Dīdhiti Prakāśa, p. 273.

2. अथ पर्याप्त्याख्यविलक्षणसम्बन्ध एवाप्रामाणिकः, तत्कथं तत्सम्बन्धता ?
Vyutpattivāda, p. 162, Chowkhamba edition.

3. पर्याप्तिः अयमेको घटः, इमौ द्वौ इति प्रतीतिसाक्षिकः स्वरूपसम्बन्ध-विशेषः—

Avacchedakatvanirukti-Dīdhiti, p. 262, Chowkhamba edition.

4. अन्यथा द्वौ द्वित्ववानिति प्रतीत्योरविशेषप्रसङ्गादिति भावः—

Avacchedakatvanirukti-Jāgadiśi, p. 262, Chowkhamba edition.

Similar is the case with the expression *Imau dvau ghaṭau* where the stem word *Dvi* in the expression *Dvau* means *Dvīṭva* *Sanikhyā* or 'two-ness' which resides in the substance *Ghaṭa* (Jar) through the *Samavāya* relation, whereas the *Dvīṭva* *Sanikhyā* or 'two-ness' which is signified by the suffix *Au* (the suffix signifying the dual number) becomes associated with the same substance *Ghaṭa* (Jar) through the *Paryāpti* relation.

In the aforesaid cases (i.e. *Ayam eko ghaṭaḥ, Imau dvau ghaṭau*) a separate relation called *Paryāpti* has got to be accepted as the meaning of the suffixes *Su* and *Au*, otherwise there would be repetition of the same *Samavāya* relation while construing the meanings of the stem words (*Prakṛti*) and the suffixes (*Pratyaya*)¹.

The idea underlying the above-mentioned statements is this. The numbers 'one-ness' (*Ekatva*), 'two-ness' (*Dvīṭva*), etc., being of the category of *Guṇa* (Quality), naturally reside, according to the theory of Nyāya philosophy, in the *Dravya* (Substance) through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). Two-ness resides even in each of the two substances like two *Ghaṭas* (Jars) through the relation of inherence. But through the *Paryāpti* relation, two-ness resides in both of the two *Ghaṭas* taken together and not in one *Ghaṭa* only. Hence, though one of the two *Ghaṭas* may be called *Ghaṭo dvīṭvavān* (The jar is connected with two-ness), it cannot be called *Ghaṭo dvau* or 'This jar is two', because, the number two-ness, if understood to reside in a substance through the relation of *Paryāpti*, warrants that sort of expression. But through the *Paryāpti* relation, as has already been stated, two-ness does not reside in any single one of the two substances taken together. Therefore, one of the two jars (*Ghaṭa*) in this case or for the matter of that, in any other case, cannot be called 'Two jars' (*Ghaṭau dvau*).

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, in the *Vyutpattivāda*, his famous book on Navya Nyāya, has supplied an additional argument for accepting this new type of relation called *Paryāpti*. There he says that unless the relation of *Paryāpti* is accepted, the invalidity

1. I am grateful to Paṇḍita Madhusūdana Nyāyācārya, Professor of Nyāya in the Post-Graduate Research and Training Department, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, for the above-mentioned interpretation.

of the cognition *Ākāśau* (Two skies) cannot be established¹. Because, if the aforesaid cognition is accepted as having the relation of *Samavāya* (Inherence) as its content, instead of *Paryāpti* then the statement *Ākāśau* or the cognition produced by that sort of statement cannot be called invalid.² The reason underlying this argument is this. *Dvītva* or two-ness is said to have been connected even with a single substance through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). Hence, *Ākāśa* (the sky or ether), though one in number according to the Nyāya theory, may be described with a dual number attached to it to signify two skies, obviously an erroneous concept. To avoid this incongruity, the relation of *Paryāpti* is accepted by the logicians of the new school in this and similar other cases. In this connection Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has quoted as authority the statement of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi³ in the *Avacchedakatvanirukti-Dīdhiti* to this effect. Gadādhara has further clarified there the nature of *Paryāpti* by saying that *Paryāpti* is identical with two-ness etc.⁴

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra in his commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri* has beautifully summed up the arguments in favour of accepting *Paryāpti* as a separate relation.⁵ There the learned Paṇḍita has stated that the relation of *Paryāpti* has got to be admitted for the sake of establishing the validity of the cognition in the form of 'one is not two'.⁶ Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra

1. आकाशावित्यादिवाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधस्याप्रमात्वानुपपत्त्यैव तादृशसम्बन्ध-
सिद्धेः—

Vyutapattivāda, p. 163, Chowkhamba edition.

2. तादृशबुद्धेः समवायविषयकत्वे प्रमात्वनिराकरणस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्—
Ibid.

3. उक्तं च दीधितिकृता-पर्याप्तिश्चायमेको घट-इमौ द्वावित्यादिप्रतीति-
साक्षिकः स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः—

Vyutapattivāda, p. 163.

4. द्वित्वादस्वरूपस्यैव द्वित्वादिपर्याप्तिरतयाभिमतसिद्धेः—

Vyutapattivāda, p. 163.

5. This has been noticed by Prof. Ingalls also and mentioned in the Foot Note of his book *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, p. 76.

6. एको न द्वाविति प्रतीतिः प्रामाण्यनिर्वाहाय पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धः आवश्यकः—
Śivadatta Miśra's Commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 81.

goes on to say in this connection that the acceptance of the cognition as valid in the form of 'one is associated with two-ness' (*Eko dvitvavān*) through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*) and the non-acceptance of the cognition in the form of 'one is two' (*Eko dvau*), distinctly point to the existence of a separate relation in the form of *Paryāpti*¹ or the relation of completion. The difference of the two aforesaid cognitions can be satisfactorily explained only on the assumption of two different types of relation called *Samavāya* and *Paryāpti*.

There are two trends of thought about this *Paryāpti* relation. According to some, this *Paryāpti* relation is a relation of complete occurrence (*Vyāpyavṛtti*). This school is headed by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra² who holds that properties existing in conjoint properties (*Vyāsajyavṛttidharma*) like bothness (*Ubhayatva*), two-ness (*Dvitya*), three-ness (*Tritva*) etc., exist even in a member of the group of their loci through the *Paryāpti* relation. According to this standpoint, bothness etc., cannot exist through the relation of *Paryāpti* in both of the loci taken together unless they exist in each of them separately through the same relation.³

There is again another school of thought headed by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa and subsequently upheld by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and others, according to which the relation of *Paryāpti* is a relation of incomplete occurrence (*Avyāpyavṛtti*). According to this school, both-ness (*Ubhayatva*) and for the matter of that, any other property existing in conjoint properties (*Vyāsajyavṛtti-dharma*), completely exists in both of the loci taken together and not in any one of them separately.⁴

Now, if we make a comparative study of the two theories

1. समवायेन एको द्वित्ववानिति प्रतीतेरभ्युपगमेन एको द्वाविति प्रतीतेरनभ्युपगमेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्—

Ibid.

2. जगदीशमते पर्याप्तिव्याप्यवृत्तिः—

Commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri* by Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, p. 82.

3. प्रत्येकमुभयत्र पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धेनासतोऽवच्छेदकत्वस्य उभयत्र पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन सत्त्वायोगात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 210. Chowkhamba edition.

4. उभयत्वमुभयत्रैव पर्याप्तम्, न त्वेकत्र—

Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri, p. 79, Śivadatta's edition.

regarding the *Paryāpti* relation, we are constrained to say that there is no fundamental difference between the two viewpoints. The difference there is only in the different angles of vision. In the theory of the former school, certainly there is some logic in holding that unless a property exists in a single member of a group of its loci through a particular relation, it cannot exist in the complete group of the loci taken together through the very same relation.

Now, the standpoint of the latter school also does not lack in logical argument inasmuch as a single member of a group, say of two, cannot be called 'Both' (*Ubhaya*). Because we feel, and rightly so, that a jar (*Ghaṭa*) cannot be called both a jar and a piece of cloth (*Paṭa*) taken together.¹

Though it has been pointed out earlier that there was a school of logicians who held that the relation of *Paryāpti* is nothing other than inherence (*Samavāya*) by which the cognitions 'This is one' and 'These are two' can be explained², yet there are other cases like absence, colour, etc., where a satisfactory explanation cannot be offered without admitting a separate relation called *Paryāpti*. When we say: 'Two or three absences' or 'Four colours' etc., we cannot explain the cognitions satisfactorily without some other relation than inherence (*Samavāya*), because, according to the Nyāya theory, number, itself a quality, cannot inhere in an absence³ or another quality.

Some scholars again divide this *Paryāpti* relation into two kinds. One is that *Paryāpti* which is supposed to exist in those properties which are not mutually qualified by one another, whereas, the second type is supposed to exist in those properties which are

1. घटो न घटपटोभयम्—

Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri, p. 80,
Śivadatta's edition.

2. न चायमेक इत्यादिप्रतीतेः समवायेनैवोपपत्तौ एकत्ववह्नित्वादेः पर्याप्ति-
सम्बन्धमत्त्वे मानाभावात्—

Avacchedakatvanirukti, Jāgadisī, p. 226.
Chowkhamba edition.

3. अभावादौ संख्यायाः समवायसम्बन्धेनासत्त्वेऽपि पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन सत्त्वे
बाधकाभावात्—

Sāmānyābhāva—Jāgadisī p. 298,
Chowkhamba edition.

mutually qualified by one another.¹ As for example in the former case, the cognition *Vahnighaṭauna staḥ* (The fire and the jar are not existing) establishes a *Paryāpti* relation of a particular property existing in *Vahnitva* (Fireness), *Dvītva* (Two-ness) and *Ghaṭatva* (Jariness), whereas, in the second case, the cognition *Mahānaśīya-vahnir nāsti*, (There is no fire of the kitchen), the *Paryāpti* relation is supposed to exist in qualified properties like *Mahānaśīyatva* and *Vahnitva* inasmuch as *Vahnitva* (Fireness) is qualified by *Mahānaśīyatva* (Relation of the kitchen.)

But it appears to us that this sort of division of the *Paryāpti* relation does not serve any useful purpose. Because whether the *Paryāpti* relation of a particular property exists or not in unqualified or qualified loci, it does not make any fundamental difference from the standpoint of explaining a particular situation. Nevertheless, according to some scholars the distinction is there and it is admitted by authoritative writers on Navya Nyāya as quoted earlier.

Non-occurrence-exacting relations (*Vṛtṭīyāyāmaka sambandha*)

Non-occurrence-exacting relations are innumerable. They are nevertheless called relations by virtue of their being contents of qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*), though they may not determine the occurrence of one entity in another.

In the following pages we shall take some selected non-occurrence-exacting relations for discussion.

Abheda-sambandha or *Tādātmya-sambandha* (Relation of identity or essential identity):

The relation of identity or essential identity (*Abheda, tādātmya*) is not an occurrence-exacting relation (*Vṛtṭīyāyāmaka-sambandha*), though it is used as a relation in the primary sense of the term.²

1. पर्याप्तिश्च द्वयी—विशेषणविशेष्यभावानापन्ने, तदापन्ने च; यथा वह्निघटौ न स्तः, महानसीयवह्निर्नस्तीत्यत्र च । प्रथमे वह्नित्वे द्वित्वे घटत्वे च परस्परविशेष्यविशेषणाभावानापन्ने तत्पर्याप्तिः, महानसीयवह्नित्वे तु विशेषणविशेष्यभावानपन्ने विशिष्टे इति भेदः ।

Vyadhikaraṇa-Dīdhiti-Prakāśa, p. 169, Asiatic Society edition.

2. तच्च तादात्म्य-विशेषणता-संयोग-समवायेष्वेव मुख्यम्—

Paṇḍita Ananta Kumāra Nyāya Tarkatīrtha, Commentary on *Jñānalakṣaṇāvicārahāsyā*, p. 3.

In Western logic, as pointed out by Prof. Ingalls,¹ there are certain terms like equality, equivalence and identity which have got different shades of meaning. In Navya Nyāya also, there are certain terms like *Samānatva*, *Tulyatva*, *Samanyiatatva* *Tādātmya* etc., which may correspond with this or that term of Western logic. But *Tādātmya* in Navya Nyāya has got a special technical sense which I would like to discuss here from the Navya Nyāya standpoint.

Tādātmya and *Abheda* have been used as synonymous terms in Navya Nyāya, but mere derivative meaning of the term *Abheda* would not, from the standpoint of Navya Nyāya help one much to properly understand the meaning of the term *Tādātmya*. Because, the term *Abheda*, if derived, would mean the constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*) of *Bheda* (*Anyonyābhāva* mutual absence). But this absence of *Bheda* may either be *Bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva* or the constant absence the counter positiveness to which is limited by *Bhedatva* (Mutual absenceness) or *Bheda-pratīyogikābhāva* or the constant absence whose counterpositive is *Bheda* (Mutual absence). There cannot be any third alternative of the meaning of the term *Abheda*. Now, if we take any one of the two alternatives, we would see that we are led to an absurd conclusion and hence none of the two alternative meanings would serve our purpose. Because, if *Abheda* means *Bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva*, then this constant absence would not be found anywhere.² Because, the mutual absence (*Bheda*) of any indefinite object would be found everywhere and hence the constant absence of *Bheda*, the counterpositiveness to which is limited by *Bhedatva* would not be found anywhere. Because, the constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*) is contradictory to its counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) the counterpositiveness to which is limited by its limiter³ (*Avacchedaka*). Therefore, if even a single manifestation (*Vyakti*) of the counterpositive of a constant absence happens to exist in a particular place, that constant absence would not be existing there.

1. *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, p. 67.

2. अभेदो यदि भेदत्वावच्छिन्नाभावस्तदाप्रसिद्धिः—

Vyutpattivāda, p. 49. Chowkhamba edition.

3. यस्य कस्यचिद्भेदस्य सर्वत्रैव सत्त्वाद् अभावस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नेन सह विरोधात् भेदत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकाभावाप्रसिद्धिरित्यर्थः—

Jayadeva Miśra, Commentary on *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 49.

Here in this particular case, *Bhedatvāvacchinna* i.e., *Bheda* (Mutual absence) in general or any individual manifestation of *Bheda* would be contradictory to the constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*) of the *Bheda* (Mutual absence), and because, an individual manifestation (*Vyakti*) of *Bheda* would always remain everywhere, the constant absence of *Bheda* would not exist anywhere. Now, to avoid this difficulty, if it is argued that *Abheda* (Essential identity) is not *Bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva*, but it is *Bheda-pratiyogikābhāva* i.e., the constant absence the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) to which is a *Bheda* (Mutual absence or *Anyonyābhāva*), then, of course, it will be possible to find an absence of *Bheda* inasmuch as even though there may be a particular manifestation of *Bheda* in a particular place, the absence of another particular manifestation (*Vyakti-viśeṣa*) of *Bheda* may be found there. But even if the absence whose counterpositive is a *Bheda* is found, it will give rise to the erroneous cognition as 'The water is blue.'¹ Because, the constant absence of the *Bheda* of *Nila* (Blue) i.e. *Nila-bhedābhāva* may be found in water by taking the absence of *Nila-bheda* with a property existing on conjoint objects (*Vyāsajya-vṛtti-dharma*) or a qualified property (*Viśiṣṭa-dharma*) as the limiter of the counterpositiveness. The idea underlying the above statement is this. Water is not blue by nature and hence it can be said about water that it is not blue. The proposition 'Water is not blue' means that the mutual absence (*Bheda*, *Anyonyābhāva*) of blue (*Nila na*) can be consistently said about water. But, though the mutual absence of blue (*Nila-bheda*) is not to be found in water in the normal way, it can be said to exist in water if we take the constant absence of the mutual absence (*Bhedābhāva*) to mean *Bheda-pratiyogikābhāva* or the constant absence whose counterpositive is a *Bheda* (Mutual absence). For, if we take an otherwise unconnected object like a jar (*Ghaṭa*) with the mutual absence of blue (*Nila-bheda*), then we can say that both the mutual absence of blue (*Nila-bheda*) and the jar (*Ghaṭa*) are not in the water (*Jale nila-bheda-ghaṭobhayam nāsti*). In that case, the constant absence has got two things as its counter positive (*Pratiyogī*), the blue colour (*Nila*) and the jar (*Ghaṭa*) and as such it can certainly be said that

1. यदि च भेदप्रतियोगिकोऽभावस्तदा नीलं जलमित्यादिवाक्यस्यापि प्रामाण्यापत्तिः । जले द्वित्वादिना नीलभेदाद्यभावस्यापि सत्त्वात्—

Vyutpattivāda, p.49, Chowkhamba, edition.

the constant absence here has got *Nīla-bheda* (Mutual absence of blue) as the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*). Only there is an additional counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) in the form of the jar (*Ghaṭa*). So, according to the dictum *Adhikantu na taddhānikaram* (Something more is not harmful to that object), the constant absence of both the mutual absence of blue (*Nīla-bheda*) and the jar (*Ghaṭa*) can be called as having mutual absence of blue (*Nīla-bheda*) as its counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*), as a result of which the constant absence of the mutual absence of blue (*Nīla-bhedābhāva*) can be said to exist in the water, and as such the statement that the water is blue would take place as a valid one. Because, that which has got the constant absence of the mutual absence of blue in it is certainly essentially identical with blue or in other words, that object can certainly be called blue.

Therefore, *Abheda* (Identity) has been described as *Tādātmyam*¹ (essential identity).

Now, what is this *Tādātmyam*?

Tādātmya (Essential identity) is the uncommon property (*Asādhāraṇa-dharma*) existing in the self (*Sva*).² Now, wherein lies the uncommon-ness (*Asādhāraṇya*) of the property? Uncommon-ness is the existence or occurrentness (*Vṛttitva*) in one and only one³ object. In other words, the property which exists in one and only one object is called the uncommon property of that object. This occurrentness of the property in one and only one object consists in its being other than that which is qualified by the mutual absence (*Bheda*) through both the relations called *Svasāmānādhikarāṇya* and *Sva-pratiyogi-vṛttitva*.⁴ The pronoun *Sva* meaning self in the beginning of the relations here indicates *Bheda* (Mutual absence), the meaning of the first term of the relations. The meaning of the second term of the first relation is

1. अभेदस्तादात्म्यम्—

Vyutpattivāda, p. 63, Chowkhamba edition.

2. तच्च स्ववृत्त्यसाधारणो धर्मः—

Ibid.

3. असाधारण्यं च एकमात्रवृत्तित्वम्—

Vyutpattivāda, p. 64.

4. तच्च स्वसामानाधिकरण्य-स्वप्रतियोगिवृत्तित्वोभयसम्बन्धेन भेदविशिष्टं यत् तदन्यत्वम्—

Ibid.

occurrence in the same locus (*Sāmānādhikaraṇya*). Similarly, the meaning of the second term of the second relation is the occurrence (*Vṛttitva*) in the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) of the same *Bheda* (mutual absence) indicated by the pronoun *Sva*, the first term of the relations. Hence, all the common properties like jariness (*Ghaṭatva*) etc., would become qualified by the *Bheda* (Mutual absence) through the two aforesaid relations (*Sva-sāmānādhikaraṇya-sva-pratīyogivṛttitva*). Because, common properties like jariness etc., would exist in all the jars, one of which would be the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) of the mutual absence in the form of *Tad-ghaṭa-vyaktir na* (This is not that individual manifestation of jar). The counterpositive of this mutual absence is that particular manifestation (*Vyakti*) of the jar whose difference from other jars is understood here. Similarly, the locus (*Adhikaraṇa*) of that particular mutual absence would be all the jars other than that particular one whose difference is understood in this connection. Hence, it is easy to see that *Ghaṭatva* (Jariness) or for the matter of that any other common property, would become qualified by the *Bheda* (Mutual absence) through the two aforesaid relations. Therefore, *Tad-vyaktitva* (That individual manifestation-ness) would be different from the common property like jariness etc., inasmuch as the individual manifestation-ness would exist only in either the *Pratīyogī* (Counterpositive) or in the *Anuyogī* (Locus) or the *Bheda* (Mutual absence), but not in both of them.

The discussion which we have done upto this time points to the fact that an uncommon property (*Asādhāraṇa-dharma*) is to be taken for *Tādātmya* (Essential identity). This *Tādātmya* exists in one and only one entity, being the essence of that entity.

To accept this essential identity as a relation seems to us to be an act of imagination without which it is difficult to conceive the nature of relation in this sort of essential identity. Nevertheless, according to the theory of Navya Nyāya this essential identity (*Tādātmya*) also is a relation, though not an occurrence-exacting one.

Vyabhicaritatva-sambandha

This relation literally means deviated-ness relation. If an entity is deviated from another, then the one which is deviated from the other is supposed to be related to that through the *Vyabhicaritatva* relation. As for example, fire (*Vahni*) is deviated

from smoke (*Dhūma*). In other words, fire exists in the locus (*Adhikaraṇa*) of the constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*) of smoke. Hence, through the relation of existing in the locus of the constant absence of smoke, fire may be said to be connected with smoke.

This *Vyabhicaritatva* relation may be expressed otherwise as *Svābhāvavadyṛtitva* relation. That is, occurrence in the locus of the constant absence of the self. It is to be noted in this connection, as has been rightly noticed by Prof. Ingalls¹ that while a relation is mentioned by using the pronoun *Sva* (Self) in the beginning of the name of the relation, it is regularly named by mentioning the abstract property existing in the second term of the relation. Practically speaking, the Navya Naiyāyikas consider the abstract property residing only in the subjunct (*Anuyogī*) as the relation.² It is to be remembered that, generally speaking, this method of naming relations in Navya Nyāya treatises is generally applied in naming indirect relations, occurrence-exacting or non-occurrence-exacting. But, there may be cases when direct relations also may be named in this way. As for example, instead of saying *Samyoga*, we can say *Svasamyuktatva*³ relation or the relation of contacted-ness with the self. A jar (*Ghaṭa*) may be said to be connected with the ground through the relation of *Samyoga* (Contact) or *Sva-samyuktatva* i.e., contacted-ness with the self. In this and other similar cases of naming relations, the word *Sva* regularly stands for the first term or rather the meaning of the first term, whereas the name of the abstract property existing in the second term or rather in the meaning of the second term points to the last limit of the relation through which the entity signified by *Sva* (Self) is connected with the entity in which the abstract property resides.

Therefore, through this *Svābhāvavadyṛtitva* relation smoke may be said to be connected with fire.

This *Vyabhicaritatva* relation may again be called by the term

1. *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, p. 80.

2. अनुयोगिनिष्ठस्यैव सम्बन्धत्वेन—

Jayadeva Miśra, *Commentary on Vyutpattivāda*, p. 7.

अनुयोगिवृत्तिधर्मस्यैव सम्बन्धत्वस्वीकारात्—

Parīṣkāradarpaṇa, p. 54.

3. *Materials for the study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, p. 80.

Avyāpyatva which literally means non-pervadedness. An entity which is not pervaded by another entity is called *Avyāpya* (Non-pervaded) of that entity and the abstract property *Avyāpyatva* (Non-pervadedness) points to the final limit of the relation through which the entity signified by the first term of the relation may be connected. Prof. Ingalls translates this *Avyāpyatva* relation as Non-pervader¹ relation. But we are inclined to translate it as Non-pervasion relation. The earlier example of smoke being connected with fire may be recalled in regard to this relation also.

This *Vyabhicaritatva* relation is again sometimes called by the term *Vyabhicāra* also.

Vyāpyatva-sambandha

Vyāpyatva literally means the state or condition of being *Vyāpya* (Pervaded). Therefore, *Vyāpyatva-sambandha*, as rightly noted by Prof. Ingalls, literally means pervadedness relation.² Here again I am inclined to render this relation as Pervasion relation instead of Pervader relation as done by Prof. Ingalls.

When one entity is pervaded by another the pervaded one is called *Vyāpya* and the abstract property residing in the *Vyāpya* constitutes the relation of the pervader (*Vyāpyaka*) with the *Vyāpya*. As for example, the smoke (*Dhūma*) is the *Vyāpya* of fire (*Vahni*) and hence through the *Vyāpyatva* relation fire may be said to be connected with smoke.

Vyāpakatva-sambandha

The term *Vyāpaka* means pervader. Therefore, *Vyāpakatva* literally means pervaderness. Though pervaderness also is nothing other than pervasion or *Vyāpti* yet to avoid ambiguity, I would like to render the term *Vyāpakatva* as pervaderness. Hence, *Vyāpakatva-sambandha* means pervaderness relation. As for example, smoke (*Dhūma*) which is the *Vyāpya* (Pervaded), of the (*Vahni*), the *Vyāpaka* (pervader), may be said to be connected with fire through this *Vyāpakatva* relation.

Viśayitva-sambandha

That which has got a content (*Viśaya*) is called *Viśayī*, the possessor of a content. Therefore, *Viśayitva-sambandha* literally means content-possessor-ness³ relation. Prof. Ingalls calls

1. & 2. *Materials for the study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, p. 80.

3. I take this rendering from Prof. Ingalls.

it content relation. As for example, the content (*Viśaya*) of a knowledge which is called a *Viśayi* content-possessor, may be said to be connected with its knowledge through the *Viśayitva* relation. This may equally be said about the contents of desire etc., which may be said to be connected either with a desire or an effort or aversion through the *Viśayitva* or content-possessor-ness relation or in brief, content relation.

Viśayatva-sambandha

This is just the opposite of the *Viśayitva* relation. The content of a knowledge etc., is called *Viśaya* and the abstract property residing in the *Viśaya* is called *Viśayatva*. Now, through this *Viśayatva* relation knowledge etc., may be said to be connected with the content of knowledge etc., As for example, knowledge of a pot (*Ghaṭa*) is said to be connected with the pot through this *Viśayatva* relation. Similarly, the desire of a pot also is said to be connected with its object (pot) through this relation and so on.

According to Prof. Ingalls this relation may be called container relation or contentness relation.¹ Possibly by the word 'container' the learned Professor wants to impress on the readers that through this *Viśayatva* relation the knowledge etc., are said to be contained in the *Viśaya* and hence the content (*Viśaya*) is the container of the knowledge, so to speak, through this relation. Hence, the name is given like that.

Prakāratā -sambandha

The principal adjective or the chief qualifier of knowledge etc., is called a *Prakāra* and the property residing in the *Prakāra* is the *Prakāratā*. Through this *Prakāratā* or chief qualificierness relation, knowledge or desire or effort (*Kṛti*) or aversion (*Dveṣa*) may be said to be connected with the chief qualifier (*Prakāra*).

Prakāritā-sambandha

Knowledge or desire etc., are called *Prakāri* i.e., Chief-qualifier-possessing. In other words, knowledge etc., have got for their content something which is a chief qualifier. Now, the knowledge, for example, which is a *Prakāri* or chief-qualifier-possessing, has got a property called *Prakāritā* or the condition of possessing

1. This rendering has been given by Prof. Ingalls in his book (page 80) mentioned earlier.

a chief qualifier. This condition of possessing a chief qualifier may be conceived as a relation which is called *Prakāritāsambandha*. Through this *Prakāritā* relation a chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) may be said to be connected with its knowledge, etc.

Viśeṣyatā-sambandha

The qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) has got a property called qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatā*). Through this *Viśeṣyata* or qualificand-ness relation a qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) may be connected with the qualificand, be that qualificand any object in general or the knowledge, etc., of the qualificand in particular. As for example, in the case of a pot or a jar (*Ghaṭa*) being the qualifier of a tract of land (*Bhūtaḥ*) giving rise to the conception 'The land is pot-possessing' (*Ghaṭavad bhūtaḥ*), the pot, which is the qualifier, may be said to be connected with the land, which is the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) through this *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) relation. Similarly the knowledge etc., in the form of 'The land is pot-possessing' (*Ghaṭavad bhūtaḥ*) may be said to be connected with the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) of the knowledge etc., through this '*Viśeṣyatā*' or qualificand-ness relation.

Viśeṣyitā-sambandha

The knowledge etc., of a *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) are called *Viśeṣyī* or qualificand-possessing and they are supposed to be possessing a property called *Viśeṣyitā* or the condition or state of possessing a qualificand. Now, through this *Viśeṣyitā* (literally qualificand-possessing-ness or qualificand-possession) relation the qualificand of the knowledge, etc., may be said to be connected with the knowledge etc., of the qualificand. As for example, the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand), say *Ghaṭa* (Jar), which is the content of the knowledge in the form of 'The land is jar-possessing' (*Ghaṭavad bhūtaḥ*), is supposed to be connected with the said knowledge through this *Viśeṣyitā* relation.

Pratīyogitā-sambandha

Pratīyogitā or *Pratīyogitva* (counterpositiveness) is conceived as a relation between the absence (*Abhāva*) and its counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*). Through this relation the counterpositive is said to be connected with its absence. As for example, the *Ghaṭa* (jar) which is the counterpositive of the absence in the form of *Ghaṭo nāstī* (There is no jar), is supposed to be connected with the said absence through this relation. Sometimes the absence also may be said to be connected with the counterpositive through this relation.

*Pratiyogitākatva-sambandha or
Pratiyogitānirūpakatva-sambandha*

The above-mentioned *Pratiyogitā* relation is sometimes called *Pratiyogitākatva* relation or *Pratiyogitā-nirūpakatva* relation. Though *Nirūpakatva* itself is a separate relation, yet it is conceived here as a part of the bigger relation which comprises both *Pratiyogitā* and *Nirūpakatva*. This is sometimes abridged as *Pratiyogitākatva*. The suffix *Ka* in *Pratiyogitāka* or such other like expressions regularly means the determinant. Now, because the absence (*Abhāva*), according to the Navya Nyāya theory, is conceived as the determinant (*Nirūpaka*) of the counterpositiveness, it is called by the term *Pratiyogitāka* or *Pratiyogitā-nirūpaka*. In the first of the two expressions (*Pratiyogitāka*), the suffix *Ka*, as already stated, stands for the determinant, whereas, in the second (*Pratiyogitānirūpaka*), the term *Nirūpaka* expresses the same idea. Hence, the absence being the determinant (*Nirūpaka*), the state or condition of being the *Nirūpaka* resides in the absence. This particular condition of being the determinant is expressed by the relational abstract called *Nirūpakatva*. This *Nirūpakatva* again being joined with *Pratiyogitā* forms one compact relation, through which the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) is said to be connected with the absence.

Anuyogitā or Anuyogitva-sambandha

The term *Anuyogī* has got two different meanings in two different contexts and the relational abstract *Anuyogitā* or *Anuyogitva* also has got two different meanings. In the case of an absence, the term *Anuyogī* means the locus of the absence, whereas in the case of a relation the term means the subjunct of the relation. As for example, when we know a tract of land as qualified by the absence of a jar in the form *Ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtaḥ*; the tract of land (*Bhūtaḥ*) where the absence of a jar exists is called the *Anuyogī* and the relational abstract residing in the *Anuyogī* is called *Anuyogitā* or *Anuyogitva*. Now, if this *Anuyogitā* (locusness or subjunctness is conceived as a relation, then through this relation the absence (*Abhāva*) may be said to be connected with its locus. Similarly, the adjunct (*Pratiyogī* of a relation) may be said to be connected with the subjunct of a relation in the same way.

Avacchedakatva or Avacchedakatā-sambandha

The limiter of any property is called an *Avacchedaka* and the

relational abstract residing in the *Avacchedaka* (limitor) is called *Avacchedakatva* or limitorness. Now, if this limitorness (*Avacchedakatva*) is conceived as a relation, then through this relation the property which is limited may be said to be connected with the limitor (*Avacchedaka*). As for example, when the effectness (*Kāryatā*) residing in a jar is limited by jariness (*Ghaṭatva*), the effectness may be said to be connected with the limitor *Ghaṭatva* (Jariness) through this relation. To cite another example, the *Kāraṇatā* (Causeness) residing in a cause of a jar, say a potter's stick, is limited by the property called stickiness (*Daṇḍatva*) residing in the cause and it becomes the *Avacchedaka* (Limitor) of the *Kāraṇatā*. In this *Avacchedaka* resides a relational abstract called *Avacchedakatva* or *Avacchedakatā* which can be conceived as a relation. Through this *Avacchedakatva* relation, the *Kāraṇatā* may be said to be connected with stickiness (*Daṇḍatva*), the *Avacchedaka*.

*Avacchinnavatva-sambandha or
Avacchedyatā-sambandha*

This *Avacchinnavatva* or *Avacchedyatā* (sometimes called *Avacchedyatva*) relation is just the reverse of the *Avacchedakatva* relation. That which is limited is called *Avacchinna* or *Avacchedya* and in that limited object resides a relational abstract called *Avacchinnavatva* or *Avacchedyatva*. Now, if this *Avacchinnavatva* or *Avacchedyatva* is conceived as a relation, then through this relation the *Avacchedaka* (Limitor) may be said to be connected with the attribute limited by it. As for example, the jar (*Ghaṭa*) which may be produced by a potter's stick, is the effect of that stick along with other conditions which are necessary to produce it. The effectness (*Kāryatā*) residing in the jar is limited (*Avacchinna*) by jariness (*Ghaṭatva*). In this effectness (*Kāryatā*) which is limited here by jariness resides a relational abstract called *Avacchinnavatva*, which, if conceived as a relation, connects the limitor (*Avacchedaka*) with the limited (*Avacchinna*).

Svatva-sambandha

An object which is owned by somebody is called the *Sva* or property of that individual. This *Sva* has got a relational abstract residing in it which is called *Svatva*. This *Svatva* is either a relational abstract or a separate entity¹ (*Atirikta padārtha*) from

1. एवं स्वत्वमपि पदार्थान्तरम्—
Padārthatattva-nirūpaṇa, p. 62.

those generally accepted in the Nyāya system. If this *Svatva* is conceived as a relation, then through this relation the owner of the object may be said to be connected with the object owned by him.

Svāmitva-sambandha

This relation is just the reverse of the *Svatva* relation. The owner of a particular object is called the *Svāmī* of that object. In the *Svāmī* resides a relational abstract property called *Svāmitva* (Ownerness). Now, through this *Svāmitva* relation, an object which is owned by somebody, is said to be connected with its owner (*Svāmī*).

Kāryatva-sambandha

In the effect (*Kārya*) resides a relational abstract property called *Kāryatā* (Effectness). This *Kāryatā* may be conceived as a relation and through this relation the cause (*Kāraṇa*) may be said to be connected with its effect.

Kāraṇatva-sambandha

This is just the reverse of the *Kāryatva* relation. A cause (*Kāraṇa*) of an effect has got a relational abstract property called *Kāraṇatva* (Causeness). If this *Kāraṇatva* is conceived as a relation, then, through this relation the effect may be said to be connected with its cause.

Prayojakatva or Anukūlatva-sambandha

An object which is capable of producing another object either directly or indirectly is called a *Prayojaka* (Promoter) of the object produced by it. This *Prayojaka* is sometimes called by the term *Anukūla* (Favourable). In this *Prayojaka* or *Anukūla* resides a relational abstract called *Prayojakatva* (Promoterness) or *Anukūlatva* (Favourableness). The term *Prayojaka* or *Anukūla* is a wider one than the term *Kāraṇa*, because both the direct cause and the indirect helper of an effect in its production may be called by the term *Prayojaka*¹ or *Anukūla*.

Anukūlatva or *Prayojakatva* has been defined as the counterpositiveness of an absence which is pervaded by the absence of the effect.² In other words, wherever there is the absence of the

1. प्रयोजकत्वं च जनकतावच्छेदकादिसाधारणम्—

Sāmānyanirukti Gādādharī, p. 7. Edited by Harināmadāsa Svāmī, p. 7.

2. अनुकूलत्वं च कार्याभावव्याप्याभावप्रतियोगित्वं कारणतदवच्छेदकोभयसाधारणम्—

Nyāyakusumāñjali-Prakāśa, p. 39, Chowkhamba edition.

cause (*Kāraṇa*) or of the promoter (*Prayojaka*), the absence of the effect (*Kārya*) also will systematically remain in that place. Hence, the absence of the effect (*Kāryābhāva*) becomes the pervader (*Vyāpaka*) and the absence of the cause or the promoter becomes the pervaded (*Vyāpya*). So, the cause or the promoter becomes the counterpositive of the absence which is pervaded by the absence of the effect.

Anukūlatva or *Prayojakatva* has been otherwise defined as the invariable pre-existence in regard to the effect, which (pre-existence) again is devoid of the four kinds of superfluities (*Anyathāsiddhi*) other than the first one residing in the limit of the causeness (*Kāranatā*).¹

Now, if this *Anukūlatva* or *Prayojakatva* is conceived as a relation, then through this relation the effect may be said to be connected with either the cause (*Kāraṇa*) or the promoter (*Prayojaka* or *Anukūla*).

Prayojyatva-sambandha

This relation is just the reverse of the *Prayojakatva* or *Anukūlatva* relation. The effect is said to be promoted (*Prayojya*) either by the cause or the promoter. In this effect is supposed to exist a relational abstract called *Prayojyatva* (Promotedness) which, if conceived as a relation, may be said to connect the *Prayojaka* (Promoter) with the *Prayojya* (Promoted).

Nirūpakatva-sambandha

That which determines something is called the *Nirūpaka* (Determinant) of the same. In this *Nirūpaka* resides a relational abstract called *Nirūpakatva* (Determinantness). If this determinantness (*Nirūpakatva*) is conceived as a relation, then through this relation the object which is determined may be said to be connected with the determinant.

It is to be noted in this connection that though generally speaking the *Nirūpakatva* relation is considered as a non-occurrence-exacting relation, yet according to some scholars the *Nirū-*

1. तच्च कारणतावच्छेदकवृत्त्यन्यथासिद्धिचतुष्टयरहितत्वे सति कार्यनियत-पूर्ववर्तित्वम्—प्रथमान्यथासिद्धिभिन्नान्यथासिद्धिचतुष्टयशून्यत्वे सति कार्यनियत-पूर्ववर्तित्वम्—

Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Pakṣatā*, p. 3.

pakatva relation also may sometimes be an occurrence-exacting¹ relation.

Nirūpitatva or Nirūpyatā-sambandha

This relation is just the reverse of the previously explained relation. An object which is determined by something is called *Nirūpita* or *Nirūpya*. In this *Nirūpita* or *Nirūpya* resides a relational abstract called *Nirūpitatva* or *Nirūpyatva* or *Nirūpyatā*. Through this relation the *Nirūpaka* (Determinant) may be said to be connected with the object determined (*Nirūpita*).

Avayavatva-sambandha

The term *Avayava* means a part. The relational abstract residing in the part (*Avayava*) is called *Avayavatva* (Partness). This *Avayavatva* or partness may be conceived as a relation and through this relation the *Avayavī* (Whole) may be said to be connected with the part (*Avayava*).

Avayavitva-sambandha

This relation is just the reverse of the previously stated one. The word *Avayavī* literally means that which has got a part. In other words, the whole is understood by the term *Avayavī*. In this *Avayavī* resides a relational abstract property called *Avayavitva* (Wholeness). If this property is conceived as a relation, then the part (*Avayava*) may be said to be connected with the whole (*Avayavī*) through it.

A fairly comprehensive list of some commonly used non-occurrence-exacting relation has been furnished by now. It has been pointed out earlier that the relations in Navya Nyāya are innumerable on account of the properties which may be found in innumerable entities becoming the objects of valid knowledge. If the direct relations which have been discussed hitherto are taken into account, then the other direct relations which have not been dealt with here may be understood without much difficulty. Therefore, I do not think it necessary to enter into the discussion of all the possible direct relations according to Navya Nyāya.

Paramparā-sambandha (Indirect relation)

Like direct relations indirect relations in Navya Nyāya also are innumerable and they have got different forms and appearance.

1. "निरूपकत्वस्यापि सम्बन्धस्य क्वचिद् वृत्तिनियामकत्वात्—

Jagadīśa Tarkālamkāra, *Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, p. 214, Chowkhamba Old Edition.

Indirect relations may either be formed completely of direct occurrence-exacting relations or they may be formed by the mixture of direct non-occurrence-exacting relations or they may yet be formed by the mixture of direct occurrence-exacting relations and direct non-occurrence-exacting relations. Any number of direct relations may be joined together to form an indirect relation (*paramparā-sambandha*).

In the first category of indirect relations, mention may be made of *Saṁyukta-samavāya*¹ or 'Inherence in the contacted', *Saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*² or 'Inherence in the inhered in the contacted one' *Samaveta-samavāya*³ or "Inherence in the inhered one".

In producing the perception of a quality (*Guṇa*) or any other object which inheres in a substance (*Dravya*), the indirect relation called *Saṁyukta-samavāya* comes into operation. As the quality inheres in a substance and the substance comes in contact with the sense organ, the sense organ is said to be associated with the quality through the indirect relation called *Saṁyukta-samavāya* (contact-cum-inherence).⁴ Similarly, if the perception of the generic character (*Jāti*) like *Guṇatva*, which inheres in a *Guṇa* which again in its turn inheres in a substance (*Dravya*) is to be produced, the indirect relation called *Saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya* (contact-cum-inherence-cum-inherence)⁵ comes into operation. In the like manner, when the generic character like *Śabdatva* is to be perceived, the indirect relation called *Samaveta-samavāya* (inherence-cum-inherence)⁶ is taken resort to.

To these three aforesaid indirect relations of the first category which are used in producing the perception of positive objects may be added the relation called *Viśeṣaṇatā* (qualifieriness) with a view to producing the perception of absence (*Abhāva*) in different circumstances.⁷

As for example, if we are to perceive the absence of colour in a number, the indirect relation *Saṁyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*

1.2.3. Vide Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 42, Venkaṭeśvara Press Edn.

द्रव्यसमवेतप्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियसंयुक्तसमवायजन्यम्—

etc.—Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verses 59 and 60.

4. Gaurinātha Śāstrī *Introduction to Jñānalakṣaṇā-vicārahasyam*, p. 6.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Bhāṣāpariccheda*, p. 261, N. S. press edition.

(contact-cum-inherence-cum-qualifier) comes into operation.¹ because, absence of colour which resides in a number happens to be the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) of the same, which again inheres in a substance (*Dravya*) with which contact of the eye, the perceiving organ, may take place. Numerous other examples may be cited to make these relations properly understandable. But, as the principle underlying these relations is the same, it is not considered extremely necessary to multiply more examples.

Indirect relations composed of a number of non-occurrence-exacting relation are innumerable and are frequently used in clarifying any topic that may not otherwise be explained satisfactorily. These relations are very much complex and generally defy translation in any other language. They are simply to be exposed to make the sense clear.

It may be useful to take a concrete example to illustrate one indirect relation of this type. In explaining the definition of fallacy² (*Hetvābhāsa*) given by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi says that the word *Anumiti* in Gaṅgeśa's definition should be taken in a particular sense to signify a special type of *Anumiti* whose form has been mentioned as *Sādhavyāpyahetumān Pakṣaḥ sādhyavān*.³ This special type of the *Anumiti* has been clarified by taking recourse to two indirect relations composed of some non-occurrence-exacting relations as *Sādhya-tāvacchedakāvacchinnaprakāratāviśiṣṭasādhavyāpyahetutāvacchedakāvacchinnaprakāratāśālyanumitiparamanumitipadam vaiśiṣṭyaṃ ca svanirūpakajñāniyatva-savanirūpitaviśeṣyatāvacchedakapakṣatāvacchedakāvacchinnaviśeṣyatānirūpitatvobhaya-sambandhena*.⁴

Here, by the application of two indirect relations, namely, *Svanirūpakajñāniyatva* and *Svanirūpitaviśeṣyatāvacchedakapakṣatāvacchedakāvacchinnaviśeṣyatānirūpitatva*, only the required

1 संख्यादौ रूपाद्यभावः संयुक्त-समवेत-विशेषणतया—

Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 261.

2 अनुमितिकारणीभूताभावप्रतियोगियथार्थज्ञान-विषयत्वम्—

Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari, p. 11,

Svāmī Harināmadāsa's edition.

3 *Dīdhiti on Sāmānyanirukti*, p. 27.

Harināmadāsa's edition.

4. Harināmadāsa, Commentary on *Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari*, p. 31.

Anumiti in the form of *Sādhyavyāpyahetumān-pakṣaḥsādhyavān* can be taken, because, that type of *Anumiti* alone has got a *Prakāratā* (chief qualifierness) qualified by another *Prakāratā* through the aforesaid relations.

In the above-mentioned inference (*Anumiti*) there are two *Prakāratās* one of which is qualified by the other through the two relations, because, both the *Prakāratās* are determined by one and the same knowledge inasmuch as both of them refer to the same knowledge. Hence, one of the two relations, namely, *Svanirūpakajñāniyatva* between the two *Prakāratās* is there. Here, by the pronoun *Sva* (Self) the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Sādhya* is to be understood. This *Prakāratā* again qualifies the second *Prakāratā* residing in the *Hetu* through the second relation, because, the second *Prakāratā* residing in the *Hetu* is determined by the *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) which in its turn is limited by the *Pakṣatāvachchedaka* which again is identical here with the *Viśeṣyatāvachchedaka* (limitor of the qualicandness), the *Viśeṣyatā* in which is determined by the same *Prakāratā* residing in the *Sādhya*.

By a careful consideration of the complex relations here through which the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Hetu* is qualified by the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Sādhya*, it can be understood that the inference (*Anumiti*) in the form of *Sādhyavyāpyahetumān pakṣaḥsādhyavān* alone should be taken by the term *Anumiti* in the definition of the *Hetvābhāsa* (fallacy) in the *Sāmānyanirukti* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya.

In the above-mentioned two indirect relations, the first *Svanirūpakajñāniyatva* means *Svanirūpakajñānanirūpitatva*, the suffix *Gha* (iya) after the word *jñāna* meaning relation, and the relation of the *jñāna* with the *Prakāratā* is *Nirūpitatva*, because, the *Prakāratā* of a particular knowledge is determined by the knowledge itself. Hence, by an analysis of the first relation, we find that the relation is a composite one whose component parts are *sva*, *nirūpaka*, *jñāna* and *nirūpitatva*. The four component parts together form the indirect relation where the component parts themselves also may be considered as separate relations elsewhere and those relations would be non-occurrence-exacting relations.

While considering the component parts of the indirect relation *Svanirūpakajñāniyatva* as themselves relations, the abstract properties of the component parts should be taken into account.

In other words, *Sva* should be taken as *Svatva*, *Nirūpaka* as *Nirūpakatva*, *Jñāna* as *Jñānatva*, or *Jñāna* may be retained as it is, because, *Jñāna* itself is an abstract thing, and finally *Nirūpitatva*.

Similarly, the second indirect relation *Svanirūpitaviśeṣyatā-vacchedakapakṣatāvachchedakāvacchinnaviśeṣyatānirūpitatva* also is composed of *Sva*, *Nirūpita*, *Viśeṣyatā*, *Avacchedaka*, *Pakṣatāvacchedaka*, *Avacchinna*, *Viśeṣyatā* and *Nirūpitatva* which also should be taken as abstract properties as before like *Svatva*, *Nirūpitatva*, *Viśeṣyatātva*, *Avacchedakatva*, *Pakṣatāvachchedakatva*, *Avacchinnatva*, *Viśeṣyatātva* and *Nirūpitatva*. The component part *Pakṣatāvachchedaka* here need not be split into *Pakṣatā* and *Avacchedaka* as the *Viśeṣyatāvachchedaka* should be directly construed with *Pakṣatāvachchedaka*.

In splitting up an indirect relation into its component parts, due consideration should be given to the mutual construction and relation of the parts themselves and accordingly some parts should be split up into more parts and some again into less parts as the case may be.

Now, the discussion on the third type of indirect relation may be taken up. It has already been pointed out earlier that the third type of indirect relation is a mixture of direct occurrence-exacting and direct non-occurrence-exacting relation and as such there is no fundamental difference between the former relation and this one.

Nevertheless, it may be useful to give an example of this type of relation.

In the definition of fallacy (*Hetvābhāsa*), there is a mention of valid knowledge (*Yathārtha jñāna*) as a component part of the statement of the definition of fallacy.¹ The valid knowledge has been interpreted here as valid in every part (*Sarvāmśe pramātvasya*).² The validity of the knowledge in every part has been clarified of relations by the application as follows:—

Viśeṣyatāviśiṣṭaprakāratvanirūpakatvaṁ sarvāmśe bhramabhinnatvaṁ, vaiśiṣṭyaṁ ca svanirūpitatva-svāśrayaṇiṣṭhādhikaraṇatānirūpitā-dheyatā-vadanyatvobhayasambandhena. Ādheyatāvatvaṁ ca svānavacchedakānavacchinnatva-svasāmānādhikarṇyasvā-

1. *Sāmānyanirukti*, p. 11, Harināmadāsa's edition.

2. *Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari*, p. 66, Harināmadāsa's edition.

*vacchedakasambandhāvacchinnatvasvayṛttitvaitaccatuṣṭayasambandhena. Svayṛttitvaṃ ca svānavacchedakānavacchinnatvasambadhe-
na.*¹

This sort of clarification by a complex system of the application of relations has been considered extremely necessary to avoid any possible misrepresentation of the validity of knowledge in every part of it.

The possibility of an ambiguity arises out of the fact that valid knowledge is defined as that knowledge whose chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) actually resides in that object which is known as qualified by that chief qualifier.² The knowledge of a rope as such is valid because the chief qualifier ropeness actually resides in the rope. If the rope were known as a snake, then, of course, the knowledge would be invalid, because, snakeness, the chief qualifier of the knowledge does not actually exist in the rope which is known by mistake as a snake.

Now, the scope of ambiguity arises in this way that even an invalid knowledge also may be called valid at least in some part from the standpoint that some parts of the content of the knowledge may actually possess the chief qualifiers in them. A mountain may possess fire on it, yet it may erroneously be known as possessing the absence of fire. Even in that case, the fire which is the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) of the absence of fire, the content of the invalid knowledge, possesses fireness, the chief qualifier, and as such this knowledge also may be called valid up to that extent.

In this way, the definition of fallacy, which contains valid knowledge (*Yathārthajñāna*) as its component part would become too wide (*Ativyāpta*) to embrace the right *Hetu* (probans) also.

The clarification of the valid knowledge by the application of the complex system of relations as mentioned earlier safeguards against any possible defect of the definition from any corner.

In that chain of relations, the relation *Adhikaraṇatā* when understood as a *Svarūpa-sambandha*, is considered as an occurrence-

1. Svāmī Harināmadāsa, *Kalāvīlāsa*, a commentary on *Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari*, pp. 65-67.

2. तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः—

Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ, p. 35., Veṅkateśvara Press edition.

exacting relation and as such the chain of indirect relations by which the validity of the knowledge in every part is clarified, falls into the third category of indirect relation.

Though there is no authoritative reference to the indirect relations being divided into three categories as mentioned here, I have tried to classify indirect relations in this way for facilitating the understanding of the indirect relations when used in a complex manner.

Relations of Navya Nyāya have been dealt with here in a more or less comprehensive way, though many other relations may be found here and there in the Navya Nyāya treatises. But the principle underlying them would not now be difficult to understand. I do not think it necessary to mention them in more detail.

CHAPTER III

PRATIYOGITVAM OR PRATIYOGITĀ (COUNTERPOSITIVENESS)

The conception of the entity called *Pratiyogitva* or *Pratiyogitā* also is very important in the system of Navya Nyāya philosophy. The word *Pratiyogitva* or *Pratiyogitā* in Sanskrit has been derived from the stem word *Pratiyogin* with the suffix *tva* or *tal* attached to it. The stem word *Pratiyogin* in the context of absence means an entity which is contradictorily related to it¹ (the absence). The suffix *tva* or *tal* attached to the stem word *Pratiyogin* means the abstract property residing in the *Pratiyogī* (counterpositive).

Now what is this *Pratiyogitva* or *Pratiyogitā* by virtue of which some entities are known as *Pratiyogī*? From the derivation of the word *Pratiyogitā* as shown just now, it can be readily understood that *Pratiyogitā* means contradictory relation. Though the term *Pratiyogitā* is a technical one (*Pāribhāṣika*) which has got different shades of meaning according to different schools of Navya Nyāya, yet at the outset the derivative meaning also may be taken into account upto a certain extent to have an idea about the import of the term.

Some Navya Naiyāyikas hold that *Pratiyogitva* is a *Svarūpa-sambandha*.² *Svarūpa-sambandha* has been explained in a different topic.³ Hence we are now to decide with whom the *Pratiyogitva* should be considered identical.

There is one school of Navya Naiyāyikas who hold that the *Pratiyogitā* is not an extra category by itself, but it is either identical with the *Pratiyogī* (counterpositive) or with the *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka* (limitor of the counterpositiveness), on account of its being identical with the *Pratiyogī* or the *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka* which belongs to this or that accepted category of thought

1. प्रतिरूपं युज्यते इति प्रति + युज् + घिनुण् = प्रतिकूलसम्बन्धवति—
Vācaspatyam, p. 4449.

2. अभावप्रतियोगित्वं स्वरूपसम्बन्ध एवेत्युक्तमधस्तात्—
Kevalānvayi-Dīdhiti, p. 811, Chowkhamba edition.

3. Vide discussion on *Avacchedakatva*.

the *Pratiyogitā* does not fall into the head of a different category but is counted as a member of that category to which the *Pratiyogī* or the *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka* belongs. As for example, in the case of an absence (*Abhāva*), the counterpositiveness of the absence *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar) resides in the *Ghaṭa* (jar), the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*), which is a substance (*Dravya*). Now, if the *Pratiyogitā* is considered identical with the *Pratiyogī* then in this particular case the *Pratiyogitā* would be nothing other than a substance (*Dravya*), an already accepted category of thought. If the *Pratiyogitā* again is considered identical with the *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka* (limitor of the counterpositiveness), then the *Pratiyogitā* here would belong to the category of a generic character (*Jāti*), because, jariness (*Ghaṭatva*) belongs to that category.

This alternative theory, regarding the nature of the absential counterpositive (*Abhāvīya-pratiyogitā*) has been considered necessary to admit owing to the exigencies of certain circumstances. Even then the *Pratiyogitā* must be limited by some relation (*Sambandha*) and property¹ (*Dharma*). Because, the *Pratiyogitā* which is limited by the relation of contact (*Samyoga*) is different from the one which is limited by the relation or inherence (*Samavāya*) and hence to make any definition or clarification of any thing flawless in which the *Pratiyogitā* may have been used, the same must be specifically mentioned with all its necessary limiting adjuncts.

This absential *Pratiyogitā* is a relation² (*Sambandha*) also, because, it connects the *Pratiyogī* (counterpositive) with the *Abhāva* (absence). This *Pratiyogitā* as a relation between the absence and its counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) must be admitted, otherwise, the knowledge having the form *Dhūmo nāsti* (There is no smoke) which has got for its content a relation (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) of something which is a qualified one (*Viśiṣṭa*), cannot be properly justified.

1. अत्र वदन्ति—प्रतियोगिस्वरूपं तदवच्छेदकस्वरूपं यत्प्रतियोगित्वं तदपि कस्यचिदभावस्य केनचिद्धर्मेण सम्बन्धेन वावच्छिन्नं व्यवहारबलात् न तु सर्वेण सम्बन्धेन धर्मेण वा; समवायावच्छिन्नबलवद्भावप्रतियोगित्वं न संयोगावच्छिन्नमित्यादिव्यवहारात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadīśi, p. 237, Chowkhamba edition.

2. प्रतियोगितात्वेन संसर्गतावत्त्वाच्च—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on

Avacchedakatvanirukti Jāgadīśi—p. 1.

Because, the relation between *Dhūma* (smoke) which is qualified by *Dhūmatva* (smokeness) and the absence cannot be *Samyoga* (contact) or *Samavāya* (inherence) or any other known relation, because, they are not possible in the case of an absence. Hence, a new type of relation called *Pratīyogitā* is accepted here between the absence and the counterpositive.¹ This *Pratīyogitā* should be understood as being qualified by the property called *Pratīyogitātvā* (counterpositive-ness-ness). The *Pratīyogitā*, when conceived as a relation between the absence and the *Pratīyogī*, cannot be known as qualified by the general property called *Sambandhatva* or relation-ness, because, in that case the knowledge of the *Pratīyogitā* as a relation would become impossible on account of its being involved in the technical defect called *Ātmāśraya*² or self dependence. Unless the relation is known beforehand as qualified by the property called relation-ness, it cannot be properly known as such. Similarly, unless relation-ness is known beforehand, the relation also cannot be properly known as such. In other words, the knowledge of a relation depends on the knowledge of relation-ness, and the knowledge of relation-ness again depends on the knowledge of relation. Hence, there is *Ātmāśraya* or self dependence in the knowledge of the relation and relation-ness.

To avoid this technical defect called *Ātmāśraya*, the *Pratīyogitā* as a relation has been taken here as qualified by the special attribute called *Pratīyogitātvā* (counterpositive-ness-ness) which is an indivisible property whose knowledge does not involve the knowledge of relation as such.³

1. धूमो नास्तीति विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिनी बुद्धिः धूमत्वविशिष्टस्याभावे सम्बन्धमवश्यमेव गोचरयति, अन्यथा विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहित्वानुपपत्तेः । सा च न संयोगसमवायादिः अभावे तदसम्भवात्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : Commentary on *Avacchedakatvanirukti*, p. 34.

2. ननु प्रतियोगित्वं स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः तत्र च नियमघटितसम्बन्धप्रवेशादात्माश्रय इत्यत आह प्रतियोगित्वादिश्चेति—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Prakāśa, p. 361, Asiatic Society edn.

3. प्रतियोगितावादिश्च स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषो न सम्बन्धत्वेन निविष्टः—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Dīdhiti, p. 255, Chowkhamba edition.

प्रतियोगितात्वादिधर्मान्तरप्रकारेण—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Jāgādīśi, p. 256, Chowkhamba edn.

प्रतियोगितात्वरूपाखण्डोपाधित्वात्—

M. M. Rākhalaḍāsa, *Tattvasāra*, p. 15.

This *Pratiyogitā* which is called a *Svarūpasambandha* is considered identical by many scholars with both the *Pratiyogī* and the absence (*Abhāva*)¹ as opposed to the theory put forth earlier that the *Pratiyogitā* is identical either with the *Pratiyogī* or with the absence. That theory, though mentioned by Jagadīśa Tarkāla-mkāra, is not approved by him as is evident from his mentioning the theory with the words *Atra vadanti* (Some scholars say in this connection).

The *Pratiyogitā* of the absence of a jar, or for the matter of that of any other object, cannot be identical with its *Pratiyogī* alone, because, in that case there would be no difference between the *Pratiyogitā* of a generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) and that of a specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*).² As the blue jar (*Nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) is not other than a jar,³ in other words, a blue jar is identical with a jar, the *Pratiyogitā* of a specific absence, if considered identical with the *Pratiyogī*, must become identical with the *Pratiyogitā* of a generic absence with whose *Pratiyogī*, the jar (*Ghaṭa*), the *Pratiyogī* of the specific absence, the blue jar (*Nīlo ghaṭaḥ*), is considered identical.

There was a school of thought of the Navya Naiyāyikas according to which the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) of an absence may be identical either with the *Pratiyogī* or with the limitor of the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitāvacchedaka*) as is evident from the refutation of that theory by Bhavānanda Siddhānta-vāgiśa in his *Anumāna-Dīdhiti-Prakāśā*. There the learned scholar goes on to say that the *Pratiyogitā* of an absence cannot be called identical with the *Pratiyogī*, because, in that case the statement *Ghaṭābhāvapratiyogī* would mean *Ghaṭo' bhāvaghaṭavān* i.e. the jar is qualified by the absence and the jar. This sort of

1. तत्तदभावप्रतियोग्युभयस्वरूपाया इति तदर्थः—

Avacchedakatvanirukti Jāgadiśī, p. 258, Chowkhamba. edn.

“प्रतियोगित्वं न केवलाभावस्वरूपं किन्तु तत्तदभावोभयरूपम्—

Commentary on *Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā*

Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgiśa, p. 131, Kāraka Prakaraṇa.

2. तत्तत्प्रतियोगिमात्रस्वरूपत्वे सामान्याभावविशेषाभावयोरविशेषापत्तेरिति ध्येयम्—

Avacchedakatvanirukti-Jāgadiśī, p. 13, Vāmācarāṇa's edn.

3. न हि भवति नीलो घटो घटान्यः—

Vyāptipañacaka-Dīdhiti, p. 82.

meaning is obviously unrealistic and is not recognised by anybody.

If again the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence is considered identical with the limiter of the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitāvacchedaka*) then also the statement *Ghaṭo'bhāvapratiyogī* would mean *Ghaṭo'bhāvaghataḥ* i.e. , the jar is identical with the absence and the jar. This type of meaning also is quite unrealistic and impossible¹.

But, some Navya Naiyāyikas headed by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra hold that the *Pratīyogitā* of the generic absence is a peculiar relation identical with the limiter of the *Pratīyogitā* (*Pratīyogitāvacchedaka*), but not with the *Pratiyogī* (counterpositive), because, in that case, there would be no uniformity on account of the counterpositives being innumerable and of diverse dimension in most of the cases. Moreover, the condition of the absence becoming the superstratum (*Ādheya*) of a substratum (*Ādhāra*) would not be possible in the case of the absence being identical with the counterpositive. Because, the condition of something becoming the superstratum of a substratum depends on difference between the two.²

In the case of the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) whose counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) is limited by a generic property (*Sāmānyadharma*) as in the absence having the form *Vahnitvena mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* (There is the absence of the fire of the kitchen having its counterpositiveness limited by fireness), the counterpositiveness would be identical with the specific property (*Viśeṣadharma*) alone which is the chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) of the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*), but not the generic property (*Sāmānyadharma*). The specific property in the above mentioned absence would be *Mahānasiyavahnitva* (Fireness limited by the relation of the kitchen) and not *Vahnitva* (fireness) alone, because,

1. ननु घटाभावप्रतियोगित्वं घटस्वरूपं घटत्वस्वरूपं वा ? आद्ये घटाभावप्रतियोगीत्यस्य घटोऽभावघटवानित्यर्थः स्यात्तथा चाननुभवः । द्वितीये घटोऽभावघट इत्याकारः स्यात् तत्रापि च स एव दोषः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Dīdhiti-Prakāśa, p. 265, Asiatic Society.

2. प्रतियोगित्वं हि स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः स च सामान्यभावस्थले प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकस्वरूप एव न तु प्रतियोगिस्वरूपोऽनुगमाद् अभेदेन आधाराधेयभावानुपपत्तेश्च—

Vyadhikaraṇa Jāgadīśi, p. 125, Chowkhamba edition.

fireness would be too wide a property to be the limiter of the counterpositiveness.¹

Now, a question arises in this connection that if the counterpositiveness is considered identical with the limiter of the counterpositiveness, then the condition of the counterpositiveness being limited by the limiter of the counterpositiveness and conversely the condition of the limiter of the counterpositiveness being the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) would not be justifiable, because, the condition of being limited and a limiter is dependent upon difference.

In answering this question it has been said that the pure fireness (*kevala vahnitva*), as for example, in the case of the absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti* (There is no fire) is considered as the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) whereas the fireness qualified by the *Nirūpitatva*² determined by the absence (*Abhāvanirūpitatvaviśiṣṭasya*) is supposed to be the limited (*Avacchedya*) one³. Hence, though the counterpositiveness is supposed to be identical with the limiter of the counterpositiveness, the one and the same thing like fireness etc., it may be said to be the limited (*Avacchinna*) and the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) viewed from different angles of vision. This theory of the Navya Naiyāyikas is an *Abhyupagama siddhānta* or an accepted theory, by the acceptance of which they try to solve some apparent contradiction.

Even then the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence of a jar limited by the relation of contact would become identical with the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence of the same jar limited by the relation of inherence. Because, both the *Pratiyogitās* being identical with the same jariness, the limiter of the *Pratiyogitās* in question, it would be difficult to make a difference between the two. But the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence of the jar limited by the relation of

1. सामान्यधर्मेण विशेषभावस्थले च प्रतियोग्यं प्रकारीभूतो विशेषधर्म एव न तु सामान्यधर्मः अतिप्रसक्तत्वात्—

Vyadhikaraṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 125, Chowkhamba edition.

2. The state or condition of being described.

3. न च प्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदकस्वरूपत्वे अवच्छेद्यावच्छेकभावानुपपत्तिरवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावस्य भेदनियतत्वादिति वाच्यं केवलस्य बह्वित्वादेरवच्छेदकत्वम् अभावनिरूपितत्वविशिष्टस्य चावच्छेद्यत्वमित्युपगमात्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Notes on the Commentary of *Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī*, p. 36.

contact and the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of the same jar limited by the relation of inherence must not be considered identical. Because, we feel, and rightly so, that the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of the jar limited by the relation of contact is different from the *Pratīyogitā* of the same absence limited by the relation of inherence. We can never say rightly that the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of a jar limited by the relation of inherence is at the same time limited by the relation of contact also. Rather, we say that it is not so.

If the difference between the two kinds of *Pratīyogitā* cannot be established, then the difference between the absence of a jar limited by the relation of contact and that of the same jar limited by the relation of inherence also cannot be justified. Because, the difference between different kinds of absence depends mainly on the difference of the *Pratīyogitās* of the absence.¹

In solving this problem it has been suggested that though the *Pratīyogitā* of a generic constant absence is identical with the limitor of the *Pratīyogitā*, yet it is not considered to be limited by all the relations. Rather, in different cases of absence whose *Pratīyogitās* are limited by specific relations, some sort of difference is assumed to exist between the *Pratīyogitās* on account of their being limited by different kinds of relation.

In the technical languages of Navya Nyāya it has been said that in each and every *Pratīyogitā* there exists a *Nirūpyatā* or describability or determinableness which is limited by a property called *Pratīyogitātva* or counterpositive-ness-ness. This *Nirūpyatā* or describability existing in the *Pratīyogitā* in its turn is again determined by the describability of determinableness (*Nirūpakatva*) existing in the specific relation. This *Nirūpakatva* existing in the specific relation again is determined by another determining factor or determinant (*Nirūpaka*) whose determinableness (*Nirūpakatva*) again is limited (*Avacchinna*) by the relation-ness (*Saṃsargatā*) which in its turn again is limited by specific properties like inherenceness (*Samavāyatva*), contactness (*Samyogatva*), etc.

1. अभाववैलक्षण्यं हि प्रतियोगितावैलक्षण्याधीनम्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Note on the commentary of *Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī*, p. 36.

By this technical language the Navya Naiyayikas have tried to avoid inconsistency in an unambiguous manner !

The idea underlying the above mentioned technical language of Nyaya may be elaborated in the following manner. Though the *Pratiyogitā* of the generic constant absence (*Samanyabhāva*) is identical with the limiter of the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitāvachchedaka*) which may be one and only one in the case of the absences of the same entity through different relations, as for example, *Samavāyena ghaṭo naṣṭi* (There is the absence of the jar limited by the relation of inference) and *Samyogena ghaṭo naṣṭi* (There is the absence of the jar limited by the relation of contact) and as such, it becomes difficult to distinguish between the two kinds of absence, yet by accepting different kinds of *Nirūpyatā* (describability or determinable-ness) which are different aspects of the same *Pratiyogitāvachchedaka* (limiter of the counterpositiveness) with which the *Pratiyogitā*s have been considered identical, the absences may be clearly differentiated without any shadow of inconsistency. The different kinds of *Nirūpyatā* existing in the *Pratiyogitā* which is identical with the *Pratiyogitāvachchedaka* have been clearly differentiated by the application of a chain of limiting adjuncts each and every one of which is extremely necessary to avoid any possible ambiguity in any stage.

In the case of the absence having the form *Samyogena ghaṭo naṣṭi*, the *Pratiyogitā* existing in the *Ghaṭa* (jar) is said to be limited (*Avacchinna*) by a particular *Pratiyogitātva* (counterpositive-ness) which is connected with the particular absence of the *Ghaṭa* through an indirect relation having *Samyoga* (contact) as its component part. In that *Pratiyogitā* again is supposed to exist a *Nirūpyatā* (describability or determinable-ness) which also is limited by the same *Pratiyogitātva*. Though the *Pratiyogitā* of the different kinds of absence of the *Ghaṭa* may be one and the same, being identical with *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness), the *Pratiyogitā* is a distinct one quite different from the *Nirūpyatā* existing in the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence of the same *Ghaṭa* through the relation

१. मधवायेन घटावाच्यवप्रतियोगितान्धर्वाच्छन्ननिरूप्यताया मधवायन्धर्वाच्छन्नमधवेनावाच्यवप्रतियोगितान्धर्वाच्छन्ननिरूपकतानिर्वापितव्यवस्वर्वाक्रियते न तु मधापन्धर्वाच्छन्ननिरूपकतानिर्वापितव्यमिति तन्प्रतियोगित्वयोर्वैतदभ्यापयति —

Pandita Śrīmadatta Mitra, Note on the commentary of *Vyaptipancaka Māthuri*, p. 36.

of inherence. The *Nirūpyatā* existing in this *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of the *Ghaṭa* through the relation of contact is again described or determined (*Nirūpita*) by a describer or determinant (*Nirūpaka*) which is nothing other than the particular relation *Samyoga*, the *Nirūpakatva* (describerness) of which is limited by the relationness (*Samśargatā*) which again is limited (*Avacchinna*) by the special feature of the particular relation here called *Sam-yogatva* or contactness.

Therefore, by the application of the various kinds of abstract properties in different stages as a limiter (*Avacchedaka*), any possible ambiguity has been sought to be totally eliminated.

The *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of the same *Ghaṭa* (jar) through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*) does not possess the same *Nirūpyatā* as mentioned earlier. But it has got a separate *Nirūpyatā* which is limited (*Avacchinna*) by another *Pratīyogitā* (counterpositiveness-ness) connected with the absence of the *Ghaṭa* through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). Here again this particular *Nirūpyatā* existing in the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence through the relation of inherence is described (*Nirūpita*) by a describer (*Nirūpaka*) relation, the *Nirūpakatā* (describerness) of which is limited by *Samavāyatva* (inherenceness) and not by *Samyogatva* (contactness).

Thus, by accepting different kinds of *Nirūpyatā* clearly differentiated by the application of various limitors (*Avacchedakas*) in different stages, the difference between different kinds of absence is established, though the *Pratīyogitās* may be identical with the same *Pratīyogitāvacchedaka*.

According to Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa, *Pratīyogitva* or *Pratīyogitā* is nothing other than the absence of the absence, which theory has been quoted as an authority by Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra in his commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*.¹ It is clear that according to this theory the *Pratīyogitā* is a *Svarūpa-sambandha*, because otherwise, the *Pratīyogitā* and the *Pratīyogi* (counterpositive) cannot be called identical.

Udayanācārya also in his *Kusumāñjali* has defined *Pratīyogitā*

1. तत्प्रतियोगित्वं तदभाव इति मथुरानाथोक्तैरभावाभावस्यैव प्रतियोगितारूपत्वात्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary of *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 45.

as the absenceness of absence.¹ There, of course, it is not explicitly mentioned whether the *Pratiyogitā* is identical with the limiter of the *Pratiyogitā* or not. This is quite natural as the higher dissertations regarding the exact nature of the *Pratiyogitā* developed later on in the writings of Raghunātha, Pakṣadhara Mīśra, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa, Gadādhara and others.

But one thing is quite clear in the above-mentioned definition of *Pratiyogitā* mentioned by Udayanācārya that the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence must exist in a real object. The word *vastunaḥ* in the definition means that the *Pratiyogitā* exists in a *Vastu* or real object as opposed to *Avastu* or unreal object. The sixth case ending (*Ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti*) after the stem word *Vastu* here means *Niṣṭhatva* or residency.

By this definition of *Pratiyogitā* Udayanācārya has revealed a very important theory of the Nyāya school of philosophy that an unreal object can never be negated.

In explaining the definition of *Pratiyogitā* given by Udayanācārya, Raghunātha Śīromaṇi has said that the word *Viraha* here does not mean absence, but it means the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge which is contradictory to some other knowledge.² Obviously, the meaning of the term *Viraha* accepted by Raghunātha Śīromaṇi is the secondary meaning which he has accepted with a view to including the *Pratiyogī* of the mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva*) and eliminating the limiter of *Pratiyogitā* (*Pratiyogitāvacchedaka*) of the same which are excluded and included respectively if the word *Viraha* is taken in its primary sense.³ Because, the absence of a mutual absence, according to the generally accepted theory, is the limiter of the *Pratiyogitā* and hence the meaning of the term *Viraha* in the definition of *Pratiyogitā*, if taken in its primary sense, would make the definition too narrow and too wide at the same time to exclude the *Pratiyogī* which is identical with the *Pratiyogitā* as a *Svarūpasambandha* and include the *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka*, which should have

1. अभावविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतियोगिता

2nd verse of the 3rd stavaka of Kusumāñjali.

2. विरहपदस्य तज्ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकज्ञानविषयार्थकत्वात्—

Vyāptipūrvapakṣa-Dīdhiti, p. 190, Chowkhamba edition.

3. न चान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितातदवच्छेदकयोरप्रसक्त्यतिप्रसक्ती—

Vyāptipūrvapakṣa-Dīdhiti, p. 358, Chowkhamba edition.

been included and excluded respectively in the definition of *Pratīyogitā*.

The explanation of the definition of *Pratīyogitā* given by Raghunātha Śīromaṇi appears to be justifiable in the sense that it makes the definition comprehensive to include all the cases of *Pratīyogitā* either of a relational absence (*Samsargābhāva*) or of a mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva*). Otherwise, the definition will have to be restricted, as has been done by some scholars, to make it free from any defect.¹

This *Pratīyogitā* in the case of the constant relational absence (*Atyantābhāva*) is always limited by a particular relation like contact (*Saṁyoga*), inherence (*Samavāya*), etc. Because, otherwise, certain phenomena cannot be satisfactorily explained. As for example, in a place where a jar exists through the relation of contact (*Saṁyoga*), the absence of the same jar during the same point of time also exists through a different relation, say, inherence (*Samavāya*). Similarly, in the locus of a jar where it exists through the relation of inherence there also exists at the same time the absence of the same jar through the relation of contact.²

The locus of a jar through the relation of contact may be a tract of land where the jar does not exist at the same time through the relation of inherence. Because, the locus of a jar through the relation of inherence is the final parts of the jar and not the tract of land. Hence, it is but natural that on the locus of a jar through the relation of contact would exist at the same time the absence of the same jar through the relation of inherence.

This sort of argument is applicable only in the case of the constant relational absence (*Atyantābhāva*), but not in the case of the posterior absence (*Dhvaṁsābhāva*)³ or prior absence (*Prāgabhāva*). So, the question of the *Pratīyogitā* of the

1. Vide *Dīdhiti* on *Pūrvapakṣa*, p. 358, *Gādādhari*, Chowkhamba edition.

2. समवायेन घटाधिकरणे संयोगेन घटो नास्ति संयोगेन घटाधिकरणे समवायेन घटो नास्तीति प्रतीत्युपपत्तये हि संयोगसमवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नघटाभावयोर्भेदोपपत्तये अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितायां सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वमंगीक्रियते
Rāmarudrī, p. 21, N. S. Press edition.

3. ध्वंसे च तादृशयुक्त्यसम्भवेन संसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वमप्रासाङ्गिकमिति भावः—

Rāmarudrī, p. 21, N. S. Press edition.

absence being limited by any relation arises only in the case of the constant relational absence and, of course, in the case of the mutual absence also (*Anyonyābhāva*) whose *Pratiyogitā* is limited by the relation of essential identity (*Tādātmya*).

When the *Pratiyogitā* of an absence is said to be limited by a particular relation it should be taken to mean that the relation in question to which the *Pratiyogī* stands with its locus has been negated in that context.

There is another kind of *Pratiyogitā* which is accepted in the case of the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*). *Viśeṣābhāva* or specific absence is of two kinds. One is called specific absence of that type whose *Pratiyogitā* is limited by a generic property¹ (*Sāmānyarūpeṇa viśeṣābhāva*). As for example, *Vahnitvena mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* or there is the absence of the fire of the kitchen whose *Pratiyogitā* is limited by *vahnitva* or fireness. The second type of the specific absence is the usual one like *Nilo ghaṭo nāsti* or there is the absence of a blue jar whose *Pratiyogitā* is limited by jariness qualified by blueness (*nīlatva-viśiṣṭaghaṭatva*).

The *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence of the first category (*Dravyatvena vahnir nāsti* or *Vahnitvena mahānasiyavahnir nāsti*) is expressly mentioned as identical with the specific property which is the chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) of the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) and not the generic property, because that would become too wide and as such would exist in more substances (*Dravya*) than the fire.²

As regards the nature of the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence of the second type (*Nilo ghaṭo nāsti*), no such direct mention is to be found anywhere in the Navya Nyāya treatises.

But there are texts which would indicate that the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence also is identical with the limiter of the

1. अतएव च द्रव्यत्वेन वह्निर्नास्ति वह्नित्वेन तद्वह्निर्नास्तीति प्रतीत्या सामान्यधर्मेण विशेषाभावोऽभ्युपेयते—

Vyadhikaraṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 124, Chowkhamba edition.

2. सामान्यधर्मेण विशेषाभावस्थले च प्रतियोग्यं प्रकारीभूतो विशेषधर्म एव तथा, न तु सामान्यधर्मः अतिप्रसक्तत्वात्—

Vyadhikaraṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 125, Chowkhamba edition.

सामान्यरूपेण विशेषाभावप्रतियोगिता च प्रतियोग्यं प्रकारीभूतधर्मस्वरूपा—
Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 37.

Pratīyogitā (*Pratīyogitāvacchedaka*).¹ Hence, the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence having the form *Nilo ghaṭo nāsti* is identical with *Nilaghaṭatva* or *Nilatvaviśiṣṭaghaṭatva* (jarness qualified by blueness).

It cannot be called identical with the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*), because in that case the *Pratīyogitā* would be much more in number and as such it would involve the technical defect called *Gaurava* or heaviness. According to the theory of the Naiyāyikas of the old school the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence is identical with the *Pratīyogī*,² and it has been clearly mentioned as such by Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, an eminent Naiyāyika of the new school who had lived in Vārāṇasī even a few years ago. The old Navya Nyāya treatises remaining almost silent on this point, one has naturally to find out any authoritative statement anywhere and as such we are to accept the authority of Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra in holding the view that the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence, according to the old school, is identical with the *Pratīyogī* 'counterpositive' of the absence. From this it can be guessed that the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence, according to the new school, is something different from the theory of the old school of Naiyāyikas. Otherwise, the word *Prācīnamate*, meaning according to the theory of the old school, would convey no sense.

There are other kinds of absence which are called prior absence (*Prāgabdhāva*) and posterior absence (*Dhvaṃsābhāva*) as has already been referred to earlier.

The *Pratīyogitā* of the prior absence (*Prāgabdhāva*) as also of the posterior absence (*Dhvaṃsābhāva*) is, of course, a separate entity³ (*Atirikṭa padārtha*) existing in the *Pratīyogī* (counterpositive) of the absence. Though the counterpositive of the prior absence does not come into being until the effect is produced, so also, the counterpositive of the posterior absence does not exist at the

1. प्रतियोगिस्वरूपं तदवच्छेदकस्वरूपं वा यत् प्रतियोगित्वम्—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 237, Chowkhamba edition.
2. प्राचीनमते विशेषाभावीयप्रतियोगिता च केवलप्रतियोगिस्वरूपा—
Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p., 37.
3. विषयतातत्तादिवत् प्रतियोगित्वाधिकरणत्वतत्त्वसम्बन्धत्वादयोऽप्यतिरिक्ता
एव पदार्था इत्येकदेशिनः—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti, p. 256. Chowkhamba edition.

time of the absence, yet the counterpositiveness is said to be existing in the respective *Pratiyogīs* just at the time of their existence. In the meantime while the *Pratiyogī* is not existing, the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) is said to be existing in time (*Kāla*) through the temporal relation (*Kālika sambandha*).

Of course, according to this theory, the *Pratiyogitā* of the constant relational absence (*Atyantābhāva*) also, either generic (*Sāmānyābhāva*) or specific (*Viśeṣābhāva*), is a separate entity (*Atirikta padārtha*) and as such it should not be included into the seven generally accepted categories like Substance (*Dravya*), Quality (*Guna*), etc.

But this theory has not been universally accepted and as such it has been contradictory to the theory of the Naiyāyikas in general.¹ Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the illustrious author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, holds that *Pratiyogitā* is a nature-relation (*Svarūpasambandhaviśeṣa*) of a peculiar type.² Hence, it has been called the theory of a particular group of logicians.³

Therefore, the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence of any type should be considered as the nature-relation (*Svarūpasambandha*)⁴ or peculiar nature relation as accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

The *Pratiyogitā* of an absence in the form of *Svarūpa-sambandha* is many in number and differs individually according to the difference of the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*).⁵

The *Pratiyogitā* of an absence, except that of the prior absence (*Prāgabdhāva*) or the posterior absence (*Dhvamsābhāva*), as has already been mentioned earlier, is limited by a particular relation

1. अतिरिक्तपदार्थस्वरूपप्रतियोगिनायाः सिद्धान्तविरुद्धत्वादिति भावः—
Avacchedakatvanirukti Gādādhari, p. 484, Chowkhamba edn.

2. एवञ्च प्रतियोगिता स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेष इति पूर्वमते एव मणिकारम्य निर्भर इति सूचितम्—

Pūrvapakṣa, Gādādhari, p. 372, Chowkhamba edition.

3. अतिरिक्त एव पदार्थ इत्येकदेशिनः—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti, p. 256, Chowkhamba edition.

4. अभावप्रतियोगित्वं स्वरूपसम्बन्ध एव—
Kevalānvayi-Dīdhiti, p. 811, Chowkhamba edition.

5. स्वरूपसम्बन्धात्मनः प्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रतिव्याक्तिभेदेन भिन्नतया—
Kevalānvayi-Jāgadīśi, p. 813, Chowkhamba edition.

प्रतियोगिनायाः स्वरूपसम्बन्धात्मिकायाः प्रतिव्याक्तिभिन्नतया—
Avacchedakatvanirukti-Dīdhiti, p. 756, Asiatic Society edn.

according to the particular circumstances under which that relation is denied of the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*). But the *Pratīyogitā* of any type of absence is always limited by a particular property (*Dharmu*). This limitation of the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence by a particular property is extremely necessary to avoid any possible ambiguity.

There is another kind of absentia counterpositiveness (*Abhāvīya pratīyogitā*) which is limited by a property that does not exist in the locus of the counterpositiveness. This is called *Vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinnapratīyogitā* (The counterpositiveness which is limited by a property that exists in a different locus). As for example, the counterpositiveness of the absence in the form *Vahnitvena ghaṭo nāsti*, there is the absence of the jar whose *Pratīyogitā* (counterpositiveness) is limited by fireness. This kind of absence is called *Vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinnapratīyogitākābhāva*, an absence the counterpositiveness of which is limited by a property that does not exist in the locus of the same counterpositiveness. This type of absence is unnegatable *Kevalānvayī* i.e., existing everywhere and hence it cannot be negated.

Instead of calling this absence as *Vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinna-pratīyogitākābhāva*, it is sometimes briefly called *Vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinnābhāva* or more briefly *Vyadhikaraṇābhāva*.

This type of absence is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas, but one scholar of the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy named Somaśodopādhyāya¹ is said to be responsible for this theory.

Nevertheless, the Naiyāyikas had to discuss this theory in detail and one treatise of Navya Nyāya named *Vyadhikaraṇa*, which forms a part of the famous *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, exclusively deals with several definitions of pervasion (*Vyāpti*) based on this theory. Of course, some scholars of the Navya Nyāya school even went to the length of saying that the Naiyāyikas including Gaṅgeśopādhyāya² could not but accept this type of

1. सोन्दडमते प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकधर्मावच्छिन्नवत्तामात्रस्याभावविरोधित्वात्—

Vyadhikaraṇa-Jāgadiśī, p. 124, Chowkhamba edition.

2. समनियताभावानामैक्येन निखिलव्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावस्यैव गगनाभावतया गगनाभावस्वीकर्तृणां चिन्तामणिकाराणां तदनङ्गीकारानुपपत्तेः—
Vyadhikaraṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 125, Chowkhamba edn.

absence. But the dispute is only in the different kind of counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) of this absence.¹

Even Raghunātha Śīromaṇi also said at the end of *Vyadhikaraṇa* that this particular absence cannot be denied under certain circumstances.² But there in the same breath he has expressed his personal dislike in accepting this theory by saying *Yadi punaḥ* (If again) which clearly expresses his disapproval of this type of absence. Had this particular type of absence been wholeheartedly approved by him, then he would never have made a subjunctive statement like that.

Now this *Pratiyogitā* (counterpositiveness) is said to be limited by all possible relations and properties³ which may not exist in the same locus with its counterpositiveness, because, a particular limiting relation can be accepted only in the case of a *Pratiyogitā* which is determined or described (*Nirūpita*) by an absence which is limited by some circumstances. But this particular absence called *Vyadhikaraṇābhāva* exists everywhere, because, it is an unnegatable (*Kevalānvayī*) absence. Every absence is contradictory to its counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) which is limited by the limiter of the counterpositiveness. But the *Pratiyogī* (counterpositive) limited by a property which does not exist in the locus of the counterpositiveness is not to be found anywhere and hence it cannot be contradictory to any absence whatsoever.

This particular *Pratiyogitā* of the absence called *Vyadhikaraṇābhāva* is an extra category⁴ other than the substance (*Dravya*),

1. विवादोऽपि अतिरिक्तायां प्रतियोगितायामेव—

Ibid.

2. यदि पुनरानुभविको लोकानां स्वरस्रवाही षट्त्वेन पटो नास्तीत्यादि-
प्रत्ययो न तदा तादृशाभावनिवारणं गोर्वाणगुरुणामपि अशक्यमिति मन्तव्यम्—
Vyadhikaraṇa Dīdhiti, p. 170, Chowkhamba edition.

3. व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नश्चेदभावः प्रामाणिकस्तदा तस्यैकस्यैव प्रति-
योगिताः सर्वेरेव व्यधिकरणैर्धर्मैः सर्वैश्च समानासमानाधिकरणैश्च सम्बन्धै-
रवच्छिद्यन्ताम्—

Sāmānyābhāva-Dīdhiti, p. 294, Jāgadiśī, Chowkhamba edn.

- व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नश्चेदभावः प्रामाणिकस्तदा सर्वैः सम्बन्धैस्तत्-
प्रतियोगिता अवच्छिद्यन्तामिति ग्रन्थकृतैव सामान्याभावे वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्—
Vyadhikaraṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 111, Chowkhamba edition.

4. व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावस्थले च प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकादिस्वरूपं न
प्रतियोगित्वं किन्तु अतिरिक्तमेव—

Vyadhikaraṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 125, Chowkhamba edition.

quality (*Guṇa*), etc. But though an extra category, this *Pratīyogitā* is many in number according to the difference of its locus.¹

Now a few words may be added here to explain the utility of accepting this absential counterpositiveness (*Abhāviya-pratīyogitā*).

There are many things explained and elaborated in the Navya Nyāya treatises which cannot be satisfactorily explained unless this absential counterpositiveness is accepted. *Abhāvatva* or absenceness and *Pratibandhakatva* or contradictoriness are some of the entities which would require absential counterpositiveness for their definition and clarification, otherwise they cannot be explained satisfactorily.²

Abhāvatva or absenceness has been defined as that difference or mutual absence whose counterpositiveness is limited by positiveness (*Bhāvatvāvachhinna-pratīyogitāko bhedaḥ*). Here in this definition absential counterpositiveness has been taken into account. Though absenceness (*Abhāvatva*) may be defined otherwise so that there may not be any essential necessity to admit the absential counterpositiveness (*Abhāviya pratīyogitā*), yet there may be other entities like contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatva*) etc., which would require the absential counterpositiveness (*Abhāviya-pratīyogitā*) for their definition and clarification.³

Contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatva*) has been defined as that absence (*Abhāva*) whose counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) has been limited by existence (*Vartamānatva*) in one time and place⁴ Or, contradictoriness has been defined elsewhere as the counterpositiveness of the absence which is the cause of something.⁵

1. अतिरिक्तापि प्रतियोगिता स्वाश्रयभेदान्नानैवेति ध्येयम्—
Sāmānyābhāva Jāgadiśi, p. 294, Chowkhamba edition.
2. अभावत्वप्रतिबन्धकत्वयोः प्रतियोगिताघटितत्वात् तथाविधव्यवहारगोचरस्यापि विना प्रतियोगितां निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वाच्च—
Pūrvapakṣa Dīdhiti Jāgadiśi, p. 193, Chowkhamba edn.
3. यद्यभावत्वं न भावत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताको भेदः किन्तु भावाभावासाधारणः स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः तदाप्याह प्रतिबन्धकत्वेति—
Pūrvapakṣa Jāgadiśi, p. 194, Chowkhamba edition.
4. एकदैकत्ववर्तमानत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावरूपस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्य—
Ibid.
5. कारणोभूताभावप्रतियोगित्व etc.
Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari, p. 1580, Chowkhamba edition.

In these and other similar cases counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) is taken into consideration for the definition and clarification of contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatva*).

There may, of course, be some other round-about ways of defining contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatva*), but those mentioned just now are comparatively less cumbrous. Indeed, it is almost impossible to find out better and easier definitions of contradictoriness than those mentioned above.

Therefore, it is to be conceded that an entity called absential counterpositiveness (*Abhāvīyapratiyogitā*) has got to be admitted for the sake of clarity and easy understanding of contradictoriness.

In the like manner pervasion (*Vyāpti*) also cannot be explained satisfactorily unless absential counterpositive-ness is accepted.

The conclusive definition of pervasion (*Vyāpti*) in the famous Navya Nyāya treatise called *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* also has been perfected along with other things with the help of this absential counterpositiveness.¹

Numerous other things can be mentioned for whose clarification and thorough definition this absential counterpositiveness has been accepted by the Navya Naiyāyikas.²

Abhāvīya Pratiyogī (Absential counterpositive).

As regards the absential counterpositive (*Abhāvīya-pratiyogī*) it is generally said that that thing is to be taken as the absential counterpositive whose absence is understood in a particular context.³ As for example, in the case of the absence in the form of *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar or there is the absence of a jar), the jar (*ghaṭa*) is said to be the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) of the absence. This absential counterpositive may either be a positive or a negative object. As for example, in the case of the absence in the form *Ghaṭābhāvo nāsti* (There is the absence of the absence of a jar), the absence of the jar (*Ghaṭābhāva*) is the counterpositive of its own absence.

1. प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयत्समानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेद-
कावच्छिन्नं यन्न भवति तेन समं तस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः—

Tattvacintāmaṇi Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 209, Chowkhamba edition.

2. As for example, causeness (*Kāraṇatva*), promoteness (*Prayojakatva*) etc.

3. यस्याभावः स प्रतियोगी—

Now an interesting controversy arises in this connection about the nature of the absential counterpositive where the counterpositive itself is an absence by nature. Should the absence of an absence be considered as an absence, a negative entity or should it be called a positive entity where the counterpositive of the first absence is a positive entity ? There are arguments for and against both of these theories which are equally forceful from their own standpoints.

According to Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa and others the absence of a constant relational absence (*Atyantābhāva*) and that of a mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva*) is by nature a member of the seventh category (*Saptama padārtha*) i.e., absence.¹

But even previous to this theory the famous Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* held that the constant absence of a constant absence is equivalent to the counterpositive of the first absence. Hence, according to this theory the constant absence of the constant absence of a jar (*ghaṭa*) is the jar itself, the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) of the first absence.²

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra also supports the theory of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and adds that everywhere the absence of another absence is, of course, identical with the counterpositive of the first absence and the counterpositive also is contradictory to the absence through the limiting relation of the counterpositiveness.³

Pakṣadhara Miśra, as has been referred to by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, of course, has tackled the problem in a new way. He says that whether in the case of a mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva*) or in the case of a constant absence (*Atyantābhāva*), the absence of either of the two kinds of absence would be nothing other than the limiting relation of the counterpositiveness.⁴

1. अत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोरत्यन्ताभावस्य सप्तमपदार्थस्वरूपत्वात्—
Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri, p. 21, Vāmācarāṇa's edition.

2. अत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोरत्यन्ताभावस्य प्रतियोग्यादिस्वरूपत्वनये तु—
Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri, p. 21, Vāmācarāṇa's edition.

अत्यन्ताभावात्यन्ताभावः प्रतियोग्येव—

Tattvacintāmaṇi Kevalānvayī, p. 806, Chowkhamba edition.

3. यद्यपि सर्वत्र अभावस्याभावः प्रतियोग्येव तस्यापि प्रतियोगितावच्छेदक-
सम्बन्धेनैव अभावविरोधित्वात्—

Kevalānvayī Jāgadiśī, p. 808, Chowkhamba edition.

4. अथान्योन्यात्यन्ताभावसाधारणः प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्ध एवाभावा-
भावः—

Kevalānvayī-Dīdhiti, Jāgadiśī, p. 808, Chowkhamba edition.

It is obvious that according to this theory, the absence of another absence would neither be an absence, a member of the seventh category, nor would it be identical with the counterpositive of the first absence. According to this theory, therefore, the question does not arise at all whether the absence of another absence would be the counterpositive of the first absence or not.

This theory of Pakṣadhara Miśra has been criticised by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in the following manner. When something having been known, something is not known and the absence of that is expressed, that thing verily is said to be identical with the absence of that (which is known). This condition is experienced mutually in the case of the counterpositive and its absence. The relation of the counterpositive is not an object of that sort of experience.¹

Now the question remains whether the counterpositive of an absence would always be a positive entity or not. The term counterpositive apparently suggests that counterpositive of an absence should be a positive entity. But it is always not the case. An absence may equally be the counterpositive of another absence, just like a positive entity. Only it is to be taken into consideration that the counterpositive of an absence is not a fictitious thing, because the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) is said to exist in a real object as has been clearly expressed by Udayanācārya in the *Nyāya Kusumāñjali*.² The counterpositive of an absence should be the absence of an absence as has been stated in the verse of *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* just now referred to. Hence, the counterpositive of the absence in the form of *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar) is, of course, the *Ghaṭa* (Jar), which again is equivalent to the absence of the absence of the jar.

But the question still remains to be solved in this connection whether the absence of another absence can ever be a positive entity or not? Those who hold with Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa that the absence of another absence is a member of the

1. यद्वत्त्वे हि ज्ञाते यद्वत्त्वं न प्रतीयते तदभाववत्त्वं च व्यवहियते तस्यैव तदभावात्मकत्वमुपेयते प्रतियोगितदभाववत्त्वबुद्ध्योश्च मिथस्तथात्वमानुभविकम् । न च तत्सम्बन्धवत्त्वञ्च तद्विषयः—
Kevalānvayi-Didhiti, Jāgadiśī, p. 803, Chowkhambā edition.

2. अभावविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतियोगिता—
Kusumāñjali, 2nd verse, 3rd Stavaka.

seventh category (*Saptama padārtha*), i.e. absence, obviously think that otherwise the validity of the knowledge of an absence cannot be established. For, validity consists in the relation of a property with its substratum when that property actually exists there.¹ According to this theory, the absence of the absence of a jar (*Ghaṭa*) is not the jar itself, but it is the absence of the absence of the jar (*Ghaṭābhāvābhāva*). Though the absence of the absence of a jar is equivalent to the jar itself, yet in the capacity of the absence of the absence of the jar (*Ghaṭābhāvābhāvātvena*), it is considered as the counterpositive of the absence of the jar.

But though the definition of the counterpositive fits in with this theory, and though the validity of the knowledge of the counterpositive as an absence of the absence is maintained thereby, yet it goes against our normal experience that the absence of a jar as a jar is the counterpositive of the absence of the jar.

Possibly with a view to solving this difficulty the eminent logician Raghunātha Śīromaṇi held that absenceness (*Abhāvatva*) is common to both positive and negative entities. In the opinion of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, absenceness (*Abhāvatva*) is a peculiar nature-relation (*Svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa*) common to both positive and negative entities as is justified by the experience having the form 'This is not here', 'This is not this.'²

But we have reason to think that Raghunātha Śīromaṇi has explained absenceness in the above-mentioned way according to the orthodox Navya Nyāya School. In his own independent opinion, which he has put forward in the *Padārthatattva-nirūpaṇa*, Raghunātha has defined absenceness as an indivisible property (*Akhaṇḍopādhi*).³

Whether the absence of another absence is an absence or not, it is surely the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) of the first absence.

Accordingly Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the last prolific writer

1. तद्वति तत्प्रकारकानुभवो यथार्थः—

Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 35. Veṅkaṭeśvara Press edition.

2. अभावत्वञ्च इदमिह नास्ति इदमिदं न भवतीतिप्रतीतिनियामकः
स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Dīdhiti, p. 956, Jāgadiśī, Chowkhamba edn.

3. अभावत्वमेव वानुगतप्रत्ययसिद्धोज्ज्वण्डोपाधिः—

Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa, p. 49, Benares edition.

on Navya Nyāya also has clearly defined absential counterpositive (*Abhāviya-pratiyogī*) as the absence of the absence of the self residing in the self.¹ Raghunātha Śiromaṇi also has this definition in his mind when he clarifies the definition of the absential counterpositive given by Udayanācārya in the Nyāya Kusumāñjali.²

As for example, a jar (*Ghaṭa*) is the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) of its own absence. Hence the absence of the absence of the jar residing in the same jar is the definition of the counterpositive which surely fits in with the jar here. The insertion of the word self (*Sva*) in the definition of the counterpositive is, of course, extremely necessary to prevent the definition from becoming too wide. Otherwise, the locus of the jar also may equally be taken into account, in which case the definition of *Pratiyogī* would naturally become too wide. By the insertion of the word *Sva* meaning self, this defect of the definition in question can be eliminated. Because, the term *Sva* here refers to the jar alone.

Now, to sum up the conclusion it can be said that whether the absence of another absence is itself an absence or not, the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) of an absence would always be equivalent to the absence of another absence of a particular entity.

The term *Pratiyogī* in the case of an absence, as also elsewhere, is a relative term (*Sāpekṣa śabda* or *Sambandhi-śabda*) and as such it must be related to an absence in the context of a negation.

The counterpositive of an absence is always conceived as a qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) of its absence. Because, wherever an absence is known, it is known to be an absence of something and that object whose absence is known becomes the qualifier of the absence concerned.³

1. तथा च स्वीयो योऽभावः स्वनिष्ठतद्विरहवत्त्वमेव स्वस्थतद्भावप्रतियोगित्वम्—

Pūrvapakṣa Gādādhari, p. 369, Chowkhamba edition.

2. अभावपदस्य च स्वाभावपरत्वात्—

Pūrvapakṣa Dīdhiti, p. 358, Gādādhari, Chowkhamba edition.

3. प्रतियोगिविशेषिताभावज्ञानं च विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबोधमर्यादां नातिशेते—

Vyutpattivāda, p. 61, Jayadeva Miśra's edition.

प्रतियोगिना विशेषितो योऽभावस्तज्ज्ञानम्—

Jayadeva Miśra, Commentary on *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 63.

The counterpositive which is the qualifier of an absence, becomes so through a relation called *Pratīyogitā* (counterpositiveness) or, to be more precise, *Pratīyogitā-nirūpakatva* or briefly *Pratīyogitākatva* which means describerness of the *Pratīyogitā*. The absence (*Abhāva*) is said to be the describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the *Pratīyogitā* and hence the property called describerness (*Nirūpakatva*) residing in the absence constitutes the last limit of the relation pointing to the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) where the counterpositive is understood as a qualifier.

This *Pratīyogitā* relation is always made specific by two kinds of limitors (*Avacchedaka*). One of the limitors is the special property residing in the *Pratīyogī* (counterpositive) and the other is the relation to which the *Pratīyogī* stands with its locus. In the case of the absence of a jar (*Ghaṭa*) limited by the relation of contact (*Samyoga*), the *Pratīyogitā* relation is limited by the relation of contact as also by the special property of the *Pratīyogī* which is jariness (*Ghaṭatva*) here.

Hence, through the relation of *Pratīyogitā* limited by the relation of contact as also by the special property called jariness (*Ghaṭatva*), the generic absence of the jar (*Ghaṭa-sāmānyābhāva*) is qualified by its *Pratīyogī*, the jar itself.

This, of course, is in the case of a generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*).

In the case of a specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) like *Nilaghaṭo nāsti* (There is the absence of a blue jar), the *Pratīyogitā* relation between the absence and its counterpositive should be limited by an additional property called blueness (*Nilatva*), so that there may not be any ambiguity between the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva* and the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*).

Therefore, the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) of the blue jar (*Nilaghaṭa*) through the relation of contact is qualified by its counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) through the relation of *Pratīyogitā* (counterpositiveness) limited by the relation of contact as also by the special properties called *Nilatva* (blueness) and *Ghaṭatva* (jariness), taken together.

While the counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) of an absence whether generic, or specific, is known as a qualifier of the absence, it should in its turn be clearly understood to have been qualified by some special property or properties otherwise, ambiguity can never be avoided.

If the counterpositive of the generic absence *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar or there is the absence of a jar) be not understood as qualified by the special property called *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) alone then the absence of the jar may be confused with the absence of a substance (*Dravya*). Because, the jar being a substance, the property called substantiveness (*Dravyatva*) also exists in it and as such the absence of the jar may well be taken for such an absence which is qualified by a counterpositive called *Dravya* (Substance). In other words, the absence in that case may be understood as that of a substance and not of a jar.

Therefore it is to be clearly understood in connection with the counterpositive of an absence that not only should the counterpositive be a qualifier of the absence, but the property which is the limiter of the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) should also be very clearly mentioned.

One more point is to be taken into account in this connection. The special property residing in the counterpositive which happens to be the limiter of the counterpositiveness should not be understood in a disconnected way. But it should be connected with the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) as also with the absence simultaneously, though to be connected with the absence, the limiter or the counterpositive should always be connected with the absence through the counterpositive and not independently, because otherwise, the absence cannot be perceived as an integrated entity.¹

Sāmsargikapratyogitā

(Relational counterpositiveness or adjunctness)

The word *Sāmsarga* means relation and it is synonymous with *Sambandha* which also means relation. The word *Sāmsargika* is an adjective derived from *Sāmsarga* and as such it means related to a relation.

The word *Sāmsargika* is freely used in connection with the *Pratiyogitā* of a relation in preference to the word derived from *Sambandha*. It seems that it is only a convention and it has got no other implication whatsoever.

1. विशेष्ये विशेषणमिति न्यायेन च नाभावः प्रत्यक्षः—

Vyadhikaraṇa-Dīdhiti Prakāśa, p. 248, Asiatic Society edition.

विशेष्ये विशेषणमिति रीत्या न कश्चिदभ्युपैति—

Vyutpattivāda, p. 63, Jayadeva Miśra's edition.

The word *Pratīyogitā* in the context of a relation means "adjunctness" and this term has been conveniently used by Prof. Ingalls¹ to avoid any possible ambiguity with the absential *Pratīyogitā* (counterpositiveness) because, absential *Pratīyogitā* means altogether a different thing. But it appears to us that it is not so much necessary to coin a new term as adjunctness for the relational counterpositiveness, because, any possible ambiguity can always be avoided by making the reference of the relation (*Samsarga*) to the particular *Pratīyogitā* as is the universal custom with the writers of the Navya Nyāya treatises.

The derivative meaning of the term *Pratīyogitā* which is nothing other than the contradictory relation, also thoroughly fits in with the relational counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*), because, the *Pratīyogitā* of the relation also is equally contradictory to the *Anuyogitā* (subjunctness) of the relation, just as the absential counterpositiveness is contradictory to the subjunctness (*Anuyogitā*) residing in the absence.²

Nevertheless, the term adjunctness may also be used in the place of the counterpositiveness of a relation. If, of course, it is supposed that the term counterpositiveness to some extent refers to a contradictory negative entity, then the term adjunctness may conveniently be used for the relational counterpositiveness. But generally speaking it appears that the term counterpositiveness may equally be used in a more or less technical sense in the context of relation also for the sake of uniformity.

All relations in Navya Nyāya subsist between two terms. In the case of direct occurrence-exacting (*Vṛttiniyāmaka*) relations, there is, of course, no complexity, because, the superstratum (*Ādheya*) which may exist on the substratum (*Ādhāra*) through a particular relation is called the *Pratīyogī*, adjunct or counterpositive of that relation. The relational abstract residing in the superstratum is called adjunctness or counterpositiveness determined by the relation. As for example, when a jar (*Ghaṭa*) exists on a tract of land through the relation of contact (*Sañyoga*), it is called the adjunct of the relation and the relational abstract

1. *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, p. 55.

2. अभावे तत्प्रतियोगिस्वरूपनिरूपितानुयोगित्वनामा सम्बन्धविशेषः—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 476, Chowkhamba edition.

property residing in the jar is the adjunctness or counterpositiveness of the relation.

In the case of indirect occurrence-exacting relations also the principle is, of course, the same. The initial and the final terms of a number of terms which comprise the indirect relation are called the adjunct or counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) and subjunct (*Anuyogī*) of the relation respectively and the relational abstract property residing in the adjunct or counterpositive is called the *Pratiyogitā*, adjunctness or counterpositiveness.

In the case of non-occurrence-exacting relations, where there is no question of one term becoming the superstratum (*Ādheya*) and the other substratum (*Ādhāra*), it is the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa* or *Prakāra*) which is called the adjunct (*Pratiyogī*) and the qualificand is termed the subjunct (*Anuyogī*) of the relation. As for example, when an object of a particular knowledge, say a jar (*Ghaṭa*), is said to be qualified by its knowledge through the relation of *Viśaya-tā* (contentness), the knowledge which happens to be the qualifier here would be called the adjunct (*Pratiyogī*) and the jar, the object of knowledge, the subjunct (*Anuyogī*).

The *Vācaspatyam* has offered a general definition of the adjunct and the subjunct of a relation from which the definition of adjunctness and subjunctness of a relation also can easily be understood. According to *Vācaspatyam*, that which is known as a qualifier (*Prakāra*) of a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭabuddhi*) is called the adjunct¹ (*Pratiyogī*) of a relation and that which is known as a qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) of a qualified knowledge is the subjunct of a relation.

In the above-mentioned definition, the relational abstract called adjunctness residing in the said adjunct is the *Pratiyogitā* or counterpositiveness of the relation.

This definition of relational counterpositiveness or adjunctness applies equally to the relational adjunctness in the case of an occurrence-exacting relation as also in the case of a non-occurrence-exacting relation, direct or indirect.

Prof. Ingalls also in his book *Materials for the study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* offers a definition of the relational adjunct-

1. तत्र विशिष्टबुद्धौ प्रकारतया भासमानं संसर्गस्य प्रतियोगिविशेष्यतया भासमानं संसर्गस्यानुयोगीति भेदः—

Vācaspatyam, p. 4449.

ness which resembles that given in the *Vācaspatyam* with this difference that the author there restricts the definition to the case of non-occurrence-exacting relations¹ only.

But it appears to us that the definition of relational adjunct and subjunct and through it of adjunctness and subjunctness is quite applicable to all cases of relational adjunct and subjunct as also of adjunctness and subjunctness irrespective of occurrence-exacting and non-occurrence-exacting relations. Because, whether occurrence-exacting or non-occurrence-exacting, a relation is quite competent to produce a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-buddhi*) and the first term as also the last term of the relation would always be known as the qualifier and the qualificand respectively which would be treated as the adjunct and the subjunct of a relation and the special property residing in them would be the adjunctness and subjunctness respectively.

1. *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, p. 44.

CHAPTER IV

VIṢAYATĀ (CONTENTNESS)

Viṣayatā or content-ness is a special property of the *Viśaya* or content of knowledge, desire etc., which are known as content-possessing entities (*Saviśayaka-padārtha*).

According to Bhaṭṭācārya Cūḍāmaṇi Jānakīnātha the *Viṣayatā* is a kind of peculiar nature-relation (*Svarūpa-sambandhaviśeṣa*), which is established by the cognition of objects.¹ This, of course, is the traditional theory of the Naiyāyikas including the Navya Naiyāyikas (neo-logicians). But along with this theory there is another theory of a section of logicians according to which *Viṣayatā* is a separate category other than the commonly accepted seven categories like substance (*Dravya*), quality (*Guṇa*) etc., which also has been mentioned by Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācārya,² Raghunātha Śiromaṇi³, Jagadīśa Tarkālīnkāra⁴ and other logicians of the new school.

Paṇḍita Umānātha Upādhyāya, a logician of the new school and commentator of the *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri* holds that *Viṣayatā* is of three kinds and each and every one of it is a relation of the knowledge with its object.⁵ This theory actually is the traditional one of the Navya Nyāya school according to which *Viṣayatā* is peculiar nature-relation (*Svarūpa-sambandhaviśeṣa*).

1. विषयता च विषयाकारप्रतीतिसाक्षिकः स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः—

Nyāya Siddhānta Mañjarī, Pratyakṣa section, p. 19.

2. पदार्थान्तरमित्येकदेशिनः—

Ibid.

3. विषयतातत्तादिवत् . . . इत्येकदेशिनः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti, p. 256, Chowkhamba edition.

4. अतिरिक्तपदार्थस्य केनचित् स्वीकाराद् दृष्टान्तता—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 256. Chowkhamba edition.

5. विषयताऽपि त्रिविधा प्रकारतासंसर्गताविशेष्यताभेदात् प्रकारात्मके विषये

ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धः प्रकारता—

Paṇḍita Umānātha Upādhyāya, Foot-note on the commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 2.

According to Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the theory that *Viśayatā* is an extra category is the theory held by a section of old school of logicians¹. But the above statement of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* appears to be a bit confusing, because, in the *Viśayatāvāda* Gadādhara himself has said that the theory that *Viśayatā* is an extra category is one which is held by the new school of logicians.²

It appears to us that *Viśayatā* as an extra category is held by a section of the new school of logicians. The statement of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in the *Viśayatāvāda* appears to be more reliable than his statement in the commentary of *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa*, because, no other commentator of *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* has mentioned anything in that way.

In establishing the existence of *Viśayatā* Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has said in the very beginning of *Viśayatāvāda* that the existence of *Viśayatā* (contentness) is proved by the everyday experience of knowledge of each and every individual. Because, whenever a knowledge is cognized it is so done as being regularly endowed with a content (*Viśaya*) like a jar (*Ghaṭa*) etc.³ We cognize that we know a jar and the like. Therefore, it is proved from this sort of knowledge that the knowledge is always connected with its content. Without reference to any content, there cannot be any knowledge whatsoever.

Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma in his commentary on *Padārthattvanirūpaṇa* of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi says that *Viśayatā* is established as the cause of the knowledge of a cloth etc., qualified by knowledge etc. By this he wants to say that to know a cloth, the object of the knowledge of a cloth, as qualified by its knowledge, depends on a relation of the knowledge with the cloth, its content. This relation is called *Viśayatā*.⁴

1. प्राचीनैकदेशिभिर्विषयताया अतिरिक्तपदार्थत्वोपगमात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 477, Chowkhamba edition.

2. नव्यास्तु विषयत्वं पदार्थान्तरमेव न तु स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 1.

3. सा च सविषयिका उक्तधर्मिग्राहकप्रतीत्या घटादिविषयकत्वेनैव तदवगाहनात्—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 1.

4. पटादौ ज्ञानादिमत्ताबुद्धिनिमित्ततया तासां सिद्धिः—

Rāmabhadra—Commentary on *Padārthattvanirūpaṇa*, p. 127.

The contentness residing in the object of knowledge is called *Viśayatā*.

The contentness (*Viśayatā*) of the knowledge of a jar residing in that jar is, of course, a particular relation whose adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) is the knowledge in question. The contentness residing in the jar which is the object of the knowledge of the jar is not an extra category of thought other than the nature¹ of the jar, because, if the contentness can be explained by accepting it as identical with an accepted and established object like a jar etc., then there is no justification of calling it an extra category.

According to some scholars the contentness (*Viśayatā*) is identical with the knowledge and not with the object of knowledge, for, in that case the condition of the contentness becoming the superstratum and that of the object of the knowledge becoming the substratum would not be justifiable.²

Again, if *Viśayatā* be held identical with the object of knowledge, then the difference between the knowledge having the form *Ghaṭavad bhūtaḥ* (The land is jar-possessing) and *Ghaṭa-bhūta-samyogāḥ* (The jar, land and contact) cannot be established. For, in both the forms of knowledge, the objects are the same, because, in the first form of knowledge also, the relation of contact (*Samyoga*) is known as an object, though it may not have been mentioned there.³

In the commentary of *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa*, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭa-cārya has pointed out that *Viśayatā* can neither be identical with the object of knowledge, nor with the knowledge itself, nor with both. Because, if *Viśayatā* be identical with the object or con-

1. घटादिनिष्ठं तद्विषयत्वं च तत्प्रतियोगिकः सम्बन्धविशेषः क्लृप्तेन स्वरूपेणैवोपपत्तौ अतिरिक्तकल्पनाया अनवकाशात्—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 1.

2. विषयताया विषयस्वरूपत्वे विषयेण समं तस्य आधाराधेयभावानुपपत्तेः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 9.

3. एवं घटवद्भूतलं घटभूतलसंयोगा इतिज्ञानयोरविशेषप्रसङ्गश्च विषयाणां तदात्मकविषयतायाश्च अविलक्षणत्वात्—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 3.

विषयताया विषयस्वरूपत्वे तु घटभूतलसंयोगा इतिसमूहालम्बनतो घटवद्भूतलमिति विशिष्टबुद्धेरवैलक्षण्यापत्तेः—

Raghudeva Nyāyālamkāra's commentary on *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, p. 78.

tent of knowledge, then there would not be any difference between the knowledge of a jar (*Ghaṭa*) whose *Viśayatā* (contentness) is limited by *Dravyatva* (substanceness) and the knowledge of the same jar whose *Viśayatā* is limited by *Ghaṭatva* (jarness). For, the object of the two kinds of knowledge being the same jar with which the *Viśayatā* is thought to be identical, it would be difficult to establish the difference between the two kinds of knowledge, since the difference between two kinds of knowledge can only be established by the difference of *Viśayatā* (contentness).¹

If on the other hand *Viśayatā* is held identical with the knowledge of the object, then the valid knowledge having for its object two or more independent things like a jar, a cloth or so would become invalid inasmuch as the *Viśayatā* residing in the jar would become limited by clothness,² since the *Viśayatā* existing in all the objects of that knowledge being one and the same on account of its being identical with the knowledge which is one here, it is limited by all the properties existing in the objects of the knowledge. Now, if the *Viśayatā* existing in the jar be limited by clothness (*Paṭatva*), a property which does not exist in the same jar, then surely the knowledge in question becomes invalid, because, invalidity of a knowledge consists in its *Viśayatā* (contentness) being limited by a contradictory property or a property which does not reside in the locus of the *Viśayatā*.

If in the third alternative the *Viśayatā* be considered identical with both the knowledge and the object of knowledge, then the twofold nature of the *Viśayatā* residing in the generic character and jarness related to the knowledge having the form *Jātimān*

1. विषयताया विषयरूपत्वे द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नघटादिविषयकज्ञानाद् घटत्वावच्छिन्नतद्विषयकज्ञानस्य विषयतावैलक्षण्यविरहादवैलक्षण्यपत्तिः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 477, Chowkhamba edn.

2. ज्ञानरूपत्वे घटपटादित्यादिसमूहालम्बनीयघटपटादिविषयतानामभिन्नतापत्त्या तादृशज्ञानस्य पटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नघटादिनिष्ठविषयताशालितया भ्रमत्वापत्तिः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 478, Chowkhamba edn.

एवं विषयताया ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे घटपटादित्यादिसमूहालम्बनात्मकैकज्ञानीय-घटपटादिरूपनानाविषयनिष्ठविषयतानामेकतया तादृशज्ञानस्य घटत्वपटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नपटघटादिनिष्ठविषयताकतया भ्रमत्वापत्तिः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 2.

ghaṭaḥ (The jar is qualified by a generic character) cannot be established.¹ Because, the knowledge here has got only one individual manifestation (*Eka-vyakti*) and the generic character (*Jāti*) and jariness (*Ghaṭatva*) which are the two qualifiers of the jar (*Ghaṭa*), the object of knowledge, also are identical, though the *Viṣayatā* (contentness) residing in the *Jāti* (generic character) and *Ghaṭatva* (jariness) are different for the simple reason that the one residing in the *Jāti* is qualified by *Jātitva* (generic character-ness), whereas the other existing in *Ghaṭatva* (jariness) is unqualified (*Niravacchinna*).

Now if the *Viṣayatā* be held identical with both the knowledge and the content or object of knowledge, then the knowledge and the content of the knowledge in connection with the knowledge having the form *Jātimān ghaṭaḥ* (The jar is qualified by a class character) being individually one in number the twofold nature of the *Viṣayatā* existing in the qualifier *Jāti* and *Ghaṭatva* cannot be established.

In that case the difference of form between the two kinds of knowledge having the form *Jātimān ghaṭaḥ* and only *Jātimān* cannot be established. Because, the difference of form between one knowledge and another depends upon the difference of *Viṣayatā* (contentness) determined by the knowledge. Now, if there be no difference of *Viṣayatā* in the two forms of knowledge like *Jātimān ghaṭa* and only *Jātimān* on account of the *Viṣayatā* of the two forms of knowledge being one and only one for its being identical with the single knowledge and the single object of knowledge, the difference of *Prakāratā* or qualificierness of the two individual manifestations of knowledge (*Jñānavyakti*) cannot be justified.²

Therefore, Gadādhara concludes in the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* that not only *Viṣayatā* (contentness) is an extra category, but also *Viṣayatātva* (content-ness-ness) is to be accepted as an extra

1. ज्ञानविषयोभयस्वरूपत्वे च जातिमान् घट इत्यादिज्ञानीयघटत्वादिविषयताया द्वैविध्यानुपपत्तिः ज्ञानविषययोरतथात्वात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhara, p. 748, Asiatic Society edn.

2. जातिमानित्याद्याकारकैकविधघटत्वादिविषयताशालितादृशबुद्धौविलक्षणप्रकारतान स्यात्—

Ibid.

category with a view to collecting all the *Viṣayatās* under a single common property.¹

But in the *Viṣayatāvāda* Gadādhara has put forward the traditional theory of the Naiyāyikas regarding the *Viṣayatā* by saying that *Viṣayatā* is identical with both the knowledge and the object of knowledge, because, there is no sufficient convincing argument to make *Viṣayatā* identical either with the knowledge (*Jñāna*) or with the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge. There the eminent logician points out that in accepting *Viṣayatā* as identical with both the knowledge and the object of knowledge, no heaviness (*Gaurava*) or acceptance of more things than urgently required is involved.² Because, both the knowledge and the object of knowledge are already previously accepted things (*Kṛpta padārtha*), only the nature of being a relation of the knowledge with its object is to be assumed anew in the *Viṣayatā*, whereas, in the event of the *Viṣayatā* being accepted as an extra category, two things have got to be assumed anew, one being the extra category in the form of the *Viṣayatā* and the other the relationship of the knowledge with its object which is to be admitted in the same *Viṣayatā*.

Now, after making a critical examination of the different theories regarding *Viṣayatā* we are inclined to think that the theory that *Viṣayatā* is an extra category which is held by a section of logicians, is comparatively a sound one compared to the traditional theory of *Viṣayatā* as a *Svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa* (peculiar nature-relation). Because, in that case the number of inconsistency would be lesser.

This *Viṣayatā* is of many kinds like *Prakāratā*, *Viśeṣyatā*, *Samśargatā*, *Vidheyatā*, *Uddeśyatā*, *Koṭitā* etc., some of which will be discussed afterwards under separate heads.

In the case of the valid knowledge in certain cases, where the object of knowledge is a qualified entity, the *Viṣayatā* also is called a qualified *Viṣayatā* (*Viśiṣṭa-viṣayatā*). As for example,

1. विषयताया विषयभेदभिन्नविषयतानामनुगमकतया च विषयतात्वस्यातिरिक्ततासिद्धिः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 748, Asiatic Society edn.

2. अस्तु वा विनिगमनाविरहादुभयमेव विषयत्वं तथापि तादृशोभयस्य क्लृप्तत्वाद् अतिरिक्तविषयतायास्तत्र ज्ञानादिसम्बन्धतायाश्च कल्पनापेक्षया तदुभयस्य ज्ञानादिसम्बन्धत्वकल्पने गौरवानवकाश इति सिद्धान्तानुयायिनः—

Viṣayatāvāda, p. 1.

when a lake is known as qualified by the absence of fire, the knowledge, of course, would be a valid one and the object of the knowledge here, the lake qualified by the absence of fire, (*Vahnnya-bhāva-viśiṣṭa-hrada*) would have a qualified *Viśayatā* in it. There is no qualified *Viśayatā* in the object of an invalid knowledge, because, really speaking, there is no qualified object in that case,¹ for the simple reason that the absence of fire actually does not exist on a mountain where fire may be existing. In that case the knowledge having the form *Vahnnyabhāvavān parvataḥ* or the mountain is 'absence-of-fire-possessing' has got no qualified *Viśayatā* (*Viśiṣṭaviśayatā*).

In the case of an invalid knowledge, the object has got no qualified *Viśayatā* but it has got a series of *Viśayatā* each and every one of which is mutually determined (*Nirūpita*) by the other. This kind of *Viśayatā* is called *Nirūpyanirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viśayatā*. It should be observed in this connection that wherever there is *Viśiṣṭa-viśayatā*, there is *Nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viśayatā* also. In other words, in the language of Navya Nyāya, *Viśiṣṭaviśayatātva* is pervaded by *Nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpannaviśayatātva* or *Nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viśayatātva* is the pervader (*Vyāpaka*) of *Viśiṣṭa-viśayatātva*. As in the previously stated example *Vahnnyabhāvavān hradaḥ*, there are both *Viśiṣṭa-viśayatā* (qualified *viśayatā*) and *Nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viśayatā*, a *Viśayatā* the component parts of which are mutually in the state of being a describer and describable. To be a bit more explicit, the *Nirūpyanirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viśayatā* means that the first *Viśayatā* of the series would be the determinant or describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the second *Viśayatā* and the second *Viśayatā* would determine or describe the third and so on. This is the procedure of both the cases of *Viśayatā* of the valid and invalid knowledge.

In the case of the valid knowledge like *Vahnnyabhāvavān hrada* the *Viśayatā* residing in *Vahni* (fire) and limited by *Vahnitva* (fireness) is the determinant or describer of the *Viśayatā* residing in the *Abhāva* (absence of fire) and limited by *Abhāvatva* (absence-ness) and this *Viśayatā* in its turn is the describer of the *Viśayatā* residing in the *Hrada* (lake) and limited by *Hradatva* (lakeness).

1. भ्रमविषयविशिष्टस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्—

Sāmānyanirukti Dīdhiti, p. 87, Śivadatta's edition.

In the language of Navya Nyāya, it is expressed as *Vahnitvāvacchinna-viśayatānirūpitābhāvatvāvacchinna-viśayatā-nirūpitahradatvāvacchinna-viśayatā*. Here in the case of the valid knowledge, as it has already been mentioned, there is a *Viśiṣṭa-viśayatā* (qualified *viśayatā*) also, which means that the *Viśayatā* residing in the *Hrada* (lake) and limited by *Hradatva* (lake-ness) is described or determined by *Hrada* which in its turn is limited by the absence of fire (*Vahnyabhāva*). In the language of Navya Nyāya this is expressed as *Vahnyabhāva-viśiṣṭahradatvāvacchinna-viśayatā*. Here, of course, *Hradatva* (lakeness) is qualified by *Vahnyabhāva* (absence of fire) through the relation of co-existence (*Sāmānādhikarāṇya*) which is an indirect relation. *Vahnyabhāva* (absence of fire) is the direct qualifier of *Hrada* (lake), because, *Vahnyabhāva* directly exists in the lake through the absential peculiar qualification relation (*Abhāvīya-viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣa-sambandha*). This *Viśayatā* is called *Viśiṣṭaviśayatā* because, it resides in a qualified object (*Viśiṣṭapadārtha*) inasmuch as the lake (*Hrada*) is actually qualified by the absence of fire (*Vahnyabhāva*).

In the case of an invalid knowledge, there is only *Nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpāna-viśayatā* and not *Viśiṣṭaviśayatā*, because, the object of an invalid knowledge as has been stated earlier, cannot actually be qualified by a qualifier which becomes the object of knowledge there. There the qualification is through the knowledge (*Vaiśiṣṭyam ca vaijñānikam*) and not through the real object of knowledge, because, there is no really qualified object as the content (*Viśaya*) of an invalid knowledge.

Sometimes there may be more than one *Viśayatā* in a particular object. Usually two *Viśayatās* are found in one object in some cases, though there may be cases where there may be even more than two *Viśayatās*.

In the opinion of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra and his followers, if there be two *Viśayatās* in one particular object, one being a *Prakāratā* (chief qualierness), a special type of *Viśayatā*, and the other a *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness), another kind of *Viśayatā*, then the two kinds of *Viśayatās* would be identical. But according to Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and logicians of his school, the two kinds of *Viśayatās* would mutually stand in the relation of being limited and a limitor (*Avacchedyāvachchedakabhāvāpāna*). In other words, one *Viśayatā* would be

the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) and the other limited (*Avacchinna*) by it.¹

For example, in the above-mentioned knowledge having the form *Vahnnyabhāvavān*, the *Viśayatā* which is in the *Abhāva* (Absence of fire, *vahnnyabhāva*) may be considered a *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) having been determined or described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* (chief qualificrness) residing in the *Vahni* or fire. At the same time, the very same, *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Abhāva* may be understood as a *Prakāratā* with reference to the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Hrada* (lake).

In the language of Navya Nyāya it can be expressed as *Vahnitvāvachchinna-prakāratā-nirūpitābhāvatvāvachchinnaviśeṣyatvābhinnaprakāratā-nirūpitahradatvāvachchinnaviśeṣyatā* in which the *Viśeṣyatā* and *Prakāratā* which are known in the intermediate state are considered to be identical (*Abhinna*).

The argument in support of this theory has been supplied by M.M. Paṇḍita Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra in his commentary on *Ubhayābhāvādivāraṅga-pariṣkāra*. There the eminent logician says that it is better not to admit an extra modern *Viśayatā* and relations of innumerable properties like *Prameyatva* (contentness of valid knowledge) etc., with it, because, in that case the technical defect of heaviness (*Gaurava*) would be involved. Other defects have also been pointed out elsewhere which will be discussed later on.²

1. भट्टाचार्य्यमते तु एकनिष्ठप्रकारताविशेष्यतयोरवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावस्वीकारात्—

Rāmarudrī, p. 292, N. S. Press edition.

समानाधिकरणप्रकारताविशेष्यतयोः कस्यचिन्मते अवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावः; कस्यचिन्मते अभेदः—

Ubhayābhāvādivāraṅga-pariṣkāra, p. 10.

2. विशेष्यताप्रकारतयोरभेदस्वीकारे रक्तदण्डवानिति बुद्धौ रक्तरूपविशेष्यकदण्डाभावनिश्चयप्रतिबध्यत्वापत्तेः दण्डप्रकारतानिरूपितरक्तरूपनिष्ठविशेष्यताशालित्वात् तादृशबुद्धेरिति ध्येयम्—

Rāmarudrī, p. 292, N. S. Press edition.

तत्राद्यमतमेव सम्यक् तथाहि द्वितीयमते संयोगेन पुरुषाभाववान् दण्ड इति बुद्धिं प्रति संयोगेन पुरुषवान् दण्ड इतिनिश्चयस्येव रक्तदण्डवत् पुरुषवानयमिति निश्चयस्यापि संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नपुरुषप्रकारतानिरूपितदण्डविशेष्यताशालिनिश्चयत्वरूपप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकवत्त्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वं स्यात् पुरुषनिष्ठदण्डप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वदेशविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारत्वयोश्चैक्यात्—

Ubhayābhāvādivāraṅga-pariṣkāra, p. 11.

But Gadādhara and his followers would say, as mentioned earlier, that one of the intermediate *Viśayatās* (*Antarābhāsamāna-viśayatā*) would limit the other and in the language of Navya Nyāya the *Viśayatā* of the knowledge having the form *Vahnabhāvavān hradaḥ* would be expressed as *Vahnitvāvacchinnaprakāratānirūpitābhāvatvāvacchinnaviśayatvāvacchinnaprakāratā-nirūpitahradatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatā* in which one of the two intermediate *Viśayatās* residing in the absence of fire (*Vahnabhāva*) is a *Prakāratā* (chief qualierness) and the other is a *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness). The *Prakāratā* here is the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the *Viśeṣyatā*.

The followers of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also supply argument in favour of their theory by saying that unless the intermediate *Viśayatās* are mutually regarded as standing in the relation of being a limiter and limited, the cognition 'qualified by a red stick' (*Raktadaṇḍavān*) would become contradicted (*Pratibadhya*) by the definite knowledge having the form 'The red colour possessing the absence of a stick', because, this knowledge also has got a *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) residing in the red colour (*Raktarūpa*) and described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* (chief qualierness) existing in the stick (*Daṇḍa*).

Let us cite another example. Just as the cognition 'The stick is qualified by the absence of a man through the relation of contact' is contradicted by the definite knowledge. 'The stick is qualified by a man through the relation of contact', similarly, it may be required to be contradicted by the definite knowledge "This (place) is qualified by a man possessing a red stick", which would rather be an absurd proposition. But the contingency would be there.

The idea underlying the two aforesaid examples is this. The knowledge of something qualified by some other thing is contradicted by the definite knowledge of that thing qualified by the absence of the other thing which qualifies it.¹ Now, if the intermediate *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣyatā* residing in the same locus are considered identical instead of standing in the relation of mutually being the describer and the describable (*Nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna*), then the above-mentioned absurd contingency would take place. Because, if the cognition 'qualified by a red stick'

1. तद्वत्ताबुद्धिं प्रति तदभाववत्तानिश्चयत्वेन विरोधित्वम्—

(*Rakta-daṇḍavān*) is to be contradicted at all, it is to be contradicted by the definite knowledge 'qualified by the absence of a red stick' (*Rakta-daṇḍābhāvavān*) and not by the definite knowledge 'The red colour is qualified by the absence of a stick' (*Daṇḍābhāvavān raktaḥ*). But according to the theory of the co-existing *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣyatā* becoming identical, the definite knowledge 'The red colour is qualified by the absence of a stick' has got a *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) residing in the red colour (*Rakta*) with the corresponding *Prakāratā* (chief qualificierness) existing in the absence of the stick (*Daṇḍābhāva*) described (*Nirūpita*) by the aforesaid *Viśeṣyatā*. Now, if the cognition 'qualified by a red stick' (*Raktadaṇḍavān*) is supposed to possess a *Viśeṣyatā* residing in the red colour (*Rakta*) and becoming the describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the *Prakāratā* (chief qualificierness) existing in the stick (*Daṇḍa*), then it can certainly be contradicted (*Pratibadhya*) by the definite knowledge "The red colour is qualified by the absence of a stick" (*Daṇḍābhāvavān raktaḥ*), which is contrary to everybody's experience. But according to the universally accepted theory of contradicted-contradictoriness (*Pratibadhya-pratibandhakabhāva*), the knowledge 'qualified by a red stick' (*Rakta-daṇḍavān*) is to be contradicted only by the definite knowledge 'qualified by the absence of a red stick' (*Rakta-daṇḍābhāvavān*) and not by the definite knowledge 'The red colour is qualified by the absence of a stick' (*Daṇḍābhāvavān raktaḥ*).

The second example of the cognition, 'The stick is qualified by the absence of a man, the Counterpositiveness of which absence is limited by the relation of contact' (*Samyogena puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*) which is actually contradicted by the definite knowledge 'The stick is qualified by a man through the relation of contact' (*Samyogena puruṣavān daṇḍaḥ*), may also be considered capable of being contradicted by the definite knowledge "This (land) is qualified by a man possessing a red stick" (*Rakta-daṇḍavat-puruṣavānayaṃ*), because, the definite knowledge "This (land) is qualified by a man possessing a red stick (*Raktadaṇḍavat-puruṣavānayaṃ*) also has got the *Prakāratā* (chief qualificierness) existing in the *Puruṣa* (man) and limited by the relation of contact (*Samyoga*), which *Prakāratā* again is the determinant or describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) residing in the *Daṇḍa* (stick). In other words, the *Viśeṣyatā* residing in the

Daṇḍa (stick), is determined (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* existing in the *Puruṣa* (man) which condition is identical with the actual contradictory definite knowledge here like 'The stick is qualified by a man through the relation of contact' (*Saṁyogena puruṣavān daṇḍaḥ*).

Therefore, the definite knowledge "This (land) is qualified by a man possessing a red stick (*Rakta-daṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṁ*), which actually cannot be the contradictory knowledge here, would come to be considered as such against everybody's experience.¹

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya himself, of course, has very clearly put forward his own theory and that of the opposite school, obviously of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra, in his exposition of *Anumiti* in a slightly different manner.

There the eminent logician has reversed the previously mentioned example to show the discrepancy of the opposite theory. Gadādhara holds that in the event of the co-existing *Prakāratā* and the *Viśeṣyatā* being considered identical, the cognition 'This is qualified by a man possessing a red stick' (*Rakta-daṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṁ*) would come to be contradicted by the definite knowledge 'The stick is qualified by the absence of a man' (*Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*), because, the condition of the contradictory knowledge in this case is to be found in the above-mentioned knowledge (*Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*) also. Actually, the contradictory knowledge here is 'This is qualified by the absence of a man possessing a red stick' (*Raktadaṇḍābhāvavatpuruṣavānayaṁ*) and not 'The stick is qualified by the absence of a man' (*Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*). But as the cognition "This is qualified by a man possessing a red stick (*Raktadaṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṁ*) possesses a *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) existing in the stick and determined or described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* (chief qualifier-ness) residing in the man (*Puruṣa*)—a condition which exists in the knowledge: The stick is qualified by a man (*Puruṣavān daṇḍaḥ*), which is to be actually contradicted (*Pratibadhya*) by the definite knowledge: The stick is qualified by the absence of a man (*Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*), the cognition: This is qualified by a man possessing a red stick, (*Rakta-daṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṁ*) would, as a matter of course, come to be contradicted by the definite knowledge: The stick is qualified by the absence of a man

1. Vide *Ubhayābhāvādivāraṅga-parīṣkāra* (quoted earlier).

(*Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*)¹ —a situation which is contradictory to everybody's experience.

Though the same example of knowledge (*Raktadaṇḍavat-puruṣavānayaṁ*) has once been considered to be contradictory (*Pratibandhaka*) and in other case as contradicted (*Pratibadhya*), yet there is no inconsistency in saying like this, because, the *Prakāratā* (chief qualifierness and the *Viśeṣyatā* on either side may be considered as the *Viśeṣyatā* and the *Prakāratā* respectively on account of their being accepted as identical.

But the theory of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra regarding the identity of the co-existing *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣyatā* also is based on very strong argument which cannot be dispensed with so easily and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has been fair enough to admit this by implication.

Before criticising the theory of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya himself advanced arguments in favour of it by saying that if the two co-existing *Viśayatās* are considered identical and accepted as one, then the law of parsimony (*Lāghava*) would be in its favour in ascertaining the limiter of causeness (*Kāraṇatāvachchedaka*) in the case of inference and its cause.²

The idea underlying the argument is this. The knowledge of pervasion (*Vyāptijñāna*) is the cause of inference (*Anumiti*) and as such the *Viśayatā* existing in the *Viśaya* (object or content) of the knowledge of pervasion is a kind of the limiter of causeness (*Kāraṇatāvachchedaka*). Now, if the co-existing *Viśayatās* are considered to be one, then surely there would be the law of parsimony (*Lāghava*) in assuming comparatively less limiters of causeness in regard to the effect in question.

Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgiśa in his *Didhiti-prakāśa* commentary, of course, has indicated the same theory as that of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya regarding the co-existing *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣ-*

1. तच्चिन्त्यं तथा सति रक्तदण्डवत्पुरुषवानयमित्यादिज्ञानानां पुरुषादि-
प्रकारतानिरूपितदण्डादिविशेष्यताकत्वेन पुरुषाभाववान् दण्ड इत्यादिनिश्चय-
प्रतिबध्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्—

Anumiti Gādādhari, p. 95, Asiatic Society edition.

2. एवञ्च एकपदार्थनिष्ठावच्छेदावच्छेदकभावापन्नविषयताद्वयनिवेशापेक्षया
एकविषयतां निवेश्य कारणतावच्छेदकनिर्वचने लाघवम्—

Anumiti Gādādhari, p. 95, Asiatic Society edition.

yatā standing in the relation of mutually being the limiter and the limited.¹

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, of course, has got a very strong argument in his favour in accepting the co-existing (*Samānādhikaraṇa*) *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣyatā* standing in the relation of mutually being the limiter and the limited. According to Gadādhara the difference between a knowledge having for its content a group of independent objects (*Samūhālambana-jñāna*) and a knowledge having a qualified object as the chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) can only be established by accepting the co-existing *Prakāratā* and the *Viśeṣyatā* standing in the relation of mutually being the limiter and the limited.

The *Samūhālambana* knowledge in the form *Adhikaraṇaṁ dhūmīyaṁ vṛttiradhikaraṇīyā* (The locus is described by the smoke and the existence is described by the locus) can be distinguished from the qualified knowledge having for its content a qualified object like *Dhūmādhikaraṇa-vṛttitvam* (Existence in the locus of smoke) by admitting that the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Adhikaraṇa* (Locus) and determined or described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* existing in the *Dhūma* (smoke) is the limiter of the *Prakāratā* existing in the same *Adhikaraṇa* and becoming the describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the *Viśeṣyatā* residing in the *Vṛttitva* (Existence).² Otherwise, the contents of both the forms of the aforesaid knowledge being the same, there cannot be any distinguishing factor other than the relation of mutually being the limiter and the limited existing between the co-existent *Prakāratā* and the *Viśeṣyatā* of the knowledge having for its content a qualified object.

Now after making a careful assessment of the opposite views regarding the essential identity or the relation of being the limiter and the limited between the co-existing *Viśayatās* we are inclined to think that the view of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra that the co-

1. तच्च पक्षनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपित-
व्याप्तिप्रकारकत्वम्—

Anumiti-Dīdhiti-Prakāśa, p. 55, Asiatic Society edition.

2. उक्तसमूहालम्बनतो विशिष्टप्रकारकधियो वैलक्षण्याय तत्रान्तरा भास-
मानाधिकरणादिपदार्थविशेषनिरूपितविशेष्यत्वविशेष्यान्तरनिरूपितप्रकारत्वयोर-
वच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावोपगमात्—

Anumiti-Gādādhari, p. 94, Asiatic Society edition.

existing *Viṣayatās* are identical appeals more to reason. The undesirable development regarding the knowledge: This is qualified by a man possessing a red stick (*Rakta-daṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ*) on account of its being contradicted by the definite knowledge—‘The stick is qualified by the absence of a man (*Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*) can be avoided, as has been rightly suggested by M. M. Paṇḍita Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgiśa in his note on *Anumiti Gādādhari*, by saying that the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Daṇḍa* (stick) should be such as is described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Puruṣa*, the describerness (*Nirūpakatā*) of which is limited by *Prakāratātva* (Chief qualifier-ness-ness) existing in the aforesaid *Prakāratā*. But it has been pointed out at the same time that this would involve in the technical defect called *Gaurava* (heaviness) in unnecessarily assuming more things than are urgently necessary to explain a situation in a satisfactory way.¹ Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also has hinted at some kind of solution like this in his commentary on *Anumiti Dīdhiti* and has pointed out in the same breath that this would involve in the technical defect called *Gaurava* (heaviness).²

Let us explain the solution a bit elaborately to make the idea more clear. The definite knowledge *Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*. (The stick is qualified by the absence of a man) would contradict the knowledge *Puruṣavān daṇḍaḥ* (The stick is qualified by a man) and not the knowledge *Raktadaṇḍavat-puruṣavānayaṃ* (This is qualified by a man possessing a red stick), because to be contradicted (*Pratibadhyā*) by the aforesaid knowledge (*Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ*), the knowledge would be required to possess a *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandess) existing in the *Daṇḍa* (Stick) and determined or described by the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Puruṣa* (Man) and at the same time being the *Nirūpaka* (determinant or describer) of the *Viśeṣyatā* from the standpoint of being limited by the special property of the *Prakāratā* called *Prakāratātva* (chief qualifier-ness-ness). This eliminates the undesirable knowledge having

1. दण्डनिष्ठविशेष्यतात्वेन पुरुषप्रकारतात्वावच्छिन्ननिरूपिता या दण्डनिष्ठ-विशेष्यता तच्छालिज्ञानत्वस्य प्रतिबध्यावच्छेदकत्वस्वीकारे गौरवादित्यर्थः—

M. M. Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgiśa, Note on *Anumiti Gādādhari* p. 95, Asiatic Society edition.

2. तत्र गत्यन्तरानुसरणे च गौरवादिति—

Anumiti Gādādhari, p. 95, Asiatic Society edition.

the form *Rakta-daṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ* (This is qualified by a man possessing a red stick), because, this knowledge does not possess that type of *Viśeṣyatā* which has been specified earlier. Here the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Daṇḍa* (stick) is not determined by the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Puruṣa* (man), but the *Prakāratā* which determines the *Viśeṣyatā* there exists in the *Rakta* (red colour) which precedes the *Daṇḍa* (stick) and the *Nirūpakatā* (describerness) which exists in the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Rakta* (red colour) is limited by a *Prakāratātva* (chief qualificerness-ness) which is connected with *Rakta* and not with *Puruṣa* (man). In other words, it is not the *Puruṣa-prakāratātvāvacchinnanirūpakatānirūpita-viśeṣyatā* which exists in the *Daṇḍa* in the knowledge *Raktadaṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ*, but the *Rakta-prakāratātvāvacchinna-nirūpakatā-nirūpitaviśeṣyatā* and hence the knowledge *Raktadaṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ* would not be contradicted (*Praitbadhya*) by the definite knowledge *Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ* but the knowledge *Puruṣavān daṇḍaḥ* would be contradicted by it as it possesses the requisite *Viśeṣyatā* determined by the specified *Prakāratā*.

The *Nirūpakatā* (describerness) which exists in the *Prakāratā* connected with the *Puruṣa* (man) has been described here as qualified by *Prakāratātva* (chief qualificerness-ness) because, otherwise, the knowledge *Raktadaṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ* cannot be eliminated. The *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) existing in the *Puruṣa* (man) with reference to the *Daṇḍa* (stick) has got a double character. It is identical with the *Prakāratā* also with reference to the next entity signified by the word *Ayam* meaning 'This' with reference to the knowledge *Raktadaṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ*. But though the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Puruṣa* and at the same time identical with the *Prakāratā* is the determinant or describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the *Prakāratā* which in its turn also is identical with the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Daṇḍa* (stick) with reference to the qualifier *Rakta* (red colour), yet by mentioning the *Nirūpakatā* (describerness) existing in the *Prakāratā* residing in the *Puruṣa* (man) as qualified by the special property called a particular *Prakāratātva* connected with the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Daṇḍa* (stick) cannot be taken in connection with the knowledge *Rakta-daṇḍavat-puruṣavānayaṃ*. Because, though the *Prakāratā* and the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Puruṣa* (man) in the knowledge *Raktadaṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ* are identical according to

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra and his followers, yet the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Daṇḍa* (stick) of the said knowledge is not said to be determined (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* which exists in the *Puruṣa* as limited by *Prakāratātva* (chief qualierness-ness). The *Viśeṣyatā* in *Daṇḍa*, of course, is determined by the *Prakāratā* which is identical with the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Puruṣa*, yet the *Viśeṣyatā* identical with the *Prakāratā* in the *Puruṣa* may be considered as the *Nirūpaka* (describer) of the *Prakāratā* identical with the *Viśeṣyatā* in the *Daṇḍa* (stick) from the standpoint of being limited by *Viśeṣyatātva* (qualificandness-ness) and not by *Prakāratātva* (chief qualierness-ness), from which standpoint the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Puruṣa* is determined by the *Prakāratā* residing in the red colour (*Rakta*) alone.

Hence, the knowledge *Rakta-daṇḍavatpuruṣavānayaṃ* (This is qualified by a man possessing a red stick) would not be contradicted by the definite knowledge *Puruṣābhāvavān daṇḍaḥ* (The stick is qualified by the absence of a man), as it does not possess the requisite condition of being contradicted by the same.

The very fact that Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has criticised this solution on the basis of the technical defect called *Gaurava*¹ (heaviness) and has pointed out no other flaw in it, proves that there is no serious defect in the solution.

But I would like to mention in this connection that the theory of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and his followers has received the approval of the traditional scholars of Navya Nyāya in later times.²

The *Viśayatā* which has been discussed so far differs according to the difference of the object of knowledge as also the knowledge itself.³ In the *Viśayatāvāda* Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has supplied

1. तत्र गत्यन्तरानुसरणे च गौरवादिति—

Anumiti Gādādhari p. 95. Asiatic Society edition

2. तत्राद्यमतमेव सम्यक्—

Ubhayābhāvādivārkapariṣkāra, p. 10.

3. विषयता च विषयभेदाद् भिद्यते—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 5.

विषयतायाः स्वाश्रयविषयादिभेदेन भिन्नत्वेऽपि—

Anumiti Gādādhari, p. 83, Chowkhamba edition.

धीभेदस्य विषयताभेदकत्वात्—

Śivadatta Miśra on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 32.

argument in favour of accepting *Viṣayatā* as different owing to the difference of the object of knowledge as also owing to the difference of knowledge itself.

If the *Viṣayatā* be not accepted as different owing to the difference of the object of knowledge, then even the valid knowledge having for its content a group of independent objects, which is called *Samūhā lambanajñāna* according to the Navya Nyāya terminology, would become invalid. Because, the *Viṣayatā* of the various objects of the said knowledge like a jar, a cloth, etc., being one, it would certainly be limited (*Avacchinna*) by a property which does not exist either in the jar or in the cloth. To be more explicit, if the *Viṣayatā* which exists in a particular object of knowledge, say a jar (*Ghaṭa*), becomes limited by a property which does not exist in the jar, then that knowledge would become invalid. Because if the *Viṣayatā*, existing in the jar is limited by clothness (*Paṭatva*) which certainly does not exist in the jar, then the knowledge of the jar would become invalid as the invalidity of knowledge depends on the *Viṣayatā* existing in its *Viśaya* (content) being qualified by a *Prakāra* (qualifier) which does not exist in the substratum of the *Viṣayatā*. Hence in the aforesaid *Samūhā lambana* knowledge, if the *Viṣayatā* of the jar (*Ghaṭa*) and the cloth (*Paṭa*) etc., be one and the same in spite of the objects of the knowledge being different from one another, then that knowledge, though valid in this particular case, cannot but be called invalid¹ on account of its *Viṣayatā* existing in the jar being limited by a property like clothness (*Paṭatva*) which does not exist in it.

Therefore, the *Viṣayatās* of a particular knowledge should be considered different from one another owing to the difference of its object.

There is another additional argument in favour of accepting the *Viṣayatā* of a particular knowledge as different owing to the difference of objects of knowledge. If the *Viṣayatā* be one and the same in spite of the objects of knowledge being different, then the *Viṣayatā* existing in a single jar (*Ghaṭa*), the object of the knowledge of that jar, will have to be differentiated from the

1. विषयता च विषयभेदाद् भिद्यते अन्यथा घटपटादिव्यादिसमूहालम्बनीय-
घटपटादिविषयताया ऐक्ये पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या तादृशज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वापत्तेः—

single *Viṣayatā* existing in a number of objects of a *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge by assuming a special kind of extra *Viṣayatā* in all the objects of that knowledge. In that case there will be the contingency of assuming an extra *Viṣayatā* in the objects of the *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge which would involve the technical defect called *Gaurava* (heaviness). Instead if the *Viṣayatā* be accepted as different due to the difference of objects of knowledge, the same *Viṣayatā* existing in the individual object of ordinary knowledge may be admitted in the case of the *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge also.¹ As for example, the *Viṣayatā* existing in a jar (*Ghaṭa*) which may be the object of the knowledge having the form 'jar' (*Ghaṭaḥ*) is a single entity. Similarly, the *Viṣayatā* existing in a cloth (*Paṭa*) which also may be the object of the knowledge of the form 'cloth' (*Paṭaḥ*) is a single entity. Now, if these two objects or some more similar objects happen to be the content (*Viṣaya*) of a *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge like 'The jar and the cloth' (*Ghaṭa-paṭau*), or 'The jar, the cloth and the temple' (*Ghaṭa-paṭa-maṭhāḥ*), then the same *Viṣayatās* existing in the objects like the jar, etc., are understood to exist in the objects of the *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge. In that case, the difference between the *Viṣayatā* existing in the object of an ordinary knowledge having for its content a single entity and that existing in the objects of a *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge having for its content a number of independent objects depends on the difference of the number of the *Viṣayatās* of the different kinds of knowledge.

According to this theory the *Viṣayatā* existing in the objects of different forms of knowledge does not differ² and hence the *Viṣayatā* existing in a jar (*Ghaṭa*) which happens to be the object of an ordinary knowledge having the form *Ghaṭaḥ* (jar) would not be different from the *Viṣayatā* existing in the objects of a *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge also.

But in the *Anumiti Gādādhari*, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has said that the *Viṣayatā* is different owing to the difference of the locus, etc., of the knowledge.³ There the term *Ādi* meaning

1. अस्मन्नये समूहालम्बने क्लृप्तप्रत्येकज्ञानीयविषयतानामेवोपगमात्—
Viṣayatāvāda, p. 6.

2. ज्ञानभेदेन विषयताभेदे मानाभावात्—
Viṣayatāvāda, p. 6.

3. विषयतायाः स्वाश्रयविषयादिभेदेन भिन्नत्वेऽपि—
Anumiti Gādādhari, p. 83, Chowkhamba edition.

'The like' indicates that the difference of knowledge also is the cause of the difference of *Viśayatā* existing in the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge.

This divergence of theory regarding the same *Viśayatā* can be reconciled by admitting that *Viśayatā* as an extra category (*Atirikta padārtha*) does not differ due to the difference of knowledge, but *Viśayatā* as a peculiar nature-relation (*Svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa*) becomes different according to the difference of knowledge. While explaining the definition of fallacy in the *Sāmānyanirukti* it has been pointed out by Paṇḍita Harināmadāsa Udāsin that *Viśayatā* differs according to the difference of knowledge viewed from the standpoint of *Avacchedakatva* of the *Svarūpasambandha* type.¹ Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra also has clearly stated this in his introduction to the *Avacchedakatvanirukti Jāgadiśi*.

Though the specific context there is that of *Avacchedakatva* of the *Svarūpasambandha* type, yet the same argument equally applies to the *Viśayatva* of the *Svarūpasambandha* variety also.

The *Viśayatā* related to the knowledge etc., is not always an eternal entity, but it lasts so long as the knowledge etc., of the objects exist.² From this it follows that if a particular knowledge be accepted as eternal, e.g., the knowledge of God, then the *Viśayatā* of the knowledge also would continue to exist for all times.

From this standpoint the *Viśayatā* of knowledge is said to be an unnegatable (*Kevalānvayī*) object.³ But one thing is to be remembered in this connection. Even if the individual *Viśayatā* of the knowledge of men like us cannot last for all times on

1. ज्ञानभेदेन विषयताभेदमंगीकृत्यैव एतल्लक्षणकरणात्—

Harināmadāsa, Commentary on *Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari*, p. 89.

स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपावच्छेदकत्वस्वीकर्तुं भिन्नानभेदेन विषयताभेदमवलम्ब्य—
Introduction to *Avacchedakatvanirukti Jāgadiśi*, p. 1.

2. विषयताया ज्ञानसमानकालीनतया—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi*, p. 6.

विषयताया ज्ञानसमानकालतया

Anumiti Jāgadiśi.

3. ज्ञेयत्वं ज्ञानविषयता सा च सर्वत्रैवास्ति ईश्वरज्ञानविषयताया केवलान्वयित्वात्—

Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 101, N. S. Press edition.

account of our knowledge being transitory (*Kṣaṇika*), lasting only for two moments,¹ (*Kṣaṇadvayāvasthāyī*) and as such the specific manifestations of *Viśayatā* of our knowledge cannot be called unnegatable, yet they are considered unnegatable on account of their being qualified by *Jñānaviśayatātva* (contentnessness of knowledge.)

Similarly, if the *Viśayatā* of knowledge be considered different owing to the difference of the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge, even then the *Viśayatā* would be considered unnegatable from the standpoint of their being qualified by *jñānaviśayatātva*.²

This point has been clarified in the *Rāmarudrī*, the commentary on the *Dinakarī*, the commentary on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*. It has been clearly pointed out there that the unnegatable-ness (*Kevalānvayitva*) does not consist in the non-counterpositiveness (*Apratiyogitva*) of an absence which is existing somewhere, because, in that case even a really unnegatable object would cease to be an unnegatable one on account of its being the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) of an absence by taking the absence of the unnegatable object along with some other irrelevant and disconnected objects. Therefore, it would be necessary to pursue up to the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) in order to avoid this unwanted contingency.

Just as in the case of *Vyāpti* or pervasion, the *Hetu* of a valid inference should have co-existence with the *Sādhya* which again should be a non-counterpositive (*Apratiyogī*) of the absence existing in the same locus, yet the *Sādhya* cannot be a non-counterpositive of an absence if the *Sādhya* is taken with an indifferent object which may not be existing in the locus of the *Hetu*. This contingency can be avoided by pursuing up to the limiter of the counterpositiveness of the absence (*Abhāva-pratiyogitāv-acchedaka*) which in the case like this would generally be *Ubhayatva* (bothness) and not the exclusive property which exists in the *Sādhya* like the fireness (*Vahnitva*) etc. Similarly, the *Viśayatā* also cannot be a non-counterpositive of an absence if an indiffe-

1. एवं ज्ञानादिकमपि क्षणद्वयावस्थायि—

Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 135, N. S. Press edition.

2. विषयभेदेन विषयताया भेदेऽपि ज्ञानविषयतात्वेन केवलान्वयित्वमस्त्येवेति भावः—

Dinakarī, p. 101, N. S. Press edition.

rent object which does not exist in the locus of the *Viṣayatā* is taken with it. But even then *Viṣayatātva* (content-ness-ness), the special property of *Viṣayatā* would not be the limiter of that absence which would be *Ubhayatva* (bothness) instead of *Viṣayatātva*.

Therefore taking recourse to this sort of clarification by pursuing up to the limiter of the counterpositiveness of a particular absence in a particular case like the one of *Viṣayatā* where an indifferent object which may not be existing in the locus of the *Viṣayatā* is taken into account to make the *Viṣayatā* a counter-positive (*Pratiyogī*) of an absence, the inconsistency is avoided and the *Viṣayatā* in this particular context is said to be a *Kevalān-vayī* (unnegatable) object.¹

The underlying idea of this type of solution is this. An object should not necessarily be considered a class as the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) of an absence if it is taken with an indifferent object which may not be existing on the locus of that object, provided the special property existing in that object does not become the limiter of the absence.

Viṣayatā, as has been pointed out earlier, is a relation between the knowledge and its object. To be more precise, it is the relation of the knowledge with its object.²

Now the question arises, what sort of relation is this ? Is it an occurrence-exacting relation (*Vṛttiniyāmaka sambandha*) or a non-occurrence-exacting relation (*Vṛttyaniyāmaka sambandha*) ? Generally speaking, it is the commonly accepted theory of the Navya Naiyāyikas that *Viṣayatā* is a non-occurrence-exacting relation, because it is not enumerated in the list of primary relations like contact (*Samyoga*), inherence (*Samavāya*) etc.,³ which are primarily accepted as the occurrence-exacting

1. वृत्तिमदभावप्रतियोगित्वं न केवलान्वयित्वं केवलान्वयिनोऽपि द्वित्वादिना अभावसत्त्वात् किन्तु वृत्तिमदभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वमेव तथा । एवञ्च घटादिनिष्ठविषयताव्यक्तेरपि ज्ञानविषयतात्वमादाय केवलान्वयित्वमस्त्येवेति भावः—

Rāmarudrī, p. 101, N. S. Press edition.

2. घटादिनिष्ठं तद्विषयत्वं च तत्प्रतियोगिकः सम्बन्धविशेषः—

Viṣayatāvāda, p. 1.

3. तच्च तादात्म्य-विशेषणता-संयोग-समवायेष्वेव मुख्यम्—

Paṇḍita Ananta Kumāra Tarkatīrtha, Commentary on *Jñānalakṣaṇā-vicārahāsyam*, p. 3.

relations. This accords with our everyday experience also, because, unless something actually exists somewhere through a particular relation, that relation cannot reasonably be called an occurrence-exacting relation.

But Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra has expressed a different opinion in his commentary on *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. There he has said that *Viṣayatā* is an occurrence-exacting relation as is established on the strength of the usage like the knowledge is in the jar.¹

This theory of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra did not, of course, get the general support of the Navya Naiyāyikas, because, in other Navya Nyāya treatises which came to be written after Jagadīśa, no such reference is to be found anywhere.

It has been mentioned earlier that there are several kinds of *Viṣayatā* of which some have been mentioned by name only. They will be discussed in different topics under different heads. But a division of *Viṣayatā* into that related to determinate knowledge (*Savikalpaka-jñāna*) and indeterminate knowledge (*Nirvikalpaka-jñāna*) need be mentioned here in a general way so that we can pick and choose several kinds of *Viṣayatā* for discussion according to logical sequence.

The *Viṣayatā* related to an indeterminate knowledge is called the fourth type of *Viṣayatā* (*turiya viṣayatā*),² because it is different from the three kinds of *Viṣayatā* related to determinate knowledge, namely *Prakāratā* (chief qualierness or qualierness), *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) and *Saṁsargatā* (relationness).

The *Viṣayatā* of determinate knowledge (*Savikalpaka jñāna*) is always limited (*Avacchinna*) by certain property (*Dharma*) and the *Viṣayatā* called *Prakāratā* of the said knowledge is again always limited by certain relation as also by some property (*Dharma*).

It is worthwhile to mention in this connection that the *Viṣayatās* of indeterminate knowledge do not stand in the relation of mutually being the describer (*Nirūpaka*) and the describable (*Nirūpya*).³

1. घटे ज्ञानमिति व्यवहारबलेन विषयताया वृत्तिनियामकत्वादिति ध्येयम्—
Sāmānyalakṣaṇā Jāgadīśi, p. 475, Chowkhamba edition.
2. तुरीयविषयतानिरूपकस्य निर्विकल्पकज्ञानस्य—
Dīpikā-Nīlakaṇṭhī, p. 42, Veṅkateśvara Press edition.
3. निर्विकल्पकीयविषयतायाः परस्परं निरूप्यनिरूपकभावविरहात्—
Viṣayatāvāda, p. 6.

The argument in favour of this theory is not very difficult to understand. The objects of an indeterminate knowledge reveal themselves in the knowledge in a mutually disconnected manner and hence the *Viśayatās* which exist in the objects of an indeterminate knowledge also remain disconnected so that there cannot be any relation of mutually being the describer and the describable between the *Viśayatās* themselves.

While a property *dharma* becomes the limitor (*Avacchedaka*), it may either be existing in the locus of the *Viśayatā* or it may not be existing in the locus of the *Viśayatā* which is limited by it, because, in the case of invalid knowledge the *Viśayatā* is limited by a property which actually does not exist in the locus of the same.¹

The fact that a property which does not exist in the locus of the *Viśayatā* can also be its limitor goes to prove that unlike in the case of the *Pratīyogitā* of an absence (*Abhāvīya-pratīyogitā*) and the like, the state or condition or a property existing in lesser or greater number of the loci, would not stand in the way of its being a limitor of the *Viśayatā*². In the case of the *Pratīyogitā* of an absence, of course, the limiting property should strictly be equally coexistent with the *Pratīyogitā* which is limited by it. As for example, *Ghaṭatva* (jariness) becomes the limitor of the *Pratīyogitā* (counterpositiveness) of the absence *Ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar or there is the absence of the jar) by virtue of its being co-existent (*Samānīyata*) with the *Pratīyogitā* which is limited by it. Hence, *Dravyatva* (substanceness) cannot be the limitor of the said *Pratīyogitā* on account of its being existent in more loci than those of the said *Pratīyogitā*.

Again *Mahānāsiya-vahnitva* (Fireiness existing in the fire of the kitchen) cannot be the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti* (There is no fire), because, that special fireiness resides in less number of loci than those of fireiness in general.

1. तदवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नतन्निष्ठविषयताशालिज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्—

Paṇḍita Dhundirāja Śāstri's note on *Viśayatāvāda*, p. 5.

स्वव्यधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्ना या या विषयता—

Sāmānyanirukti Gādādhari, p. 1587.

2. प्रतियोगित्वादावन्यूनतातिप्रसक्तत्वमवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावे तन्न न तु विषयता-
स्थले व्यधिकरणधर्मस्यापि विषयतावच्छेदकत्वात्—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 7.

But this is not in the case of *Viśayatā*, as has been pointed out earlier, where any property can be the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of *Viśayatā* in regard to an invalid knowledge, though in the case of valid knowledge, the limiter of the *Viśayatā* should be co-existent with the same.

The *Viśayatā* of an indeterminate knowledge is always different from that of a qualified determinate knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa savikalpaka jñāna*). According to some scholars, the *Viśayatā* of a determinate knowledge is one and the same and it does not differ according to the difference of the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) where the *Viśayatā* may happen to exist.¹

But this theory is not universally accepted by all the Navya Naiyāyikas. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has mentioned this theory in the *Viśayatāvāda* and has criticised it. While criticising the above-mentioned theory Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya says that the *Viśayatā* existing in the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) and identical with *Viśeṣyatā* can never be said to be identical with the *Viśayatā* residing in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and identical with *Prakāratā*. Because, in that case the chief qualifier or qualifier (*Prakāra*) and the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) of that knowledge may very well be reversed and as such the knowledge having the form *Ghaṭa* (jar) in which the chief qualifier is *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) and the qualificand is the *Ghaṭa* (jar) may come to be known as a knowledge having the *Ghaṭa* as the *Prakāra* and *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) as the *Viśeṣya*.² which is contrary to everybody's experience.

The idea underlying the criticism of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya is this. If the different kinds of *Viśayatā* existing in the qualificand and the qualifier be replaced by one and only one *Viśayatā*, then the difference between the qualificand and the qualifier can never be maintained. In the qualified determinate knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa savikalpaka jñāna*) having the form *Ghaṭa* (the jar), the qualificand is the *Ghaṭa* (jar) and the qualifier is *Ghaṭatva*

1. यत्तु घट इत्यादिविशिष्टबुद्धेर्विशेषण-विशेष्यभावापन्नेषु घटघटत्वादेषु एकैव विषयता न तु विशेष्यनिष्ठा विशेषणनिष्ठा च विषयता भिन्ना—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 6.

2. विशेष्यनिष्ठविशेष्यतात्मकविषयतया समं विशेषणनिष्ठप्रकारतात्मक-विषयतया अभेदस्यासम्भवादुक्तिकत्वात् । तथा सति तादृशबुद्धौ घटप्रकारत्व-घटत्वविशेष्यकत्वयोरपत्तेः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 6.

(jarness) and that is fixed and unalterable. Now, if there be no difference of *Viśayatā* residing in the qualificand and the qualifier, how then will the specific order of the qualificand and the qualifier be maintained ? What will then prevent the position of the qualificand and the qualifier from being of the reversed order ? In that case the aforesaid knowledge may very well be understood as having the *Ghaṭa* (jar) as the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) as the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*), which can never be conceded.

Some scholars again try to support the above-mentioned theory by saying that the *Viśayatā* of an indeterminate knowledge (*Nirvikalpaka jñāna*) which is universally accepted as different from *Prakāratā* (chief qualificierness or qualificierness) and *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) should be conceded as the *Viśayatā* of the qualified determinate knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa savikalpaka jñāna*) also and there should not be any special type of *Viśayatā* in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) known respectively as *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣyatā*¹. In so admitting there would be somewhat less assumption of objects on account of the *Prakāratā* and the *Viśeṣyatā* being dispensed with as unnecessary assumptions.

But this standpoint also has been criticised by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya by saying that unless the *Viśayatā* of a determinate knowledge be accepted as different from that of the indeterminate knowledge in the form of *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣyatā*, the two kinds of consideration (*Parāmarśa*) in which either the pervaded (*Vyāpya*) of the minor term (*Pakṣa*) may be the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*), cannot be taken in a single statement by saying that the *Viśayatā* existing in the *Pakṣa* (minor term) as described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Viśayatā* residing in the pervaded (*Vyāpya*)².

The idea of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in criticising the above theory is this. If the *Viśayatā* of the indeterminate knowledge (*Nirvikalpaka jñāna*) and that of the determinate knowledge

1. यत्तु निर्विकल्पकीया प्रकारता-विशेष्यताभिन्नत्वेनोभयमतसिद्धा या विषयता विशिष्टज्ञानस्यापि सैव विषये सम्बन्धः तत एव च विशिष्टबुद्धेरपि सविषयकत्वनिराहोऽस्तु किं प्रकारतादीनां विषयतात्वोपगमेन—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 6.

2. प्रकारता-विशेष्यतयोर्विषयतात्वानुपगमे व्याप्य-पक्ष-विशेष्यकपरामर्शयो-र्व्याप्यविषयतानिरूपितपक्षविषयता-शालित्वेनानुगमय्य अनुमितिहेतुत्वासम्भवात्—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 6.

(*Savikalpaka-jñāna*) be considered identical, then the relation of cause and effect between the consideration (*Parāmarśa*) and the inference (*Anumiti*) cannot be satisfactorily explained in a simpler way. The consideration (*Parāmarśa*) which is universally accepted as the cause of inference may be of two kinds. One type of consideration is that in which the pervaded (*Vyāpya*) *Hetu* (middle term) becomes the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the form of the consideration would be like *Vahnivyāpya-dhūmavān parvataḥ* (The mountain possesses smoke which is pervaded by fire). In this consideration, *Dhūma* (smoke) which is pervaded by *Vahni* (fire) is considered secondary with reference to the mountain (*Parvata*) which is prominent here, because, the mountain is mainly described here as the possessor of smoke. In the objects of knowledge that which is prominent (*Mukhya*) is called the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) of the knowledge and that which is secondary (*Gauṇa*) is called the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*).

There is another type of consideration (*Parāmarśa*) in which the pervaded *Hetu* (middle term) becomes prominent and as such the *Hetu* is called *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) of the consideration. In that case the form of the consideration would be *Vahnivyāpyo dhūmaḥ parvate* (The smoke which is pervaded by fire is on the mountain).

Now, if these two kinds of consideration (*Parāmarśa*) are taken separately as the cause of inference, then it would involve the technical defect called heaviness (*Gaurava*) insofar as the relation of causality between the consideration (*Parāmarśa*) and the inference (*Anumiti*) is concerned. Because, in this way at least two distinct aforesaid types of consideration will have to be admitted separately as the causes in inference.¹

If again the qualified determinate knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa savikalpaka jñāna*) is admitted to have a separate type of *Viśayatā* other than that of the indeterminate knowledge (*Nirvikalpaka jñāna*) and the *Viśayatās* therein are considered mutually to stand in the relation of being the describable (*Nirūpya*) and describer (*Nirūpaka*), then the two types of consideration may be taken together by saying that they possess a *Viśayatā* residing in the *Pakṣa* (minor term) described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Viśayatā* existing in the *Vyāpya* (pervad-

1. कारणताबाहुल्यापत्तेः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 6.

ed), the *Hetu* (cause, the middle term) of the inference. By mentioning the *Viśayatā* of the *Vyāpya* and the *Hetu* as *Viśayatā* in a general way and not specifically as *Prakāratā* (qualifieriness) or *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness), both the forms of consideration (*Parāmarśa*) in which either the *Vyāpya* or the *Pakṣa* is the qualificand can be taken into account and hence both the forms of consideration having been taken into account as the cause of inference in a single statement, the relation of causality becomes restricted into one consideration (*Parāmarśa*) of either variety and not into two forms of consideration with different kinds of *Viśayatā* like *Prakāratā* and *Viśeṣyatā*.

This type of solution can be possible only when the *Viśayatā* of a qualified determinate knowledge (*Viśiṣṭasavikalpaka-jñāna*) is considered as altogether different from the *Viśayatā* of the indeterminate knowledge (*Nirvikalpaka-jñāna*), because, the *Viśayatā* of the indeterminate knowledge, as mentioned earlier, does not mutually stand to the relation of being the describable (*Nirūpya*) and the describer (*Nirūpaka*).

There is again another theory regarding the *Viśayatā* of the determinate knowledge (*Savikalpaka-jñāna*). According to this theory the *Viśayatā* of the determinate knowledge exists only in the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) and not in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*), as there is no special argument in holding that the *Viśayatā* exists in the qualifier also.¹

It cannot, of course, be said reversely that the *Viśayatā* of the determinate knowledge exists only in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and not in the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*), because, after having known a jar (*Ghaṭa*), one subsequently feels by way of introspection (*Anuvyavasāya*) that he has known the jar (*Ghaṭa*) and not jariness (*Ghaṭatva*). On the strength of this experience, it can be logically established that there is a relation between the determinate knowledge and the jar (*Ghaṭa*) which is known specifically.² This relation of knowledge with its object, the jar (*Ghaṭa*), which is

1. यतु विशिष्टबुद्धिविषयता विशेष्यमात्रे न तु विशेषणेऽपि मानाभावात्—
Viśayatāvāda, p. 7.

2. घट इत्यादिज्ञानानन्तरं घटं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायेन घटरूपविशेष्येण समं ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धावगाहनात्—
Viśayatāvāda, p. 7.

the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) of the knowledge having the form *Ghaṭa* (the jar) is called *Viśayatā*.¹

After having known the *Ghaṭa* (jar), one can never think subsequently that he has known the jariness (*Ghaṭatva*), because to know like that one has to know jariness-ness (*Ghaṭatvatva*) beforehand inasmuch as the introspection (*Anuvyavasāya*) in the form of *Ghaṭatvaṁ jñāmi* (I know jariness) being a knowledge whose object *Ghaṭatva* (jariness) is qualified by *Ghaṭatvatva* (jariness-ness), the special property residing in the jariness, it can never take place as such unless there is the previous knowledge of *Ghaṭatvatva* (jariness-ness) present in that individual knower.²

Almost parallel to this theory runs another theory according to which there is a property (*Dharma*) named *Prakāratā* (chief quali-fierness or quali-fierness) in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*), but there is no argument in admitting a property called *Viśayatā-tva* (Contenttness-ness) in it. In other words, the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) has got a *Prakāratā* (chief quali-fierness) in it, but it has got no *Viśayatā* as such, i.e., it will not be the *Viśaya* or content of knowledge.³

But both of these theories are untenable. If the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) has got no *Viśayatā* (contenttness) in it, then it means that the qualifier does not become the content (*Viśaya*) of knowledge. In other words, it means that the qualifier is not known at all. This is an absurd standpoint as it goes contrary to our everyday experience. We feel in our everyday life, and rightly so, that there is something which qualifies some other thing. Some objects which are known as qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) under certain circumstances restrict the qualificand from being used indiscriminately. This will not be possible unless the qualifier is known beforehand in those cases.

1. घटादिरूपविशेष्ये ज्ञानस्य विषयतात्मकसम्बन्धस्यावश्यमुपेयत्वात्—

Ibid.

2. घटत्वं जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायस्तु तत्रासिद्ध एव, तस्य घटत्वादिविशिष्टवै-
शिष्ट्यावगाहित्वेन घटत्वत्वप्रकारकव्यवसायानन्तरमेव तत्सम्भवात्—

Ibid.

3. अस्तु वा विशेषणे विषयतानिरूपितप्रकारताख्यधर्मविशेषः तथापि तस्य
विषयतात्वे ज्ञानप्रतियोगिकत्वे च मानाभावः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 7.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, of course, has criticised the above mentioned theories in a different way. He says that unless the *Viśayatā* of knowledge is accepted in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*), or in other words, unless the qualifier is known, the subsequent knowledge of an object qualified by a qualifier which is caused by a similar earlier knowledge cannot be explained satisfactorily.¹

The idea underlying the criticism of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya is this. The qualifier must be admitted to be the object of knowledge. Because, otherwise, the subsequent chain of knowledge (*Paravarti-dhārāvāhika-jñāna*), of an object qualified by a qualifier cannot be justified. For, the qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭabuddhi*), i.e., the knowledge whose object is a qualified entity can be produced only by the previous knowledge of the qualifier. Now, if it is held that the qualifier cannot have any *Viśayatā* (contentness) of knowledge, then the qualifier being not known, its knowledge (which will never take place) will not be there to produce the subsequent qualified knowledge, because, the knowledge of the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) is essential for the production of the qualified knowledge.² Though Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has not explicitly mentioned the subsequent knowledge which is to be produced as the chain knowledge (*Dhārāvāhika-jñāna*), yet we are to understand the subsequent knowledge as a chain knowledge, otherwise, the inconsistency of the qualifier in not becoming an object of knowledge cannot be established. An object can be called a qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) when it really qualifies some other object and hence, to know a property as a qualifier, it is necessary to know it as such with reference to some other object which is qualified by it. Otherwise, how can it be proved that it is a qualifier, if it is not known with reference to some other object which is qualified by it?

Therefore, the theory that the determinate knowledge (*Savikalpaka-jñāna*) has got no separate *Viśayatā* other than that of the indeterminate knowledge (*Nirvikalpaka jñāna*) or the qualifier

1. विशेषणस्य विशिष्टज्ञानाविषयत्वे तद्धर्मविशिष्टज्ञानानन्तरं तद्धर्मविशिष्टज्ञानानुपपत्तेः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 7.

2. विशिष्टबुद्धौ विशेषणविषयकज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात्—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 7.

(*Viśeṣaṇa*) has got no *Viṣayatā* at all does not stand criticism and it is not accepted by the Navya Naiyāyikas as their undisputed theory.

Hence, to conclude it can be safely said that *Viṣayatā* (content-ness) as an entity, whether in the form of a *Svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa* (peculiar nature relation) or an extra category (*Atirikta-padārtha*) is one of the accepted theories of the Navya Naiyāyikas, which according to them, is very much necessary to admit for satisfactorily explaining many logical and metaphysical problems.

Viṣayitā (Content-possessor-ness).

Viṣayitā or *Viṣayitva* is, as it were, a counterpart of *Viṣayatā*. *Viṣayitā* is a relational abstract property (*Dharma*) existing in what is called a (*Viṣayi*). The word *Viṣayi* literally means content-possessor, i.e., that which has got a *Viśaya* or content. Knowledge (*Jñāna*), desire (*Ichhā*), effort (*Kṛti*) and aversion (*Dveṣa*) are primarily known as content-possessing (*Saviṣayaka*) entities. Generally speaking, knowledge (*Jñāna*) is more frequently referred to as *Viṣayi* in the Navya Nyāya treatises. In *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* we find clear mention of knowledge by the term *Viṣayi*¹.

Paṇḍita Umānāthopādhyāya in the footnote of his commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī* says that the relation of the content of knowledge with the knowledge itself is called *Viṣayitā*.² Obviously he has based his theory on the well-known theory of the Navya Naiyāyikas that *Viṣayitā* like many other entities of the same category, is a peculiar nature-relation (*Svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa*).

According to Yādavācārya, the commentator of *Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī*, *Viṣayitā* is identical with *Prakāritā* alone existing in any kind of knowledge.³ But this statement appears to us to be an incomplete one inasmuch as *Viṣayitā* is not identical only

1. विषयि यस्य तस्यैव व्यापारो ज्ञानलक्षणः—

Siddhāntamuktāvalī, *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa*, Verse No. 65.

2. ज्ञाने विषयस्य सम्बन्धो विषयिता—

Paṇḍit Umānātha Upādhyāya, Footnotes on the commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī*, p. 2.

3. ज्ञाननिष्ठा या प्रकारिता सैव विषयितेत्युच्यते—

Yādavācārya, commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 20.

with *Prakāritā*, but also with *Viśeṣyatā* and *Saṃsargitā* which are the varieties of *Viśayitā*.¹ It should also be noted in this connection that *Viśayitā* does not exist in knowledge alone, but it equally exists in desire (*Ichā*), effort (*Kṛti*) and aversion (*Dveṣa*) which are primarily known as content-possessing entities (*Saviśayakapadārtha*).

Viśayitā exists in the knowledge etc. So long as the knowledge or for the matter of that, desire, effort and aversion continue to exist.²

Viśayitā is sometimes limited (*Avacchinna*) by a relation. When the *Viśayitā* is considered identical with the *Prakāritā*, in that case only it can be limited by a relation. Because, *Prakāritā* is connected with *Prakāratā* through the relation of describerness (*Nirūpakatva*) and as such it is sometimes considered as *Prakāratā* existing in the knowledge, etc., through the relation of describerness. Now, because the *Prakāratā* is considered capable of being limited by a relation,³ the *Prakāritā* also when understood to be identical with the *Prakāratā* can equally be limited by a relation. But when the *Prakāritā* is considered identical either with the *Viśeṣyatā* or with the *Saṃsargitā*, it is not said to be limited by any relation whatsoever, because, neither the *Viśeṣyatā* nor the *Saṃsargitā* is limited by any relation according to the theory of Navya Nyāya. This has been specifically pointed out by Paṇḍita Lokanātha Śarmā in his *Ubhayābhāvādivārakapariṣkāra* by using the term *Eva* meaning 'only' in the portion of the text just now referred to. The author of *Pariṣkāradarpaṇa* has, of course, explicitly stated that *Viśeṣyatā* is not limited by any relation⁴.

The *Viśayitā* whether it is identical with *Prakāritā* or with *Viśeṣyatā* or with *Saṃsargitā* is always said to be limited by a

1. सापि त्रिविधा प्रकारिता-संसर्गिता-विषयिताभेदात्—

Paṇḍita Umānāthopādhyāya, Footnote on the commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri* p. 2.

2. विषयिता च ज्ञानसमानकालीनैवेति—

Rāmarudri, p. 54, N. S. Press edition.

3. संसर्गावच्छिन्नत्वं प्रकारतायामेव—

Ubhayābhāvādivārakapariṣkāra, p. 11.

4. सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वं प्रकारतायामेव न तु विशेष्यतायाम्—

Pariṣkāradarpaṇa, p. 36.

property (*Dharma*) with a view to eliminating inconsistency and avoiding ambiguity.

In all cases where a knowledge would either contradict another knowledge or be contradicted (*Pratibadhya*) by another knowledge or be a cause of an effect or be produced by a cause or in whichever other capacity it may be used, the *Viśeṣyitā* or *Prakāritā* or *Samsargitā* existing in the knowledge which may be mentioned by the common name of *Viśayitā* would regularly be limited by a specific property.

The *Viśayitā* may sometimes again be the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of any relational abstract property as has clearly been mentioned in many Navya Nyāya treatises and higher additional dissertations popularly known as *Kroḍapatra* in the Navya Naiyāyika circles. As for example, while clarifying the definition of *Pakṣatā* given by Jagadīśa Tarkālamkāra in which the eminent logician has used the term *Pakṣaviśayatābahirbhūta*, Paṇḍita, Śivadatta Miśra has clarified the meaning of the term according to the higher dissertations (*Kroḍapatra*) of Navya Nyāya by mentioning *Viśayitā* or *Viśayitva* as a limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of a mutual absence (*Bheda*).¹

1. पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नविषयित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वं पक्षविषयिताबहिर्भूतत्वम्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Pakṣatā Jāgadīśi*, p. 29.

CHAPTER V

PRAKĀRATĀ (CHIEF QUALIFIERNES OR QUALIFIERNES)

The word *Prakāra* in the Navya Nyāya terminology means an adjective, a qualifier¹ (*Viśeṣaṇa*). So, the peculiar property which resides in the qualifier by virtue of which a qualifier is called by that term is to be understood by the *Prakāratā* (qualifierness or chief qualifierness).

Though the word *Prakāra* has been, in many cases, used synonymously with *Viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier), yet it is almost uniformly used in connection with the adjective or qualifier of knowledge, desire, effort (*Kṛti*), aversion (*Dveṣa*), the four generally accepted content-possessing (*Saviśayaka*) objects.

Prakāratā is a sub-class under *Viśayatā*, or in the language of Navya Nyāya, *Prakāratātva* (qualifierness-ness) is a property pervaded by *Viśayatātva* (contentness-ness) *Viśayatātva-vyāpya-dharma*.

Bhaṭṭācārya Cūḍāmaṇi Jānakīnātha has said in the *Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī* that *Prakāratā* is a particular kind of *Viśayatā* whose other name is *Viśeṣaṇatā* (qualifierness) existing in the qualifiers like jariness and the like which are the objects (contents) of the knowledge having the form 'This is a jar' (*Ayam ghaṭaḥ*)² etc. There Jānakīnātha has only said that *Prakāratā* is a particular type of *Viśayatā*, but he has not mentioned it specifically wherein lies the particularity of the *Viśayatā*. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also has defined *Prakāratā* in the similar way.³

1. यः प्रकारः स एव विशेषणमित्युच्यते—

Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 252, N. S. Press edition.

2. प्रकारता चायं घट इत्यादिज्ञाने विशेषस्य घटत्वादेर्विशेषणत्वापरनामा विषयताविशेषः—

Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, p. 19.

3. प्रकारत्वं च विषयताविशेषः—

Anumiti Gādādhari, p. 36, Chowkhamba edition.

To us it appears that the particularity of the *Viṣayatā* here consists in its being existent only in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) of the knowledge and not in any other object of the said knowledge. There are several objects or contents of the knowledge having the form 'This is a jar' (*Ayam ghaṭaḥ*). The jar (*Ghaṭa*) and jar-ness (*Ghaṭatva*), this (*Ayam*) and this-ness (*Idantva*) and the relation between the meaning of the term 'This' and that of the term 'jar' (*Ghaṭa*). Now, *Prakāratā* is that *Viṣayatā* (content-ness) which exists only in the qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) of the knowledge and not in any other content of the same. Here in this particular knowledge *Ayam ghaṭaḥ* (This is a jar), the *Viṣayatā* which exists in *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness), the qualifier of the knowledge, is called *Prakāratā* (qualifier-ness). Prof. Ingalls has translated *Prakāra* as 'chief qualifier' in his *Materials for the study of Navya Nyāya Logic* (p. 43.) Hence *Prakāratā* according to this rendering may be called 'Chief qualifier-ness'. But it appears to us that this rendering of the term *Prakāratā* as 'chief qualifier-ness' would not always serve the purpose. Because the term 'chief qualifier-ness' would mean that kind of 'qualifier-ness' which is not identical or qualified by any 'qualificandness' (*Viśeṣyatā*). According to Navya Nyāya terminology, 'chief qualifier-ness' should be called *Mukhya-Prakāratā* in the line of *Mukhya-Viśeṣyatā*. *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness) as the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge having the form *Ghaṭaḥ* is the 'chief qualifier' (*Mukhya Prakāra*) and the relational abstract property, in that 'chief qualifier' *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness) should be called chief-qualifier-ness, as it is neither identical nor qualified by any, 'qualificandness' *Viśeṣyatā* residing in the same *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness). Thus the term 'chief qualifier-ness' would naturally be restricted to some limited cases of *Prakāratā* and may not be used in other cases where the *Prakāratā* may either be identical with or qualified by a *Viśeṣyatā*.

Some scholars of the Navya Nyāya school again define *Prakāratā* as the 'adjunctness' (*Pratīyogitva*) of the relation (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) which is being known (*Bhāsamāna*).¹

1. प्रकारता च भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वम्—

Dipikā Nilakanṭhi, p. 42, Veṅkaṭeśvara Press edition.

भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वानुयोगित्वयोरेव विशेषणत्व-विशेष्यत्वात्मकत्वात्—
Anumiti Gādādharī, p. 26, Chowkhamba edition.

अन्ये तु भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वं प्रकारत्वम्—

Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, p. 21.

In the aforesaid knowledge *Ayam ghaṭaḥ* (This is a jar), *Ghaṭatva* or jariness is the adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) of the relation (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) called inherence (*Samavāya*) which is being known (*Bhāsamāna*) here along with other objects.¹

Paṇḍita Yādavācārya, the commentator of *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, points out that *Pratīyogitva* (adjunctness) here is nothing other than describerness (*Nirūpakatva*).² The idea underlying this exposition is this. When a relation is known somewhere, the question naturally arises in one's mind or self regarding the object whose relation is known there. Unless that object is known whose relation is understood to exist in a particular place, the relation also cannot be known there distinctly. Hence, there is *Nirūpakatva* (describerness) of the relation existing in the *Pratīyogī* (adjunct) of that relation. *Nirūpakatva* (describerness) means the contentness (*Viśayatva*) of a particular knowledge which again in its turn is the cause of another knowledge (*Nirūpakatvaṃ ca jñānajanakajñāna-viśayatvam*). The knowledge of the adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) of the relation is the cause of the knowledge of the relation itself. Because, unless the adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) of the relation is known, the relation can never be known properly for the simple reason that the proper knowledge of the relation depends upon the object whose relation is mentioned in a particular context.

It should be understood in this connection that the word *Bhāsamāna* should be construed with the word *Pratīyogitva* also. The word *Bhāsamāna*, as already indicated, means object of knowledge (*Jñāna-viśaya*). Therefore, it comes to this that not only the relation of the adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) should be known, but the adjunct itself should also be known, so that any and every adjunct of the relation would not be considered as the *Prakāra* (qualifier) and the special property existing there would not be considered as the *Prakāratā* (qualifierness). But the particular adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) of the relation which may be known along with the relation for the time being should alone be called

1. अयं घट इत्यत्र हि घटत्वस्य वैशिष्ट्यं भासते तत्प्रतियोगि च घटत्वमित्याहुः—

Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, p. 21.

2. अत्र प्रतियोगित्वं निरूपकत्वम्—

Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 22.

by the term *Prakāra* and the special property residing in it should be known as *Prakāratā* (qualifierness).

But this theory regarding *Prakāratā* has been rejected, because, if the adjunct of the relation which is known be called a *Prakāra* then the staff (*Danḍa*) which may be the object of a *Samūhālam-bana jñāna* (a knowledge having for its content a number of independent objects) also would become a *Prakāra* of the same and the special property residing in it would also be called *Prakāratā*, which actually is not the case,¹ for in that case there would not be any difference between a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) and a (*Samūhālam-bana jñāna*).

Of course, Yādavācārya, the commentator of *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī*, has tried to make out a difference between the *Samūhā-lambana jñāna* and the *Viśiṣṭa-jñāna* by pointing out that in the *Viśiṣṭa-jñāna* (qualified knowledge) the *Pratīyogitva* (adjunctness) and *Anuyogitva* (subjunctness) of the relation also are known whereas in the *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge these are not known and the difference between the two types of knowledge can be established by the difference of the number of objects known. But this contention also is not quite satisfactory as has already been subsequently pointed out by Yādavācārya himself.

If the *Pratīyogitva* and the *Anuyogitva* of the relation being known in the qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) constitute its difference from the *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge, then the *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge also may very well have the *Pratīyogitva* and the *Anuyogitva* for its content and as such, there would not be any difference between the *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge and the qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*)². In other words, a *Samūhālam-bana* knowledge also may have the form like *Danḍa-Puruṣa-saṃyogapratīyogitvānuyogitvāni* in which along with

1. दण्ड-पुरुष-संयोगा इतिसमूहालम्बने दण्डी पुरुष इतिवत् दण्डस्य प्रकार-
तापत्तेः संयोगे हि दण्डस्य वैशिष्ट्यं भासते तत्प्रतियोगी च दण्ड इति दिक्—
Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, p. 22.

तदसत्, उक्तसमूहालम्बनस्यापि घटप्रतियोगिकवैशिष्ट्यविषयकतया
घटप्रकारकत्वापत्तेः—

Viśayātāvāda, p. 4.

2. दण्ड-पुरुष-संयोग-प्रतियोगित्वानुयोगित्वानीति समूहालम्बनस्य दण्डी
पुरुष इति विशिष्टज्ञानस्य च भेदो न स्यात्—

Yādavācārya's Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 22.

the staff (*Daṇḍa*), the man (*Puruṣa*) and the relation of contact (*Samyoga*), *Pratīyogitva* (adjunctness) and *Anuyogitva* (subjunctness) also may be the content (*Viśaya*), so that if the *Pratīyogitva* of a known relation is called *Prakāratā*, then there would be no difference between a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) and a *Samūhālamḃana* knowledge—a position which can never be conceded, as it goes against everybody's experience. In a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) the relations of the relation, namely, *Pratīyogitva* (adjunctness) and *Anuyogitva* (subjunctness) also become the content (*Viśaya*). Now if in the *Samūhālamḃana* knowledge also the same relations become the content, then what would constitute the difference between the two types of knowledge ?

If, of course, it is held that in the qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) the relation of *Pratīyogitva* (adjunctness) and *Anuyogitva* (subjunctness) which themselves are the relations of the relation, is understood, whereas in the *Samūhālamḃana* knowledge no such things are cognised and this constitutes the difference between the two forms of knowledge, then there would be a regress *ad infinitum* (*Anavasthā*) of the things cognised, which is unjustifiable.¹

Hence, it follows from the above-mentioned arguments that *Prakāratā* cannot be defined as the adjunctness (*Pratīyogitva*) of the relation (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) which is known for the time being (*Bhāsamānavaiśiṣṭya-pratīyogitvam*).

Accordingly, the theory that *Prakāratā* is a particular nature-relation (*Svarūpasambandha-viśeṣa*) which is called a particular type of *Viśayatā* (*Viśayatā-viśeṣa*) is generally accepted. The *Prakāratā* according to some logicians is a separate category of thought.²

Yādvacārya in his commentary on the *Nyāyasiddhānta-mañjarī* points out that there are two main types of *Prakāratā*, one is called *Viśeṣaṇatā* (qualifieriness) as already mentioned and the other is called *Upalakṣaṇatā* (indicatoriness). The *Prakāratā* in

1. न च तत्र प्रतियोगित्वानुयोगित्वयोरपि सम्बन्धोऽभ्युपेयत इति वाच्यं विषयानवस्थापत्तेरिति—

Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 22.

2. पदार्थान्तरमित्येकदेशिनः—

Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, p. 19.

the form of *Viśeṣaṇatā* is that property which exists only in those differentiating factors which differentiate the objects differentiated by them by being existent in them (the objects differentiated). Whereas, the *Upalakṣaṇatā* is that *Prakāratā* which exists in that qualifier which differentiates the objects differentiated by it by even not being existent in the object differentiated.¹

In the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra also, while explaining the meaning of the third case ending (*Tṛtiyā vibhakti*) in the expressions like 'Jaṭābhis tāpasah' etc., has expressed the same view.²

This *Prakāratā* in the form of *Viśeṣaṇatā* and *Upalakṣaṇatā* has been further clarified by Yādavācārya by saying that the limitor of the locusness (*Adhikaraṇatā*) of the absence (*Vyāvṛtti*) and at the same time the differentiating factor of the object differentiated is called *Viśeṣaṇatā*. As for example, in the statement "Staff-holder (*Daṇḍī*), earring-holder (*Kuṇḍali*) and cloth-holder (*Vāsasvī*) Devadatta", the absence of that which is other than the staff-holder etc. is understood to exist in the locus of the staff-holder, etc. In this case the staff (*Daṇḍa*) or for the matter of that, the earring or such other thing is the limitor of the locusness (*Adhikaraṇatā*) of the absence of the staff-holder etc. and at the same time it is the differentiating factor of the staff-holder from that which is not so. Hence, the staff or some other object like that is called the *Prakāra* (qualifier) of the type of *Viśeṣaṇa*. In other words, the *Prakāratā* (qualifieriness) existing in the *Prakāra* of this type is called *Viśeṣaṇatā*. Whereas, in the expressions like *Jaṭābhistāpasah*, etc. where an ascetic is indicated by the matted locks of hair, those matted locks of hair are not the limitor of the locusness of the absence of the individual without the matted locks of hair. Because, the matted locks of hair may not always exist on the head of the ascetic and as such, they exist in less points of time than the locusness (*Adhikaraṇatā*) of the absence of the individual without

1. विशेषणतोपलक्षणताभेदेन प्रकारता द्विविधा तत्र विद्यमानं व्यावर्त्तकं सद् विशेषणम् अविद्यमानमपि व्यावर्त्तकं सदुपलक्षणम्—

Yādavācārya, Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 20.

2. इदन्तु बोध्यम्, प्रकृत्यर्थस्य निरुक्तवैशिष्ट्यं यदि वर्तमानतया प्रत्याय्यते तदैव विशेषणत्वेन यदि चावर्त्तमानत्वेन तदा उपलक्षणत्वेन व्यपदिश्यते—

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Kāraṇaprakaraṇam, p. 209.

the matted locks of hair and that which exists in less points of time or in less place cannot be its limiter (*Avacchedaka*).¹

This second type of *Prakāratā* is known as *Upalakṣaṇatā* (indicatorness) in the Navya Nyāya treatises.

The clarification of the two primary types of *Prakāratā* in a rather technical way of Navya Nyāya as *Viśeṣaṇatā* and *Upalakṣaṇatā* has been considered necessary inasmuch as the commonly accepted definition of *Viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) and *Upalakṣaṇa* (indicator) as the differentiating factors which differentiate an object from another on being present and sometimes even being absent respectively in the object differentiated does not satisfactorily serve the purpose in all cases. Because, a crow hovering over a house or the matted locks of hair, even though existing on the house or on the head, would not, for a moment, be considered as a *Viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) and the *Viśeṣaṇatā* (qualifieriness) would not exist in it, rather, it would always be considered an *Upalakṣaṇatā* (indicator) and the property called *Upalakṣaṇatā* (indicatorness) would be accepted in it.²

This *Prakāratā* is again divided by some logicians into two other types as unlimited and limited by a different qualifier.³ As for example, the *Prakāratā* existing in *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) which also is a content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge having the form *Ghaṭaḥ* is unlimited, because, no other property (*Dharma*) flashes on *Ghaṭatva* in our knowledge having the said form.⁴ Had there been any other property flashing on *Ghaṭatva* in our mind or self

1. दण्डी कुण्डली वासस्वी देवदत्त इत्यादौ दण्ड्यादिमतिग्रहणदण्ड्यादिव्यावृत्तिर्बुध्यते इत्यदण्ड्यादिव्यावृत्तकतावच्छेदकं दण्ड्यादिकमिति तद् विशेषणम्, काक-जटादिकं तु न गृह-तापसादिविशेषणम्, तदभाववत्यपि तृणत्वादिना व्यावृत्तिदर्शनात् । तस्मात् व्यावृत्त्यधिकरणत्वावच्छेदकत्वे सति व्यावृत्तिजनकं विशेषणं व्यावृत्त्यधिकरणतानवच्छेदकत्वे सति व्यावृत्तिजनकमुपलक्षणम्, उपलक्षणस्य व्यावृत्त्यधिकरणतानवच्छेदकत्वात्—

Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 20.

2. काकवन्तो देवदत्तगृहाः, जटाभिस्तापस इत्यादौ भवनोपरि भ्रमत्काकस्य शिरसि जटायाश्च विद्यमानत्वेऽपि विशेषणत्वाभावात्—
Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, p. 20.

3. प्रकारता च द्विविधा निरवच्छिन्ना विशेषणान्तरावच्छिन्ना च—
Viśayatāvāda, p. 15.

4. तत्र निरवच्छिन्ना घट इत्याकारकज्ञानीयघटत्वादिप्रकारता तत्र स्वरूपत एव घटत्वादेर्भावात्—

Ibid.

as a limiting adjunct of *Ghaṭatva*, then the *Prakāratā* existing in *Ghaṭatva* would have been limited by that property. But it is not the case here in regard to the knowledge having the form *Ghaṭaḥ*. Because, it is universally accepted by the logicians that a generic character (*Jāti*), if not mentioned by its name, would become known by its own nature alone and no other property would be known on it as its limiting adjunct.

The idea underlying this assumption is this. If we mention a jar (*Ghaṭa*) by its name, then the jar as qualified by the generic character jar-ness (*Ghaṭatva*) becomes known to us and no other property like *Ghaṭatvatva* (jar-ness-ness) and the like is known as the limiting property of the jar. If, of course, *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness) is mentioned by its name, then *Ghaṭatvatva* (jar-ness-ness) or the particular property residing in the jar-ness would be known to us as the limiting adjunct of jar-ness. Hence, it follows that only one property which happens to be the limiting adjunct of a particular object that is mentioned by its name flashes in our mind or self when that object is mentioned by its name and not any other property on that limiting adjunct is known there.

So, when a jar is mentioned by its name *Ghaṭa*, then only *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness) flashes in our mind or self as the limiting adjunct of *Ghaṭa* (jar) and as such the *Prakāratā* (qualifierness) existing in *Ghaṭatva* (jar-ness) is not limited by any other property. This sort of unlimited *Prakāratā* is admitted only in a generic character (*Jāti*) and in indivisible property (*Akhaṇḍopādhi*).¹

There is another kind of *Prakāratā* which is called limited. This type of *Prakāratā* exists in objects like a jar (*Ghaṭa*) which becomes the object of knowledge having the form *Ghaṭavad* (jar-possessing) in which the jar (*Ghaṭa*) is the qualifier (*Prakāra*) and the *Prakāratā* (qualifierness) existing in the jar (*Ghaṭa*) is limited by jar-ness (*Ghaṭatva*), a generic character which flashes on the jar (*Ghaṭa*) as its limiting adjunct².

Though the *Prakāratā* as stated above, is sometimes unlimited and sometimes limited by some property, yet it is always limited

1. तादृशी च प्रकारता जात्यखण्डोपाधिभिन्ने न स्वीक्रियते—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 15.

2. सावच्छिन्ना च घटवदित्यादिज्ञानीयघटादिप्रकारता तत्र घटत्वादेर-
वच्छेदकत्वात्—

Ibid.

by some relation (*Sambandha*). That is the reason why the *Prakāratā* has been defined by some scholars as the *Viśayatā* which is limited by a relation.¹

Now a question may be raised as to why the *Prakāratā* alone is accepted as qualified by a relation and not the corresponding *Viśeṣyatā*. Paṇḍita Lokanātha Śarmā has supplied arguments in favour of the theory that only the *Prakāratā* is qualified by a relation and not the *Viśeṣyatā*. In the event of the *Prakāratā* being qualified by a relation, the relation of being contradicted and contradictory (*Pratibadhyā-pratibandhakabhāva*) existing between different types of knowledge can be explained in a simple way.

As for example, the knowledge having the form “the jar does not exist through the relation of contact” (*Samyogena ghaṭo vṛttiḥ*) can be contradicted by various kinds of definite knowledge like “The land is qualified by a jar through the relation of contact (*Samyogena ghaṭavad bhūtaḥ*)”, the mountain is qualified by a jar through the relation of contact (*Samyogena ghaṭavān parvataḥ*) etc. by assuming contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatva*) in those different forms of definite knowledge in one way as the definite knowledgedness (*Niścayatva*) related to a qualificerness (*Prakāratva*) limited by the relation of contact and jariness (*Ghaṭatva*).²

The idea underlying this standpoint is this. The knowledge *Samyogena ghaṭo vṛttiḥ* (The jar does not exist through the relation of contact) can be contradicted by innumerable forms of definite knowledge (*Niścaya*) having different qualificands (*Viśeṣya*) like *Bhūtaḥ*, *Parvataḥ* etc. Now, if the individual form of the contradictory definite knowledge is taken into account separately, then it will be humanly impossible to ascertain it on account of the qualificands (*Viśeṣya*) of the different forms of the contradictory definite knowledge being innumerable. Therefore, for the sake of simplification and brevity some device has got to be invented so that the innumerable forms of contradictory definite know-

1. संसर्गावच्छिन्नविषयतेति यावत्—

Nilakaṇṭhī, p. 42, Veṅkaṭeśvar Press edition.

2. संयोगेन घटोऽवृत्तिरिति बुद्धिं प्रति संयोगेन घटवद्भूतलं संयोगेन घटवान् पर्वत इत्यादिनिश्चयानां संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारताशालि- निश्चयत्वेनैकरूपेणैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वमिति लाघवम्—

Ubhayābhāvādīvārakapariṣkāra, pp. 11.12.

ledge can be taken into account by a single statement. This can only be done if the limiter of the contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*) existing in the different forms of contradictory definite knowledge here is mentioned as the definite knowledgeness (*Niścayatva*) in which the definite knowledge (*Niścaya*) has got a qualierness (*Prakāratā*) limited by the relation of contact (*Saṁyoga-sambandha*) as also by a property (*Dharma*) called jariness (*Ghaṭatva*).¹

It is to be noted that only the *Prakāratā* (qualierness) limited by a certain relation and property (*Dharma*) has been mentioned here without any reference to the qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatā*) existing in the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) of the contradictory definite knowledge (*Pratibandhakaniścaya*). By so doing, innumerable forms of definite knowledge have been mentioned by a single statement, because, though the contradictory definite knowledge here may be of diverse forms and hence innumerable owing to the difference of the qualificands, yet the qualierness (*Prakāratā*) existing in the single qualifier, the jar (*Ghaṭa*), being limited by a single relation (*Sambandha*) and a single property (*Dharma*) is one and only one equally existing in all the forms of contradictory definite knowledge, so that they can be easily collected together by mentioning the limiter of the contradictoriness (*Pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*) having for its component part the *Prakāratā* as mentioned above.

Hence, with a view to establishing in a simpler way the relation of being contradicted and contradictory (*Pratibadhya pratibandhakabhāva-sambandha*) between different forms of knowledge, the *Prakāratā* (qualierness) is accepted to be limited by particular relations in particular cases, but not the *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness).

Now, a question may be raised as to why the *Prakāratā* alone is accepted to be qualified by a particular relation and not the *Viśeṣyatā* also ? Conversely, why is it not accepted that the *Viśeṣyatā* alone be qualified by some particular relation and not the *Prakāratā* ?

The answer to the first question is not far to seek. If by accepting the *Prakāratā* alone as qualified by a particular relation the situation of one knowledge becoming the contradicted (*Prati-*

1. *Ubhayābhāvādivāraṅga-pariṣkāra*, pp. 11-12.

badhya) and the other contradictory (*Pratibandhaka*) can be explained satisfactorily, then what is the use of accepting the corresponding *Viśeṣyatā* also as qualified by a relation? Moreover, the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) of a knowledge may not always be mentioned and hence the qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatā*) also cannot always be found at least in the case of some forms of contradictory definite knowledge where the qualificand is not necessarily mentioned. In those cases of contradictory definite knowledge the question of the qualificandness being qualified by some relation does not arise at all. As for example, the knowledge having the form *Samyogena ghaṭo nāsti* (There is the absence of a jar, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the relation of contact) is contradicted by the definite knowledge *Samyogena ghaṭavān* (qualified by a jar through the relation of contact). In this contradictory knowledge the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) is not mentioned and hence the *Viśeṣyatā* also does not come into the picture here. So the question of the *Viśeṣyatā* being limited by a relation also does not necessarily arise at all. So, if the *Viśeṣyatā* is said to be limited by a relation then the knowledge having the form *Samyogena ghaṭavān* and the like cannot be taken into account as contradictory forms of knowledge.¹

But in all forms of qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) the *Prakāra* (qualifier) will always be mentioned, otherwise the knowledge cannot be called a qualified knowledge at all. In all those cases of qualified knowledge again, the *Prakāratā* (qualifierness) has got to be necessarily limited by a particular relation. Otherwise, ambiguity cannot be avoided. Because, the knowledge *Samyogena ghaṭo nāsti* (There is no jar through the relation of contact or there is the absence of the jar, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the relation of contact) can be contradicted only by the definite knowledge having the form *Samyogena ghaṭavān* or *Samyogena ghaṭo'sti* (Qualified by a jar through the relation of contact or the jar exists through the relation of contact), but not by the definite knowledge having the form *Samavāyena ghaṭavān* or *Samavāyena ghaṭo'sti* (Qualified by a jar through

1. घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितसंयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशालिनिश्चयत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वे तु संयोगेन घटवानिति ज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वं न स्यात्—

Ubhayābhāvādivārakapariṣkāra, pp. 15-16.

the relation of inherence or the jar exists through the relation of inherence). Hence, it is extremely necessary to regulate the *Prakāratā* by making it limited by a particular relation in a particular case.

No such argument, of course, can be advanced for a *Viśeṣyatā* and therefore it cannot be said to be limited by any relation at all.

Prof. Ingalls has pointed out a difference between the *Prakāra* which constitutes a limiter of the subject (*Uddeśyatā-vacchedaka*) and that which is expressed in the predicate by rendering the *Prakāra* of the second type as 'Chief qualifier', a term which may be convenient to adopt,¹ of course, in a general way. Obviously, the chiefness of the qualifier, in the opinion of the learned Professor, I think, possibly consists in its not being directly an adjective to something which may be in the subject side of a judgement. It has been considered necessary to use the word directly here, because even a chief qualifier becomes indirectly an adjective to the limiter of the subject through the subject itself.² But I have earlier stated that the term 'chief qualifier' has got a special meaning. (Vide Ch. V under the topic *Prakāratā*).

Paṇḍita Ananta Kumāra Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha, one of the most renowned Navya Naiyāyikas of Bengal, with whom I had had the unique opportunity and privilege to read systematically a good number of important Navya Nyāya treatises in the traditional way for more than twenty years, had informed me that among the contents of knowledge produced by verbal testimony, that which is first known is the *Viśeṣaṇa* or *Prakāra* (qualifier) and that which is known subsequently is the *Viśeṣya*³ (qualificand). Though it is extremely difficult to find out the original source of this definition, I have no doubt that this excellent definition has been handed over to the disciples by generations of teachers of Navya Nyāya. The definition which is extremely brief and flawless has a ring of thorough exactitude in it which points to its traditional nature.

1. *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, p. 43.

2. धर्मिपारतन्त्र्येण धर्मितावच्छेदके प्रकारभानस्य सकलसम्प्रदायानुमततया
Tattvasāra, p. 38.

3. शान्दबोधे प्राक्प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेषणत्वं पश्चात्प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेष्यत्वम्

On hearing the words *Nilo ghaṭaḥ* (A blue jar) a special type of knowledge called verbal knowledge arises in our mind or soul. In this verbal knowledge there are several contents (*Viśaya*). These are *Nilāḥ* (blue), *Nilatva* (blueness), *Ghaṭaḥ* (jar), *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) and the relation between the meaning of the term *Nilāḥ* and that of the term *Ghaṭaḥ*. The meaning of the term *Nilāḥ* in this context is 'qualified by blue colour (*Nilaguṇaviśiṣṭaḥ*)'. *Nilatva* here means *Nilaguṇa* (blue colour). *Ghaṭatva* is jarness, the generic character residing in all the jars, and *Ghaṭaḥ* means the individual jar where *Ghaṭatva* or jarness inheres through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). The relation between the meaning of the term *Nilāḥ* which is the *Prakāra* or qualifier here and that of the term *Ghaṭaḥ* which is the *Viśeṣya* or qualificand is the relation of identity (*Tādātmyasambandha*), because the term *Nilāḥ* here means *Nilaguṇaviśiṣṭaḥ*.

The meaning derived from the statement *Nilo ghaṭaḥ* if analysed according to the technique of Navya Nyāya would be *Nilatvāvacchinna-tādātmyasambandhāvacchinna-prakāratānirūpita-ghaṭatvāvacchinna-viśeṣyatāśrayo ghaṭaḥ*. Here among the contents (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge, *Nila* or blue becomes known at first and hence according to the definition mentioned earlier, the meaning of the term *Nilāḥ* or blue is the *Prakāra* and the *Prakāratā* (qualifieriness) exists in it.

The *Prakāratā* being a kind of *Viśayatā*, it is always mentioned in connection with knowledge, etc. Hence, the *Prakāratā* is systematically referred to in the Navya Nyāya treatises as described (*Nirūpita*) by the knowledge or some other content-possessing (*Saviśayaka*) entity.

There are three ways of mentioning the *Prakāratā*. In some cases it is said that the *Prakāratā* is described (*Nirūpita*) by the knowledge etc., and in other cases it is said to be described by the *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) existing in the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) of the knowledge, etc. In some other cases again the *Prakāratā* is said to be described by the abstract property called *Prakāratā* existing in the knowledge and the like.

When, of course, the *Prakāratā* is said to be described (*Nirūpita*) by the knowledge, etc., it is meant that the *Prakāratā* is described by them through the abstract property called *Prakāritā* existing in the knowledge and the like. But generally speaking, *Prakāratā* is more frequently used as the describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the corres-

ponding *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) of the knowledge, etc.

Prakāritā (Qualifier-possessor-ness).

The counterpart of *Prakāratā* as it were is *Prakāritā*. *Prakāritā*, is a relational abstract property residing in the knowledge, desire, etc., which are called content-possessing (*Saviśayaka*) entities.

The general theory of Navya Nyāya is that the *Prakāritā* is a kind of *Viśayitā* which again is a relation of the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge with the knowledge itself. The content of the knowledge in the form of a *Prakāra* also has got a relation with its knowledge which is called *Prakāritā* (content-possessor-ness).¹

Paṇḍitacūḍāmaṇi Jānakīnātha has said in the *Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī* that the *Prakāratā* which exists in the *Prakāra* like *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) etc., is called *Prakāritā* while existing in the knowledge and the like.²

This *Prakāritā* existing in the knowledge etc. is a kind of *Viśayitā* and as such it is sometimes called by the term *Viśayitā* also.³ Of course, though *Prakāritā* is identical with *Viśayitā* in some cases, yet all the cases of *Viśayitā* are not those of *Prakāritā* inasmuch as the term *Viśayitā* is a wider one than the term *Prakāritā*. Hence, the statement of Paṇḍita Yādavācārya, the commentator of *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, that the *Prakāritā* is verily the *Viśayitā* (*Yā prakāritā saiva viśayitetyuchyate*) appears to us to be a general way of statement.

The general usage of the Navya Naiyāyikas in modern times is that if the *Prakāratā* which naturally exists in its locus through the particular nature-relation (*Svarūpasambandhaviśeṣa*) is known to exist through the relation of describerness (*Nirūpakatva-sambandha*), then it is called by the term *Prakāritā*. This usage conforms with the theory about *Prakāritā* expounded by Paṇḍita Yādavācārya, the commentator of *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* quoted earlier, where the learned scholar holds that the very same

1. प्रकाराख्यविषयस्य ज्ञाने सम्बन्धः प्रकारिता—

Paṇḍita Umānāthopādhyāya, Note on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 2.

2. या घटत्वादिनिष्ठा प्रकारता सा ज्ञानादिनिष्ठा प्रकारिता—

Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 20.

3. ज्ञानादिनिष्ठा या प्रकारिता सैव विषयितेत्युच्यते—

Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 20.

Prakāratā which exists in the contents of knowledge like *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) etc., is called *Prakāritā* when it exists in the knowledge itself. Though Yādavācārya has mentioned only knowledge where the *Prakāratā* may be existing through the relation of describerness (*Nirūpakatva*) to be known as *Prakāritā*, yet the word *Jñāna* (knowledge) should be taken there as an *Upalakṣaṇā* or indicator which would indicate not only knowledge but something more to include desire (*Ichhā*), effort (*Kṛti*) and aversion (*Dveṣa*), the commonly accepted content-possessing (*Saviśayaka*) entities.

The knowledge is the describer (*Nirūpaka*) of the *Viśayatā* existing in the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge. *Prakāratā* also being a kind of *Viśayatā* is described (*Nirūpita*) by the knowledge of the *Prakāra* (qualifier). Hence, there exist in the knowledge of the *Prakāra* a relational abstract property called describerness (*Nirūpakatva*) which may be considered as a relation through which the *Prakāratā* may exist in or be associated with the knowledge of the *Prakāra* (qualifier). Thus, *Prakāratā* existing in the knowledge through the relation of describerness (*Nirūpakatva*) is given a separate name called *Prakāritā* with a view to distinguishing it from the *Prakāratā* existing in the *Prakāra* (qualifier) through the relation called *Svarūpa sambandhaviśeṣa* or peculiar nature-relation.

According to the above theory *Prakāritā* is a peculiar nature-relation (*Svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa*) considered identical with the locus of the *Prakāritā* like knowledge, desire etc., in which it is supposed to exist through the peculiar nature-relation.

But according to this theory a difficult problem crops up which is not very easy to solve. If the *Prakāritā* exists in its locus like knowledge, desire etc., through the peculiar nature-relation, then how can it be called at the same time to be identical with the very same relation ? Certainly, one and the same thing cannot consistently be supposed to exist somewhere through a particular relation being at the same time identical with the relation. A jar existing on a particular tract of land through the relation of contact (*Samyoga-sambandha*) cannot certainly be called identical with the same relation.

Nowhere in the Navya Nyāya treatises is to be found a clear solution of the above problem. But a clue to the solution of this problem may possibly be found in a statement of Bhaṭṭa-

cārya Cūḍāmaṇi Jānakīnātha in the *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* which clearly seeks to establish that the state or condition of being a substratum (*Ādhāra*) and a superstratum (*Ādheya*) may be supposed to exist even between identical objects. As for example, the absence of a jar (*Ghaṭābhāva*) may easily be said to be existing in the same absence of the jar.¹ The commentator Yāda-vācārya also supports this standpoint by citing another example. There the learned scholar points out that the contentness of a valid knowledge (*Prameyatva*) exists in the same contentness of the same valid knowledge.²

Now, if the state or condition of being a substratum (*Ādhāra*) and a superstratum (*Ādheya*) can be supposed to exist between two identical objects, then what objection can be raised in the case of the particular nature-relation (*Svarūpsambandha-viśeṣa*) becoming the occurrence-exacting relation (*Vṛttiniyāmaka-sambandha*) of the same thing which may be identical with the particular nature-relation?

This sort of solution, it must be admitted, can only be satisfactory in the case of the above-mentioned position being accepted by both the contestants. But if this position is not accepted, then this solution also falls far short of one's expectation to satisfy the spirit of logical enquiry. This side of the solution of the problem raised earlier did not lose sight of the Navya Naiyāyikas and hence it has been called an *Abhyupagamasiddhānta* or a conclusion accepted as such by a group of philosophers and not by all the philosophers of a particular school of thought.

Therefore, in later times this *Prakāritā* also was considered an extra category of thought by a group of the Navya Nyāya school of philosophers.³

1. घटाभावे घटो नास्तीतिप्रतीतिरभेदेऽपि त्वयाऽङ्गीकारात्—

Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, p. 42.

2. इदमुपलक्षणं प्रमेयत्वे प्रमेयत्वमित्यपि बोध्यम्—

Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 42.

3. विषयतातत्त्वादिवत् प्रतियोगित्वाधिकरणत्व-तत्त्व-सम्बन्धत्वादयोऽप्यतिरिक्ता एव पदार्था इत्येकदेशिनः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti, p. 256, *Jāgadiśī*, Chowkhamba edn.

आदिना प्रकारित्वग्रहः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśī, p. 256, Chowkhamba edn.

CHAPTER VI

VIŚEṢYATĀ (QUALIFICANDNESS)

Just as *Prakāritā* (qualifier-possessor-ness) may be called a counterpart of *Prakāratā*, similarly *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) is another counterpart of *Prakāratā*. *Prakāritā* existing in the knowledge, etc., is described or determined (*Nirūpita*) by *Prakāratā*, whereas, *Viśeṣyatā* in its turn, though likewise described or determined by *Prakāratā*, exists in the object or content of the knowledge, etc. Generally speaking in the Navya Nyāya treatises *Viśeṣyatā* is more frequently used in connection with *Prakāratā*.

Like *Prakāratā* (qualifierness) *Viśeṣyatā* also is a kind of *Viśayatā* and as such all the general characteristics of *Viśayatā* should be associated with *Viśeṣyatā* also.

If we look into the derivation of the term *Viśeṣya*, then that which is particularly qualified or specified should be understood as its primary meaning¹, the *Upasarga Vi* signifying particularity. Hence, *Viśeṣyatā* would be nothing other than the particular relational abstract property residing in that which is considered as a *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) for the time being.

To become subsequently the object of the special type of knowledge technically known as *Śābdabodha* is the traditional definition of *Viśeṣyatā*² as already mentioned earlier.

In a *Sābdabodha* or knowledge produced by verbal testimony, first the *Viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) is known and then subsequently the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) becomes known as qualified by the *Viśeṣaṇa*. As for example, the knowledge *Nīlo ghaṭah*, if analysed in a Navya Nyāya style would mean *Nilatvāvacchinnābhedasambandhāvacchinnaprakāratānirūpita-ghaṭatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatāśrayo ghaṭah*. In this knowledge *Ghaṭa* or the jar becomes known subsequently and hence the *Viśeṣyatā* exists in it.

1. वि + शिष् + यत्

2. शाब्दबोधे पश्चात्प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेष्यत्वम् ।

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya in his commentary on *Dādhiti* of *Anumiti Cintāmaṇi* has said that *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) is nothing other than the subjunctness (*Anuyogitva*) of the relation (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) which becomes known in a particular context.¹ As for example, in the knowledge *Nilo ghaṭaḥ* (a blue jar), *Nilāḥ* or qualified by blue colour, *Ghaṭaḥ* the jar and the relation called *Tādātmya* or identity become the content (*Viśaya*). Among these objects which are known jointly, the jar is, of course, the subjunct (*Anuyogī*) of the relation (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) which in its turn also is known here. Therefore, the jar (*Ghaṭa*) is to be understood as the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) here.

The *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) is sometimes unlimited (*Niravacchinna*) and sometimes qualified by a different qualifier.² In the knowledge having the form *Ghaṭa* (jar) the *Viśeṣyatā* described or determined (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* (qualifier) existing in the jar-ness (*Ghaṭatva*) is unlimited, because, no limitor of the *Viśeṣyatā* (*Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka*) becomes the content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge *Ghaṭaḥ*.³ As *Ghaṭatva* or jar-ness is the *Prakāra* (qualifier) of the said knowledge, it cannot at the same time be the limitor of the *Viśeṣyatā* of the same. This type of knowledge in which the limitor of the *Viśeṣyatā* is not known is called *Nirdharmitāvacchedaka*, the term *Dharmitā* being synonymous with *Viśeṣyatā*.⁴

In the knowledge *Ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ* (This is a jar) the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the object signified by the term *Ayaṁ* (This) and described (*Nirūpita*) by the *Prakāratā* (qualifier) residing in jar-ness (*Ghaṭatva*) is limited by 'Thisness' (*Idantva*).⁵ Therefore,

1. भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वानुयोगित्वयोरेव विशेषणत्व-विशेष्यत्वात्मकत्वात्—

Anumiti Gādādhari, p. 26, Chowkhamba edition.

2. विशेष्यता च क्वचिन्निरवच्छिन्ना क्वचिच्च विशेषणान्तरावच्छिन्ना—
Viśayatāvāda, p. 16.

3. तत्र निर्धर्मितावच्छेदके घट इत्याद्याकारकज्ञाने घटत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपिता विशेष्यता निरवच्छिन्ना—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 16.

4. विशेष्यतावच्छेदकताया एव धर्मितावच्छेदकतापदार्थत्वात्—

Ibid.

5. अयं घट इत्याद्याकारकसधर्मितावच्छेदकघटत्वादिविशिष्टबुद्धौ च घटत्वाद्विप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यता इदन्त्वाद्यवच्छिन्ना—

Ibid.

the *Viśeṣyatā* here is limited by some other qualifier and as such it is a case of a limited *Viśeṣyatā*.¹ The *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) may sometimes differ owing to the difference of the qualifier (*Prakāra*). As for example, *Viśeṣyatā* of a *Samūhā lambana* knowledge (a special kind of knowledge in which a number of independent objects become the content) differs on account of the difference of the *Prakāra* (qualifier).² It is, of course, to be understood in this connection that the *Viśeṣyatā* would, as a rule, naturally differ owing to the difference of the *Prakāratā* (qualifieriness) as also in those cases where the *Viśeṣyatā* differs owing to the difference of the *Prakāra* (qualifier). Because, the *Prakāratā* has got a direct relation called *Nirūpitatva* (the state or condition of being determined or described) with the *Viśeṣyatā*, and as such, being connected with mutually different types of *Prakāratā*, the *Viśeṣyatā* also will differ as a matter of fact.

But there are instances where in spite of the difference of the *Prakāra* (qualifier) or for the matter of that, of the *Prakāratā* (qualifieriness), the *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) would not differ at all. This is to be found in the case of doubt (*Samśaya*), a special type of invalid knowledge. According to the theory of Navya Nyāya there is only one *Viśeṣyatā* or *Viśeṣya* in the invalid knowledge of the nature of doubt. There are two sides (*Koṭi*) in a doubt, one positive and the other negative, each of which is a kind of *Prakāra* having *Prakāratā* in it. There is one *Viśeṣyatā* described or determined (*Nirūpita*) by the two *Prakāras* or *Prakāratās* which in their turn are determined by the doubt having those *Prakāras*.

It is logically necessary to admit only one *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) described or determined (*Nirūpita*) by two opposite *Prakāratās* in the special type of invalid knowledge called doubt (*Samśaya*), because, otherwise, the very nature of doubt would not be established. *Samśaya* or doubt has been defined as that kind of knowledge in which contradictory positive and negative objects are known as the *Prakāras* with reference to a single

1. विशेषणान्तरावच्छिन्ना—

Ibid.

2. विषयता च समूहालम्बने प्रकारभेदाद् भिद्यते—

Ibid.

entity, the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) of the knowledge.¹ If the *Viśeṣyatā* of a doubt (*Samśaya*) be more than one, then there would not be any conflict or contradiction between its two opposite *Prakāras*, because, in that case the opposite *Prakāras* would become associated with two different *Viśeṣyatās* and hence there would not be any scope of conflict whatsoever.

Therefore, it is but natural that in spite of the two different *Prakāras* or *Prakāratās* existing in a doubt, the *Viśeṣyatā* would remain one and the same.

Hence a difference is drawn between the *Samūhā lambana* knowledge or the *Samuccaya* knowledge, as it is sometimes called, and the *Samśaya*, because, in the former type of knowledge the *Viśeṣyatā* differs owing to the difference of the *Prakāras* or the *Prakāratās*, whereas, in the latter the *Viśeṣyatā* does not differ in spite of the *Prakāras* or the *Prakāratās* which themselves are different and contradictory.

Unlike *Prakāratā* the *Viśeṣyatā* is not limited (*Avacchinna*) by any relation. Because, the argument in favour of the *Prakāratā* being limited by a relation is totally absent in the case of the *Viśeṣyatā*.²

Some objects may qualify some other objects through a particular relation and hence the qualifier (*Prakāra*) necessarily possesses a qualificerness (*Prakāratā*) limited by that specific relation through which the *Prakāra* or qualifier qualifies the other object.

But this argument does not hold good in this case of the *Viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness), because, the *Viśeṣyatā* generally does not exist in an object which qualifies some other object. In the case of a secondary *Viśeṣyatā* the object in which the *Viśeṣyatā* exists becomes the qualifier (*Prakāra* or *Viśeṣaṇa*) of another object and hence the word 'generally' has been used here.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the *Viśeṣyatā* is sometimes divided into two sub-classes. One is called the pri-

1. स संशयो मतिर्या स्यादेकत्राभावभावयोः—

Bhāṣāpariccheda, Verse 130.

एकधर्मिकविरुद्धभावाभावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संशयः—

Siddhāntamuktāvalī on the same verse.

2. In this connection see also the topic *Prakāratā* in ch. V.

mary *Viśeṣyatā* (*Mukhya Viśeṣyatā*) and the other secondary. Primary *Viśeṣyatā* is that *Viśeṣyatā* which is not identical with *Prakāratā* or which does not exist in the same locus with a *Prakāratā* or which is not limited (*Avacchinna*) by a *Prakāratā*.¹

As for example, in the expression *Daṇḍimāndeśaḥ* (The land qualified by a staff holder), the meaning of the term *Daṇḍi*, the staff-holder, is a *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) with reference to *Daṇḍa* (staff) which is its qualifier (*Prakāra*) and at the same time the same *Daṇḍi* is the qualifier of *Deśaḥ* (land). Hence, *Daṇḍi* (staff-holder), has got a double capacity, one in the form of a *Prakāra* (qualifier) and the other in the form of a *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) with reference to different objects and as such the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Daṇḍi* cannot be a primary *Viśeṣyatā* (*Mukhya Viśeṣyatā*), but it is a secondary one. Because, the *Viśeṣyatā* existing in the *Daṇḍi* (staff-holder) is either identical with the *Prakāratā* existing in the same *Daṇḍi* according to Jagadīśa and his followers, or it is limited (*Avacchinna*) by the *Prakāratā* existing in the same locus of the same *Viśeṣyatā*, in the opinion of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and logicians of his school.

Though the *Viśeṣyatā* is not limited (*Avacchinna*) by any relation (*Sambandha*), yet it is certainly limited by a property (*Dharma*), according to the theory of the Navya Naiyāyikas. Otherwise, a qualified knowledge (*Viśiṣṭabuddhi*) cannot be contradicted by a contradictory knowledge (*Bādhābuddhi*). Because, to be contradicted (*Pratibādhyā*) by a contradictory knowledge, the qualified knowledge should have the same limiter of qualificandness (*Dharmitāvacchedaka* or *Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka*). Because, if the knowledge which is to be contradicted (*Pratibādhyā*) does not possess the same limiter of qualificandness with the contradictory knowledge, then there would be vagueness in either side or both sides of the knowledge and as such no knowledge would be competent enough either to contradict another knowledge or to be contradicted by another knowledge. As for example, the knowledge having the form *Bhūtalam ghaṭavat* (The ground is jar-possessing) can only be contradicted by the definite knowledge having the form *Bhūtalam ghaṭābhāvavat* (The ground is an absence-of-the-jar-possessing). But this can

1. मुख्यत्वञ्च विशेष्यतायां प्रकारतानवच्छिन्नत्वं प्रकारताभिन्नत्वं वा—
Viśayatāvāda, p. 17.

take place only when the *Bhūtaḥ* (ground) is known as qualified by the property called *Bhūtaḥ* (groundness) and not by any other property in both the forms of knowledge, the contradicted and the contradictory. The *Bhūtaḥ* (land) being a substance (*Dravya*), it may be known as qualified by substantiveness (*Dravyatva*) in either or both the forms of the aforesaid knowledge. But in that case none of the two forms of knowledge would be able either to be a contradictory one or be contradicted, because, in one case the *Bhūtaḥ* would be known as a *Bhūtaḥ* (ground) and not as a *Dravyam* (substance) and in other case it would be known as a *Dravyam* (substance) and not as *Bhūtaḥ* (ground). Therefore, on account of this discrepancy of property (*Dharma*) which happens to be the limiter of the qualificandness (*Viśeṣyatāvacchedaka*), the knowledge on either side of the picture would become ineffective in many respects, and hence, it can neither be a contradictory knowledge, nor can it be contradicted, as it is essential for the different forms of knowledge to possess the same limiter of qualificandness either to be contradictory or to be contradicted.¹

Viśeṣyitā (Qualificand-possessoriness).

The knowledge which always has got a content (*Viśaya*) may sometimes possess a qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) as its content. Hence, the knowledge then can be called a *Viśeṣyī* or the possessor of a qualificand. In that case, the *Viśeṣyitā* or qualificand-possessoriness would be a special attribute or property of the said knowledge.

This *Viśeṣyitā* is a particular type of *Viśayitā* (content-possessoriness). The generally accepted theory of the Navya Naiyāyikas is that the *Viśeṣyitā* is a relation between the knowledge and its qualificand (*Viśeṣya*), a particular content (*Viśaya*) of the knowledge. To be more precise, the *Viśeṣyitā* is the relation of the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand) existing in the knowledge of the same.² The first term of the relation is the qualificand and the second term is the knowledge of the qualificand. According to the custom of the Navya Naiyāyikas, the special property existing in the

1 समानधर्मावच्छेदकयोर्बाधविशिष्टबुद्धयोरेव प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावात्—
Rāmarudrī, p. 376, N. S. Press edition.

2. ज्ञाने विषयस्य सम्बन्धो विषयिता सापि त्रिविधा प्रकाशितासंसर्गिता-
विशेष्यिताभेदात्, विशेष्यरूपविषयस्य ज्ञाने सम्बन्धो विशेष्यिता—
Paṇḍita Umānāthopādhyāya, *Vyāptipāñcaka Māthuri*, p. 2.

second term of the relation is considered, as already stated elsewhere in a different topic,¹ as the relation of the first term with the second. Hence, the property called *Viśeṣyitā* which exists in the knowledge is actually the relation of the *Viśeṣya* (qualificand), the first term, with the knowledge, the second.

This *Viśeṣyitā* in the form of a relation is a peculiar nature-relation (*Svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣa*) and being a form of *Viśayitā*, it will last so long as the knowledge of the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*) exists.²

But it should be remembered in this connection that if the *Viśeṣyitā* be considered as a separate category, as has been done by a group of Navya Naiyāyikas,³ it should be understood to last so long as the knowledge of the *Viśeṣya* continues to exist, because, in that case also its existence depends on the existence of the knowledge.

As the *Viśeṣyatā* is not limited by any relation, so the *Viśeṣyitā* also, which is considered by many as identical with *Viśeṣyatā* and existing in the knowledge through the relation of *Nirūpakatva* is not limited by any kind of relation. But it is certainly assumed to be limited by a property (*Dharma*), otherwise, innumerable kinds of inconsistency and ambiguity will never be eliminated.

The *Viśeṣyitā* does not exist in knowledge alone, but it equally exists in desire (*Icchā*), effort (*Kṛtī*) and aversion (*Dveṣa*) also which are considered along with knowledge as content-possessing entities (*Saviśayakapadārtha*).

Koṭitā (Sideness).

Koṭitā is a relational abstract property existing in the opposite sides (*Koṭi*) of a doubt (*Samśaya*). Doubt, as is well known, has got two opposite sides as its content (*Viśaya*). These opposite sides are rather special kinds of chief qualifier (*Prakāra*) in which the special property called *Koṭitā* exists. Therefore, *Koṭitā* is

1. In the topic of *Sambandha* (Relation).

2. विषयिता च ज्ञानसमानकालीनैवेति—

Rāmarudrī, p. 54, N. S. Press edition.

3. विषयतातत्त्वादिवत् प्रतियोगित्वाधिकरणत्वतत्त्वसम्बन्धत्वादयोऽप्यतिरिक्ता एव पदार्था इत्येकदेशिनः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti, p. 256, Chowkhamba edition.

a special kind of *Prakāratā*¹ (qualifierness) whose speciality consists in its being existent only in the opposite contents of a doubt.

This special *Viśayatā* called *Koṭitā* has been admitted by the Navya Naiyāyikas to distinguish doubt (*Samśaya*) from other types of knowledge like perception (*Pratyakṣa*), objection (*Āpatti*) etc., on the strength of our everyday experience like 'I doubt' etc. Just as in the perceptual knowledge caused by the normal connection of the sense organs with the object, a special type of *Viśayatā* is admitted in the object of perception, or on the strength of the experience like 'I infer', a particular type of *Viśayatā* is admitted in the object of inference, or on the strength of the experience like 'I object', a special kind of *Viśayatā* is admitted in the object of the knowledge called objection (*Āpatti*), similarly, on the strength of the experience like 'I doubt', a particular type of *Viśayatā* is admitted in the object of doubt and this special *Viśayatā* is called *Koṭitā*.² The speciality of this *Viśayatā* called *Koṭitā* has been explained by M. M. Paṇḍita Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra as an indivisible property (*Akhaṇḍopādhi*) like *Prakāratā* (chief qualifierness) etc.³ The speciality of the *Koṭitā* has been otherwise enumerated by the same learned logician as the describerness (*Nirūpakatva*) of the *Prakāritā* (chief qualifier-possessorship) limited by another *Prakāritā*. In a doubt both the *Prakāritās* connected with both of its sides (*Koṭi*) are supposed to stand mutually in the relation of being limited and at the same time of becoming the limitor with a view

1. सा च प्रकारताप्रभेदः—

Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari, p. 1810, Chowkhamba edition.

एषैव विषयता कोटितापदेनोच्यते—

M. M. Paṇḍita Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra, Commentary on *Ubhayābhāvādivārakapariṣkāra*, p. 13.

2. यथा लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्ये साक्षात्करोमीतिप्रतीतविषयताविशेषः अनुमिनोमि आपादयामीतिप्रतीतेश्चानुमित्यापत्त्योः साध्यापाद्ययोर्विषयताविशेषो दुरपह्नवः तथा सन्देहीत्यनुव्यवसायबलात् संशयेऽपि कोट्यंशे विलक्षणविषयता निष्प्रत्यूहैवेति—

Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari, p. 1809, Chowkhamba edition.

3. विशेषत्वं च तत्र प्रकारतात्वादिवदखण्डोपाधिरूपम्—

M. M. Paṇḍita Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra, Commentary on *Ubhayābhāvādivārakapariṣkāra*, p. 13.

to distinguishing them from those of the *Samūhālambara* knowledge. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also holds similar view regarding the speciality of the *Koṭitā* of a doubt.¹

There may, of course, be instances of doubt where the opposite sides (*Koṭi*) may be known as the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*). As for example, in the doubt having the form *Vahniḥ parvate na vā* (The fire exists in the mountain or not), the fire and its absence, in the final analysis, are considered as the opposite sides of the doubt, though at the initial stage the fire (*Vahni*) is not known as a side of it, rather occurrence in the mountain (*Parvata*) and its absence are known as such.

In cases of doubt like the one mentioned above, the *Koṭitā* existing in the sides of the doubt cannot be considered as a type of *Prakāratā*, because, *Prakāratā* would reside in a *Prakāra* (chief qualifier) and not usually in a *Viśeṣya* (qualificand). To include instances like this Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has defined *Koṭitā* in a different way by saying that *Koṭitā* is something different from the special type of *Prakāratā* mentioned earlier.² Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, of course, has not mentioned it distinctly what precisely that other object would be which should be understood as a *Koṭitā*. But as *Koṭitā* is a kind of *Viśayatā* we can safely presume that it is an extra category as has been held by a group of Navya Naiyāyikas in the case of *Viśayatā* and some other objects of the like nature.³

To avoid ambiguity the *Koṭitā* must be limited by a relation

1. यद्वा प्रकारित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारितानिरूपकत्वं तत्र विशेषत्वं लाघत्वात् संशये तत्तत्कोटिप्रकारितयोः समुच्चयवैलक्षण्याय अवच्छेद्यावच्छेदकभावस्य अभ्युपेतत्वात्
Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari, p. 1810, Chowkhamba edition.

अस्तु वा विरोधिकोट्यन्तरविषयकत्वेन ज्ञाननिरूपकत्वमेव समुच्चयविषय-
व्यावृत्तस्तद्विशेषः संशये एव तत्तत्कोटिविषयकत्वयोर्मिथोऽवच्छेद्यावच्छेदक-
भावोपगमात्

Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari p. 1810, Chowkhamba edition.

2. तदन्यैव वा कोटिविशेष्यकसंशयसाधारण्यानुरोधात्—

Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari, p. 1810, Chowkhamba edition.

3. विषयता-तत्त्वादिवत् प्रतियोगित्वाधिकरणत्व-तत्त्वसम्बन्धत्वादयोप्यतिरिक्ता
एव पदार्था इत्येकदेशिनः

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Dīdhiti, p. 256, Jāgadiśi, Chow. edn.

अतिरिक्तविषयतापक्षस्य केनचित् स्वीकाराद् दृष्टान्तता—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 256, Chowkhamba edition.

(*Sambandha*) as also by a property (*Dharma*). Because, when a doubt arises in our mind or soul that the mountain may or may not possess fire (*Parvato vahnimān na vā*), we surely understand that the fire may exist there through the normal relation of contact (*Samyoga*) or the absence of fire whose counterpositiveness is limited by the relation of contact (*Samyogasambandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitākavahnyabhāvaḥ*) may exist there through the absential peculiar qualification relation (*Abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatāviśeṣasambandha*). Therefore, it is clear that the *Koṭitās* of the doubt which exist in the fire (*Vahni*) on the one hand and in the absence of fire (*Vahnyabhāva*) on the other are limited by the relation of contact and the absential peculiar qualification relation respectively.

Similarly, it must be understood that with a view to getting exact precision regarding the sides (*Koṭi*) of the doubt, the *Koṭitā* of the doubt should be certainly considered as limited by specific properties (*Dharma*). Otherwise, the sides of the doubt would remain vague to a degree. Because, the fire on the mountain may very well be understood as a substance (*Dravya*) and the absence of fire may also be known as the absence of a substance. Under the circumstances, it will certainly be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether the fire as fire (*Vahnitvena*) is doubted on the mountain or as some other object with a different property flashing on it.

Therefore, both the limitors (*Avacchedaka*) of the *Koṭitā* of the doubt, one in the form of a relation (*Sambandhatvena*) and the other in the form of a property (*Dharmavidhayā*) must be scrupulously mentioned to make the knowledge clear and definite.

Vidheyatā or Sādhyatā

It is generally held that *Vidheyatā* is a kind of *Prakāratā*.¹ The word *Vidheya* in the general context means that which is predicated of something. In that sense the statement 'This man is a scholar' means that scholarship is predicated of this man. Whereas, in the particular sense, in the context of inference the word *Vidheya* means the object or content of inference. Whether in the general or in the particular sense, that of which

1. प्रकारताविशेषस्यैव विधेयतात्वात्—

Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari, p. 1792. Chowkhamba edition.

something is predicated is mentioned before and that which is predicated is mentioned subsequently.¹

But this rule is to be understood in cases other than a compound.² Otherwise the defect in the eyes of Lord Śiva, as has been humorously described by the poet Kālidāsa in the *Kumārasambhava*,³ cannot be predicated of the eyes as such.⁴ There the word *Virūpa* which indicates the defect is not the final one, the word *Akṣi* which has become *Akṣa*, in the compound, having been mentioned finally.

This rule, of course, is admitted particularly in the case of verbal knowledge.⁵ Hence in the opinion of the rhetoricians there is a defect of poetry called *Vidheyāvimarśa* in the poetical composition *Nyakkāro hyayameva*, etc., in which Rāvaṇa castigates himself for the very fact that he has got enemies.

But this always is not the fact in the case of inference where the nature of *Vidheya* or *Vidheyatā* is admitted in that object the knowledge of whose pervasion is said to be the cause of inference.⁶

This theory has been clearly indicated by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra in the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi* in course of the discussion of the definition of *Vyāpti* in the case of the inference having the

1. अनुवाद्यमनुक्त्वा तु न विधेयमुदीरयेत् इति नियमात्
Maheśvara Nyāyālaṅkāra, *Vijñāpriyā Commentary on Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, p. 8, Motilal Banarasidasa's edn.
2. समासातिरिक्तस्थले चरमनिर्देशस्य विधेयतानियामकत्वात्
Viśayatāvāda, p. 21.
3. वपुर्विरूपाक्षमलक्ष्यजन्मता
दिगम्बरत्वेन निवेदितं वसु ।
वरेषु यद्बालमृगाक्षि मृग्यते
तदस्ति किं व्यस्तमपि त्रिलोचने ॥
Kumārasambhava, Canto V, verse 72
4. अथ शाब्दबोधे चरमनिर्दिष्टपदार्थस्य विधेयत्वे वपुर्विरूपाक्षमित्यादा-
वक्ष्णोर्वैरूप्यस्य विधेयत्वानुपपत्तिः
Viśayatāvāda, p. 21.
5. शाब्दबोधे चरमनिर्दिष्टपदार्थस्यैव विधेयत्वात्—
Viśayatāvāda, p. 20, Chowkhamba edition.
6. यद्व्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानजन्यत्वमनुमितौ तदंशे एव विधेयत्वाख्यविषयतास्वी-
कारात्
Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi, Śivadatta Miśra's edition, p. 114.

form *Daṇḍimān daṇḍisaṃyogāt*, where it has been stated that the *Daṇḍi* or the staff-holder cannot be the *Sādhya* or *Vidheya* of the inference in the event of *Daṇḍa* (staff) not being known as the limiter of the pervaderness (*Vyāpakatāvachchedaka*).¹

When in the particular sense the word *Vidheya* is considered synonymous with *Sādhya* or content of inference, it signifies each and every individual content of the inference concerned wherever possible.² In that case the relational abstract property called *Sādhya* or *Vidheyatā* also would vary according to the mutual difference of the contents of inference.

In the *Viśayatāvāda*, of course, Gādādhara has defined *Vidheyatā* as a kind of *Viśayatā*. There he says that *Vidheyatā* cannot be called a *Prakāratā*, because, in that case the limiter of the qualificandness also would come to be considered as a *Vidheya*,³ which should not be the case. In the inference having the form *Parvato vahnimān* or the mountain possesses fire, *Parvatatva* or mountainness is the limiter of the qualificandness, whereas, the *Vahni* or fire is the *Vidheya*, the object predicated. Now, if *Vidheyatva* is considered identical with *Prakāratva*, then the *Prakāratva* which exists in *Parvatatva*, the limiter of the qualificandness, would become the same as the *Vidheyatva*. But in this case, mountainness (*Parvatatva*) is, of course, not known as the object predicated. Hence, this standpoint is not correct.

The theory that *Vidheyatā* is a kind of *Viśayatā* has, of course, been finally accepted by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya as is evident from his writing in the *Viśayatāvāda* quoted earlier.

Though in the *Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari*, Gadādhara has said that *Vidheyatā* is a kind of *Prakāratā*, yet ultimately he did not rely on that theory as can be understood from his statement there

1. तथा चोक्तव्याप्तिज्ञानाद् दण्डं च शेषे दण्डत्वप्रकारिका दण्डत्ववत्त्वादित्येवानु-
मितिर्न तु दण्डिममिति दण्डप्रकारिकापि तस्य व्यापकतावच्छेदकत्वेनाग्रहात्
कारणबाधेन तदवच्छिन्नविधेयतानुमित्यसम्भवादिति भावः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, pp. 211-22, Chowkhamba edition.

2. साध्यपदस्य सिद्धिकर्मतत्तद्व्यक्तिपरतया—

Vyāptipañcaka Jāgadiśī, p. 79, Chowkhamba edition.

3. इत्थं प्रकारतादिवत् विधेयत्वमपि विषयतान्तरं न तूक्तप्रकारत्वमेव तत्
धर्मितावच्छेदकस्यापि तथात्वापत्तेः—

Viśayatāvāda, p. 17.

suggesting an alternative solution based on an alternative theory regarding *Vidheyatā* by saying *Anyathā tu*¹ etc.

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, of course, has said in the *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā* that *Vidheyatā* is a special kind of *Prakāratā*.² In that case the speciality or peculiarity of the *Prakāratā* should be so defined as not to include the limitorness of the qualificandness (*Dharmitāvachchedakatā*).

But it appears that Jagadīśa subsequently gave up this theory regarding *Vidheyatā*. In the *Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi* he has said that *Vidheyatva* or *Vidheyatā* is not pervaded by *Prakāratā*.³ In other words, it cannot be said that wherever there is *Vidheyatā* there is *Prakāratā* also. But *Vidheyatā* is a kind of *Viśayatā* which is established by the introspection like 'I am inferring fire on the mountain and not the mountain on the fire' in the cases of the forms of inference like—'There is fire on the mountain'—'The mountain is fire-possessing' etc.

Hence, it is clear from the above statement that *Vidheyatā* can equally be admitted in the qualifier as also in the qualificand and Jagadīśa has clearly mentioned this standpoint in his commentary on *Pakṣatā*, quoting at the same time the authority of *Vardhamānopādhyāya* in this respect to the effect that in the statement like *Guṇānāṃ guṇatvam* (There is qualityness in the qualities), the *Vidheyatā* is admitted in the *Guṇatva* which is, of course, the qualificand (*Viśeṣya*).⁴

This *Vidheyatā* whether in the case of an inference or in the general case is construed through the *Vidheya* in a sentence in twofold way. On the strength of this twofold way of construction of a *Vidheya* and through it of *Vidheyatā*, a sentence is divided into two categories. One type of sentence is that in which

1. Vide *Satpratipakṣa Gādādhari*. p. 1791, Chowkhamba edition.

2. विषयतावच्छेदकत्वान्यप्रकारत्वं प्रकारताप्रभेदो वा—

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, *Samāsaprakaraṇa*, p. 22, Old Benares edn.

3. विधेयत्वं तु न प्रकारतानियतम्—

Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi. p. 113, Śivadatta's edition.

4. किन्तु पर्वते वह्निः पर्वतो वह्निमानित्याद्यनुमितौ पर्वते वह्निमनुमिनोमि नतु वह्नौ पर्वतमित्याद्यनुभवसाक्षिको विषयताविशेषः क्वचिद् विशेष्यवृत्तिरपीति नासिद्धिः, अतएव गुणानां गुणत्वमित्यत्र विशेष्यीभूतस्यापि गुणत्वस्य विधेयत्वमुक्तमुपाध्यायैरिति ध्येयम्—

Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi, p. 113, Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra's edition.

the *Vidheya* or predicate is construed with some of the subjects, whereas, there is another kind of sentence in which the *Vidheya* is construed with all the subjects. In the technical language of Navya Nyāya, the former type of sentence is called *Uddeśyatā-vacchedakasāmānādhikaraṇyena videhānvayi*, whereas, the latter type is called *Uddeśyatāvacchedakāvacchedena vidheyānvayi*.¹

This twofold nature of construction of the *Vidheya* or *Vidheyatā* is particularly taken into account at the time of ascertaining the relation of contradicted-contradictoriness (*Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva*) between inference and the definite knowledge of the *Sādhya*, the content of inference, where it has been said that in the event of the *Sādhya* being known in some of the *Pakṣas* (*Pakṣatāvacchedakasāmānādhikaraṇyena*), the inference may take place in all the *Pakṣas* and in the event of the *Sādhya* being known in all the *Pakṣas* (*Pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchedena*), the inference will not take place at all. Hence it follows that the inference of the *Sādhya* in all the *Pakṣas* will be checked by the definite knowledge (*Siddhi*) of the *Sādhya* in all the *Pakṣas*, whereas, the inference of the *Sādhya* in some of the *Pakṣas* will be checked either by the definite knowledge of the *Sādhya* in some of the *Pakṣas* or by the definite knowledge of the *Sādhya* in all the *Pakṣas*.²

Here in considering the twofold construction of the *Vidheya* or the *Sādhya* of the inference for the sake of ascertaining the relation of *Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* between the inference and the definite knowledge of the *Sādhya* in some or all the *Pakṣas*, the limitor of the *Pakṣatā* (*Pakṣatāvacchedaka*) has been taken into special consideration by Jagadīśa Tarkālāṅkāra in his commentary on *Pakṣatā*. Though Jagadīśa has not clarified the special type of the limitoriness of the *Pakṣatā* (*Pakṣatāvacchedakatva*) here, it will be convenient to accept the definition

1. वाक्यं हि द्विविधम् एकमुद्देश्यतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येन विधेयान्वयपरं द्वितीयमुद्देश्यतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन विधेयान्वयपरम्—

Harināthi Commentary of Śaktivāda Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, p. 83, Chowkhamba edition.

2. पक्षतावच्छेदकस्य सामानाधिकरण्येन साध्यसिद्धावपि तदवच्छेदेनानुमिति-दर्शनात् पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनानुमितं प्रति तदवच्छेदेन सिद्धेः सामानाधिकरण्येनानुमिति प्रति तु सिद्धिमात्रस्य विरोधित्वम्—

Pakṣatā-Didhiti, p. 105, Śivadatta Miśra's edition.

of *Avacchedakatva* as given by Pakṣadhara Miśra in his *Āloka* commentary of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as the causeness (*Janakatva*) of the definite knowledge.¹

If the *Vidheya* and through it the *Vidheyatā* is construed with all the *Pakṣas*, then the *Vidheya* or the *Sādhya* becomes the pervader of the limiter of the *Pakṣatā*², whereas, in the case of the *Vidheya* being construed with some of the *Pakṣas*, it becomes altogether a different proposition.

1. अवच्छेदकत्वम् अवच्छित्तिप्रत्ययजनकत्वं स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषो वा—

Īśvarānumāna Āloka, p. 67. As printed with the Māthuri, Asiatic Society edition.

2. पर्वतत्वावच्छेद्यत्वं न स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषो मानाभावात् किन्तु पर्वतत्व-
व्यापकसाध्यप्रतियोगित्वम्—

Pakṣatā jōgadiśi, p. 106, Śivadatta Miśra's edition.

PART II

CHAPTER VII

THE TECHNIQUE OF THE INSERTION OF PARYĀPTI (PARYĀPTINIVEŚA)¹

The technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* in Navya Nyāya is the subtlest conceivable instrument of expression of certain ideas in Sanskrit without the slightest possibility of ambiguity in any sense of the term. Though numerous technical terms have been coined as also innumerable technicalities evolved by the Navya-Naiyāyikas (Logicians of the new school of Indian Logic) to express the subtlest shade of meaning through the Sanskrit language, each and every one of which is superexcellent by itself from the standpoint of avoiding ambiguity, yet the technique which is known as the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* appears to be one of the most important devices ever invented by the logicians of India.

The Navya Naiyāyikas, as is well known to every body, acquainted with the works on Navya Nyāya, recognise innumerable real relations (*Sambandha*) existing between the objects of nature, and as such, their deliberations on the objects naturally take into account the relations existing between the objects themselves.

The technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* also, like many other techniques of Navya Nyāya, is, to a great extent, based on the relation technically known as *Paryāpti* in the Navya Nyāya treatises.

Though I do not propose to enter here into the elaborate discussion as to how the relation of *Paryāpti* has been accepted as a logical entity, because that has been done in a different chapter, yet some preliminary discussion regarding the topics necessary for the application of the technique of *Paryāpti* will, of course, be essential as a pre-requisite to clearly understanding the technique itself. I shall, of course, accept the theory of the Navya Naiyāyikas with a short preliminary discussion that there is a relation called *Paryāpti* by virtue of which attributes existing

1. See also Part I, ch. II, p. 51.

in more than one object exist there only in all the component objects taken together, but not in any one component part of the whole. To cite an example, it may be said according to the theory of the Navya Naiyāyikas that through the *Paryāpti* relation *Dvītva* or duality or for the matter of that any other property which exists in more than one object, remains in more than one object alone, which may be known as two or three, etc. but not in any one of the objects which taken together comprise the whole.

Now, a relation other than that of identity is always conceived between two different objects, one of which is known as the *Anuyogī* or the subjunct on which the other object stays or becomes associated with it through that relation. This other object which stays on the *Anuyogī* is known as the *Pratiyogī* of the relation. As for example, *Ghaṭatva* or jariness exists in a *Ghaṭa* or a jar through the relation of *Samavāya* or inherence. Here *Ghaṭatva* or jariness is the *Pratiyogī* (adjunct) of the relation called *Samavāya* or the object which stays in the *Ghaṭa* or the jar through the relation of *Samavāya* and the jar itself is the *Anuyogī* or the subjunct of the same relation. This *Anuyogī* has got an attribute called *Anuyogitā* (subjunctness) or the condition of being an *Anuyogī*, and the *Pratiyogī* in the like manner has got an attribute called *Pratiyogitā* (adjunctness) or the condition of becoming a *Pratiyogī*. This *Anuyogitā* and *Pratiyogitā* again are limited by certain distinct attributes which are known as *Avacchedakas* or limiting adjuncts. Generally, some particular qualifiers of the *Pratiyogī* and the *Anuyogī* are called the *Pratiyogitāvacchedaka* and the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* respectively.

The distinction between the cognitions 'This is one' and 'This is associated with the number one or oneness', as also 'These are two' and 'These are associated with the number two or twoness', and even the difference between the cognitions 'These are two' and 'This is associated with the number two or twoness' cannot otherwise be satisfactorily explained unless different types of relations between the number and the objects enumerated are recognised. The association of the number two or twoness (*Dvītva*) can be conceived in each of the two objects comprising the two objects taken as a whole. As for example, if we take into account each of the two objects, namely, the sky and a jar as a composite whole, then we may say

that jar and the sky are two, knowing it fully well that the number two or duality can never exist in each of the two objects taken separately. Therefore, when we say that the jar and the sky are two, we want to express that the number two or duality exists in both the sky and the jar taken as a whole.

In this above-mentioned instance and the like, the number two or duality exists in both the objects, i.e. the sky and the jar taken together through the relation called *Paryāpti*. We may again say that the sky alone also has an association of the number two or *Dvittva*, knowing it fully well that the sky is one and only one. Here, the association is not through the *Paryāpti* relation, but through *Samavāya* or inherence. If I am permitted to use the Sanskrit expression, then I may say *Ākāśaḥ dvittvavān*, but not *Ākāśau dvau*, i.e. we are to say *Ākāśau na dvau*. In the first instance, only some kind of association of *dvitva* with the sky is meant. In the latter case, the *Paryāpti* of *dvitva* in the sky is negated.

The qualifier of the *Pratīyogī* or the *Anuyogī* has been purposely called *particular* because each and every qualifier of the *Pratīyogī* or the *Anuyogī* is not considered as the *Avacchedaka* of the *Pratīyogitā* or the *Anuyogitā* as the case may be. Only that qualifier of the *Pratīyogī* or the *Anuyogī* which does not exist in the objects where that particular *Pratīyogitā* or *Anuyogitā* also does not exist, is to be considered as the *Pratīyogitāvacchedaka* or the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* respectively. This type of *Avacchedaka*, therefore, has got an attribute which is called *Anatiriktavṛttitvam*, i.e. the state or condition of not existing in that object where the *Pratīyogitā* or the *Anuyogitā*, also does not exist. This *Anatiriktavṛttitva* is technically known as *Anatiriktavṛttitvarūpāvacchedakatva*, owing to the existence of which in a particular object, that object is called an *Avacchedaka* of the *Anatiriktavṛtti* variety.

This *Avacchedaka* also has got a special attribute or property (*Dharma*) called *Avacchedakatva* or *Avacchedakatā* which in its turn again is limited by another attribute called *Avacchedakātva* or the special feature of an *Avacchedakatā* by virtue of which an *Avacchedakatā* is known as such.

In the like manner the *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* relation also has got a limiting adjunct or limitor (*Avacchedaka*) which is called *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* or to use the compound Sanskrit

word, the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation is called *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*. This *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka* is nothing other than the particular number of an object or objects considered as the *Anuyogī* of the *Paryāpti* relation. It should not be thought that the number of the object or objects which may be the *Anuyogī* of the *Paryāpti* relation in a particular case has been accepted as the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka* without any sound reason behind it. But I do not want to introduce that discussion here as that will then be a separate topic by itself. The argument behind accepting a particular number as the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka* in a nutshell, is this that other properties than the particular number will be more extensive than the *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* relation and as such, those attributes or properties (*Dharma*) will not be considered as the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* relation on account of their existing in more loci than those of the *Anuyogitā*.¹ We may illustrate this point with the help of an example. The *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* of the absence in the form of *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* (There is the absence of the fire of the kitchen) exists through the *Paryāpti* relation in the two objects, namely *Mahānasīyatva* or the condition of being associated with the *Mahānasa* or the kitchen, i.e. the relation of *Samyoga* or contact of the fire with the kitchen as also in *Vahnitva* or fireness, the generic character (*Jāti*) existing in all the manifestations of fire.

The technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* has got two wings, one is called the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti* or the *Paryāpti* which puts a check on taking less objects than required and the other is said to be the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* or the *Paryāpti* which puts a check on objects other than those concerned. The wing of *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti* as expressed in Sanskrit is *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpa-ryūtiḥ* and the other wing or the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* is the relation called *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatvam*.

It should be distinctly remembered in this connection that of the two wings of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti*,

1. नह्यतिप्रसक्तमवच्छेदकं संयोगादौ तथात्वाददर्शनात्—

Tattvacintāmaṇi Viśeṣavyāpti, p. 331, Chowkhamba edition.

the first wing which indicates the property which exists in the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation is called the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti*, whereas, the second wing which indicates the relation through which the above-mentioned property exists in the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation is known as the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti*.

There is a gulf of difference between these two wings of the technique of the insertion of the *Paryāpti* relation, though upto a certain extent both the wings are identical in expression. While the former wing or the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti*, i.e. *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākapyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpavṛtti* is the description of a particular property which exists in a particular *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* or the limiter of the *Anuyogitā*, the latter wing or the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* i.e. *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākapyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatvam* is the description of the relation through which a particular property described by the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti* exists in a particular *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation.

Let us now take a concrete example. The specific absence (*Viśiṣṭābhāva*) as expressed by the judgment *Mahānāsiya-vahnir-nāsti* or the absence of the fire of the kitchen as contrasted with the generic absence *Vahnir nāsti* (The absence of fire in general) may be expressed in Sanskrit through the technique of *Paryāpti* in the following manner, i.e. *Svāvacchedakatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākapyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpavṛttirya pratiyogitā tannirūpakābhāvaḥ mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti ityākārahobhāvaḥ, svam mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti ityabhāviya-pratiyogitā. Rūpavṛttitāñca svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākapyāptyanuyogitā vacchedakatvasambandhena.*

The two wings of the technique of *Paryāpti* begin with the pronoun *Svam* which means the own self of the object concerned in a particular case. The name of each and every object cannot be mentioned in each and every case separately, because, that would make the technique confined to that particular case only which may be mentioned there. In that case the technique would lose its universal character.

Let us now consider the objects which have been expressed in the two wings of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti*.

Both the wings of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* have got many things common upto a certain extent, but even

then, as has been stated earlier, there is a gulf of difference between the two. The first wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti*, i. e. the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti* begins with the pronoun *Sva* as has already been stated. By the term *Sva* any property according to the context can be taken into account. Then comes the *Avacchedakatā* which is determined (*Nirūpita*) by the *Sva*. This *Avacchedakatā* is conceived as the *Pratiyogī* (adjunct) of the *Paryāpti* relation through which this *Avacchedakatā* exists in the *Avacchedakas* like *Mahānasīyatva* and *Vahnitva* in the case of the specific absence like *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti*. Hence, this *Avacchedakatā* has got a *Pratiyogitā* (adjunctness) in it which again is limited by this *Svāvacchedakatātva*, i.e. the special attribute or property (*Dharma*) existing in the *Avacchedakatā* which is determined (*Nirūpita*) by a particular relational abstract property signified by the term *Sva* in a particular context. The *Paryāpti* relation in this particular context has been described as *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitāka*, i.e. the *Pratiyogitā* of which is limited (*Avacchinna*) by *Svāvacchedakatātva*. Now, this *Paryāpti* relation, the *Pratiyogitā* of which has been described as *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitāka* has got an *Anuyogī* or subjunct in the form of the objects in which the *Svāvacchedakatā* exists through the *Paryāpti* relation. Hence, the *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* relation in a particular context exists in those objects which are considered there as the *Anuyogī* (subjunct) of the *Paryāpti* relation. This *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* relation in its turn is limited by a special attribute or property (*Dharma*) which is called the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation. This *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka* is nothing other than the particular number of the objects which are considered as the *Anuyogī* of the *Paryāpti* relation. This *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation cannot be any other property than the particular number of the objects concerned which are known in a particular context as the *Anuyogī* or the subjunct of the *Paryāpti* relation. Because, any object other than the number of the *Anuyogī* will, either be *Nyūnavṛtti*, i.e. existing in less objects compared to the *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* or *Adhikavṛtti*, i.e. existing in more objects compared to the same *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* relation. There must be some difficulty in accepting other properties which, of course, may not exist in more or less objects than the *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti*

relation. As for example, if we take some other property like *Anyataratva* or *Anyatamatva* existing in the objects which may comprise the *Anuyogī* or subjunct of the *Paryāpti* relation, then this *Anyataratva* or *Anyatamatva*, as the case may be, being a kind of absence (*Abhāva*) in the final analysis (*Anyataratva* is *bhedadyāvāvacchinnapratiyogitākabhedavattvam* and *Anyatamatva* is *bhedakūṭāvāvacchinnapratiyogitākabhedavattvam*) would involve a comparatively lengthy procedure of knowledge, inasmuch as, *Bheda* or *Anyonyābhāva* would require for its perceptual knowledge the perception of its *Anuyogī* or the subjunct, whereas, the number like one, two, etc., or rather oneness, twoness, etc., being included in the category of *Guṇa* or quality would not require the perception of any other object for its perception than only the objects in which the number may exist. Again *Anyas-taratva* and *Anyatamatva* would exist in one of the two and one of many objects respectively. Neither of the two objects like *Anyataratva* and *Anyatamatva* can be applicable in that case where the *Anuyogī* happens to be only one object.

To illustrate the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* a popular example may be cited. The negative judgment *Vahnir nāsti* means the generic absence of all kinds of fire. The subject of the judgment, i.e., *Vahni* or fire is distributed being the subject of an E proposition according to Western Logic. To analyse the contents of the above-mentioned judgment according to the Navya Nyāya, we are to say that the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence in question, which happens to exist in *Vahni* or fire in this particular case, has been limited (*Avacchinna*) by *Vahnitva* alone. Now, the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) in the form of *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti*, the absence of the fire of the kitchen, also is limited by *Vahnitva*. Only there is a more property (*Dharma*) in the form of *Mahānasīyatva* as the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the *Pratiyogitā* which differentiates the specific absence from the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) in this case. But the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence in the form of *Mahānasīya vahnir nāsti* being limited by the properties called *Mahānasīyatva* and *Vahnitva*, is certainly limited by *Vahnitva*, though not by *Vahnitva* alone. Hence, if it is said that the generic absence of *Vahni* or fire is that absence whose *Pratiyogitā* is limited by *Vahnitva* or fireness, then the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) of *Vahni* also may sometimes be understood as a generic absence of *Vahni*,

inasmuch as its *Pratiyogitā* also is limited by *Vahnitva*. Though the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence of *Vahni* in the form of *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* is limited by an additional property (*Dharma*) called *Mahānasiyatva*, yet it can never be said that it is not limited by *Vahnitva*. According to the dictum *Adhikantu na taddhānikaram* (Something more is not harmful), the specific absence in the form of *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* can also be considered to be the absence whose *Pratiyogitā* has been limited by *Vahnitva*, and as such, this form of absence (i.e. *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti*) may sometimes be taken as the absence of pure *Vahni* (*Śuddha vahni*), i.e. *Vahnir nāsti*. Now, to avoid this possible ambiguity, it may be said that the absence whose *Pratiyogitā* is limited by only *Vahnitva* and not by any other property is to be expressed by the judgment *Vahnir nāsti*. By so saying the ambiguity in this particular case may be avoided. But this type of expression also is not a simple one, inasmuch as, it involves innumerable objects which are to be eliminated with a view to accepting *Vahnitva* alone as the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the *Pratiyogitā* of the said absence. This involves rather a round about procedure. Because, *Vahnitvamātrāvacchinnapratyogitākābhāvaḥ* means *Vahnitvetaradharmānavacchinnavahnitvāvacchinnapratyogitākābhāvaḥ*. This means that the absence whose *Pratiyogitā* is not limited by other properties than *Vahnitva* and at the same time which is limited by *Vahnitva*, is to be understood as the generic absence of *Vahni* having the form *Vahnir nāsti*. Hence, the other properties also are to be taken into account with a view to eliminating them. Because, unless the other properties than *Vahnitva* are not individually known beforehand, we shall not be in a position to eliminate them and consequently we shall not be able to take the particular *Pratiyogitā* of the generic absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti* as such. Naturally, this process involves a long procedure of elimination of the other properties than *Vahnitva*. This would necessarily render the absence almost unknowable to one who is not an omniscient being (*asarvajñadurviññeya*). There may be other cases of absence in which the other properties than the *Avacchedaka* of the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence will always remain unexampled and unknown (*Aprasiddha*). The absence *Prameyavān nāsti* may be cited as an instance of that type of absence. Of course, some device may be found out there also to avoid this difficulty in the line of *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa*

Jāgadiśi where in the case of the inference *Prameyāśrayavān dhūmāt*, the object other than the *Sādhyatāvacchedaka* (limitor of the *Sādhyatā*, the contentness of inference) has been technically described as the limitor of the qualierness (*Prakāratāvacchedaka*) which is not limited by a property that is qualified by the limitor of the limitorness (*Avacchedakatā*, described by the contentness of inference (*Sādhyatā*).¹

In the case of the above mentioned absence having the form *Prameyāśrayavān nāsti*, the object other than the limitor of the *Pratiyogitā* (*Pratiyogitāvacchedaka*) should, of course, be enumerated as the limitor of the qualierness (*Prakāratāvacchedaka*) which is not limited by a property that is qualified by the limitor of the limitorness (*Avacchedakatā*) described by (*nirūpita*) the counterpositive-ness (*Pratiyogitā*) of the said absence. But that would certainly involve a very roundabout procedure.

Hence, the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* has been accepted by the logicians as an excellent device to avoid ambiguity of expression in this and similar other innumerable cases.

The wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* which puts a check on other irrelevant objects (*Itaravāraka paryāpti*), as has been previously stated, is the relation called *Svāvacchedakatātvāvachhinnapratyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatvam*.

This relation is considered to be an integrated whole and as such, it is an intact relation, though there are many component parts in it. This is, of course, an indirect relation (*paramparāsam-bandha*) as opposed to a direct relation (*sākṣāt sambandha*).

It is also an established logical truth that the existence of a relation determines the existence of the related (*relata*) in a particular place (*Sambandhasattā sambandhisattāniyāmikā*). The existence of a *ghaṭa* or a jar in a particular place must be admitted if the existence of the relation of the jar also exists there.

Now, coming to the application of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* in a particular case, let us take the previously stated specific absence having the form *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti*.

1. तदितरपदेन येन रूपेण साध्यतावच्छेदकत्वं तेन रूपेण तदनवच्छिन्न-
प्रकारतावच्छेदकस्य तदितरपदेन विवक्षितत्वात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 13, Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra's edition.

साध्यतावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकं यद्रूपं तद्रूपविशिष्टानवच्छिन्नप्रकारतावच्छेद-
केत्यर्थः—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa*, p. 13.

The *Pratīyogitā* of this specific absence exists in *Mahānasīyavahni*, i.e., the fire of a kitchen. The *Pratīyogitāvacchedakas* here are *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva*. The *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* exists in both *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* through the relation called *Paryāpti*. Hence, the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* here has been the *Pratīyogī* (adjunct) of the *Paryāpti* relation and the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakas* (i. e. *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva*) are the *Anuyogī* (subjunct) of the same *Paryāpti* relation and as such the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation here has been the twoness or duality (*dvitva*) existing in both the properties called *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva*. So, this duality of *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva*, which happens to be the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation of the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* here, has got a property as limitor (*Avacchedaka*) called *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* or the state or condition of being the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*. Now, accepting this particular *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* as the relation of the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence as stated above, only the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* can be taken and as such, only the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* should be understood here as the determining absence of the *Pratīyogitā* and not the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) having the form *Vahnir nāsti*. Hence, this side of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* which constitutes the relation wing of the technique, puts a check on taking irrelevant objects as *Avacchedaka* of the *Pratīyogitā*. Because, if we take irrelevant properties (*dharma*) like *Parvatīyatva* (The state or condition of being associated with a mountain) and *dhūmatva* (smokeness) the two limitors (*Avacchedaka*) of the *Pratīyogitā* of a different absence having the form *Parvatīyodhūmo nāsti* (There is no smoke of the mountain), then the *Anuyogitāvacchedakatva* of the *Paryāpti* relation of the limitorness (*Avacchedakatā*) described (*nirūpita*) by the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the said absence would reside in the particular twoness or duality (*dvitva*) existing in the aforesaid properties called *Parvatīyatva* and *dhūmatva* and not in the properties called *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* and as such the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* would not reside in or become associated with the aforesaid particular duality existing in *parvatīyatva* and *dhūmatva*. Hence the properties

called *Parvatīyatva* and *dhūmatva* which are not the limitors (*Avacchedaka*) of the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the absence having the form *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti*, and as such which are rather irrelevant for the said absence, become eliminated in the final analysis on account of the duality residing in them not being taken into consideration as the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti*, relation of the limitorness (*Avacchedakatā*) described by (*nirūpita*) the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the absence mentioned above, i.e. *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti*, thus making it impossible for the second term of the relation, namely *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* to stay in the above mentioned duality.

It is to be clearly borne in mind in this connection that twoness or duality (*dvitva*), and for the matter of that any other number, differs in accordance with the difference of the objects where the number resides or according to the difference of the knowledge of the objects enumerated.¹

Therefore, the twoness which resides in the properties called *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva* does not reside in the properties like *Parvatīyatva* and *dhūmatva*. Hence, the limitorness (*Avacchedakatva*) of the *Anuyogitā* (subjunctness) of the *Paryāpti* relation of the limitorness described by (*nirūpita*) the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the absence having the form *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti*, which forms the second term of the relation called *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* of the above mentioned *Pratīyogitā*, the first term of the relation is, of course, in the particular twoness (*dvitva*) residing in *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva*, and this would naturally eliminate the irrelevant properties like *parvatīyatva* and *dhūmatva* with whom it is not connected at all. This is the reason why this relation wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* is called *Itaravāraka paryāpti* or the *Paryāpti* which puts a check on other properties than those connected with some relational abstract property like *Pratīyogitā* or the like as its limiter (*Avacchedaka*).

The other wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* puts a check on taking less properties as *Avacchedakas* than required. Because, if we take only *vahnitva* (fireness) as the *Pratīyogitā*-

1. द्वित्वस्य धीविशेषविषयत्वरूपत्वेन धीभेदेन भिन्नत्वात्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Mīśra : *Commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 32.

vacchedaka of the aforesaid specific absence (*Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti*), then the *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpa* or the property which constitutes the limiter of subjunction of the *Paryāpti* relation having for its adjunctness limited by the limitorness-ness (*Avacchedakatātva*) described by the self, i.e. the relational abstract property like the *Pratīyogitā* or the like would be the singular number or oneness (*ekatva samkhyā*) existing in *vahnitva* alone and not the duality or twoness (*dvitva*) of *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva*. But actually in the case of the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation of the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratīyogitā* of the said specific absence would be the twoness or duality existing in the properties called *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva*. Hence, we shall not be in a position to take the generic absence of fire having the form *Vahnir nāsti* in the place of the specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*) of it having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti*. Because, the particular twoness or quality (*dvitva*) will have to be taken here and not the singular number or oneness (*ekatva*) as the *Anuyogitāvacchedaka* of the *Paryāpti* relation of the *Avacchedakatā* described or determined by the *Pratīyogitā* of the said absence. Thus the acceptance of the particular twoness (*dvitva*) existing in the properties called *Mahānasīyatva* and *Vahnitva* as the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka* here naturally makes it necessary to accept both the properties as the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the absence and not one property alone.

Therefore, this wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* is called *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti* or the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* which puts a check on accepting less property as the *Avacchedaka* (limitor) of any relational abstract than required.

Another example of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* may conveniently be illustrated here for the clear understanding of the technique. In the *Vyāptipañcaka* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya has defined *Vyāpti* or pervasion as *Sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam* or the non-existence of the *Hetu* in the locus of the constant absence of the *Sādhyā*. Here the *Sādhyābhāva* has been explained by all the commentators like Jagadīśa, Gadādhara, Mathurānātha, Pakṣadhara (Jayadeva) Miśra, etc. as the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) of the *Sādhyā*, a particular

content or object of inference. But this generic absence of the *Sādhya* cannot be satisfactorily explained unless the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* is applied.

Therefore, by the application of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti*, the *Sādhya* or the generic absence of the *sādhya* has been explained as that absence whose counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) exists in a property (*rūpa* or *dharma*) which is the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the subjunctness (*Anuyogitā*) of the *Paryāpti* relation, the adjunctness (*Pratiyogitā*), i.e. *Sāmsargikapratyogitā* of which is limited by a property called limitornessness (*Avacchedakatā*), the limitorness (*Avacchedakatā*) of which again is described by (*nirūpita*) the self (*Sva*), i.e. the *Sādhya* in the case of inference. The relation through which the *Pratiyogitā* of the absence exists in the *Anuyogitā* of the *Paryāpti* relation of the *Sāmsargikapratyogitā* existing in the *Avacchedakatā* described by the above mentioned *Sādhya* of the inference is *Svāvacchedakatā* of the *Avacchedakatā* of the subjunctness (*Anuyogitā*) of the *Paryāpti* relation, the *Sāmsargikapratyogitā*, i. e. the relational adjunctness of which is limited by the limitornessness (*Avacchedakatā*), the limitorness in which is described (*nirūpita*) by the self, i.e. the same *Sādhya* or the special contentness of the inference.¹

In the case of the inference having the syllogistic argument 'This is fiery, because it possesses smoke' (*Vahnimān dhūmāt*) the object or the particular content of the inference (*Sādhya*) is fire (*Vahni*). The limiter of the contentness of inference (*Sādhya*) is fireness (*Vahni*). The limitorness of the contentness of inference (*Sādhya*) exists in fireness through the *Paryāpti* relation, The limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the relational adjunctness (*Sāmsargikapratyogitā*) is the limitornessness of the particular contentness of inference (*Sādhya*) which exists in the limitorness of the particular contentness of inference (*Sādhya*). Now the relational adjunctness (*Sāmsargikapratyogitā*) which exists in the limitorness of the particular contentness of inference and is itself limited by the limitornessness of the particular content-

1. साध्यतावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकर्षाप्यनुयोगितावच्छेदक-
रूपवृत्तिर्या प्रतियोगिता तादृशप्रतियोगिताकाभावस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, रूपवृत्तिवत्

ness of inference having been existent in fireness (*vahnitva*) through the *Paryāpti* relation, the fireness here is considered as the sub-junct (*Anuyogī*) of the *Paryāpti* relation whose adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) is the above mentioned relational adjunctness (*Sāmsargikapratīyogitā*). The limiter of the subjunctness of the *Paryāpti* relation (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvachedaka*) of the said relational adjunctness here is the particular singular number or oneness existing in fireness (*Vahnitvagatamekatvam*). In this particular singular number existing in fireness resides the *Pratīyogitā* of the generic absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti* alone through the aforesaid relation, i.e. *Svāvachedakatātvāvachinnapratīyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvachedakatva* and not the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence having the form *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti*. Because, in the case of the specific absence having the form *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti* the *Pratīyogitā* exists in the particular twoness or duality (*dvitva*) existing in both the properties called *Mahānāsiyatva* and *Vahnitva* through the aforesaid relation but not in the particular singular number or oneness (*ekatva*) existing in *Vahnitva* alone.

In the case of the inference where the fire of the kitchen, i.e. *Mahānāsiyavahni* happens to be the *Sādhya* or object or particular content of inference, the specific absence (*Viśiṣṭābhāva*) having the form *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti* would be the absence of the *Sādhya* and not the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) having the form *Vahnir nāsti*, because, the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of the *Sādhya* in this case having the form *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti* would stay in the particular twoness (*dvitva*) existing in both *Mahānāsiyatva* and *Vahnitva* and not in the particular oneness (*ekatva*) existing in *Vahnitva* alone through the relation mentioned earlier, i.e. *Svāvachedakatātvāvachinnapratīyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvachedakatva*. Nor would the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of the above mentioned *Sādhya* having the form *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti* reside in the particular oneness (*ekatva*) existing in the property called *Mahānāsiyatva* alone through the said relation.

The *Pratīyogitā* of either of the two forms of absence like *Mahānāsiyo nāsti* and *Vahnir nāsti* would reside in the particular oneness (*ekatva*) existing either in the property called *Mahānāsiya-*

च प्रतियोगितायां स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकपर्याप्त्यनुयो-
गितावच्छेदकत्वसम्बन्धेन—

tva or *Vahnitva* through the above mentioned relation. Hence, the absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* would never be confused with either of the two forms of absence mentioned above.¹

Of the two wings of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* sometimes only the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti* is used in cases where the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* is not considered necessary to insert.

The method of inserting only the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti* is this that the first wing of the technique which constitutes the description of the relational abstract properties like *Pratiyogitā*, *Sādhyatā* etc., existing in the limitor of the subjunctness of the *Paryāpti* relation (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*) is mentioned in full detail as expressed earlier i.e. *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinna-pratiyogitākapyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpavṛtti*, whereas, the second wing of the technique which forms the description of the relation through which the above mentioned relational abstract properties reside in the limitor of the subjunctness of the *Paryāpti* relation (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpa*) is mentioned in a changed form. Instead of mentioning the relation wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* in its full detail as *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinna-pratiyogitākapyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*, it is expressed as *Svanirūpitāvacchedakatāpratiyogikaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*.²

This makes a gulf of difference between the original relation wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* and its changed form. Because, when the relational adjunctness (*Sāṃsargika Pratiyogitā*) existing in the *Avacchedakatā* is mentioned as limited by the property called *Avacchedakatāiva*, the *Sāṃsargika Prati-*

1. महानसीयवह्निसाध्यकस्थले तु साध्यतावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-
कपर्याप्त्यनुयोगितावच्छेदकीभूतमहानसीयत्ववह्नित्वगतद्विवे महानसीयवह्न्य-
भावप्रतियोगितैव वर्तते, नतु प्रत्येकाभावीयप्रतियोगिता, तत्र महानसीयाभाव-
प्रतियोगिता महानसीयत्वगतैकत्वे एवं वह्न्यभावप्रतियोगिता वह्नित्व-
गतैकत्वे इति तयोर्व्युदासः—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, *Commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 31.

2. केवलन्यूनवारकपर्याप्तिनिवेशश्च साध्यतावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रति-
योगिताकपर्याप्त्यनुयोगितावच्छेदकरूपवृत्तिर्या प्रतियोगिता तादृशप्रतियोगिता-
काभावः, रूपवृत्तित्वञ्च प्रतियोगितायां स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकताप्रतियोगिक-
पर्याप्त्यनुयोगितावच्छेदकत्वसम्बन्धेनेति— Ibid.

yogitā which happens to exist in the *Avacchedakatā*, the adjunct (*Pratīyogī*) of the *Paryāpti* relation, is accepted as a single entity existing in both the *Avacchedakatās* residing in both the properties like *Mahānasīyatva* and *Vahnitva* and as such it is technically known as *Vyāsajyavṛtti* or simultaneously existing in more than one object.¹ Though it is said in connection with the *Avacchedakatā* that it is *Vyāsajyavṛtti* when limited by *Avacchedakatā* *tva*, yet the same logic applies to the *Pratīyogitā* also.

Therefore, if only *Svanirūpitāvacchedakatāpratīyogikaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* is mentioned as the relation of the relational abstract property like *Pratīyogitā* or *Sādhyatā* etc., instead of saying *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*, then a single *Sāmsargika Pratīyogitā* existing in a single *Avacchedakatā* which exists in a single property like *Mahānasīyatva* or *Vahnitva* may be taken into consideration. Consequently, the limiter of the subjunctness of the *Paryāpti* relation (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*) of the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* may equally be the oneness or singular number of *Mahānasīyatva* or *Vahnitva* and as such the relation of the *Pratīyogitā* of the generic absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti* may be found in the oneness of *Vahnitva*, thus making the two forms of the absence identical. This would naturally lead to confusion and ambiguity in regard to the two forms of absence mentioned above.

By mentioning the relation as *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*, the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratīyogitā* or the *Sādhyatā* and the like has been taken as a single entity equally existing in both the properties like *Mahānasīyatva* and *Vahnitva* in the case of the absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* or in the case of the inference *Mahānasīyavahnimān dhūmāt* and the like and as such the limiter of the subjunctness of the *Paryāpti* relation (*Paryāptyanuyogitā*-

1. अत्रेदं बोध्यम्, महानसीयवह्नयभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकता साध्यता-वच्छेदकता वा तद्व्यक्तिवृत्तित्वेन प्रमेयत्वादिना वा न व्यासज्यवृत्तिरिति तद्दोषता-दवस्थ्यमतोऽवच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नत्वं प्रतियोगितायामुपात्तम्, तथा चावच्छेदकतात्वेन सा व्यासज्यवृत्तिरिति—

Foot Note on *Commentary on VyāptipañcakaMāthuri*, Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, p. 31.

vacchedaka) would be the particular twoness (*dvīta*) existing in both the aforesaid properties. Hence, the *Paryāptyanuyogitā-vacchedakatva* would be the relation of the *Pratiyogitā* or the *Sādhya* and the like with the aforesaid particular duality.

The confusion between the two types of absence, etc. mentioned earlier can now be avoided. Because, the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* would never exist in the oneness (*ekatva*) existing in only *Vahnitva* through the aforesaid relation i.e. *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*.

Similarly, the technique of the insertion of only the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* would be just the reverse of the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti*. In the case of the inference *Vahnimān dhūmāt* the technique of the insertion of only the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* for clarifying the absence of the *Sādhya* would be *Sādhya-tāvacchedakatāpratyogikāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpavṛttir yā pratiyogitā tādr-śapratyogitākābhāvaḥ. Rūpavṛttitvaṃ ca pratiyogitāyām svanirūpitāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratyogitāvacchedakatvasambandhena*.¹

This technique of the insertion of the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* alone need not be elaborated any more, as the principle underlying this insertion has already been explained earlier and as such it can be understood without much difficulty.

But even in this excellent technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* some weak points may be found out if some facts are viewed from a different angle of vision.

It now appears to us that in both the wings of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti*, the portion *Svanirūpitāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratyogitā* or *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratyogitā* bears a weak point in it, because, it cannot be denied that a single *Sāmsargika-pratyogitā* existing in a single *Avacchedakatā* residing in a single property like *Mahānasīyatva* or *Vahnitva* also may be considered to be limited (*Avacchinna*) by the property called *Avacchedakatātvā*, the *Avacchedakatā* of which may be described (*Nirūpita*) by any relational abstract property like *Pratiyogitā* etc. The *Sāmsargika-pratyogitā* existing in a single *Avacchedakatā* residing in a single property like *Mahānasīyatva*

1. Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 31.

is, of course, different from the *Sāmsargika-pratīyogitā* existing in another *Avacchedakatā* residing in another property like *Vahnitva*, because, its substratum, the particular *Avacchedakatā*, is different in the two properties, inasmuch as the *Avacchedakatā* existing in *Mahānasīyatva* is limited by *Samyogatva* (contactness), whereas, the *Avacchedakatva* existing in *Vahnitva* is not limited by any other property in accordance with the theory of Navya Nyāya that a generic character (*Jāti*), if not directly mentioned by any word, is known without any limiting property flashing on it. Here the generic character (*Jāti*), like *Vahnitva* is not directly mentioned by any word, only the fire (*vahni*) having been mentioned directly by the term *Vahni* and not fireness or *Vahnitva*. But *Mahānasīyatva*, if analysed, means *Mahānasānuyogikasaṁyoga*, i. e. the contact (*Samyoga*) whose subjunct (*Anuyogī*) is *Mahānasa* or the kitchen. Therefore, the *Avacchedakatā* which exists in the property called *Mahānasīyatva* or *Mahānasānuyogikasaṁyoga* is limited by a particular *Samyogatva* or a particular contactness, because *Samyogatva* flashes over it, whereas, the *Avacchedakatā* existing in *Vahnitva* is non-limited (*Niravacchinna*) inasmuch as no other property flashes on *Vahnitva* as a limitor of the *Avacchedakatā* existing in it. Hence, on account of being limited in one case and not limited in another, the *Avacchedakatās* are considered to be different from one another,¹ although from the standpoint of being limited by the property called *Avacchedakatā* (limitor-ness) the *Avacchedakatās* are accepted as a single entity equally existing in more than one property.²

1. नानासम्बन्धेन नानाधर्मप्रकारेण भासमानेष्वेकावच्छेदकता न स्वीक्रियते—

Foot Note on *Commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī*, Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, p. 34.

गोत्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकतातोऽवयवसंयोगनिष्ठावच्छेदकताया भिन्नत्वात् तदवच्छेदकसंसर्गादीनां भिन्नत्वात्—

Kṛṣṇakānta Commentary on Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Nāmaprakaṣaṇa), p. 143, Old Benares edition.

अवच्छेदकत्वस्य वृद्धित्वमहानसीयत्वादिनिष्ठस्य संबंधादिभेदेन भिन्नत्वेऽपि—
Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 614, Asiatic Society edition.

2. अवच्छेदकतात्वेन सा व्यासज्यवृत्तिरेवेति—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 614, Asiatic Society edition.

अवच्छेदकत्वस्य अनुगतेन तत्तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतात्वेन रूपेण व्यासज्य-

Now, the *Sāmsargika-pratīyogitā* or relational adjunctness existing in the *Avacchedakatā* existing in *Vahnitva*, one of the limitors of the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence of the *Sādhyā* in the case of the inference *Mahānasiyavahnimān taddhūmāt* or in the case of the specific absence having the form *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* being equally limited by the property called *Avacchedakatātva* the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpa* can equally be the *Ekatvasaṁkhyā* or the singular number existing in *Vahnitva* alone. Thus the *Pratīyogitā* of the aforesaid specific absence may reside in the particular *Ekatvasaṁkhyā*, the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpa*, existing in *Vahnitva* alone through the relation called *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*, admitting at the same time that in the relation wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* also the *Sāmsargikapratīyogitā* residing in the *Avacchedakatā* existing in *Vahnitva* alone can be taken into account on the strength of the argument put forward earlier that the aforesaid *Sāmsargikapratīyogitā* also is equally limited by the property called *Avacchedakatātva*. Hence, the specific absence having the form *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* may be confused with the generic absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti* inasmuch as the *Pratīyogitā* of the generic absence which actually resides in the singular number (*ekatvasaṁkhyā*) existing in *vahnitva*, the substratum of the *Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpa* of the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratīyogitā* of the said absence may also be said to be existing as referred to earlier, in the *Ekatvasaṁkhyā* of the *vahnitva* taken apart from the *Mahānasiyatva* which together comprise the joint *Avacchedakas* of the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the specific absence having the form *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti*, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate the two forms of absence mentioned above.

This problem in the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* leading to the confusion in the understanding of the two forms of absence, generic and specific, had been raised sometime back

वृत्तितायाश्चक्रवर्तिलक्षणे वल्लित्वादेरवच्छेदकत्वपर्याप्त्यनधिकरणत्वमुपपादितवतो दीधितिकारस्यानुमतत्वात्—*Ibid.*

सार्वभौमैस्तु विशेषधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकूटानतिरिक्तसामान्यधर्मावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगितासम्बन्धत्वेनानुगतेन व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वमिति कण्ठरवेणैवोक्तम्—*Ibid*

by the present writer of this book with a solution offered by him which had been published in a Sanskrit journal of Calcutta.¹

The solution suggested there in a nutshell is this. Instead of saying *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpavṛttirya pratiyogitā tādṛśapratiyogitākābhāvaḥ*. *Rūpavṛttitvaṃ ca svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatvasambandhena*, it should be expressed as *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnā yā yā pratiyogitā tattatpratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakarūpavṛttipratiyogitākābhāvaḥ*. *Rūpavṛttitvaṃ ca svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnā yā yā pratiyogitātattatpratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatvasambandhena*. By the *Vipsā* or repetition of *yā* as *yā yā* in both the wings of the technique, all the *Sāmsargikapratyogitās* existing in all the *Avacchedakatās* residing in all the limitors (*Avacchedaka*) of a particular absence should be taken into account so that any one of the *Avacchedakas* cannot be left aside. In a case where there is only one *Avacchedaka*, the *Vipsā* in *yā* need not be resorted to, as it would be unnecessary there to do so. There would, of course, be no harm if the repetition of *yā* as *yā yā* is resorted to in the case of the absence where the *Avacchedaka* of the *Pratiyogitā* be only one in number. In that case the repetition of *yā* would indicate entirety (*Sākalya*). Where there is only one *Avacchedaka*, the entirety there would subsist in the one limitor of the subjunctness of the *Paryāpti* relation of the *Avacchedakatā* (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*) existing in only one property like *Vahnitva* as in the case of the generic absence like *Vahnir nāsti*.

Now while taking the generic absence of *vahni* (fire) as *Vahnir nāsti*, the specific absence of *vahni* as *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti* cannot be taken into account, because, by *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnā yā yā pratiyogitā*, in the case of a generic absence like *Vahnir nāsti*, only one *Sāmsargikapratyogitā* residing in a single *Avacchedakatā* existing in only one *Avacchedaka* like *vahnitva* is to be understood and not two *Sāmsargika-pratiyogitās* residing in two *Avacchedakatās* existing in two *Avacchedakas* like *mahānāsiyatva* and *vahnitva*, as in the case of the specific absence like *Mahānāsiyavahnir nāsti*. Therefore, the limitor of the subjunct-

1. प्रणव-पारिजातः—Jyāṣṭha, 1366, Bengali year.

ness of the *Paryāpti* relation of the *Avacchedakatā* (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*) in the case of the generic absence like *Vahnir nāsti* would be only the particular singular number (*ekatvasaṁkhyā*) existing in *vahnitva*, the limitor of the *Pratiyogitā* of the said absence, and not the particular twoness or duality (*dvitva*) existing in the properties like *Mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* as in the case of the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti*, thus making it impossible for the two kinds of absence to be confused in any way inasmuch as the *Pratiyogitā* of the said generic absence would reside only in the particular singular number existing in *vahnitva*, whereas, the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence mentioned in this connection would reside only in the particular twoness (*dvitva*) existing in *Mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* taken together and not in the singular number of *vahnitva* taken apart from *mahānasīyatva*.

This technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* has been criticised in a different way by some scholars of the Navya Nyāya school in later times. According to them the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* cannot be checked while taking into account the generic absence of fire as *Vahnir nāsti* in the case of the inference like *Vahnimān dhūmāt* (This is fiery because it possesses smoke). Because, although the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* exists in both of the properties called *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* taken together on account of its being limited by *Avacchedakatāitva* and as such it cannot reside in the particular singular number existing in *vahnitva* alone through the relation called *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*, yet from a different angle of vision it can be said to be existing in the singular number (*ekatvasaṁkhyā* of *vahnitva* alone through the relation *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*. The idea underlying this particular relation through which the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence called *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* may reside in the singular number of *Vahnitva* is this that though the *Avacchedakatā* in the case of the above mentioned specific absence normally resides in the dual number (*dvitva*) of *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva*, yet being qualified by its existence (*vṛttitva*) in *Vahnitva* alone, the *Avacchedakatā* may easily be said to be existing in *vahnitva* and

not in *mahānasīyatva* and as such through the relation called *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavacchedakatātvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* the *Pratīyogitā* of the said specific absence may be said to be existing in the singular number of *vahnitva* alone, making the two types of absence confused to a degree.

To give answer to this criticism later scholars have given some suggestions by way of new insertions (*niveśa*) in the higher dissertations popularly known as *Kroḍāpatras*.

The solution suggested in this case may be summed up as follows. In the relation wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* the *Sāmsargika-pratīyogitā* should be such as not to be the describer (*anirūpikā*) of any *Avacchedakatā* other than the *Avacchedakatā* existing in the absential counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) which is limited by the relation called *Nirūpitatva*. This *Sāmsargika-pratīyogitā* again should be the describer of the *Avacchedakatā* existing in the said *Pratīyogitā* of the absence as also of the *Avacchedakatā* existing in the property called *Avacchedakatātvā* and at the same time should not become the describer of any other *Avacchedakatā* than the aforesaid *Avacchedakatā* existing in the property called *Avacchedakatātvā*.¹

The above mentioned insertion (*niveśa*) aims at eliminating the particular relation through which the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence like *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* may reside in the singular number (*ekatvasaṁkhyā*) existing in *vahnitva* (fireness), and thus making the specific absence and the generic absence of fire (*vahni*) confused.

In the relation *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavacchedakatātvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* which constitutes the specified form of the relation wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti*, the *Sāmsargika-pratīyogitā* existing in the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* is again described (*nirūpita*) by the *Avacchedakatā* residing in

1. सम्बन्धकोटौ निरूपितत्वसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नस्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकताभिन्ना सती अवच्छेदकतात्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकताभिन्ना या अवच्छेदकता तदनिरूपिका ईदृशावच्छेदकताद्वयनिरूपिका या अवच्छेदकतानिष्ठसांसर्गिकप्रतियोगिता तन्निरूपकपर्याप्त्यादिविवक्षणे न दोषः—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 33.

the property called *Tattva* (that-ness) as also the *Avacchedakatā* residing in the relation (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) of the existence in a specific manifestation (*Tattva-tadvyaktivṛttitvavaiśiṣṭyāniṣṭhāvacchedakatva*) apart from its being described by the *Avacchedakatva* existing in the *Pratīyogitā* as limited by the relation called *Nirūpitatva* and at the same time described by the *Avacchedakatā* existing in the property called *Avacchedakatātva*.¹

It may be considered useful to deal with this point a bit more elaborately. In the case of the generic absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti*, the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the absence exists in the singular number of *vahnitva* through the relation called *Svāvacchedakatātvāvachhinnapratīyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvachhedakatva*. Hence the absence whose *Pratīyogitā* exists in the singular number of *vahnitva* is called the generic absence of *vahni* (fire). Now, if the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence like *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti* also can reside in the singular number of *vahnitva* through the aforesaid relation in any way, then the specific absence would be considered equal to the generic absence making the two forms of absence confused to a degree.

The *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence like *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti* exists equally in both the properties called *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva* on account of its being limited by *Avacchedakatātva*, by virtue of which the *Avacchedakatā* is considered one and the same in both the above mentioned properties.² But even then the *Avacchedakatā* may be said to be existing in *vahnitva* from the standpoint of its being qualified by the existence exclusively in *vahnitva*. As an individual named *Devadatta* who may exist in more than one place, of course, at different times may be considered to be existing in a particular place only on account of his being qualified by the existence in that place, similarly, the *Avacchedakatā* which may be existing in more than one property like *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva*,

1. तदवच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नसांसर्गिकप्रतियोगिताया निरूपितत्वसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नस्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकताभिन्नेन अवच्छेदकतात्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकताभिन्नेन च तत्तद्व्यक्तिवृत्तित्ववैशिष्ट्यनिष्ठावच्छेदकतात्वेन निरूपिततया धर्तुमशक्यत्वात्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 33.

2. तादृशप्रतियोगितानिरूपितावच्छेदकताया अवच्छेदकतात्वेन व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वेऽपि—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 33.

may be said to be existing in *vahnitva* alone on account of its being qualified by the existence in *vahnitva*. By citing another example according to the theory of Navya Nyāya this point may be further clarified a bit more convincingly. Just as *Sattā* a *Jāti* or a generic character existing equally in *Dravya* (Substance), *Guṇa* (Quality) and *Karma* (Action) may be said to be existing only in *Dravya* when it is qualified by the difference of *Guṇa* and *Karma* (*Guṇa-karmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattā* and as such is considered to be limited only by the existence in *Dravya*, similarly, the *Avacchedakatā* which may be existing equally in *vahnitva* and *mahānasīyatva* may also be said to be existing only in *vahnitva* when it is considered to be limited by its existence in *vahnitva*.

Thus the relation *Svanirūpitāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* may be understood in a particular context like the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* as *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* in which the *Avacchedakatā*, though existing in both the properties like *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* from the standpoint of its being limited by the special property called *Avacchedakatātva* may be said to be existing in *vahnitva* alone viewed from a different standpoint of being limited by its existence in *vahnitva*. Because, being limited by its existence in *vahnitva*, the *Avacchedakatā* cannot exist in other objects like *mahānasīyatva* or something else for the simple reason that it cannot be qualified by the existence in *vahnitva* while residing in other objects than *vahnitva*. Hence, through the relation called *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*, the *Pratiyogitā* of the specific absence having the form *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* would stay on the singular number of *vahnitva*, and as such there would be no bar to call this specific absence of fire as its generic absence, regard being had to the fact that the generic absence of fire, as has already been pointed out, means that absence whose *Pratiyogitā* exists in the singular number of *vahnitva* through the relation called *Svanirūpitāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva* which may be known in a particular case of absence like this one as *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratiyogitākāparyāptyanuyogitāvacchedakatva*.

Now the essence of the solution lies in the fact that relational adjunctness (*sāmsargikapratyogitā*) existing in the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratyogitā* of the absence and at the same time limited by *Avacchedakatātva* should be such as not to be described by the *Avacchedakatvas* existing in 'That-ness' (*tattva*) as also in the relation of the existence in a particular object (*tadvyakti-vṛttitvavaiśiṣṭya*). But to check the said *sāmsargikapratyogitā* from becoming too wide, some other limiting adjuncts, as mentioned earlier, have been inserted. As a result of this the *sāmsargika-pratyogitā* existing in the *Avacchedakatā* which exists in a single property like *vahnitva* would become eliminated in the specific absence like *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* inasmuch as the *sāmsargika-pratyogitā* there, apart from its being described by the *Avacchedakatā* existing in *Avacchedakatātva* as also in the *Pratyogitā* of the absence, is also described by the *Avacchedakatva* existing in 'that-ness' (*tattva*) and in the relation (*vaiśiṣṭya*) of the existence in a particular object which is expressed by the statement of the specific relation wing of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* as *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvavaiśiṣṭyatada-vacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratyogitākaparyāptyanuyogitāvachedakatva*.

But even then this insertion of the non-describerness (*anirūpakatva*) existing in the relational adjunctness (*sāmsargika-pratyogitā*) of the *Avacchedakatva* existing in the aforesaid relation (*vaiśiṣṭya*) of the existence in a particular object like *vahnitva*, which goes a long way to eliminate the cause of ambiguity in the case of absence as we discussed earlier, can be made ineffective by taking into account the absence of the describerness (*nirūpakatva*) existing in the relational adjunctness caused by taking an indifferent (*udāsīna*) object like a jar (*ghaṭa*) with it. Just as a jar (*ghaṭa*) existing in a particular place may be said to be non-existent there if taken together with an indifferent object like a cloth (*paṭa*) which may not be existing there, similarly, the describerness (*nirūpakatva*) of the *Avacchedakatva* existing in the relation (*vaiśiṣṭya*) of the existence in a particular object may equally be said to be non-existent if taken together with a jar (*ghaṭa*) which may not be existing there. This type of absence is known as *Vyāsajyavṛttidharmāvacchinnābhāva*, i.e. the absence whose *Pratyogitā* is limited by a property (*dharma*) which exists in conjoint objects.

To make up the deficiency of this technique it has been suggested that the generic absence of the *Sādhyā* in the case of an inference like *Vahnimān dhūmāt* should be understood as that absence whose *Pratīyogitā* exists in the property that exists in the limitor of the *Sādhyatā* through the relation called *Svanirūpitāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyāptisambandhāvacchinnādheyatā-nirūpitādhikaraṇatāvacchedakatva*.

This new type of insertion in the relation wing of the technique of *Paryāpti* goes a long way to make the device flawless to a very great extent. Now the technique can no longer be rendered useless by taking the *Avacchedakatā* as qualified by the existence in *Vahnitva* (*Vahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavacchedakatā*), keeping in view the *Pratīyogitā* described by the specific absence having the form *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* to be taken instead of the *Pratīyogitā* described by the generic absence having the form *Vahnir nāsti* for the sake of making the two kinds of absence confused and as such ineffective for all practical purposes. Because, though the *Avacchedakatā* practically existing in both the properties like *mahānasiyatva* and *vahnitva* in the case of the specific absence *Mahānasiyavahnir nāsti* can be taken separately as qualified by the existence in *Vahnitva*, and as such the limitor of the subjunction of the *Paryāpti* relation (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*) of the *Avacchedakatā* would be the singular number (*ekatvasaṁkhyā*) of *vahnitva*, yet owing to the new insertion as stated above, the singular number of *vahnitva* shall not be taken into account inasmuch as the superstratumness (*Ādheyatā*) existing in the *Avacchedakatā* will have to be taken as a single entity on account of its being limited by *Avacchedakatātvā*, a single limitor (*Avacchedaka*) of the superstratumness. The theory that the *Ādheyatā* (superstratumness) should be considered as one owing to the oneness of the limitor is supported by a statement of Jagadīśa Tarkālāṅkāra also in a like case in the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* where he says that the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of an absence is one and the same according to the new school in the event of its limitor being one, though there may be different manifestations of the counterpositive (*Pratīyogivyakti*).¹ Hence

1. एकधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितायाः प्रतियोगिव्यक्तीनां भेदेऽपि ऐक्यमिति नव्यमते—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 221, Chowkhamba edition.

the single and undivided superstratumness existing in the *Avacchedakatā* and limited (*avacchinna*) by the relation of *Paryāpti* is the determinant or describer (*nirūpaka*) of the locusness (*Adhikaraṇatā*) residing in both the properties called *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* in the case of the specific absence *mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* and not in *vahnitva* alone as in the case of the generic absence *Vahnir nāsti*, thus making the dual number (*dvitva-saṁkhyā*) of the properties called *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* the limitor of the locusness described by the aforesaid superstratumness. Now through the particular relational abstract property like the limitorness (*Avacchedakatva*) of the locusness described by the superstratumness (*Ādheyatā*) limited by the specified *Paryāpti* relation as mentioned earlier, i.e., *Svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyāpti*, only the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence in the case of that kind of absence like *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* will exist in the dual number or twoness (*dvitvasaṁkhyā*) of *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* which constitutes the second term of the relation and not the *Pratīyogitā* of the generic absence like *Vahnir nāsti*. Hence, it will be impossible now for the two kinds of absence, generic and specific, to become confused as the two kinds of *Pratīyogitā* of the two kinds of the above-mentioned absence will never stay on the same place through the aforesaid relation, i.e., *Svanirūpitāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyāptisambandhāvacchinnādheyatānirūpitādhikaraṇatāvacchedakatva*.

It should be clearly borne in mind in this connection that the *Adhikaraṇatā* which forms a component part of the relation here should be taken as a single entity existing in both the properties like *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* in the case of the specific absence like *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* and also of similar other cases of different category like inference etc. The *Adhikaraṇatā* (locusness) described by the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* (limitorness described by the counterpositiveness of the absence) in the case of the specific absence like *Mahānasīyavahnir nāsti* should be taken as a single entity, because, the *Ādheyatā* which exists in the *Pratīyogitāvacchedakatā* also has been taken as a single entity on account of its being limited by a single property called *Avacchedakatātva* (limitorness-ness) and the *Adhikaraṇatā* which is described (*nirūpita*) by a single relational abstract property must necessarily be a single relational abstract property itself existing in both the

properties as the case may be. Hence the limiter of the locusness (*Adhikaraṇatāvachedaka*) related to the *Avachedakatā* wherein resides the *Ādheyatā* existing in the said *Avachedakatā* in the case of the specific absence *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti* would be the particular dual number or twoness (*dvitvasamkhyā*) existing in both *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva*, because, other properties, on account of their being too wide, or narrow, would never be considered as *Avachedaka* of the *Adhikaraṇatā*.

Hence, through the relation called *Svanirūpitāvachedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyāptisambandhāvacchinnādheyatānirūpitādhikaraṇatāvachedakatva*, the *Pratīyogitā* of the specific absence *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti* alone would reside in the particular twoness (*dvitvasamkhyā*) existing in *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva* and not in the oneness (*ekatvasamkhyā*) of only *vahnitva* where the *Pratīyogitā* of the generic absence *Vahnir nāsti* alone would reside. So, *Sādhyābhāva*, i. e., *Sādhyasāmanyābhāva* or generic absence of the *Sādhyā* having the form *Vahnir nāsti* in the case of the inference *Vahnimān dhūmāt* would never be confused with the *Sādhyaviśeṣābhāva* or the specific absence of the *Sādhyā* having the form *Mahānāsīyavahnir nāsti*.

The keynote of the solution lies in the fact that by the expression *Svanirūpitāvachedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitākāparyāptisambandhāvacchinnādheyatā*, only the single and undivided *Ādheyatā* existing in the *Avachedakatā* residing in both *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva* should be taken into consideration and not the piecemeal *Ādheyatā* existing in a single *Avachedakatā* residing in either *mahānāsīyatva* or *vahnitva*. Because, by *Svanirūpitavahnitva-vṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavachedakatā*, the *Avachedakatā* existing in only *vahnitva* cannot, according to the theory advanced for the solution of the problem, be taken into account inasmuch as the *Ādheyatā* (superstratumness) existing in the *Vahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavachedakatā* is limited by the relation of the existence in *Vahnitva* (*Vahnitvavṛttitvavaiśiṣṭyāvachinnā*) only and not by *Avachedakatātvā* as that would involve the defect of the argument called heaviness (*Gaurava*). Nor the *Ādheyatā* existing in the *Vahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavachedakatā* can be said to be limited by both the properties called *vahnitvavṛttitvavaiśiṣṭya* and *Avacheda-*

katātva on account of heaviness (*Gaurava*) as also for want of proof.¹

Now because the *Avacchedakatā* existing only in the property called *vahnitva* cannot be taken separately apart from the *Avacchedakatā* existing in the property called *mahānasīyatva* as the superstratum to be understood to exist in *vahnitva* alone from the expression *Svanirūpitavahnitvavṛttitvaviśiṣṭatadavacchedakatātvāvacchinnā*, the defect cropping up on that score in the form of the confusion in the understanding of the two kinds of absence, generic and specific, would no longer come into being.

Up till now both the wings of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* have been discussed theoretically as independent devices. But the relation wing of the technique which constitutes the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti*, cannot practically be used independently for want of utility of such an application.²

The argument underlying this standpoint is not far to seek. The relation of a particular object depends wholly on the object concerned whose relation is meant in a particular context. If there be no object to be placed somewhere or to be connected with some other object through a relation, then what useful purpose would be served by the consideration of a mere relation ? Therefore, it has been rightly held by the Navya Naiyāyikas that there is no independent application of the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti*.

We do not find any reference of the application of this technique in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. Not to speak of the technique in its fully developed form, even the mention of the relation called *Paryāpti* is nowhere to be found in that epoch making book on Navya Nyāya.

The first reference of the relation called *Paryāpti* which forms the pivot of the technique is to be found, as rightly noticed by

1. वल्लित्ववृत्तित्वविशिष्टावच्छेदकतावद्वल्लित्वमितिप्रतीतावच्छेदकतानिष्ठा-
धेयत्वं वल्लित्ववृत्तित्ववैशिष्ट्यावच्छिन्नमेव नत्ववच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नं गौरवात्,
नापि वल्लित्ववृत्तित्ववैशिष्ट्यावच्छेदकतात्वोभयधर्मावच्छिन्नं मानाभावाद्
गौरवाच्च—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Foot Note on Commenary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 34.

2. स्वातन्त्र्येणैतरवारकपर्याप्तिनिवेशो नास्ति प्रयोजनाभावात्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra: *commentary on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 34.

Prof. Ingalls, in the works of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi.¹ But it is difficult to say whether Raghunātha had used this technique in its fully developed form which is to be found in frequent use in the higher dissertations of Navya Nyāya popularly known as *Kroḍa-patras* in later times. There is, of course, indication in the writings of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi that he also knew this technique in some form. While defining the technical *Avacchedakatva* (*Pāribhāṣikāvacchedakatva*) in the *Avacchedakatvanirukti*, Raghunātha Śīromaṇi has said that the *Avacchedaka* described by the absence which constitutes a part of the definition of *Vyāpti* should exist in equal number of loci with the limiter of the contentness of inference (*Sādhyatāvacchedaka*),² thus hinting at the application of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* which has been frequently applied by the later commentators.³

There is indication in the writings of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra that he was quite aware of the technique. In the definition of *Pakṣatā*, a special property of the *Pakṣa*, the minor term, Jagadīśa has indicated the non-insertion of the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* by using the word *ghaṭita*, meaning 'comprised of'.⁴ That which is comprised of something is certainly a wider object than that of which it is comprised. Now if the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* is inserted, then the word *ghaṭita* would become useless, because, the application of the word *ghaṭita* indicates that there is something

1. *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Foot Note 171, p. 77.

पर्याप्तिश्चायमेको घट इमौ द्वावितिप्रतीतिसाक्षिकः स्वरूपसम्बन्ध एव—
Avacchedakatvanirukti-Dīdhiti, p. 262 *Jāgadiśi* (Chowkhamba edition).

2. स्वसमानवृत्तिकं चावच्छेदकं ग्राह्यम्, तत्त्वं च स्वपर्याप्त्यधिकरण-
पर्याप्तिवृत्तिकत्वम्—

Paṇḍita Vāmācarāṇa Nyāyācārya commentary on *Avacchedakatvanirukti*, p. 34.

3. तादृशरूपवृत्तिनिरूपकताकाधिकरणत्वाभाववन्निरूपितवृत्तितानवच्छेदकत्व-
स्यैव पारिभाषिकावच्छेदकत्वात्, वृत्तित्वञ्च स्वावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रति-
योगिताकपर्याप्त्यनुयोगितावच्छेदकत्वसम्बन्धेन—

4. तथापि प्रकृतपक्षविषयताबहिर्भूतप्रकृतसाध्यविषयताघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नं
यत् प्रकृतपक्षधर्मिकप्रकृतसाध्यवत्तानिश्चयनिवर्त्यत्वं तन्निवेशितमित्यदोषः—

Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi, p. 624, Chowkhamba edition.

घटितपदं पर्याप्त्यनिवेशसूचनाय, अन्यथा साक्षात्परम्परासाधारणावच्छेद-
कत्वोपगमेन साध्यविषयत्वपर्याप्तावच्छेदकताकप्रतिबध्यत्वाप्रसिद्धिः स्यात्—

Commentary on Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi by Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, p. 25.

other than a particular object which is comprised of some other object that is necessary to be included in a particular context for clarification of a particular standpoint, whereas, the insertion of *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* clearly points to the fact that the additional object is to be eliminated. But unless the application of the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* is known, one cannot consistently try to avoid it in a particular case. Therefore, by the application of the word *ghaṭita*, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra has indicated that he also knew the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* in some form or other. Jagadīśa has made reference to the use of *Paryāpti* in many places in his works.¹

Similar arguments may be advanced in favour of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also in whose works the clarification of some points is found to have been made through the application of the *Paryāpti* relation.² Like Jagadīśa, Gadādhara also has used the word *ghaṭita* in many places to indicate the application of the technique of *Paryāpti* for the sake of clarification of some theories.³

तथा च घटितपदमितरवारकपर्याप्त्यनिवेशलाभार्थकम्, अन्यथा साध्यता-
वच्छेदकावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतामात्रनिष्ठावच्छेदकाकत्वनिवेशे वक्षिमात्र-
वेतिसंशयादावसम्भवः स्यात् संशयीयप्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदककोटौ पक्षविशेष्य-
कत्वस्य आहार्यभेदस्य च निवेशनीयतया तत्प्रतिबध्यतायां साध्यविषयतामात्र-
निष्ठावच्छेदकत्वानिरूपकत्वादिति तत्त्वम्—

Foot Note on the commentary of Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi. Ibid.

1. हेतुसमानाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतायाः पर्याप्त्यधिकरण-
भिन्नत्वं साध्यतावच्छेदकस्य वाच्यमिति कश्चित्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 13, Paṇḍita Vāmācāraṇa's edn.

2. न च फलीभूतसंशयधर्मितावच्छेदकता यादृशधर्मे पर्याप्ता तादृशधर्मा-
वच्छिन्नविशेष्यकयत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन संशयं प्रति हेतुतेतिविवक्षणे नायं दोषः—
Savyabhicāra Gādādhari, p. 1642, Chowkhamba edition.

जनकतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वञ्च जनकतावच्छेदकपर्याप्तावच्छेदकाकत्वम्—
Savyabhicāra Gādādhari, p. 1642, Chowkhamba edition.

3. यदि च साध्यविशेषणकोपस्थितिवृत्तिसाध्यसन्देहजनकतानियतं यज्जन्यत्वं
तन्निरूपितायां साध्यविशेषणकोपस्थित्यवृत्तिसाध्यसन्देहजनकतानियतञ्च
यज्जन्यत्वं तन्निरूपितायाञ्च जनकतायामवच्छेदिका या प्रकारता तस्याः
साध्याभावविषयकत्वघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नजनकतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नजन्यतानिरूपितायां
तादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यविषयकत्वघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नजनकतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नजन्य-

Even direct reference of the insertion of *Paryāpti* is to be found in the writings of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.¹

But in spite of all these facts it appears to us that almost the fully developed form of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* is to be found in the *Kroḍapatras* or higher dissertations on Navya Nyāya by Paṇḍita Kālīsaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya. These *Kroḍapatras* are popularly known as *Kālīsaṅkarī vivecanā* in the Navya Naiyāyika circles all over India.

In the opinion of Paṇḍita Tārānāthā Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha, formerly Professor of Nyāya of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and subsequently Professor of Nyāya in the University of Calcutta, with whom also the present writer had the proud privilege to read some important treatises of Navya Nyāya, Paṇḍita Kālīsaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya had the credit of giving the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* its present fully developed form. This, of course, is borne out up to a certain extent by the fact that in the *Kālīsaṅkarī vivecanā* on Navya Nyāya treatises, some statements are found here and there which indicate the application of this technique for the sake of the clarification of some points.²

After a careful study of the *Kroḍapatras* of Kālīsaṅkara, the present writer also is inclined to think that the present form of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* is, to a great extent, due to Paṇḍita Kālīsaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya Tarkavāgiśa of Bengal who flourished in the first part of the 19th century A. D.

But it is worthwhile to take note once again of the contribution of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya towards the development of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* in its present form. Apart from his direct mention of the insertion of *Paryāpti*,

तानिरूपितायाञ्च जनकतायामवच्छेदिका या प्रकारता तस्या वा निवेशान्नोक्त-
दोषः—

Savyabhicāra Gādādhari, p. 1644, Chowkhamba edition.

1. जनकतावच्छेदकतापर्याप्तिर्न निवेश्यते प्रयोजनाभावात्—

Savyabhicāra Gādādhari, p. 1642, Chowkhamba edition.

2. न च पर्वतनिष्ठाधिकरणताया निरूपकतावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रति-
योगिताकपर्याप्त्यनुयोगितावच्छेदकत्वाभाव एव धूमत्वगतैकत्वे साध्यत इति
वाच्यम्—

Kālīsaṅkarī vivecanā on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadisī, p. 262 (Edited by
Paṇḍita Vāmācaraṇa Nyāyācārya).

which has been pointed out earlier, Gadādhara has clearly mentioned the dual number or twoness existing in the properties like *Mahānāsīyavahnibhinna* or the mutual absence of the fire of the kitchen and 'vahnitva' or fireness as the limiter of the subjunction of the 'Paryāpti' (*Paryāptyanuyogitāvacchedaka*) of the *Sādhyatāvacchedakatā* or the limitorness of the contentness of inference in the case of the inference like *Mahānāsīyavahnibhinnavahnimān dhūmāt*, thus indicating that he had knowledge of the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* in which the number existing in a certain property or properties, constituting, as it does, the limiter of the subjunction (*Anuyogitā*) of the *Paryāpti* of the *Avacchedakatā*, forms the very essence of the speculation in this matter.¹

It may not possibly be very far from truth to suggest that Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya had considerably developed the technique of *Paryāpti* which had been mentioned by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi who might have got the clue from Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma of Bengal and Pakṣadhara Miśra of Mithila, his renowned teachers, and elaborated by Mathurānātha and Jagadīśa and subsequently given the final touch by Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya.

1. उक्तस्थलीया (महानसीयवह्निभिन्नवह्निमान् धूमात्) नुमितिविधेयता-
वच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकदर्शितधर्मद्वयनिष्ठद्वित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नहेतुमन्निष्ठाभावप्रति-
योगितावच्छेदकत्वपर्याप्तिमति विरोधेन तदवच्छिन्नाभेदासत्त्वात्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Gādādhari, p. 393, Chowkhamba edition.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TECHNIQUE OF EXPRESSION AS AVACCHEDAKĀVACCHINNA

The technique of mentioning an object with its limiter (*Avacchedaka*) is the most common and important one among the Navya Naiyāyikas. As for example, the word *Go* meaning a cow or the word *Caitra*, the name of an individual, would, according to the Navya Naiyāyikas, mean *Gotvāvacchinna* or *Caitratvāvacchinna*.¹ The pursuance of the *Avacchedaka* (limitor) in all these and similar other cases has got a special significance in Navya Nyāya inasmuch as it helps one to remove the ambiguity of meaning from a number of view points. Hence all the treatises on Navya Nyāya are found replete with this sort of peculiar expression.

It should never be thought even for a single moment that the Navya Naiyāyikas used this type of expression for the mere fun of it or for their unusual desire to take particular delight in mentioning things in a roundabout way. Because, in their extreme anxiety to express things or ideas in as precise and unambiguous a manner as possible, the Navya Naiyāyikas never hesitated to burden their statements with apparently cumbrous expressions like *Avacchedakāvacchinna*, which after deep thinking would invariably be considered extremely necessary.

For example, in the definition of *Vyāpti* or the invariable concomitance or pervasion as *Pratīyogyaśamānādhikaraṇayatsamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaṁ yanna bhavati tena samaṁ tasya sāmānādhikaraṇaṁ vyāptiḥ*², the *Vyāpti* has been defined as the co-existence of the *Hetu* with the *Sādhya* which is not limited by the limiter of the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the absence existing in the locus of the *Hetu* while the absence is non-existent at the same time in the

1. यथा गोचैत्रादिः सा हि गोत्व-चैत्रत्वादिजात्यवच्छिन्नमेव गवादिक-
मभिधत्ते—

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā under verse 19, p. 89, old Benares edition.

2. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa*, p. 209, Chowkhamba edn.

locus of its counterpositive. Here, instead of describing the *Sādhya* as *Apratiyogi yanna bhavati*, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya has said *Pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnam yanna bhavati*, because, he wants to avoid the elimination of the *Sādhya* through the process of sifting (*cālāni-nyāya*).

The individual manifestation of fire which exists in the mountain does not exist in the kitchen and vice versa. Similarly, other cases of fire which may be existing elsewhere certainly do not exist in the loci other than their own.

Hence, by the process of sifting (*cālāni-nyāya*) all the specific manifestations of fire become the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) of the absence which may be existing in the locus of smoke, the *Hetu*, in the particular case of inference like *Parvato vahnimān dhumāt* (The mountain possesses fire, because it has got smoke on it).

By pursuing up to the *Avacchedaka*, the process of sifting can be avoided. Because, though an individual manifestation of fire may not be existing in a particular locus of smoke like a mountain, the generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) of fire cannot be found there, because, the generic absence exists only when there is not even a single individual of a particular class in a particular place. Hence, *vahnitva* or fireness would not be the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) of the counter-positiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) of the absence of fire in the mountain or some other place like that where even a single manifestation of fire may be existing.

Vahnitva (fireness) would be the limiter of the counter-positiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) only when the generic absence of *vahni* or fire exists in a particular place.

Hence, though an individual manifestation of fire (*vahnivyaktiviśeṣa*) may be the counterpositive (*Pratiyogī*) through the process of sifting (*Cālāni-nyāya*), the definition of *Vyāpti* would be flawless by pursuing upto the *Avacchedaka* (limitor) of the counterpositiveness of absence.

Innumerable instances may be multiplied where the pursuance of *Avacchedaka* helps to make the statement precise. Therefore, in the treatises of Navya Nyāya, wherever the reference of an *Avacchedaka* occurs, it should always be clearly understood that there is a definite purpose behind it and the mention of the *Avacchedaka* (limitor) which would limit any relational abstract property or any thing other than that is not for nothing.

The use of the term *Avacchedakāvacchinna* (limited by a limiter) in the above mentioned definition of *Vyāpti* has been variously justified by the subsequent commentators. It has been suggested by some scholars that if in the definition of *Vyāpti* of the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* the expression *Avacchedakāvacchinna* were not used, then the definition would become too wide to include the case of a wrong inference in which a substance (*dravya*) may be considered a *Sādhya* (object of inference) through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). It has been pointed out that the *Pratiyogitva* (counterpositiveness) of the absence existing in the locus of the *Hetu* of a wrong inference like that would exist in an inhered substance alone (*samaveta-dravyasyaiva*) and as such, other substances (*dravyas*) which are not inhered (*samaveta*) like the ether etc. (*gaganādi*) would become *apratyogī* or non-counterpositive of the said absence. So, the wrong *Hetu* like *Prameyatva* etc. would exist in the same locus of its *Sādhya* and as such, the *Vyāpti* of the *Sādhya* existing in the *Hetu* would be supposed to exist in the wrong *Hetu* like *Prameyatva* etc. also, which would make the definition of *Vyāpti* too wide.

By saying *Avacchedakāvacchinna* this contingency can be avoided. Because, *dravyatva* (substanceness) would be the limiter of the counterpositiveness of the absence existing in the locus of the *Hetu* which, of course, is *Prameyatva* in the above mentioned wrong inference¹ and as such, the co-existence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the *Hetu* with the *Sādhya* which is limited by the limiter of the counter-positiveness of the absence existing in the locus of the 'Hetu' would not be considered as the *Vyāpti* here. Hence the definition of *Vyāpti* would not be too wide to include the 'Hetu' of a wrong inference where the *Vyāpti* actually does not exist.

In his commentary on *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Dīdhiti*, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra has pointed out the utility of using the expression *avacchinna* in the definition of *Vyāpti* mentioned earlier. There the eminent logician says that the use of the term *avacchinna* in the

1. अपरे तु अवच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वानुपादाने समवायेन द्रव्यसाध्यकव्यभिचारिण्यतिव्याप्तिः तादृशाभावप्रतियोगित्वं समवेतद्रव्यस्यैवेति स्वीकारात् तच्छून्यत्वस्य गगनादौ सत्त्वादिति—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : Foot Note on the commentary of *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgādīśi* p. 2.

definition of *Vyāpti* is not for nothing. He has said it by implication that by using the term *avacchinna* Gaṅgeśopādhyāya has saved the definition of *Vyāpti* from being involved in the technical defect of the definition called *Ativyāpti* (overpervasion). Because, if the term *avacchinna* were not mentioned in the definition, then the *Sādhya* of a wrong inference might be considered as a noncounterpositive (*apratiyogī*) of an absence existing in some particular loci of the *Hetu* and as such, the *Hetu* of a wrong inference also may appear to be a right one. For example, in the case of a wrong inference like *Ayam dhūmavān vahneḥ* (This is smoky, because it possesses fire), the smoke (*dhūma*) which is the *Sādhya* of the inference may be existing in some loci of fire like the mountain, the cross road etc. and as such it would be the non-counterpositive (*apratiyogī*) of the absence existing in the locus of the *Hetu* to a certain extent, thus making the *Hetu* i.e. the fire, (*vahni*) appear to be a valid one by virtue of its apparently possessing the *Vyāpti* or pervasion.

But by pursuing up to the *avacchinna* in the expression *avacchedakāvacchinna* of the definition of *Vyāpti*, this contingency can be avoided. Because, in that case *dhūmatva* or smokiness would never be considered as an *anavacchedaka* or non-limitor of the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of the absence existing in the locus of fire (*vahni*), the *Hetu* of the wrong inference. Because, the generic mutual absence (*sāmānyabheda*) of the *Avacchedaka* of the *Pratīyogitā* has been hinted at as *Avacchedakatvāvacchinnapratīyogitākabhinnatvam* by the mention of the term *avacchinna* in the definition. Instead of saying *apratiyogī yanna bhavati* the statement *Pratīyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaṁ yanna bhavati* certainly has got some special significance. Otherwise, there would not have been any sense in saying in a roundabout way. Particularly, the expression *avacchinna* in the definition indicates that in the final analysis the term *avacchinna* should certainly be used for the clarification of the sense. In making the clarification of the definition by using the term *avacchinna*, the word *Avacchedaka* in the definition has been taken for *Avacchedakatva* by Jagadīśa, because, otherwise the clarification would not be perfect.¹ Hence the term *Avacchedaka* in the defi-

1. तथा च प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकेत्यस्य भावप्रधाननिर्देशतया अवच्छिन्न-पदस्यावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकपरतया तादृशप्रयोगितावच्छेदकत्वावच्छिन्नप्रति-

inition, according to Jagadīśa, is a *Bhāvapradhānanirdeśa* or a statement which mainly indicates the special abstract property existing in a particular object signified by a stem word.¹ Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita also has explained the meaning of the term *Bhāva* in the similar way.² Jñānendra Sarasvatī in his *Tattvabodhinī* commentary on *Siddhāntakaumudī* has approved this meaning of the term *Bhāva* by adding that each and every property should not be understood as a *Bhāva*.³

This sort of interpretation is sometimes resorted to in the Sanskrit treatises including the works of Navya Nyāya with a view to making the sense absolutely clear, and hence it is not unwarranted. We find this sort of expression in the rules of Pāṇini's grammar also. The rules *Dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane* (1.4.22) and *Bahuṣu bahuvacanam* (1.4.21) have been explained by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita as *Dvitvaikatvayorete staḥ* and *Bahutve etat syāt* respectively. There in the two rules the words *Dvi Eka* and *Bahu* have been explained as *Dvitva*, *Ekatva* and *Bahutva* respectively indicating thereby that the term *Dvi*, *Eka* and *Bahu* should be taken to mean the special abstract property (*Bhāva*) residing in the objects signified by the words *Dvi*, *Eka* and *Bahu*. Vācaspati Miśra also has approved this interpretation of the above mentioned rules of Pāṇini's grammar in his commentary called *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* in the verse *Avivekyādeḥ siddhistraiguṇyāt*, etc.⁴

There the eminent philosopher has explained the word *Aviveki* as *Avivekitva*, suggesting thereby that it is a case of *Bhāvapradhānanirdeśa*, citing at the same time the above men-

योगिताकभिनत्तत्वं लभ्यत इति मूले नावच्छिन्नपदवैयर्थ्यमिति ध्येयम्—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadīśi, p. 209, Chowkhamba edition.

1. प्रकृत्यर्थासाधारणधर्मस्यैव भावपदार्थत्वात्—

Anumiti Gādadhari, p. 209, Chowkhamba edition.

2. प्रकृतिजन्यबोधे प्रकारो भावः—

Siddhānta Kaumudī, under Pāṇini's rule 5.1.119. p. 290.

3. न तु यः कश्चिद् धर्मः घटत्वमित्यत्र द्रव्यत्वपृथिवीत्वादेरभानात्—

Tattvabodhinī, p. 290.

4. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, verse 14.

अविवेकित्वमविवेकि, यथा द्व्येकयोर्द्विवचनैकवचने इत्यत्र द्वित्वैकत्वयोरिति, अन्यथा द्व्येकेष्विति स्यात्—

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on the same verse.

tioned rules of Pāṇini's grammar as an authoritative example.

Hence, the interpretation of the term *Avacchedaka* existing in the definition of *Vyāpti* given by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as *Avacchedakatva* by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra is absolutely according to the principles of interpretation of Sanskrit texts in this way wherever necessary.

The technique of double negation

In the technique of Navya Nyāya, negation or absence (*Abhāva*) plays a very important part. Almost all the definitions and elaborate treatment of facts and ideas are put forward with the help of the absence. In many cases the double negation or absence is very much used with a view to clarifying those points which otherwise could not have been clarified in the proper sense of the term.

The common theory regarding the use of double negation is this that by the use of double negation the fact in question is strengthened.¹

In the *Vyāptipañcaka*, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya has defined *Vyāpti* or pervasion as *Sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam* which means the non-existence of the *Hetu* or the middle term in the locus of the absence of the *Sādhyā* or the object of inference.

If instead of saying *Sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam* with two negative words, the *Vyāpti* were defined as *Sādhyavadavṛttitvam*, then the definition of *Vyāpti* would become too wide to include the *Hetu* of the wrong inference like *Dhūmavān vahneḥ* in which the *Hetu*, i.e., *vahni* (fire) exists in the locus of the *Sādhyā* which is *dhūma* (smoke) here². But if the *Vyāpti* is defined as *Sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam*, as has been done by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya,

1. नञ्द्वयस्य प्रकृत्यर्थदाढ्यबोधकत्वम्—

Foot Note on *Siddhānta Kaumudī*, p. 11, Edited by Vāsudeva Śarmā, (N. S. Press Edition).

द्वाभ्यां निषेधाभ्यां प्रकृत्यर्थदाढ्यबोधनेन—

Paramalaghumañjūsā, p. 72, Chowkhamba edition.

2. अत्र साध्यवद्वृत्तित्वमित्युक्तौ धूमवान् वल्लेरित्यत्रातिव्याप्तिर्वल्लेर्धूमवद्वृत्तित्वात्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, Commentary on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī* p. 22.

then the definition would become free from the above mentioned defect. Because fire exists in the locus of the absence of smoke, the *Sādhya*, in a red hot iron ball (*taptāyogolakāḥ*).

The argument underlying the strength of objects to be understood through the mention of double negative words has been supplied by Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra in his commentary on *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi*. There the eminent scholar says that double words signifying negation have the capacity to produce a sense in which the absence is construed with all the loci of the absence of a particular object.¹ Therefore, on the strength of this argument the non-existence of the *Hetu* in all the loci of the absence of the *Sādhya* is to be understood from the definition of *Vyāpti* as *Sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam*.

Now if a single instance of the locus of the absence of the *Sādhya* is found in which the *Hetu* also exists, then the non-existence (*avṛttitva*) of the *Hetu* in all the loci of the absence of the *Sādhya* would not be proved.

Hence by the application of the technique of the use of double negation the *Naiyāyikas* always try to make the statement useful and unambiguous.

Innumerable similar instances of the statements with double negative words are to be found in the Navya Nyāya treatises, in each and every case of which there is some deep significance.

1. नञ् द्वयस्य अनुयोगितावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनान्वयबोधजनकत्वस्य व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धत्वादिति भावः—

Commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi, p. 100, Chow. edn.

CHAPTER IX

THE TECHNIQUE OF ANUGAMA

The technique of *Anugama* is very commonly applied in the Navya Nyāya treatises for the sake of including diverse objects of the same category and sometimes even of different categories into one group by a single statement. The word *Anugama* means accepting all required objects in a common form (*Anugatarūpeṇa sarvasaṁgrahaḥ*). On the strength of an interpretation of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, Bhīmācārya, the author of Nyāya-koṣa, has defined *Anugama* as a common connotation (*Pravṛttinimitam*). For example, all the jars (ghaṭa) have got a common connotation in the form of the generic character like jariness (*ghaṭatva*).¹ In his commentary on *Avayava-Dīdhiti* Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has explained the word *Ananugama* of *Dīdhiti* as *Anugatapravṛttinimitavirahaḥ* meaning the absence of a common connotation, thus indicating that the word *Anugama* means a common connotation.² According to Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa and Raghunātha, *Anugama* may mean a common statement.³

Like many other original devices of Navya Nyāya, this technique of *Anugama* also may be said to have been systematised by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. There is a book in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* called *Vyāptyanugama* in which the great logician has tried to systematise all kinds of pervasion (*Vyāpti*) by defining it as

1. अनुगमः अनुगतप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्, यथा सर्वेषां घटानामनुगमो घटत्वम्—
Nyāyakoṣa, p. 17.

2. अननुगमः अनुगतप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तविरहः—
Avayava Gādādhari, p. 146, Chowkhamba edition.

3. अस्यैकोक्तिमात्रपरतया गौरवस्यादोषत्वात्—
Vyāptipāñcaka Māthuri, p. 23, Vāmācarāṇa's edition.

तेन यत्पक्षकयत्साध्यकानुमितौ कस्यापीच्छा न जाता तत्रोक्तिसाधारण्य-
मात्रसम्पादनायेश्वरेच्छानिवेशनायासो नोपादेयः ।

Pakṣatā Dīdhiti (Jāgadiśi) 1650, Chow. edition.

Anaupādhikatva or the state or condition of being free from an *Upādhi*.¹ The term *Upādhi* here is technical and in a technical sense it means that object which is the pervader (*vyāpaka*) of the *Sādhya* or the object of inference, the major term, and at the same time non-pervader (*avyāpaka*) of the *Hetu* or argument of the inference, the middle term.² If the derivative meaning is taken into consideration then the term *Upādhi* means that object which projects its own attribute on another object existing near it or existing with it in the same locus.³ An *Upādhi* in the context of inference is always associated with a wrong *Hetu*, indicating that the *Hetu* cannot produce any valid inference under the circumstances. But that is a different topic which need not be discussed here. Only to make the *Anugama* of *Vyāpti* it has been considered necessary to point out that the *Vyāpti* in all cases is absolutely free from the association of any kind of *Upādhi*.

There are two distinct methods of *Anugama* in Navya Nyāya. One is called *Samśarga-mudrayā anumamaḥ* or the *Anugama* or common statement through the application of relation, the words *saṁsarga* and *mudrā* meaning relation and process respectively. The other kind of *Anugama* is called *Prakāramudrayā anumamaḥ* or the common statement through the mention of the qualifiers for the sake of eliminating some undesirable objects as also for making a flawless common statement.

The first kind of *Anugama* is to be found in the earlier treatises of Navya Nyāya beginning with, as already pointed out, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. Later on, Pakṣadhara Miśra, Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and subsequently writers of the higher

1. अनौपाधिकत्वं हि तल्लक्षणम्—

Vyāptyanugama, p. 736, Chowkhamba edition.

2. साध्यस्य व्यापको यस्तु हेतोरव्यापकस्तथा—

Bhāṣāpariccheda, verse No. 138.

3. उप समीपवर्त्तनि आदधाति स्वीयं धर्ममित्युपाधिः—

Upādhi-Dīdhiti, *Jāgadiśi*, p. 524, Chowkhamba edition.

उप समीपवर्त्तनि स्वसमानाधिकरणे स्वधर्मं व्याप्ति बोधयतीति उपाधिशब्दो जपाकुसुमादिसाधारणः—

M. M. Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgiśa. *Kusumāñjali Haridāśi*, commentary, p. 58.

dissertations called *Kroḍapatras* and *Patrikās* oftentimes used this particular technique of *Anugama* for the clarification and simplification of many complex facts and ideas.

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has mentioned *Anugama* in many places of his commentary called *Didhiti*. For example, in his commentary on *Pakṣatā* in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, he has referred to *Anugama* in the course of the enumeration of desire (*icchā*) which forms a qualifier of the *Pakṣa* in the form of the absence of definite knowledge (*siddhi*)¹ of the 'Sādhya' (object of inference). Not only has Raghunātha Śiromaṇi mentioned *Anugama* in a negative way as in the case just referred to where he has said *Ananugama*, which means in the event of the want of *Anugama*, but he has clearly mentioned *Anugama* in a positive way also in many cases.²

Similarly, many examples may be given from the commentaries of Pakṣadhara Miśra, Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa, Jagadiśa Tarkālankāra, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgiśa, Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma and others, only to mention a few, to show that the technique of *Anugama*, though sometimes extremely difficult and complicated, has been a very favourite device the Navya Naiyāyikas.

Sambandhamudrayā anumamaḥ is more frequently used in the Navya Nyāya treatises to clarify any object, simple or complex. A very simple object like contact (*Samyoga*) which is of incomplete occurrence (*Avyāpya-vṛtti*) by nature can be expressed as such by *Anugama* as *Svapratīyogitvasvasāmānādhikaraṇyobhaya sambandhenābhāvavattvam*.³ This sort of statement has got some advantage over the statement of the same object as *Svātīyāntābhāvasamānādhikaraṇatvam*.⁴ Because, if *Avyāpya-*

1. यादृशयादृशेच्छासत्त्वे सिद्धौ सत्यामनुमितिस्तादृशेच्छाभावसमुदायस्य विशेषणत्वादिच्छाया अननुगमेऽपि न क्षतिः—

Pakṣatā-Didhiti, pp. 633-34, Jāgadiśi, Chowkhamba edition.

2. स्वनिवर्तकप्रत्यक्षादिसमवहितान्यत्वादिना च तादृशेच्छयोरनुगमेऽतीव गौरवम्—

Pakṣatā-Didhiti, p. 1162, Gādādhari, Chowkhamba edition.

3. *Dīpikānilakaṇṭhī*, p. 32, Venkatesvara Press edition.

स्वप्रतियोगित्व-स्वसामानाधिकरण्योभयसम्बन्धेनाभावविशिष्टत्वम्—

Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā-Kiraṇāvalī by Kṛṣṇaballabhācārya, p. 55.

4. *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā*, p. 32, Venkatesvara Press edition.

ṛttitva or incomplete occurrence is defined as the existence in the locus of the absence of the self (*Svātyantābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyam*), then the definition would be too wide to include an indifferent (*Udāsīna*) object like substance-ness (*Dravyatva*) which may be existing in the locus of the absence of the contact and which, unlike *Samyoga*, is of complete occurrence. Hence the existence in the locus of the absence should be understood in the self (*Sva*) itself. This obviously involves some sort of additional assumption, if the definition is to be saved from becoming too wide. Compared to this the *Anugama* as noted earlier has got a definite advantage over the definition of *Avyāpyavṛtti* or of incomplete occurrence discussed above. Because, nothing other than an object of incomplete occurrence like contact, etc. would be qualified by an absence through both the relations called *Sva-pratīyogitva* or counter-positiveness of the self (*sva*) and *Sva-sāmānādhikaraṇya* or existence in the same locus with the self, leaving no scope for the definition of *Avyāpyavṛtti* to become too wide and consequently not necessitating any assumption to make the definition flawless.

An object of incomplete occurrence (*Avyāpyavṛtti*) like contact or the like possesses the counterpositive-ness (*Pratīyogitva*) of the absence of the self as also it exists in the same locus with its own absence. It is, of course, extremely necessary to define the *Avyāpyavṛtti* with the help of the two relations mentioned in the *Anugama*. If any one of the relations is omitted, then the definition would become too wide to include objects which are not *Avyāpyavṛtti*. Because, if the second relation, i.e., *Svasāmānādhikaraṇya* is omitted and only the first relation called *Sva-pratīyogitva* is retained, then the objects like *Dravyatva* (substance-ness) which are never *Avyāpyavṛtti* or of incomplete occurrence will be considered as such, inasmuch as *Dravyatva* is always qualified by its absence existing in other objects than *adravya* through the relation of *Svapratīyogitva*.

Similarly, if the second relation, i.e., *Sva-sāmānādhikaraṇya* is retained and the first one called *Svapratīyogitva* is omitted, then also the definition would again become too wide. Because, in that case an object of complete occurrence like *Guṇatva* (quality-ness), the generic character (*jāti*) existing in all the twentyfour kinds of *Guṇa* (quality) may equally be taken into account inasmuch as *Guṇatva* also exists in the same locus with

the absence of contact as no *Guṇa* is said to be existing in any of the twentyfour kinds of *Guṇa*.

Hence it is necessary to state both the relations mentioned earlier in the *Anugama*.

The *Anugama* through relations (*Sambandha-mudrayā anugamaḥ*), of course, may be of highly complicated character in which the component part of a relation may be qualified by another relation, the component part of that relation again may be qualified by yet another relation and so on for the sake of avoiding any possible defect of the statement as also for the sake of making the statement universal. By way of giving an example, the *Anugama* of the *Vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinābhāva* may be cited. *Vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinābhāva* has been defined with the help of *Anugama* through relations by the Navya Naiyāyikas as that absence whose counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) is qualified by another counterpositive-ness through both the relations called *Sva-tādātmya* and *Svāśrayaniṣṭhādhikaraṇatānirūpitanirūpakatāviśiṣṭyāvacchedakatākatva*. The qualification of the *Nirūpakatā* in the *Avacchedakatā* again, which forms a component part of the previously stated relation, is through the four kinds of commonly used relation in the Navya Nyāya treatises for the sake of making *Anugama* of any object, namely, *Svāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinnatva*, *Svasāmānādhikaraṇya Svānavacchedakānavacchinnatva* and *Svavṛttitva*. Again *Svavṛttitva* or existence in the self is to be understood through the relation called *Svānavacchedakānavacchinnatva*.¹

It is to be remembered in this connection that the word *Sva* meaning self in a relation, as stated elsewhere, always refers to the first term of the relation.

The utility of all the aforesaid relations in the *Anugama* has

1. नव्यास्तु प्रतियोगिताविशिष्टप्रतियोगिताकाभावत्वं व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकाभावत्वम्, वैशिष्ट्यञ्च स्वतादात्म्य-स्वाश्रयनिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपितनिरूपकताविशिष्टान्यावच्छेदकत्वोभयसम्बन्धेन । अवच्छेदकतायां निरूपकतावैशिष्ट्यञ्च स्वावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्व-स्वसामानाधिकरण्य-स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व-स्ववृत्तित्वैतच्चतुष्टयसम्बन्धेन । स्ववृत्तित्वञ्च स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्वसम्बन्धेन ।

been pointed out by Paṇḍita Miśra in his *Kroḍapatra* on *Vyadhikaraṇa*.¹

I have quoted here the 'Anugama' of 'Vyadhikaraṇābhāva' from the 'Kroḍapatra' without going to explain it in detail, which work I have undertaken along with the examples of many other *Anugamas* in a different treatise entitled 'Anugama in Navya Nyāya'.

The second type of *Anugama* is called *Prakāramudrayā anugamaḥ* or the general statement through the process of mentioning the *Prakāra* (qualifier or chief qualifier) with a view to eliminating the undesirable *Avacchedakatās* for making the statement free from any shade of doubt or ambiguity.

The final definition of *Vyāpti* as given by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya² in the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has been clarified by the eminent logician, Paṇḍita Dharmadatta Sūri, popularly known as Baccā Jhā of Mithilā, in his *Kroḍapatra* on *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* Jāgadiśī called *Tattvāloka* as follows : *Tadvyaktitvāśrayanirūpitapratīyogitānirūpitāvachedakatāvaddharmāvacchinnam ne-tipratītisākṣikahetusamānādhikaraṇābhāvavṛttyubhayāvṛttidharmāniṣṭhāvachedakatābhinnāvacchedakatvānirūpitabhāvāniṣṭhāvachedakatābhinnāvacchedakatvānirūpitapratīyogitāniṣṭhāvachedakatābhinnāvacchedakatvānirūpitāvachedakatvaniṣṭhāvachedakatābhinnāvacchedakatvānirūpitadharmanīṣṭhāvachedakatābhinnāvacchedakatvānirūpitāvachinnatvaniṣṭhāvachedakatābhinnāvacchedakatvānirūpitapratīyogitākabhedatvāvacchinnānuyogitākāparyāptikakūṭatvāvacchinnavatsādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ vyāptiḥ*.³

In this *Anugama* of the definition of *Vyāpti* all the essential objects which comprise the *Vyāpti* have been mentioned with meticulous care, particularly eliminating those *Avacchedakatvas*

1. रजतत्वनिष्ठस्वावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकताकस्वरूपतो रजतत्वावगाहिज्ञाना-
भावस्य व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वसम्पादनाय स्वानवच्छेदकावच्छि-
न्नत्वनिवेशः । एवं विषयितया स्वरूपतो रजतत्वेन रजतत्वत्वविशिष्ट-रजतत्वा-
वगाहिज्ञानाभावस्य व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावत्वसम्पत्तये स्ववृत्तित्वपदम् ।
Ibid.

2. प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयत्समानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितावच्छे-
दकावच्छिन्नं यन्न भवति तेन समं तस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः—

Tattvacintāmaṇi Siddhāntalakṣaṇa (Jāgadiśī), p. 210, Chowkhamba edition.

3. *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Tattvāloka*, p. 3, Chowkhamba edition.

which should be discarded for the sake of making the definition flawless.

The keynote of the *Anugama* here lies in the fact that the *Sādhya* of the inference should never be limited by the limiter of the counterpositive-ness of the absence which may exist in the locus of the *Sādhya*. In other words, the *Sādhya* should be altogether different from the counterpositive of the absence existing in the locus of the *Sādhya*. This fact has been expressed by the *Anugama* by qualifying the *Sādhya* by the absence existing in the locus of the *Sādhya*. The absence evidently should be the absence of all the indifferent objects like a jar (*ghaṭa*) and the like which actually do not exist in the locus of the *Sādhya*. The absence in question here is of the form *Tadvyaktitvāśraya-nirūpitapratiyogitānirūpitāvacchedakatāvaddharmāvacchinnanā*. The absence of the indifferent objects existing in the locus of the *Sādhya* has been taken as an individual manifestation (*tadvyakti*) for clearly taking the absence into consideration. The particular statement of the difference of the *Avacchedakatā* at every stage has been considered necessary to eliminate the undesirable *Avacchedakatās*, which, if taken into consideration, would incorporate a great deal of ambiguity in the absence in question, thereby rendering the definition of *Vyāpti* useless for all practical purposes. Because, the difference of the *Avacchedakatā* described (*nirūpita*) by the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence makes the absence itself different. Hence by cautiously proceeding at every step after eliminating the undesirable *Avacchedakatās*, the *Sādhya* has been described here in the *Anugama* as something altogether different from the counterpositive of the indifferent absences like those of a jar, etc., which may not exist in the locus of the *Sādhya*, and the co-existence of the Hetu with this type of *Sādhya* has been called *Vyāpti* or pervasion.

The *Anugama* with the help of a *Prakāra* always involves a more detailed statement of objects than the *Anugama* through the relations, because, each and every qualifier (*Prakāra*) has got to be mentioned for eliminating the undesirable objects, whereas, in the *Anugama* through relations, the qualifiers need not be mentioned at all as the relations are not considered as *Prakāra* or qualifier in any way.

Here in the aforesaid *Anugama* the absence of other objects than the *Sādhya* has been taken as an individual manifestation (*Tad-*

vyakti) of absence to be found in the locus of the *Sādhya*. This has been considered extremely necessary, because, otherwise, the absence of other objects which may be existing in the locus of the *Śādhya* may again be considered as non-existent if taken together with another object which may not be existing there. According to the theory of Navya Nyāya the *Vyāsajyavṛttidharmāvacchin-napratiyogitākābhāva* of the absence of other objects than the *Sādhya* may be found in the locus of the *Sādhya*, thus making the *Anugama* of the definition of *Vyāpti* ineffective. Similarly, the elimination of other irrelevant *Avacchedakatās* also is extremely necessary and this has been done at every step to avoid ambiguity and irrelevancy.

If the above mentioned *Anugama* through the mention of the *Prakāras* (*Prakāramudrayā anumamaḥ*) is to be converted into an *Anugama* through the mention of the relations (*Samśargamudrayā anumamaḥ*), then it would be as follows :

*Pratiyogyasamānādhikaraṇahetusamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvavi-
śiṣṭa-sādhyaśamānādhikaraṇyaṁ vyāptiḥ. Vaiśiṣṭyañ ca svavṛt-
tyubhayāvṛttidharmāśraya-nirūpita-pratiyogitānirūpitāvacchedakatā-
vaddharmāvacchinnaśbedakūṭavattvasambandhena.*

This *Anugama* of the definition of *Vyāpti* through the mention of relations, of course, involves rather a comparatively less analysis of objects and as such it is generally used as a handy process of *Anugama*. But if the relation becomes too big and very much indirect (*atiparamparā*),¹ then the relation is not accepted there as such and it necessitates the analysis of all the objects mentioned in a particular context leading to the general statement of the facts by way of *Anugama* through the mention of the *Prakāras* (qualifier or chief qualifier).

But it is interesting to note in this connection that the *Anugama* whether *Samśargamudrayā* or *Prakāramudrayā* is a very much favourite device of the Navya *Naiyāyikas* who would like to clarify any and every object with the help of this method of expression with a view to giving it a general form without any shade of ambiguity or defect in any way.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned here that this method of *Anugama* had subsequently become very popular with the

1. ईदृशपरम्परायाः संसर्गत्वानुपगमादिति—

Commentary on Pakṣatā—Jāgadiśi by Pandita Śivadatta Miśra, p. 105, Chowkhamba edition.

Sanskrit scholars in other fields of Sanskrit study also. The new school of grammarians in particular, and almost all the scholars in other subjects of Sanskrit in general, were so fond of this technique of *Anugama* that even a casual reader of the new school of Sanskrit study in any branch would undoubtedly be convinced of the reality underlying the situation.

The technique of Āṅkura

The word *Āṅkura* literally means a sprout. But the literal meaning of the word is not taken here by the *Navya Naiyāyikas*, though up to a certain extent, a shade of the literal meaning of the word continues to pervade the theory underlying the technique of *Āṅkura*.

Just as a sprout may come out of a seed in any suitable place which may not always be noticed, similarly, there may be a particular point in a particular subject which, though unnoticed in the ordinary course, may be referred to in connection with the logical analysis of certain facts and ideas which must be taken into consideration to make the definition or elucidation of a subject matter all comprehensive and flawless even when viewed from the furthest angle of vision.

The conception of this method of approach to certain problems also is to be traced in the writings of Raghunātha Śīromani¹ and it has been accepted as a logical problem by subsequent writers of Navya Nyāya treatises like Jagadīśa Tarkālāṅkāra,² Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya³ and others and even by the very modern

1. तथाच यत्र सिद्धयन्तरं कदाप्यनुमितिर्न जाता तत्र सिद्धयभावमात्रं कारणम् नतु तत्रेच्छानिवेशोऽपि गौरवात्, प्रयोजनाभावाच्च । तेन यत्पक्षक-यत्साध्यकानुमितौ कस्यापीच्छा न जाता तत्रोक्तिसाधारण्यमात्रसम्पादनायेश्वरे-च्छानिवेशनायासो नोपादेयः—

Pakṣatā-Dīdhiti (Jāgadiśī) p. 650, Chowkhamba edition.

2. इदमुपलक्षणम्, यत्र पक्षे साध्यवत्ताज्ञानोत्तरं कस्याप्यनुमितिर्नोत्पन्ना तत्र साध्यवत्ताज्ञानाभावमात्रं क रणं निश्चय वमपि न निवेशनीयम्—

Pakṣatā Jāgadiśī, p. 651, Chowkhamba edition.

3. यत्साध्यकयत्पक्षकस्थले कदाचिदपि कस्यचिदिच्छा न जाता तत्र पक्षत्वा-प्रसिद्धिरित्याशङ्कायां विश्वविषयिणीं भगवदिच्छामादाय केषाञ्चित् समाधान-माक्षेप्तुं तादृशस्थले इच्छाविरहाविशेषितः सिद्धयभाव एव पक्षतेति समाधत्ते—

Pakṣatā Gādādhari, pp. 1130-31, Chowkhamba edition.

scholars of the field like the late M. M. Paṇḍita Vāmācāraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya¹ of East Bengal domiciled in Vārāṇasī.

The idea underlying the technique of assuming an *Añkura* is that even the very remote possibility of the existence of an object must be taken into consideration and any general statement regarding any logical standpoint must be made in such a way that it may cover the particular point raised, though by a very searching process of imagination. Any logical definition or any general statement regarding any object or objects must be modified in accordance with the point raised by assuming an *Añkura* and hence the technique of assuming an *Añkura* also is of much importance in the Navya Nyāya treatises.

For example, with reference to the points previously mentioned in the foot notes above in this connection, eminent logicians like Raghunātha Śiromaṇi etc. have given due consideration to the facts raised by an *Añkura* and have offered solutions modified by the consideration of those points. Hence in the definition of *Pakṣatā*, a special property of the *Pakṣa*, the minor term, has been modified by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi by the absence of the definite knowledge of the *Sādhya*² in a particular case.

Jagadīśa Tarkālāṅkāra and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also suggested the same kind of modification in the definition of *Pakṣatā* out of their consideration for the points raised by pointing out an *Añkura*.

Therefore, in considering the problems discussed in the Navya Nyāya treatises, due consideration should always be given to the points raised by the technique of assuming an *Añkura* in certain cases.

1. अत्रास्मद्गुरुचरणाः—

यस्मिन् व्याप्यवृत्तौ कस्यापि नाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वभ्रमस्तद्व्याप्यवृत्तितत्साध्यके नोपादेयम्—

Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra, *Commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Jāgadiśī* p. 96, Chowkhamba edition.

2. तत्र सिद्धयभावमात्रं कारणम्—

Pakṣatā-Dīdhiti (Jāgadiśī), p. 650, Chowkhamba edition.

CHAPTER X

SOME OTHER TECHNIQUES

(a) *The technique of mentioning the Avacchedaka through the third case ending (Tṛtīyā vibhakti):*

Innumerable instances are to be found in the Navya Nyāya treatises in which the *Avacchedaka* is not clearly mentioned as such, but it is to be understood from the application of the third case ending (*Tṛtīyā vibhakti*). For example, in the expression *Yena rūpeṇa sādhyatāvacchedakatvaṁ tena rūpeṇa tadanavacchinna-prakāratāvacchedakasya vivakṣitatvāt*,¹ the portion *Yena rūpeṇa sādhyatāvacchedakatvaṁ* means *Yadrūpāvacchinnaṁ sādhyatāvacchedakatvaṁ* or *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakaṁ yadrūpam*.²

Here it is to be noticed that the property (*rūpa*) which happens to be the limiter (*avacchedaka*) of the limitoriness of the limitoriness of the *sādhyatā* (*Sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakam*) has been mentioned as such by the third case ending (*Tṛtīyā vibhakti*) in the word *rūpeṇa*.

(b) *The mention of the Avacchedaka by the term Ghaṭaka*

Sometimes the *Avacchedaka* is expressed by the term *Ghaṭaka*. For example, in the expression *Pratiyogipadaṁ pratiyogitāvacchedakatāghaṭakasambandhenāvacchedakasya vaiśiṣṭyalābhāya*,³ the word *ghaṭaka* means *Avacchedaka*. But this sort of expression is always to be found in the case of relation (*Sambandha*) becoming an *Avacchedaka*, but not in the case of a property (*dharma*).

(c) *The technique of expressing qualification through the suffix Cha, i.e. Īya*

Sometimes the qualification of some object is meant through

1. Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi*, p. 13.

2. Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *commentary on Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi*, p. 13.

3. *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśi*, p. 81, Chowkhamba edition.

the suffix *Cha* which systematically becomes *Īya* according to Pāṇini's rule *Āyaneyīniyiaḥ phaḍhakhachaghām pratyayādinām*.¹

In the statement *Vastutastu svapratiyogitāvacchedakasamsargeṇa sādhyavadbhinne vartate yaḥ sādhyatāvacchedakasambandhena sādhyīyo'bhāvastadvadavṛttitvamarthaḥ*,² the word *Sādhyīyaḥ* which is derived from the stem word *Sādhyā* with the suffix *Cha* or *Īya* attached to it means qualified by the *Sādhyā*. Hence *Sādhyīyo'bhāvaḥ* in the statement quoted here means "The absence which is qualified by the *Sādhyā*." Now, the relation through which the absence becomes qualified by the *Sādhyā* is to be understood by considering the objects concerned in a particular context. Here in this case the relation between the *Sādhyā* and the absence is *Pratiyogitā* (counterpositive-ness) or to be more explicit *Svaniṣṭhapratiyogitākatva*, i.e., the describer-ness of the counterpositive-ness residing in the self. The word *Pratiyogitākatva* means *Pratiyogitānirūpakatva*, the suffix *Ka* standing for the *nirūpaka* or the describer. The first term of the relation signified by the word *Sva* is related to the second term of the relation here through the relation of the particular describer-ness as signified by the compound word *Svaniṣṭhapratiyogitākatva*, the *Pratiyogitā* of which again being limited by the relation which happens to be the limitor of the *Sādhyatā* as stated in the text referred to in this connection.

This suffix *Cha* or *Īya* is sometimes used to signify the adjunct (*Pratiyogī*) of a relation. This type of expression is generally found in the higher dissertations or *Kroḍapatras* to be found in the treatises dealing with some problems relating to inference as discussed in the *Anumānakhaṇḍa* of Navya Nyāya. For example, in the statement *Viśiṣṭasādhyatāvacchedakasthale svāvacchinnāvacchedakatvīyasvarūpasambandhena yadrūpeṇa sādhyatāvacchedakatvaṃ taditarānavacchinnāvacchedakatākahetumanniṣṭhābhāvīyaniruktasambandhena sādhyatāvacchedakatāviśiṣṭānyapratiyogitāvacchedakatvābhāvasya sādhyatāvacchedake vivakṣitatvāditi dhyeyam*³ the expression *Avacchedakatvīyasvarūpasambandhena* means through that *Svarūpasambandha* which has got the specified *Avacchedakatā* as its adjunct (*Pratiyogī*).

1. Pāṇini, 7.1.2.

2. *Vyāptipañcaka-Jāgadiśī*, p. 78, Chowkhamba edition.

3. *Kālīśaṅkarī vivecanā* on *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśī*, p. 250, Vāmācārāṇa Nyāyācārya's edition os *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadiśī*.

Sometimes again the suffix *Cha* or *Iya* stands for *Nirūpita* or described. In the statement just quoted, the expression *Hetumanniṣṭhābhāviya* means *Hetumanniṣṭhābhāvanirūpita* to be construed with the *Pratiyogitā* mentioned there subsequently.

This last mentioned application of the suffix *Cha* or *Īya* is to be frequently met with in the expressions like *Abhāvīya-viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandhaḥ* or absential peculiar qualification relation, where the word *Abhāviya* regularly means *nirūpita* or described by the *Abhāva* or absence.

(d) *The technique of expression with the suffix Ka*

Though the suffix *Ka* is enjoined alternatively in the *Bahuvrihi* compound words, yet in the *Navya Nyāya* treatises the use of this suffix is regularly to be found to signify various shades of meaning.

The general meaning of the suffix *Ka* in the *Navya Nyāya* treatises is possession. For example, in the expression *Tathāhi kiṃ sādhyaviśiṣṭapakṣakānumititvavat tatra liṅgamapi viśayatayā kāryatāvachedakam*,¹ the compound word *Sādhyaviśiṣṭapakṣakānumiti* means that inference which has got a *Pakṣa* qualified by a *Sādhyā*. Similarly, in the expression *Vahnivyāpyavatsa-dharmā parvato vahnimāṇna veti samśayasya tādrśaparvatatvāvacchinnapakṣakavahnivyāpyasādhyakānumitau pakṣatātvavyudāsakatvāt*,² the compound word *Tādrśaparvatatvāvacchinnapakṣakavahnivyāpyasādhyakānumiti* means that *anumiti* or inference which has got a *Pakṣa* qualified by the mountain-ness of that type and a *Sādhyā* in the form of *vahnivyāpya* or pervaded by fire. Many more instances may be cited to exemplify this sort of use of the suffix *ka*.

But a very common use of the suffix *ka* is also to be found in innumerable occasions in the *Navya Nyāya* treatises in which the suffix discussed here means a *nirūpaka* or a describer. For example, in the expression *Sāmānyadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāvasyātyantābhāvātmakatayā*,³ the compound word *Sāmānya-*

1. Pakṣadhara Miśra *Āloka* commentary on *Asādhakatāsādhakatva-prakaraṇam*, p. 1936, Chowkhamba edition of *Gādādhari*.

2. *Pakṣatā Jāgadiśi*, p. 625, Chowkhamba edition.

3. *Vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva-Gādādhari*, p. 209, Chowkhamba edition.

dharmāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva means that absence the *Pratiyogitā* or counterpositive-ness of which is limited by a generic property. In other words, (in the case of a generic absence) the absence happens to be the describer (*nirūpaka*) of the *Pratiyogitā* limited by a generic property.

Similarly, in the expression *Kecittu samśayatvamatra prakṛta-pakṣaviśayatānirūpitaprakṛtasādhyaṇiṣṭhaviśayatākatvam*,¹ the word *Prakṛtapakṣaviśayatānirūpitaprakṛtasādhyaṇiṣṭhaviśayatāka* means that which is the describer (*nirūpaka*) of the *Viśayatā* existing in the *Sādhya* in the particular context and at the same time described (*nirūpita*) by the *Viśayatā* existing in the *Pakṣa* in question.

(e) *The technique of using the word Prati to convey the sense of the sixth case ending (Ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti)*

The word *prati* which is an *Upasarga* or a *Karmapravacanīya* according to grammatical terminology, is used in many cases to signify the sense of the sixth case ending (*ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti*).

For example, in the statement *Tasmāt talliṅgakānumititvāvacchinnaṁ prati prāguktakrameṇa tadanyamātraliṅgakānumitsātreṇa pratibandhakatvameva samyagiti dik*,² the words *Anumititvāvacchinnaṁ prati* mean 'of the *Anumiti*.'

There are innumerable instances of this type which the reader of any *Navya Nyāya* treatise will come across every now and then.

(f) *The technique of the use of the seventh case ending (Saptamī vibhakti) to signify the sense of the sixth case ending*

Sometimes the seventh case ending (*Saptamī vibhakti*) is used to convey the sense of the sixth case ending (*Ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti*).

For example, in the expression *Vahnau ghaṭādisandeho na parvatapakṣakavahnnyanumitau pakṣatā*,³ the word *vahnnyanumitau* means of the inference of *vahni* or fire.

This sort of expression is found elsewhere also and it is commonly known as *ṣaṣṭhyarthe saptamī*.

The use of the seventh case ending to convey the sense of the sixth case ending is, of course, an accepted principle of the

1. Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Pakṣatā Jāgadiśī*, p. 46.

2. Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Pakṣatā Jāgadiśī*, p. 81.

3. Paṇḍita Śivadatta Miśra : *Pakṣatā Jāgadiśī*, p. 7.

Sanskrit writers in general. Hence this sort of use of the seventh case ending in the place of the sixth case ending is not a special feature of the technique of *Navya Nyāya* as such. But it is a fact that the Navya Naiyāyikas have made frequent use of this type of expression.

Though according to Pāṇini's grammar, there is no direct rule to govern this type of expression, yet a very humorous verse of unknown authorship is almost universally quoted in support of it. The verse runs thus :

Kāyasthenodarasthena māturmāṁsam na bhakṣitam.

Na tatra karuṇā hetustatra heturadantatā.

A Kāyastha¹ while lying in his mother's womb does not eat the flesh of his mother. Kindness is not the cause of it, the cause of it is the absence of teeth.

(g) *The technique of the use of the sixth case ending (Ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti) to signify the limiting relation of the Kāraṇatā (cause-ness) and the Kāryatā (effect-ness)*

Sometimes the sixth case ending is used to signify the limiting relation of the *Kāryatā* (*Kāryatāvacchedakasambandha*) as also of the *Kāraṇatā* (*Kāraṇatāvacchedakasambandha*). In the statement *Tathā ca cakṣusannikṣṭaviśeṣyakacākṣuṣaprakāratāvacchedakibhūtaghaṭatvamevaghāṭatvāvacchinnaprakāritākacākṣuṣamprati hetuḥ Atrāpi kāryasyālaukikamukhyaviśeṣyatvaṁ kāraṇasya tu svāśrayatvaṁ pratyāsattiḥ*,² the words *Kāryasya alaukikamukhyaviśeṣyatvaṁ* mean that the relation which is the limiter of the *Kāryatā* (*Kāryatāvacchedakasambandha*) is called *Alaukikamukhyaviśeṣyatvaṁ* whereas, the words *Kāraṇasya svāśrayatvaṁ* mean that the relation which is the limiter of the *Kāraṇatā* (*Kāraṇatāvacchedakasambandha*) is called *Svāśrayatvaṁ*.

(h) *The technique of mentioning the limiter (Avacchedaka), both as a relation and as a property through the third case ending (Tṛtīyā vibhakti).*

1. A particular caste in the Hindu society in India whose social status is just below that of a Brahmin, the highest of all the castes.

2. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa—Jāgadiśi*, p. 338, Chowkhamba edition.

Sometimes the third case ending (*Tr̥tīyā vibhakti*) is used to signify the limiter (*Avacchedaka*) in the form of a relation (*sambandha*) as also in the form of a property (*dharma*).

In the statement *Viśayatayā dravyalaukikapratyakṣe samavāyena mahattvasya hetutvāt*,¹ the word *Viśayatayā* indicates that in regard to the normal perception of a substance (*dravyalaukikapratyakṣa*), the relation which is the limiter of the *Kāryatā* existing in the *Laukikapratyakṣa* of a substance (*dravya*) is called *Viśayatā*, whereas, *Samavāya* or inherence is to be understood as the limiting relation of the *Kāraṇatā* existing in *mahattva* or the *mahat-pārimāṇa*.

Similarly, in the expression *Daṇḍaḥ daṇḍatvena ghaṭakāraṇam*, the word *daṇḍatvena* indicates that the property called *daṇḍatva* is the limiter of the *Kāraṇatā* existing in the *daṇḍa* or the staff.

Though mentioned earlier, this technique has been dealt with here again to illustrate both types of *Avacchedaka*'s, a relation and a property, by the *Tr̥tīyā vibhakti*.

(i) *The technique of mentioning an object of knowledge as an Avacchedaka*

When any kind of knowledge which is a content-possessing object (*saviśayaka-padārtha*) is considered to be a cause of something, then the content (*viśaya*) of the knowledge is called an *Avacchedaka* of the relational abstract property called *Kāraṇatā*. The general mode of expression of this type of *Avacchedaka* is *Viśayavidhayā avacchedaka*.²

Sometimes this type of *Avacchedaka* is called *Viśayatayā avacchedakaḥ*.³

This kind of *Avacchedaka* may be called in respect of any other relational abstract property like *Kāryatā* etc. which may be existing in the knowledge in the event of the knowledge becoming an effect.

It should be mentioned in this connection that this sort of

1. *Dīnakarī*, p. 107, N. S. Press edition.

2. तद्धर्माविच्छिन्नहेतुकतादृशधर्माविच्छिन्नविधेयकानुमितेर्जनकतायां विषय-
विधया अवच्छेदिका—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa—Jāgadiśī, p. 210, Chowkhamba edition.

3. विषयतया अनुमितिजनकतावच्छेदकादभिन्नैवेत्यर्थः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa—Jāgadiśī, p. 215, Chowkhamba edition.

Avacchedaka may be called in regard to an object or content of desire, effort and aversion also, which, along with knowledge, are known as content-possessing objects (*saviṣayakapadārtha*).

In the expression *Viṣayavidhayā*, the word *vidhā* means a *Prakāra* or qualifier. Therefore, the word *Viṣayavidhayā* indicates that the object of the knowledge is a kind of a *Prakāra* of the knowledge, though it may sometimes be called an *Avacchedaka* also.

(j) *The technique of elliptical statement*

A special characteristic feature of the Navya Nyāya technique is the use of elliptical language wherever possible. But though something may not be mentioned explicitly, yet it can be clearly understood from the reference of some other objects which may be mentioned in a particular context. For example, in the expression *Yādṛśasambandheṇa gaganatvāder vṛttimadavṛttitvaṁ tādṛśasambandhāvacchinnāvacchedakatākapratiyogitāko gaganatvādinā prameyasāmānyābhāvo vācya iti bhāvaḥ*,¹ the portion *tādṛśasambandhāvacchinnāvacchedakatāka* means *tādṛśasambandhāvacchinapratiyogitāvacchedakatāka* in which the word *Pratiyogitā* is dropped. But this *Pratiyogitā* as an adjective of the *Avacchedakatā* can be easily understood from the consideration of the *Pratiyogitā* mentioned later on in the same context. Having taken into account the *Pratiyogitā* mentioned later on here, it can be easily understood that the *Avacchedakatā* in question must be the *Pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* or in other words, the *Avacchedakatā* here must be the *Avacchedakatā* described by the *Pratiyogitā* and as such, the *Pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* need not be mentioned in so many words.

Similarly, in the case of the statement of an absence whose *Pratiyogitā* may be limited by a particular property, the property alone is sometimes mentioned as a limiter (*Avacchedaka*), leaving aside the *Pratiyogitā* which is to be understood.

For example, in the expression like *Sādhyatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinnābhāvapraveśe*,² *Sādhyatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinnābhāva* means *Sādhyatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinapratiyogitākābhāva*, where the word *Pratiyogitā*, has not been mentioned in the original statement. But it has got to be supplied to make

1. *Vyadhikaraṇa-Jāgadiśī*, p. 100, Chowkhamba edition.

2. *Vyadhikaraṇa-Jāgadiśī*, p. 146, Chowkhamba edition.

the sense complete. Because, the *Pratiyogitā* alone of an absence can be limited by a property and hence if the property is mentioned as a limiter in the case of an absence, the *Pratiyogitā* which is limited by the property has got to be supplied for the clear understanding of the meaning of the cryptic statement.

Sometimes the relation by which the 'Pratiyogitā' of an absence is limited is mentioned, leaving aside the 'Pratiyogitā' which is limited by the relation to be understood. The expression *Samyogasambandhāvacchinnaguṇābhāvādeḥ*¹ means the absence of *Guṇa* etc. whose *Pratiyogitā* is limited by the relation of contact. Here the 'Pratiyogitā' is not mentioned, but has got to be supplied to make the sense complete.

In some cases again some objects are not mentioned explicitly which are to be understood by considering some other objects connected with them. For example, in the statement *Hetutāvacchedakāvacchinnahetvadhikaraṇatāpratiyogikahetutāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinnādheyatānirūpitaviśeṣaṇatāviśeṣasambandhena niruktasādhyābhāvatvaviśiṣṭanirūpitaniruktasambandhasaṃsargakaniravacchinnādihikaraṇatāśrayavṛttitvasāmānyābhāvasya vivakṣitavāt*,² the expression *sādhyābhāvatvaviśiṣṭanirūpitaniruktasambandhasaṃsargakaniravacchinnādihikaraṇatā* means *Sādhyābhāvatvāvacchinnādheyatānirūpitādihikaraṇatvam*.³ Of course, the *Adhikaraṇatā* here is to be taken through the relation mentioned in this connection, i.e., through the absential qualification relation.

It is to be noted here that though the *Ādheyatā* has not been explicitly mentioned, yet it has got to be understood. For otherwise, the expression *Sādhyābhāvatvaviśiṣṭa* here would convey no cogent sense at all.

Though the expression *Sādhyābhāvatvaviśiṣṭa* may mean the *Sādhyābhāva* or the absence of the *Sādhyā* which is qualified by the absenceness described by the *Sādhyā* as also by the supersaturness (*Ādheyatā*) existing in the *Sādhyābhāva*, yet the word *Adhikaraṇatā* mentioned subsequently in this connection indicates that the object which is described here as qualified by the absence-

1. *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*. p. 48, Vāmācāraṇa Nyāyācārya's edn.

2. *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 46, Vāmācāraṇa Nyāyācārya's edn.

3. Paṇḍita Vāmācāraṇa Nyāyācārya : *Commentary Manoramā on Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 46.

ness of *Sādhya* is nothing other than the *Ādheyatā* or superstratumness existing in the absence of the *Sādhya*.

(k) *The technique of mentioning objects through the describer.*

Sometimes objects are not at all mentioned by their actual names. Rather they are signified by their describers. For example, in the expression *Sādhyābhāvāvaccchinanirūpakatānirūpitanirūpyatāvadyṛttivābhāvasya vivakṣitatvāt*,¹ the *Ādheyatā* or superstratumness existing in the *Sādhyābhāva* has been signified by the word *Nirūpakatā* and the *Adhikaraṇatā* or substratumness residing in the *Adhikaraṇa* of the *Sādhyābhāva* has been indicated by the word *Nirūpyatā* respectively. The *Adhikaraṇatā* existing in any *Adhikaraṇa* or substratum is normally described or determined by *Ādheyatā* residing in the *Ādheya* or superstratum.

Hence both the *Ādheyatā* and the *Adhikaraṇatā* have been indicated here by mentioning them through the term *Nirūpakatā* and *Nirūpyatā* respectively which are nothing other than the words describing the relational abstract properties like those mentioned in this connection.

(l) *The technique of expressing facts by implication*

One of the most important techniques of Navya Nyāya is to express objects by implication. Something may be expressed openly by any statement. But the real meaning would in many cases remain hidden, which would reveal itself to any one who would care to meditate deeply upon the real implication of the statement. Of course, in finding out the implied meaning one has got to proceed in a strictly logical way. Therefore, it is the commonly established theory among the Navya Naiyāyikas even upto this day that the Navya Nyāya treatises should not always be taken to mean what is apparent. The implied meaning should certainly be found out to avoid any possible inconsistency. That is why we find almost everywhere in the Navya Nyāya treatises that the original statement of a particular book has been explained otherwise by the commentator. The final definition

1. Vāmācaraṇa Nyāyācārya : *Manoramā* on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī*, p. 17.

Harihara Śāstrī, *Kroḍapatra* on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthurī* p. 2.

of *Vyāpti* as given by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in the *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa*¹ has been explained otherwise by *Raghunātha Śīromaṇi*.² Similarly, in the *Kroḍapatra* of *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, Paṇḍita Vāmācaraṇa Nyāyācārya has explained the statement *Sādhyābhāvatvaviśiṣṭa*³ etc. as *Sādhyābhāvatvāvacchinnādheyatānirūpitādhi-karaṇatvamityarthaḥ. Sādhyābhāvatvāvacchinnatvañcādheyatāyām sādhyābhāva ityākārakajñānīyaviśayatāvachedakatātvāvacchin-napratīyogitūkaparyāptyanuyogitāvachedakarūpavṛttitvam, vṛttitvañca svāvacchedakatātvāvacchinnapratīyogitūka-paryāptyanuyogitāvachedakatvasambandhena*.⁴

It will be readily noticed that in the *Kroḍapatra* of *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, Paṇḍita Vāmācaraṇa Nyāyācārya has applied even the technique of the insertion of *Paryāpti* to bring out the inner significance of the text of *Māthuri* which would have been unwarranted unless the original statement is supposed to convey the implied meaning.

Of course, in other branches of Sanskrit study also this sort of implied meaning is sometimes taken into account, and hence this cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as the speciality of the Navya Nyāya system alone. But the Navya Nyāya system of Logic has made the maximum use of this type of interpretation so that the Navya Nyāya treatises are found to be replete with innumerable expressions which should not always be taken to mean only what is apparent from them, but something more by way of implication should, in many cases, be understood from those statements.

This is one of the reasons why the Navya Nyāya texts sometimes become very difficult to understand, because, unless the implied meanings are thoroughly understood, it can never be said that the books have been properly read and assimilated.

1. प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयत्समानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नं यन्न भवति तेन समं तस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa—Jāgadiśi, p. 209, Chowkhamba edition.

2. प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणयद्रूपविशिष्टसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदको यो धर्मस्तद्धर्मविच्छिन्नेन येन केनापि समं सामानाधिकरण्यं तद्रूप-विशिष्टस्य तद्धर्मविच्छिन्नयावन्निरूपिता व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः—

Siddhāntalakṣaṇa—Dīdhiti Jāgadiśi, pp. 209-210, Chow. edn.

3. *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 46, Vāmācaraṇa's edition.

4. *Ibid.*

(m) *The technique of analytical approach with a view to finding out the implication of a statement*

The technique of analysis of objects through a process of elimination and acceptance with a view to finding out the real implication of a statement, which may appear to be easy on the face of it, is oftentimes applied in the *Kroḍapatras* or the higher dissertations on Navya Nyāya treatises.

An apparently simple line from the *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri* may be cited here by way of illustration.

Vyāpti or pervasion has been defined as *Sādhyābhāvādhikarāṇavṛttiyabhāvaḥ*.¹ This again has been explained in the *Māthuri* as *Tādṛśavṛttivasāmānyābhāvaḥ*.² Apparently, the meaning is quite clear. *Vyāpti* means the generic absence of the occurrence of that type (which has been referred to immediately before in the *Māthuri*). In other words, the *Vyāpti* or pervasion is the generic absence of the occurrence described by the locus of the absence of the *Sādhyā*.

This apparently simple definition has been thoroughly analysed by Paṇḍita Vāmācāraṇa Nyāyācārya as follows:

Sādhyatāvacchedakasambandhāvacchinnasādhyatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinnaprativyogitvasambandhāvacchinnā yā sādhyaniṣṭhāvacchedakatā-tadbhinnā satī abhāvatvaniṣṭhāvacchedakatābhinna yā avacchedakatā tadanirūpitā niruktāvacchedakatādvayanirūpitā ca yā abhāvaniṣṭhāvacchedakatā tadbhinnā satī adhikaraṇatvaniṣṭhāvacchedakatābhinna yā avacchedakatā tadanirūpitā niruktāvacchedakatādvayanirūpitā yā adhikaraṇaniṣṭhāvacchedakatā tadbhinnā satī yā vṛttivatvaniṣṭhāvacchedakatābhinna vacchedakatā tadanirūpitā yā niruktāvacchedakatādvayanirūpitā pratiyogitā tanirūpakō'bhāva eva tādṛśavṛttivasāmānyābhāva ityasyārthaḥ.³

Here it will be readily noticed that the analysis is based on a generic absence of the specified occurrence (*Tādṛśavṛttitva*) whose form may be understood on a perusal of the analysis as *Sādhyābhāvādhikaraṇa-(nirūpita) vṛttitvaṇi nāsti*. The counterpositive of this absence is *vṛttitva* or occurrence directly or indirectly qualified by many objects and properties.

1. *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 12, Vāmācāraṇa's edition.

2. Ibid.

3. Vāmācāraṇa Nyāyācārya Paṇḍita : *Manoramā* on *Vyāptipañcaka Māthuri*, p. 13.

According to the theory of Navya Nyāya, all the qualifying objects or properties of a counterpositive are called *Avacchedakas* of the *Pratīyogitā* existing in a *Pratīyogī*. Therefore, particular care must be taken to see to it that a single *Avacchedakatā* existing in any one of the *Avacchedakas* is not left out of consideration or a single indifferent 'Avacchedakatā', in other words, an *Avacchedakatā* which does not exist in any one of the objects or properties which qualify the *Pratīyogī*, is unwarrantedly taken in. Because, if an enumerated *Avacchedakatā* is left out or any indifferent *Avacchedakatā* is taken in, then the nature of the absence would become changed altogether, and as such, that changed absence of the occurrence would not constitute the *Vyāpti* as desired. For, according to the theory of Navya Nyāya, the absence becomes different owing to the difference of the *Pratīyogitā*, and the *Pratīyogitā* also becomes different on account of the difference of the *Avacchedakatā* which may describe it. Therefore, if any unwarranted *Avacchedakatā* is taken into account or any necessary *Avacchedakatā* is left out, then the absence will necessarily become different owing to the difference of the *Pratīyogitā* of the absence.

Hence, to avoid this undesirable position, all the necessary *Avacchedakatās* have been clearly mentioned here as so many *Nirūpakas* of the *Pratīyogitā* and all the unnecessary *Avacchedakatās* also have been referred to in a general way for the sake of avoiding them. This has necessitated a very hairsplitting analysis of all the 'Avacchedakatās' in this connection which may be profitable to deal with a bit elaborately.

The form of the absence of the specific occurrence, when analysed, leaves no other alternative than the above mentioned *Parīṣkāra* or clarification of the *Avacchedakatās* which are to be taken into account for the clear and unambiguous understanding of the absence of the occurrence that constitutes the *Vyāpti* or pervasion.

The side of the *Parīṣkāra* in which the unwanted *Avacchedakatās* have been eliminated is equivalent to the insertion of the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti*, whereas, the other side which takes into consideration all the necessary *Avacchedakatās* which are to be included constitutes the *Nyūnavāraka Paryāpti*.

This type of analysis is sometimes preferred by the Navya Naiyāyikas to the insertion of the *Paryāpti*, because, the relation

wing of the insertion of *Paryāpti* which constitutes the *Itaravāraka Paryāpti* is based on a very long indirect relation, the relationness of which is sometimes disputed.

Therefore, the analysis of the absence of the specified occurrence of the *Hetu* has been resorted to for the sake of the clear understanding of the nature of pervasion. If the *Avacchedakatā* which is different from the *Avacchedakatā* existing in the *Sādhya* as also different from the *Avacchedakatā* residing in the *Abhāvātva* etc., be not eliminated by saying *Tadanirūpitā*, then any indifferent absence may be understood in the place of the absence of the specified occurrence, and as such, there would be confusion in the understanding of the real absence in question.

Similarly, if the qualifying clause *Niruktāvacchedakatādvayanirūpitā* be not mentioned, then some of the necessary *Avacchedakatās* may be omitted, as a result of which the absence in question will become confused with some other absence whose *Pratīyogitā* may be described by a lesser number of *Avacchedakatā*.

The Navya Nyāya treatises, therefore, are found to be replete with this sort of analysis which, though appearing cumbrous at the first sight, has got a very great importance from the standpoint of avoiding ambiguity and attaining exact precision.

(n) *The technique of the clarification (Pariškāra) of definitions etc. by Anugama through relations.*

Definitions etc. are frequently clarified with the help of relations. Something may be defined in one way in the main text. The definition also may be found to be suitable at the first hand and it may meet the logical enquiry upto certain extent. But after subsequent deliberation on the definition some defect may be detected in it which cannot be removed unless the definition is clarified by taking resort to the technique of *Anugama* through the application of relations.

Let us consider the definition of *Nimittakāraṇa* (Instrumental cause) of an effect as given in the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* of Viśvanātha Nyāyapancānana. There the 'Instrumental cause' (*Nimittakāraṇa*) has been defined as *Ābhyām param trīyaṁ syāt*.

A Cause, according to the Nyāya theory, is of three kinds, *Samavāyikāraṇa* (Inherence-exacting cause), *Asamavāyikāraṇa* (Non-inherence-exacting cause) and *Nimittakāraṇa* (Instrumental cause).

After defining *Samavāyikāraṇa* (Inherence-exacting Cause)

and *Asamavāyikāraṇa* (Non-inherence-exacting Cause), *Nimittakāraṇa* (Instrumental Cause) has been defined as follows :—

*Yatsamavetaṁ kāryaṁ bhavati
jñeyaṁ tu samavāyijanakaṁ tat /
Tatrāsannaṁ janakaṁ dvitīyaṁ
ābhyāṁ paraṁ tṛtīyaṁ syāt //*

According to this definition *Nimittakāraṇa* (Instrumental Cause) is that cause which is different from both the *Samavāyikāraṇa* and the *Asamavāyikāraṇa*.

But this definition also becomes too narrow or less extensive to include the *Nimittakāraṇa* of the destruction or posterior absence (*Dhvaṁsābhāva*) of a jar (*Ghaṭa*), as the definition of the *Nimittakāraṇa* cannot be applied to it inasmuch as these can have no *Samavāyikāraṇa* or *Asamavāyikāraṇa* of the destruction of a jar, for the simple reason that the destruction or posterior absence of a jar is not produced anywhere through the relation of *Samavāya*. Hence the *Nimittakāraṇa* of the destruction of a jar as distinct from its *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa* is not possible owing to the fact that the *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa* of the destruction of a jar not being a real entity, a mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva*) of those two kinds of *Kāraṇas* cannot be logically established, and as such the definition of a *Nimittakāraṇa* of the destruction of a jar as distinct from its *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa* also cannot be established.¹

To avoid this difficulty the 'Navya Naiyāyikas have taken recourse to the technique of clarification (*Pariṣkāra*) of the definition by *Anugama* through relations.

Nimittakāraṇa has been defined as *Svasamavāyikāraṇatvasvāsamavāyikāraṇatvānyatarasambandhena Kāryābhāvavattve sati kāraṇatvam*.²

1. तथा सति ध्वंसं प्रति निमित्तकारणे प्रतियोग्यादावव्याप्तेः, तस्य समवायिकारणासमवायिकारणयोरप्रसिद्धेः—

Rāmarudrī super commentary on the *Dinakarī* commentary of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, verse No. 18.

2. This definition was handed over to me by M. M. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgiśa, with whom also I read some treatises of Nyāya for some years. It has also been mentioned by Pt. Rudradhara Jhā of B. H. U. in his commentary on the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* of the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.

The idea underlying this clarification of the definition of the *Nimittakāraṇa* may be elaborated in the following manner.

Nimittakāraṇa of an effect is that cause which is qualified by the absence or negation of its effect, the counterpositiveness (*Pratīyogitā*) of which is limited by either of the two relations, namely, *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva* and *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva*.

An effect, say a jar (*ghaṭa*), is connected with its *Samavāyikāraṇa*, the two final parts of the jar, through the relation called *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva*. It is also connected with its *Asamavāyikāraṇa* through the relation called *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva*. But the jar is not connected with its *Nimittakāraṇa* like the striking by a stick (*daṇḍa*) etc. through either of the two aforesaid relations. Hence it can be said that the absence or negation of the jar, the counterpositive-ness (*Pratīyogitā*) of which is limited by either of the two above mentioned relations (i.e. *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva* and *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva*). The counterpositiveness of the negation of an absence is said to be limited (*avacchinna*) by that relation through which the object does not exist in a particular locus (*Adhikaraṇa*) or does not become associated with it through that relation.

It is now to be taken into account in this connection that *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva* and *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva* are *Vyadhikaraṇa-sambandhas* for the destruction (*Dhvaṃsābhāva*) of a jar, and as such, the *Dhvaṃsābhāva* of a jar, cannot exist in, or become associated with any object through either of the two above-mentioned relations. For, a *Vyadhikaraṇasambandha* is that relation through which a particular object does not exist in, or does not become associated with a particular locus (*Adhikaraṇa*). As for example, the relation of *Samyoga* (contact) is a *Vyadhikaraṇasambandha* for a jar while existing in its final parts called *Kapāla* and *Kapālikā* where it normally exists through the relation of *Samavāya* (Inherence), and never through the relation of *Samyoga*.

Svasamavāyikāraṇatva and *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva* can be conceived as relations of those effects whose *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa* actually exist, and as such, the special abstract properties called *Samavāyikāraṇatva* and *Asamavāyikāraṇatva* existing in the *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa* respectively can become the component parts of a relation in regard to them.

Both *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva* and *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva* are the two *Vyadhikaraṇasambandhas* in regard to the *Dhvaṃsābhāva* of a jar, for the simple reason that a *Dhvaṃsābhāva* has got neither a *Samavāyikāraṇa* nor an *Asamavāyikāraṇa* and as such, the relations *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva* and *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva* which have got a *Samavāyikāraṇa* and an *Asamavāyikāraṇa* included in them, can never be conceived as relations for a *Dhvaṃsābhāva*.

Hence the *Dhvaṃsābhāva* or the destruction of a jar cannot exist anywhere through either of the two aforesaid *Vyadhikaraṇa* relations, and as such, the counterpositiveness (*Pratiyogitā*) of the *Dhvaṃsābhāva* of the jar will be limited (*avacchinna*) by either of the two relations. This particular absence of the effect (*Kārya*) in the form of the *Dhvaṃsābhāva* of a jar exists in the jar also, the counterpositive of the absence, which is one of the instrumental causes of the destruction of the jar along with other instrumental causes like the striking by a stick, etc.

The two component parts of the definition of the *Nimittakāraṇa* of any effect including the destruction of a jar, i.e. *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva*-*Svāsamavāyikāraṇatvānyatarasambandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitākakāryābhāvavattvam* and *Kāraṇatvam* are applicable to any kind of *Nimittakāraṇa*, and as such, it does not suffer from any defect of the definition called *Avyāpti*, *Ativyāpti* and *Asambhava*.

The above mentioned definition of *Nimittakāraṇa* means that causeness (*Kāraṇatva*) which is qualified by the absence of the effect (*Kāryābhāva*)—the counterpositiveness of which is limited by either of the two relations called *Svasamavāyikāraṇatva* and *Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva*.

It is now to be taken into account that a *kārya* or effect does not exist or become associated with any one of the *Nimittakāraṇas* (instrumental cause) through either of the two aforesaid relations. So the *kāryābhāva* or the absence of the effect, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by either of the two above mentioned relations, exists or becomes associated with the *Nimittakāraṇa* of the effect and the property called *Kāraṇatva* (Causeness) also exists there in the *Nimittakāraṇa*, so that the definition of *Nimittakāraṇa* becomes general and flawless with reference to any kind of *Nimittakāraṇa*, be that a positive effect (*bhāvakārya*)

like a jar (*ghaṭa*) or a negative effect like the *dhvaṃsābhāva*, or posterior absence of a jar.

This clarification (*pariṣkāra*) of the definition of *Nimittakāraṇa* of an effect like the posterior absence of a jar has been hinted at, though not clearly stated, in the *Rāmarudrī* super commentary of the *Dinakarī* commentary of the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*¹. The problem only has been raised there leaving aside the clarified solution of it to be offered later on by the Navya Naiyāyikas after taking a clue from the *Dinakarī* commentary where it has been stated *Atredam bodhyam, Samavāyikāraṇatvāsamavāyikāraṇatvabhinnakāraṇatvameva nimittakāraṇatvam*².

It is to be noted here in the above clarification of the definition of *Nimittakāraṇa* as offered by Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Dinakarī* Commentary, that the astute logician has made some modification of the original definition of the *Nimittakāraṇa* as a cause different from the *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa* and has offered his own definition of *Nimittakāraṇa* as quoted above in which the difference has been drawn from the *Samavāyikāraṇatva* and *Asamavāyikāraṇatva* and not from the *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa*.³ By so doing the definition of *Nimittakāraṇa* has been saved from becoming too narrow or less extensive by enabling it to include the contact of the weaver's shuttle called 'Turi' with the yarn or thread (*turītantu-samyoga*) which is the *Nimittakāraṇa* of the contact of the said instrument with the cloth (*turīpaṭasamyoga*). Otherwise, the *turītantusamyoga* (the contact of the weaver's shuttle called 'Turi' with the yarn or thread (*tantu*) being the *Asamavāyikāraṇa* (Non-inherence-exacting cause) of the 'turīpaṭasamyoga' (the contact of the *turī* with the cloth), the general mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva* or *Bhinnatva*) of the *Asamavāyikāraṇa* will not be found in its *Nimittakāraṇa*. If, of course, without giving a general definition of *Nimittakāraṇa*, particular individual definitions of the same are separately given for individual effects,

1. तथा सति ध्वंसं प्रति निमित्तकारणे प्रतियोग्यादावव्याप्तेः तस्य समवायिकारणासमवायिकारणयोरप्रसिद्धेः—
Rāmarudrī, 75, chowkhamba edition.
2. *Dinakarī* commentary on *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, verse 18, p. 85, chowkhamba edition.
3. *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, verse No. 18.

then a way can be found out to save the definition from including the 'Asamavāyikāraṇa', the contact of the weaver's shuttle called 'Turi' with the cloth (*turīpaṭasamyoga*), as has been suggested in the *Dinakarī*¹ Commentary of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and elaborated in the *Rāmarudrī*² supercommentary. But even in that case the definition of the *Nimittakāraṇa* of the destruction of a jar, as mentioned earlier, cannot easily be given in that line as there cannot be a *Samavāyikāraṇa* or *Asamavāyikāraṇa* of the destruction of a jar from which a difference can be drawn and hence the definition would become too narrow to include the *Nimittakāraṇa* of the destruction or posterior absence of a jar, thus calling for a new clarified definition.

But even the clarified definition of the *Nimittakāraṇa* as offered by Mahādeva in the *Dinakarī* commentary and explained in the *Rāmarudrī* supercommentary does not offer a thoroughly satisfactory definition unless the clarification (*Parīṣkāra*) with the help of the application of *Vyadhikaraṇasambandha* is resorted to as explained earlier. Because even to find out a difference between the *Samavāyikāraṇatva* and *Asamavāyikāraṇatva* on the one hand and the *Nimittakāraṇatva* on the other, in respect of a particular effect, it is at first necessary to establish logically the real objects in the form of *Samavāyikāraṇatva* and *Asamavāyikāraṇatva* with reference to that effect.

But as the destruction or posterior absence (*Dhvaṃsābhāva*) of a jar can have no *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Asamavāyikāraṇa*, the relational abstract properties called *Samavāyikāraṇatva* and *Asamavāyikāraṇatva* in respect of the destruction of a jar cannot be established and hence no distinction from those two

1. अत्रेदं बोध्यम् । समवायिकारणत्वासमवायिकारणत्वभिन्नकारणत्वमेव निमित्तकारणत्वम् । तेन तुरीपटसंयोगं प्रति तुरीतन्तुसंयोगस्यासमवायिकारणत्वेऽपि न तस्य पटं प्रति निमित्तकारणत्वक्षतिरिति ।

Dinakarī under Verse 18 of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, p. 85, chowkhamba edition.

2. ननु समवायिकारणासमवायिकारणभिन्नत्वे सति कारणत्वस्य निमित्तकारणलक्षणत्वे पटनिमित्तकारणे तुरीतन्तुसंयोगेऽव्याप्तिः, तस्य तुरीपटसंयोगासमवायिकारणत्वेन तदभिन्नत्वविरहात् । नच तत्कार्यसमवायिकारणासमवायिकारणभिन्नत्वे सति तत्कार्यकारणत्वं तत्कार्यं प्रति निमित्तकारणत्वमिति विशिष्यैव लक्षणं वक्तव्यम्, तथा च तुरीतन्तुसंयोगस्य पटसमवायिकारणासमवायिकारणयोर्भिन्नत्वेन न तत्र पटनिमित्तकारणत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तथा सति ध्वंसं प्रति निमित्तकारणे प्रतियोग्यादावव्याप्तेः, तस्य समवायिकारणासमवायिकारणयोरप्रसिद्धेरित्याशङ्कां निराकुहते—अत्रेदमित्यादिना ।

Rāmarudrī, p. 85, Chowkhamba edition.

abstract properties (i.e. *Samavāyikāraṇatva* and *Asamavāyikāraṇatva*) can be drawn with the *Nimittakāraṇatva* of the destruction of a jar and the like, thus necessitating the clarification of the definition of the *Nimittakāraṇa* with the help of the technique of *Anugama* through relations and thus save the definition from any kind of defect.

The clarification (*pariṣkāra*) of the definition of the 'Nimittakāraṇa' by 'Anugama' through the application of relations has already been explained in some detail. The technique of the expression called 'Anugama' through relations took a particularly condensed form in later times. The condensed form is nothing but a different mode of expression based on the analytical form of the 'Anugama' which is a bit more exhaustive and hence comparatively easy to understand.

The definition of 'Nimittakāraṇa' as 'Svasamavāyikāraṇatva-svāsamavāyikāraṇatvānyatarasambandhena kāryābhāvavattve sati kāraṇatvam' has been more briefly expressed as 'Vastuviśiṣṭatvam Nimittakāraṇatvam'. Obviously this definition through 'Anugama' is very concise in form.

But if we are to make a critical evaluation of the nature of this type of 'Anugama', we are constrained to observe that the conciseness of the definition through 'Anugama' with the help of relations is of course, convenient to a degree, but actually all the aspects necessary to make the definition flawless will have to be taken into account with a view to clearly understanding it. Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that the 'Anugama' type of clarification is certainly concise in form like the 'Sūtra' literature.

The 'Anugama' of the definition of 'Nimittakāraṇa' has already been mentioned as 'Vastuviśiṣṭatvam'. Now if we proceed to analyse the 'Anugama' with a view to clarifying it, we will have to consider many things.

At the first instance we are to take note of the fact that instead of mentioning the effect (*Kārya*) whose 'Nimittakāraṇa' is being defined by the 'Anugama', objects in general have been mentioned by the term 'Vastu'. An effect, of course, is certainly a 'Vastu' or an object. But to mention an effect by the term 'effect' is quite different from mentioning it by the term 'Vastu'. 'Vastu' is a general term which can be applied to signify any conceivable object which may be an effect (*Kārya*) or otherwise. Then what is the advantage of mentioning the effect (*Kārya*) as a 'Vastu' without having mentioned it as an 'effect' in the 'Anugama'?

The answer is not far to seek. As it is always easier to have a general view of an object without entering into the consideration of its particular nature, the 'effect' (Kārya) has been mentioned as a 'Vastu' instead of its being mentioned as an 'effect'. Because 'Vastutva' or objectness is an all pervading non-negatable property existing in each and every object including an 'effect' (Kārya), whereas 'effectness' (Kāryatva) is a particular property existing only in an 'effect'. Hence to know an object as an object, i.e., qualified by the general property 'objectness', is to know it in a general way. But to know an object as an 'effect', i.e. qualified by the particular property 'effectness', is to know it in a particular way. Now, to know 'Vastutva' or objectness is comparatively an easy affair than to know 'effectness' or 'Kāryatva', because 'Vastutva' is nothing but 'Padārthatva' which has been defined as 'Abhidheyatva', i.e., the state or condition of being primarily signified by a word.¹ Compared to this the knowledge of an object as an 'effect' is rather a bit more difficult to comprehend and involves a long procedure. Because an 'effect' (Kārya) has been defined as 'Prāgabdhāvapratiyogī'² or the counterpositive of a prior absence. Hence to know an effect (Kārya), one has to know 'Prāgabdhāva', i.e., 'prior absence and its counterpositive (Pratīyogī) also. There has been great difference of opinion about the logical justification of accepting 'Prāgabdhāva' as a separate entity. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has strongly disputed the justifiability of accepting 'Prāgabdhāva' in the 'Sāmānyalakṣaṇaprakaraṇa' of the 'Tattva-cintāmaṇi'. Again 'Kārya' is a relative term always invariably connected with a 'Kāraṇa'. Hence to know a 'Kārya' involves a long procedure compared to the knowing of a 'Vastu' or object in general.

Hence the definition of a 'Nimittakāraṇa' by 'Anugama'³ through the relations as described earlier took a more concise form later on and the 'Anugama' was mentioned as a Vastuvi-
śiṣṭatvaṁ Nimittakāraṇatvaṁ, Vaiśiṣṭyañ ca svakāraṇatvasvābhā-
vavattvobhayasambandhena. Svābhāvaś ca svasamavāyikāra-

1. Tarkasaṃgraha

Dīpikā, 6, Veṅkaṭeśvara Press edition.

2. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 40, Veṅkaṭeśvara Press. edition

3. Definition handed over to me by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgiśa.

ṇatvasvāsamavāyikāraṇatvānyatarasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākāḥ¹

Though in the definition of 'Nimittakāraṇa' the first term is a 'Vastu' or an object in general, yet by the term 'Vastu' the effect or 'Kārya' alone will have to be taken into account on the strength of the relation through which the 'Viśiṣṭatva' or qualification has been mentioned. The qualification of a 'Vastu' with the 'Nimittakāraṇa' has been mentioned through two relations, one of them being 'Svakāraṇatva' and the other 'Svābhāvavattva'. By the term 'Sva' in 'Svakāraṇatva' an effect (Kārya) will invariably have to be taken into account, because a 'Kāraṇa' (cause) can only be said of an effect (Kārya) and not of anything else. Similarly by the term 'Sva' in the second relation 'Svābhāvavattva' also, the effect ('Kārya') will have to be taken into account on the strength of the object (i.e., the effect—'kārya') which has been taken into consideration by the term 'Sva' in the first relation.

The 'Svābhāva' i.e., the 'Kāryābhāva' (absence of the effect) is to be understood as that absence whose counterpositiveness (Pratīyogitā) is limited by either of the two relations called 'Svasamavāyikāraṇatva' and 'Svāsamavāyikāraṇatva', both of which are 'Vyadhikaraṇasambandha's for the effect (Kārya) for staying in the 'Nimittakāraṇa' and hence the absence of the effect would always stay in the 'Nimittakāraṇa'. The other condition of the definition, i.e., 'Svakāraṇatva' also will then stay in the 'Nimittakāraṇa', and hence having taken into account both the conditions of the definition of the 'Nimittakāraṇa' we can invariably apply the definition to any and every case of 'Nimittakāraṇa', be that 'Nimittakāraṇa' of a positive effect (bhāvakārya) like a 'ghaṭa' (a jar) or a negative effect (abhāvakārya) like the destruction or the posterior absence of a jar (ghaṭadhvarṇsa), and herein lies the excellence of the technique of 'Anugama' in giving the otherwise impossible definition of an object of any kind, positive or negative.

Each and every qualifying clause of the definition of 'Nimittakāraṇa' by 'Anugama' has got its utility in guarding any one or more of the defects of a definition like 'Avyāpti' (less pervasiveness), 'Ativyāpti' (overpervasiveness) or 'Asambhava'

1. Paṇḍita Jvālāprasāda Gauda's commentary on the Siddhāntamuk-tāvalī on the definition of 'Nimittakāraṇa', Bhāṣāpariceheda, Verse No. 18.

(impossibility, and the writer of this work at this moment wants only to give some hints leaving the discussion to be thought out by the readers themselves, as the detailed treatment of 'Anugama' may conveniently be treated in a separate treatise.

If the relation 'Svakāraṇatva' is left aside and only the 'Svābhāvavattva' relation is retained, then the definition of 'Nimittakāraṇa' would become overpervasive. The same defect of the definition would take place again if the relation 'Svābhāvavattva' is left out and the relation 'Svakāraṇatva' alone is retained. Similarly, if the 'anyatara' relation is left out without specifically mentioning it as the limiter of the counterpositiveness of the absence of 'Sva', i.e., the 'Kārya' or effect, the definition would again become overpervasive and the 'Anugama' would fail to serve its purpose of giving a flawless brief definition of the 'Nimittakāraṇa'.

CHAPTER XI

A comparative study of the analytical techniques of finding out the meanings of words and judgements according to the 'Navya Nyāya' and the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' (grammarian) schools of thought.

The Navya Naiyāyikas have got their own independent logical and analytical technique of finding out the meanings of words and judgements. In so doing they sometimes give up the accepted meanings of other schools of thought. As for example, the meaning of the suffix 'ti' in the verb 'Pacati' (cooks), according to the grammarians, is the agent (Kartā). But the Naiyāyikas do not accept this meaning on account of 'Gaurava' or technical heaviness in accepting a number of objects necessitating a long process of understanding. Because if the suffix 'ti' in the word 'Pacati' means the agent, then the limitor of the 'Śakyatā' would be 'Kartṛtva' existing in the 'Kartā' or the agent. Now this 'Kartṛtva' is nothing but 'Kṛti' or 'Prayatna', i.e. effort existing in the self or 'Ātmā'.

To make the sense clear, it is necessary to give some explanatory notes here. The primary meaning of a word is called the 'Śakyārtha' or simply 'Śakya'. There exists in the 'Śakyārtha' a relational abstract property called 'Śakyatā' which is determined (*nirūpita*) by the 'Pada' or word. This 'Śakyatā' is limited (*avacchinna*) by the special property existing in the primary meaning or 'Śakyārtha'. As for example, the term 'Go' primarily means a cow. Hence the animal 'Go' or cow is the primary meaning 'Śakyārtha' or simply 'Śakya' of the term 'Go', and the 'Śakyatāvacchedaka' is 'Gotva' or cowness, the special property existing in the cow (Go).

Similarly, according to the grammarian school, the term 'Kartṛ' primarily means the 'Kartā' or the agent. Hence 'kartṛtva' (agentness) is the 'Śakyatāvacchedaka' existing in the 'Śakyārtha' or 'Śakya' of the term 'kartṛ'. Now what is this 'kartṛtva'? The word 'kartṛtva' has been formed by adding the 'Taddhita' suffix 'Tva' in the grammatical sense of the term 'Bhāva' added to the stem word (Prātipadika) 'kartṛ', according to the rule 'Tasya bhāvastvatalau' of Pāṇini's grammar

(Pāṇini, 5.1.119). The rule means 'The suffixes 'Tva' and 'Tal' are to be attached to a stem word to mean the 'Bhāva' of that word.' The term 'Bhāva' is used in a particular technical sense in grammar in the context of a 'Taddhita' suffix. Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, while explaining the meaning of the term 'Bhāva' in the rule, has said; 'Prakṛtijanyabodhe prakāro bhāvaḥ. Gorbhāvo gotvaṁ Gotā/Tvāntaṁ klibam, talantaṁ striyām', which means 'Bhāva' is the 'Prakāra' or qualifier which exists in the content of the knowledge caused by the 'Prakṛti' or stem word. Incidentally Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita has said that the words formed by adding the suffix 'Tva' are used in the neuter gender, whereas the words formed by adding the suffix 'Tal' are used in the feminine gender.

Jñānendra Sarasvatī while explaining the commentary on the above-mentioned Pāṇini's rule by Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita says, 'Na tu yaḥ kaścīd dharmāḥ, ghaṭatvamityatra dravyatvapṛthivtvāderabhānāt'. That is, each and every property should not be understood as the meaning of the term 'Bhāva'. The suffix 'Tva' attached to the stem word 'Ghaṭa' would mean 'Ghaṭatva' (jariness) and not 'Dravyatva' (substanceness) or 'Pṛthivtva' (earthiness) etc., because they do not flash in our mind (or in our self) on hearing the word 'Ghaṭa'. When we hear the word 'Ghaṭa' uttered before us, we know a 'Ghaṭa' or a jar as qualified by 'Ghaṭatva' or jariness (i.e., we know Ghaṭatvāvaccinna), and not as qualified by 'Dravyatva' or 'Pṛthivtva' or the like, though 'Dravyatva' 'Pṛthivtva' etc. do exist in a 'ghaṭa'. Hence the qualifier (Prakāra) alone which becomes the content (Viśaya) of knowledge produced in us on hearing a word, is to be understood as 'Bhāva' in the technical grammatical sense of the term. To be more precise, the relation of the qualifier is expressed by the term 'Bhāva' as has been pointed out by Jñānendra Sarasvatī in his Tattvabodhinī, a super commentary on the commentary of Pāṇini's grammar by Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita named *Siddhāntakaumudī*. Quoting a commentary on Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya as 'Kṛttad-dhitasamāsebhyaḥ sambandhābhidhānaṁ bhāvapratiyayena'¹, The statement means that a suffix enjoined in the sense of 'Bhāva' attached to a word formed by a 'kṛt' suffix, or a 'Taddhita'

1. Tattabodhinī Commentary under Pāṇini's rule "Tasya bhāvastva-talau" (Pāṇini, 5.1.119). *Siddhāntakaumudī*, p. 344, Veṅkatesvar Press edition.

suffix or a compound, signifies a relation (which is logically justifiable) as the 'Prakāra' or qualifier.

Now let us consider the meaning of the suffix 'Tva' attached to the stem word 'Kartṛ' in the sense of 'Bhāva'. The stem word 'Kartṛ' means 'Kṛtimān' or one who has got 'Kṛti' or effort in him. Hence 'Kṛtimattva' means the relation of 'Kṛti' or effort. Now 'Kṛti', according to Nyāya system of philosophy, means 'Prayatna' or effort existing in the self. This 'Prayatna' or effort existing in the self being a quality (Guṇapadārtha), it exists in the self through the relation of 'Samavāya' or inherence. Hence 'Kṛti' is the subjunct (Pratiyogī) of the 'Samavāya' relation and the individual self in which the 'Kṛti' exists is the adjunct (Anuyogī). Hence 'Kṛtimattva' may mean the relation of 'Kṛti', the subjunct, with the individual self, the adjunct, i.e., the relation of inherence of the 'Kṛti' with the individual self. In other words, the term 'Kṛtimattva' would mean, according to the Navya Nyāya analysis of the meaning of words, the 'Kṛti' or the effort of the self through the indirect relation of 'Svaniṣṭhapratyogitānirūpitānuyogitānirupakatva' or the describerness of the adjunctness determined by the subjunctness existing in the object expressed by the term 'Sva', the first term of the relation.

Let us now turn our attention to the original topic for the clear understanding of which the explanatory notes have been introduced here.

It will be convenient to understand the different approach of the 'Naiyāyika's if we make a comparison of the view point of the grammarians in finding out the meaning of words and judgements in the sentence 'Caitraṣṭaṇḍulam pacati' (A particular individual named) 'Caitra is cooking rice.' It should not, of course, be thought that it is only the 'Naiyāyika's and the grammarians ('Vaiyākaraṇa's) who have made analysis of the meanings of words and judgements. The 'Mīmāṃsaka's also have their own highly intricate way of analysis of finding out the meanings of words and judgements. Similarly, all the branches of study in Sanskrit more or less, have their own way of analysis. But we are here drawing a comparison between the methods of analysis of the grammarians and the 'Naiyāyika's, only to give a preliminary introduction of the kind of analysis of the meanings of words and judgements which the scholars in the field of any

branch of Sanskrit study had perfected in their own way.

In the sentence 'Caitraṣṭaṇḍulaṁ pacati', as mentioned earlier, the word 'Caitra', meaning an individual named 'Caitra', is interpreted in the same way by both the 'Vaiyākaraṇa's and the Naiyāyikas. The 'Naiyāyika's would interpret the meaning of the word 'Caitra' as 'Caitratvāvachchinna' or qualified by 'Caitratva', the peculiar characteristic feature of the individual named 'Caitra', to which, of course, the 'Vaiyākaraṇa's would take no exception. The word 'Caitraḥ' has got two parts, one, the stem word, the 'Prātipadika', i.e. 'Caitra' and the other is the 'Su Vibhakti' or the first case ending singular number. Here also there is no difference between the 'Vaiyākaraṇa's and the 'Naiyāyika's.

Though the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' would accept the standpoint of the 'Naiyāyika' that the word 'Caitra' in the sentence 'Caitraṣṭaṇḍulaṁ pacati' means 'Caitratvāvachchinna', yet it would be interesting to note that according to the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' school of thought the stem word (Prātipadika) has got as many as five meanings according to some, four meanings according to others, three meanings according to yet others, two meanings according to some and even one meaning according to some other thinkers of the school.¹ 'Svārtha' (connotation), 'Dravya' (denotation), 'Linga' (gender), 'Saṁkhyā' (number) and 'Kāraṇa' (grammatical case) are the five objects out of which all the five objects or four, three, two and even one of them had been accepted, and the names of the grammarians holding different views have been given by the commentators (vide Tattvabodhinī quoted below). Patañjali, the author of the 'Mahābhāṣya' on Pāṇini's grammar, has said that the grammarian named Vājapyāyana is responsible for holding the view that only 'Ākṛti' or 'Jāti', is the meaning of the stem word (Prātipadika) unlike the 'Naiyāyika's who hold that 'Ākṛti' means 'Avayavaśaṁsthāna' (particular composition of the parts). Patañjali has also mentioned the name of Vyāḍi as the holder of the view that only 'Dravya' or the individual denotation is

1. स्वार्थद्रव्यलिङ्गसंख्याकारकात्मकः पञ्चकं प्रातिपदिकार्थः — Tattvabodhinī. Commentary under the rule 'प्रातिपदिकार्थलिङ्गपरिमाणवचनमात्रे प्रथमा'—Pāṇini 2. 3. 46.

expressed by the 'Prātipadika' : (vide Patañjali's) Mahābhāṣya under the rule "Sarūpāṇamekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau" (Pāṇini, 1.2.64) 'Dravya', according to the grammatical terminology, is different from the 'Dravya' of the 'Naiyāyika'. According to the grammarian school, the term 'Dravya' technically means that object to which gender and number can be attached (*liṅgasamkhyānvayitvaṁ dravyatvam*). According to the terminology of the Nyāya school, a 'Dravya' (substance) is that object which is the 'Samavāyikāraṇa (Inherence exacting cause) of a 'Guṇa' (quality).

According to the Nyāya school the meaning of a term is three-fold, 'Vyakti' (the individual denotation; Ākṛti' the special composition of the parts and 'Jāti', the universal general property.¹

The suffix 'Su' (first case ending singular), attached to the stem word (Prātipadika) 'Caitra' in the sentence 'Caitraṣṭaṇḍulam pacati' means the same objects as those conveyed by the 'Prātipadika', according to the grammarian school.² The 'Naiyāyika' also has got no objection to it. Both the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' and the 'Naiyāyika' hold that although the meanings of the stem word (Prātipadika) are already conveyed by the 'Prātipadika' and hence apparently there is no need of attaching the 'Su vibhakti' to it, yet the 'Su vibhakti' will have to be attached for the sake of forming a grammatical word, which the 'Naiyāyika' also will have to use in the sentence. Because neither the 'Prakṛti' (stem word) alone, nor the 'Pratyaya (suffix) alone should be applied in a sentence *Na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā na kevalaḥ pratyayaḥ* — so runs the injunction.

The second word 'ṣaṇḍulam' of the sentence also has got two parts in it, the 'Prātipadika' (stem word) 'ṣaṇḍula' and the suffix 'Am' — the second case ending singular number. The analysis of the meaning of the stem word is like that of the word 'Caitra' according to both the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' and the 'Naiyāyika' schools, the difference being only in the fact that in the case of the meaning of 'Caitra', 'Caitratva', the 'Śakya-tāvacchedaka', limitor of the 'Śakyatā' existing in 'Caitra', the 'Śakyārtha', may or may not be accepted as a 'Jāti', whereas

1. 'व्यक्ताकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः — Nyāyasūtra.

2. 'स्वार्थद्रव्यलिङ्गसंख्याकारकात्मकः पञ्चकं प्रातिपदिकार्थः' ।

'Taṇḍulatva', existing in the 'Śakyārtha' 'Taṇḍula' (rice) is a 'Jāti' or universal generic property. The suffix 'Am' (the second case ending singular number means the object (Karmakāraka) of the verb 'pacati' (cooks) according to the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' school,¹ whereas according to the 'Naiyāyika' the meaning of the 'Am vibhakti' is 'Karmatva' (objectness) and not 'Karma' or the object, as has been explained in the *Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.²

The grammarians, of course, have got their own interpretation of the rule by which they establish their standpoint in which we do not want to enter here, as that would be a different and long discussion.

The verb 'pacati' (cooks) in the sentence also has got two parts in it, the root 'pac' (pac dhātu) and the suffix 'ti' in the 1st, third person singular number.

The root 'pac' according to both the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' (grammarian) and 'Naiyāyika' schools means 'cooking', which has been analysed as 'Vikṛtṭyanukūlavāpāraḥ', i.e., the action which is conducive to the particular disintegration (of the rice). This action here actually is not one action, but many actions taken together. These actions of cooking begin at first with the placing of the utensil, in which rice is to be cooked, on the oven, and ultimately getting it down from it.³ The grammarians also accept this theory.

Here also the 'Naiyāyika' does not differ with the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' in analysing the meaning of the root 'pac' in the word 'pacati'.

It is interesting to point out here that the new school of grammarians (Navya Vaiyākaraṇas) holds that the root 'pac' does not mean 'Vikṛtṭyanukūlavāpāraḥ' as a composite whole, but both 'Vikṛtṭiḥ' and 'Vyāpāraḥ'. 'Vikṛtṭiḥ' (disintegration) is the 'phala' or result of cooking. The 'Vyāpāraḥ' or action is prominent here with reference to the 'phala' or result.

Some Navya Naiyāyikas also would agree with this analysis

1. 'कर्मणि द्वितीया' — Pāṇini, 2. 3. 2.
2. 'कर्मणि द्वितीयेत्यनुशासनात् कर्मत्वं द्वितीयार्थः — Vyutpattivāda; द्वितीया व्युत्पत्तिः
3. 'गुणभूतैरवयवैः समूहः क्रमजन्मनाम् । बुद्ध्या प्रकल्पिताभेदः क्रियेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥" *Vākyapadiya*.

व्यापारसन्तानः क्रिया *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*.

of the meaning of the root 'pac' in two parts, in the word 'pacati', but they would not agree with the standpoint of the grammarians in ultimately analysing the meaning of the sentence 'Caitrastaṇḍulam pacati'. The grammarians hold that in the final stage of ascertaining the meaning of the sentence, the 'Vyāpāraḥ' or action would remain prominent in accordance with the dictum of Yāska's *Nirukta* as, 'Bhāvapradhānamākhyātam', i.e., the action is prominent in the meaning of a root, the word 'Ākhyāta' here meaning the action (*Vyāpāra*) indicated by the root, though, generally speaking, the word is used to mean the verbal terminations like 'Tip', 'Tas', 'Jhi', etc. according to Pāṇini's grammar.

According to the 'Naiyāyika' standpoint, the meaning of the word in the first case ending is the most prominent in a judgement ('Prathamāntārthamukhyaviśeṣyakabodhaḥ'). Hence instead of the 'Vyāpāra' (action) becoming the most prominent in the final analysis of the meaning of the judgement 'Caitrastaṇḍulam pacati', the individual 'Caitra' which is the meaning of the word 'Caitraḥ' with the first case ending (Prathamā vibhakti), would become the most prominent in the judgement. To say that the 'Vyāpāra' is the most prominent according to the grammarians or the meaning of the word with the first case ending is the most prominent according to the logicians, is to state that the 'Vyāpāra' (the action) or the meaning of the word with the first case ending, is the principal qualificand (mukhyaviśeṣya) of the judgement. 'Mukhyaviśeṣyatā' existing in a 'Mukhyaviśeṣya', as has been explained earlier in this book, is that 'Viśeṣyatā' which does not remain in the same locus with a 'Prakāratā' ('Prakāratvāsamānādhikaraṇaviśeṣyatā'). In other words, the 'Mukhya viśeṣyatā' exists in that 'Viśeṣya' (qualificand) which remains 'Viśeṣya' only and does not become a 'Viśeṣaṇa' or qualifier with reference to some other qualificand.

It has already been mentioned earlier that according to the grammarians (Vaiyākaraṇas) the action (*Vyāpāra*) which is the meaning of the root, becomes most prominent or 'Mukhyaviśeṣya'. Hence the judgement 'Caitrastaṇḍulam pacati', according to the grammarian school, means 'Caitrābhinnaiikatvāvacchinnāśraya-vṛttiḥ taṇḍulaniṣṭhaviḥ|tṭyanukulo vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ.' which means — 'The action related to the present time and conducive to the disintegration taking place in the rice, is existent in the agent, the substratum, who is qualified by the singular

number (ekatvasamkhyā) and identical with Caitra.' It is to be noted here that the meanings in the form of the present time, the singular number and the 'Āśraya' (the substratum) or the agent are derived from the suffix 'Ti', the singular form of the third person of the 'laṭ Vibhakti' to be attached to a root verb enjoined by Pāṇini in his Sanskrit grammar.

The above meaning of the judgement is not accepted by the Nyāya school for the sake of 'Gaurava' or technical 'heaviness' in accepting the 'Kartā' or agent as the meaning of the suffix 'Ti' in the word 'pacati'. Because, as has already been pointed out, in the event of the 'Kartā' becoming the meaning of the suffix 'Ti', 'Kartṛtva' or Kṛti (effort) qualified by the universal generic property 'Kṛtitva' existing in the 'Kṛti' would become the limiter of 'Śakyatā' (Śakyatāvacchedaka). In that case not only innumerable 'Kṛti's or efforts will have to be taken into account while considering the meaning of the suffix 'Ti' in the word 'pacati', but the 'Śakyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka', the limiter of the 'Avacchedakatā', determined by the 'Śakyatā' existing in the 'Śakyārtha' 'Kartā' or agent will also have to be taken into account. Moreover, 'Kṛtitva' (effortness) as the limiter of the limitorness of the 'Śakyatā' 'Śakyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka' will have to be taken into account at the time of considering the primary meaning 'Kartā' of the suffix 'Ti' in the word 'pacati', because only a 'Jāti' (universal generic property) or an 'Akhaṇḍopādhi' (indivisible property) is accepted to be known as such by its own nature, i.e., without being qualified by any other property, and not other objects like 'Kṛti', etc.

Hence, according to the 'Naiyāyaika' school of thought, the suffix 'Ti' in the word 'pacati' does not mean 'Kartā' or the agent, but it means 'Kṛti' (effort) existing in the self signified by the word 'Caitra'. Now this 'Kṛti' or 'Prayatna' (effort) being a quality (guṇa) existing in the self through the relation of inherence 'Samavāya', it would be known as a qualifier of 'Caitra', the agent. In this case the relation of 'Kṛti' with the 'Kartā' being 'Samavāya' or inherence, the construction would be through a relation of non-identity as opposed to the relation of identity ('abheda sambandha') of the 'Kartā', agent, with the individual named 'Caitra', according to the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' school of thought.

So according to the Naiyāyika school of thought the judgement 'Caitraṣaṇḍulam pacati' would mean 'Caitra' who is the substratum of the effort relating to the present time and conducive (anukūla) to the cooking (i.e., 'Vikṛtṭyanukūlavypāra'), the object of which is the rice, (the same) 'Caitra' being qualified by the singular number.

Now an interesting objection from a different angle of vision has been raised by the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' school against the analysis of the meaning of the judgement 'Caitraṣaṇḍulam pacati' accepted by the 'Naiyāika's. As has already been stated that according to the 'Naiyāyika' the suffix 'Ti' in the verb 'pacati' means 'Kṛti' (effort) existing in the 'Kartā' (agent) and not the 'Kartā' or the agent for the sake of 'Gaurava' or technical heaviness in the 'Śakyatāvachedaka' or the limiter of the 'Śakyatā' (i.e., the primary import of the suffix 'Ti' in the word 'pacati', According to Pāṇini's grammar the words signifying the agent ('Kartā') and the instrumental cause ('Karaṇa') take the first case ending ('Prathamā vibhakti') according to the rule 'Prātipadikārtha-lingaparimāṇamātre prathamā'. The same words take the third case ending (Tṛtīyā vibhakti) when the agent (Kartā) and the instrumental cause ('Karaṇakāraka') are not primarily expressed ('abhihita') by anything else. Hence, if the agent or 'Kartā' of the verb understood from the word 'pacati' (cooks) be not primarily expressed by the suffix 'Ti' in the word 'pacati', then the word 'Caitra' signifying the agent of the verb would take the third case ending by the rule 'Kartṛkaraṇayostṛtīyā' of Pāṇini's grammar¹ and the sentence would take the wrong form as 'Caitreṇa ṣaṇḍulam pacati' instead of the right form as 'Caitraṣaṇḍulam pacati'.

The 'Naiyāyika' has offered a solution to this by saying that the third case ending ('Tṛtīyā vibhakti') would be attached to a word signifying the agent ('Kartā') or the instrumental cause if the number existing in it be not primarily expressed ('abhihita') by the 'Ti' suffix or by some other words. The singular number ('ekatva-saṃkhyā') existing in the agent 'Caitra' here in the sentence 'Caitraṣaṇḍulam pacati' being

1. Pāṇini, 2. 3. 18

2. 'कर्तृसंख्यानभिधानस्य तत्र तन्त्रत्वात्' — Bhāṣāpariccheda Siddhinta-muktāvali, Śabdakhaṇḍa, p 267, Chowkhamba edition.

primarily expressed by the suffix 'Ti', which is in the singular number, there is no ground for using the wrong form 'Caitreṇa' with the third case ending instead of 'Caitraḥ' with the first case ending.

It has also been discussed in detail by the 'Naiyāyika's where the primary expression ('abhidhānam') of the number is eligible. But we do not propose to elaborate that discussion here as that would lead us to more detailed and complicated solution offered by the 'Naiyāyika's in their own way even in the field of grammatical study.

The meaning of the judgement 'Caitraṣṭaṇḍulam pacati' after analysing the meanings of its component parts when the sentence is used in the active voice ('Kartṛvācya'), has been briefly discussed here to give an idea of the analytical process of the 'Naiyāyika's compared with that of the 'Vaiyākaraṇa's in finding out the detailed meaning of judgements. The 'Mīmāṃsaka's also have got their own analytical method of finding out the meanings of judgements, so also the 'Ālankārika's (the literary school of thought) and other schools of thought for the thorough acquaintance of which a separate comprehensive and comparative study of the original treatises of those schools is urgently called for.

The meaning of the judgement 'Caitreṇa ṣaṇḍulaḥ pacyate' as used in the passive voice ('Karmavācya') would become different from that explained earlier in the case of the judgement 'Caitraṣṭaṇḍulam pacati' used in the active voice ('Kartṛvācya') according to all the schools of thought, which also would be a very interesting study, but we refrain from entering into a detailed discussion of all those topics out of the consideration for the conciseness of the treatment. But only the 'Naiyāyika' and the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' standpoints may be taken up here briefly with a view to showing the difference of meanings accepted by these schools of thought in different modes of expression of the same judgement.

The judgement 'Caitreṇa ṣaṇḍulaḥ pacyate' (Rice is being cooked by Caitra) in the passive voice ('Karmavācya') may be analysed, according to the 'Naiyāyika' standpoint, as, "Ekatvāvacchinnacaitratvāvacchinnacaitravṛttikṛtiprayojyavartamānakālikavyāpāraprayojyavikṛtyāśrayaḥ ektvāvacchinnastaṇḍulatvāvacchinastaṇḍulaḥ", which means, "The rice which is qualified by

the singular number (ekatva) as also limited by riceness (taṇḍula-tva) is the substratum of the disintegration (viklitti) caused by ('prayojya') the action relating to the present time and caused by the effort (kṛti) existing in 'Caitra' who (in his turn again) is limited by 'Caitratva' (the peculiar generic property existing in Caitra) and qualified by the singular number ('ekatvasaṁkhyā'). The 'Vaiyākaraṇa school would analyse the same judgement, i.e., 'Caitreṇa taṇḍulaḥ pacyate' in the passive voice as, 'Caitrābhinnakartṛvṛttivartamānakālikavyāpārājanyataṇḍulābhinnaikatvāvacchinnāśrayavṛtir viklittiḥ',¹ which means, "The disintegration exists in the substratum qualified by the singular number (ekatva) and identical with the rice ('taṇḍula') and is caused by the action ('vyāpāra') relating to the present time and existing in the agent ('kartā') who (in his turn) is identical with 'Caitra'.

The analytical technique of finding out the meaning of a judgement in two different modes of expression according to the 'Naiyāyika' and the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' schools of thought has been expressed here without entering into much detail with a view to giving some idea about the depth and perfection attained by different schools of thought in the field of Sanskrit study in analysing meanings of different kinds of judgements. Even in analysing the meaning of each and every single word, extremely complicated and strictly logical techniques have been developed by the different schools of thought in Sanskrit including in the 'Navya Naiyāyika's.

We would like to close this chapter by briefly introducing the analysis of meanings of the similar judgement in English in different modes of expression as, "John cooks rice" and 'Rice is being cooked by John' in the light of the analytical techniques of the 'Vaiyākaraṇa's and the 'Naiyāyika's in the field of Sanskrit study.

The judgement 'John cooks rice' has got three terms, i.e., (1) John, (2) cooks and (3) rice. The term 'John' is the subject word meaning a particular individual possessing some peculiarities and properties relating to him alone which may be described by the term 'Johnness' or 'Johnhood'.

1 Virāṇāvalī commentary of Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya on the Sindhānta-muktāvalī of the Bhāṣāpariccheda, p 297, Chowkhamba edition.

The term 'cooks', the verb word, has got two parts, (1) the root verb 'Cook' and (2) the suffix 's' in the present tense and active voice third person singular number. The verb 'cook' would mean the particular actions and processes by which the disintegration of the parts of rice would take place. The disintegration of the parts of rice is then the effect of those actions taken together right from the beginning of placing the utensil of cooking on the oven and getting it down from it on completion of the action of cooking. Therefore, a series of actions in fact comprises the act of cooking and not a single act, which has been clearly pointed out by the Sanskrit grammarians and approved by the thinkers of other schools of thought.

The suffix 's' indicates present time, singular number (ekatvasamkhyā) and the agent (kartā), according to the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' (grammarian) school of thought. The present time is construed with the act or acts of cooking, whereas the singular number (ekatvasamkhyā) is to be construed with 'John', the 'agent' (kartā). The meaning of 'agent' is to be construed with 'John', who is qualified by 'John-ness' or 'John-hood' and all that it stands for. Hence, any other individual though bearing the same name, should not be considered as the agent of this particular act of cooking, as that individual, in spite of his bearing the same name as 'John', is not qualified by the special properties signified in a particular case by 'John-ness' or 'John-hood'.

'Rice', the object of cooking, has got a special property called 'riceness' in it, and as such, the 'objectness' or 'karmatā' is limited by 'rice-ness', the limiter of the 'karmatā' (objectness) existing in the 'rice'. It is, of course, extremely necessary to pursue upto the 'avacchedaka' (limitor) of the objectness (Karmatā) in each and every case to make the sense perfectly clear. Because rice as rice, i.e., qualified by 'riceness' is considered to be the object here and not in any other aspect. 'Rice' may have a number of properties in it like 'riceness', contentness of knowledge (jñānaviśayatā), etc. But 'rice' has been taken here as an object of cooking only as rice qualified by 'rice-ness' and not by any other property which may be existing in it. Similarly, the disintegration (vikṛitti) of the rice also is to be taken as being qualified by the relational abstract property called 'disintegrationness' (vikṛittitva) existing in it. Otherwise any kind of disintegration may be confused with the proper disintegration

which is determined by the particular act of cooking here. The particular act of cooking here also is to be understood as being qualified by the 'particular actness' (vyāpāratvaviśeṣa) to avoid ambiguity.

The disintegration (vikṛtti) of the rice should be understood to be existing in the rice through a normal relation and not through an uncommon relation. The disintegration of the rice can be logically explained as the loose contact of the parts of rice ('śīthilāvayavasamyoga'). This particular contact (samyoga) from the standpoint of Sanskrit grammar and logic can subsist in the parts of rice through the relation of inherence (samavāya). Hence through 'svasamavāyisamavetatva' relation, i.e., through the 'inherence-exacting-inherent-ness relation of the self ('sva'), the 'vikṛtti' or the loose contact of the parts of rice, which is to be taken as the first-term of the relation, may be considered to be existing in or becoming associated with the rice, thus making it possible for the rice to be considered as the object of cooking.

Now if we are permitted to use the English name 'John' and some other English words to be used in the Sanskrit language, then according to the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' school of analysis, we may say 'Johnābhinnāikatvāvachinnāśrayavṛttiḥ 'rice' (taṇḍula) niṣṭhavigṛhyanukūlo vartamānakāliko Vyāpāraḥ', which means, 'The action relating to the present time and conducive to the disintegration of rice, is existant in the substratum qualified by the singular number (ekatvasamkhyā) and identical with John'. According to this analysis in pursuance of the principle of 'vyāpāramukhyaviśeṣyakabodha' of the gramatical school of thought, as has already been mentioned earlier, the action (Vyāpāra) of 'John', the agent, is the most prominent qualificand (mukhya-viśeṣya) of knowledge derived from the statement 'John cooks rice'.

If this judgement is analysed in accordance with the 'Naiyāyika' school of thought, then instead of the 'action' (vyāpāra) becoming the most prominent of the contents of the judgement, 'John' would become the most prominent with some other modifications in the construction to be understood in accordance with the technique of analysis of the 'Naiyāyika' school.

It is worthwhile to mention in this connection that the followers of both the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' and the 'Naiyāyika' schools of thought are in agreement in analysing the meaning of a Sanskrit sentence

used in the 'Bhāvavācya', i.e., a sentence from which the meaning of a 'root' (Dhātvartha) is mainly understood, the term 'Bhāva' in the context of a verb is a technical grammatical word which means the 'meaning of a root' ('Bhāvo dhātvarthaḥ'). Accordingly, the judgement 'Caitreṇa sthīyate' means 'Caitra-kartṛkā sthitiḥ'¹ i.e., the existence of 'Caitra' as its agent.

But when the judgement is expressed in the active voice like 'Caitra-stiṣṭhati,' the 'Vaiyākaraṇa' school would analyse the meaning as that of 'Caitreṇa sthīyate,' in the passive voice, but the 'Naiyāyika's would analyse the judgement in such a way as to express the meaning of 'Caitra', the agent which is signified by the term 'Caitra' with the first case ending (Prathamā vibhakti) attached to it as the most prominent of the contents (mukhya-viśeṣya) of the judgement.

The analysis of the meanings of judgements and terms according to the 'Navya Nyāya' and other schools of thought in the field of Sanskrit study is a highly developed analytical technique for entering into the intricacies of which the present chapter is intended only to serve as an introduction.

1. —Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya's Commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvali, p. 297, chowkhamba edition.

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“Adhikaṁ tu na taddhānikaram” (something more is not harmful to that object), 59.

“Annaṁ vai prāṇinām prāṇaḥ”, 7.

“Kāyasthenodarasthena māturmāṁsaṁ na bhakṣitam.

Na tatra karuṇā hetustatra heturadantatā”,

(of unknown authorship)

“Tatsambandhāt phalaṇiṣpattesteṣu phalavadupacāraḥ”, 7.

“Pradīpaḥ sarvaśāstrāṇām”, 1.

“Pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni” 5.

“Mān vān varjyā sādhya ān garjyā,

Yadi nā thāke mān vān,

Tva caḍāiā sādhyā ān.”, 5 n1.

(of unknown authorship)

“Bhāvādabhāvād yadi nātiriktaḥ
sambandhibhiḥ svikriyate padārthaḥ.

Janyāvināśi pratiyogīśūnyam

Śrīlakṣmaṇakṣauṇipater yaśaḥ kim ?” 41 n1.

“Vapur virūpākṣamalakṣyañjanmatā

Digambaratvena niveditam vasu.

Vareṣu yadbālamṛgākṣi mṛgyate

Tadasti kiṁ vyastamapi trilocane.”

Kumārasambhava, V. 72, p. 162 n3.

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